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2014 DIGILAW 1609 (MP)

Rakesh Gurjar v. State of M. P.

2014-12-05

S.K.PALO

body2014
JUDGMENT : S.K. Palo, J. Heard. 1. Petitioners have filed this revision under Sections 397 read with 401 of Cr.P.C. challenging the order dated 5.3.2014 passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Joura District Morena in S.T. No. 344/2013 by which the learned ASJ has framed charge against the petitioners under Sections 326/34 along with Sections 294 and506-II of IPC. 2. Briefly stated that the complainant Lakhan @ Ramlakhan lodged a report on 17.7.2013 at about 12:30 that after ploughing his land near Angad Baba's field, when the complainant was returning home, the petitioners met him, obstructed and abused him. When the complainant stopped them, the petitioner Rakesh Gurjar, gave blow by Farsa (a sharp cutting weapon) on the head of the complainant. Complainant sustained injury and blood was oozing. Petitioner Rakesh gave another blow of Farsa which hit on the finger of the left hand of the complainant. At that time, the petitioner No. 2 Vishamber Gurjar gave a blow of Lathi, which hit on his left shoulder and again he gave Lathi blow which hit on the right shoulder of the complainant. At that time, petitioner No. 3, Bhogiram, father of Rakesh Gurjar also came to the spot and gave a blow by Lathi which hit on the left heel of the complainant. 3. On behalf of the petitioners, argument advanced that as per MLC report dated 17.7.2013, no injury has been caused to complainant Lahkan on the head by any sharp object. It is argued that the injury caused on the left finger of the left hand said to be bony injury is on the fourth metacarpal, which is not a vital part. Therefore, no offence under Section 326 of IPC is made out against the petitioners. Hence, the order under challenged is not sustainable. 4. On behalf of the respondent/State, the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners are opposed and submitted that, the complainant Lakhan @ Ramlakhan received grievous injuries on the left hand finger, which was caused by Farsa which is a sharp edged weapon. But the injury is dangerous for human life. 5. To prove offence under Section 326 of IPC, the prosecution has to establish. "A. That, the accused caused grievous hurt as contemplated in Section 320 of IPC. B. that the accused caused it voluntarily as envisaged in Section 322 of IPC. But the injury is dangerous for human life. 5. To prove offence under Section 326 of IPC, the prosecution has to establish. "A. That, the accused caused grievous hurt as contemplated in Section 320 of IPC. B. that the accused caused it voluntarily as envisaged in Section 322 of IPC. C. that causing of such grievous hurt was made by means of instrument for shooting etc or by means of any instruments which used as a weapon is likely to cause death or by means of fire etc. or by means of any poison or any substance which is deleterious to the human body to inhale etc or by means any animal." 6. No doubt the weapon alleged to have been used is Farsa which seems to be a dangerous weapon but the injury has been caused at the left hand finger which is not a vital part of the body. The injury on the left hand finger of metacarpal is grievous in nature but it is not vital part of the body, which would ordinarily cause death. The injury which can put life to a immediate danger to death could be injury as which can be termed "dangerous to life" The injury of fracture on the metacarpal of the left hand cannot be described and has not described by the medical officer, who performed MLC as "dangerous to life". 7. In the present case, keeping in view that the grievous injury has not been caused on vital part of the body. The ingredients of Section 326 of IPC is lacking. Therefore, prima facie it is found that the offence under Section 326 of IPC is not made out. It is made clear that trial would proceed under section 294, 506-B and Section 325 read with 34 of IPC. 8. Resultantly, this petition under Section 397 read with 401 of Cr.P.C. is allowed. The impugned order dated 5.3.2014 is set aside so far as it relates to Section 326of IPC only.