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2014 DIGILAW 1622 (MP)

Pramod Kumar Shrivas v. M. P. Poorva Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Company

2014-12-08

SUJOY PAUL

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JUDGMENT : Sujoy Paul, J. 1. These writ petitions are similar in nature and therefore, on the joint request of the parties were head analogously heard and decided by this common order. The facts are taken from WP No. 8866/2013. 2. The petitioner has submitted his candidature pursuant to advertisement (Annexure P/1-A) for the post of lineman on contract basis. The petitioner was appointed by letter dated 11.11.2010 for a period of three years. The petitioner was required to furnish a surety bond before joining. The petitioner complied with the said requirement. The petitioner was terminated on 15.06.2011. He filed WP No. 4225/2011 which was decided on 30.01.2013. The petition was allowed and termination order was set aside. Employer filed a Writ Appeal against the said order bearing WA. No.181/2013. 3. Shri N.S. Kirar submits that the said appeal is still pending and no interim order is passed in the said appeal. It is also canvassed that in WP No. 4225/2011 an interim order was passed by the Court on 08.07.2011 pursuant to which the petitioner continued in employment. It is admitted that on 17.11.2013 the petitioner was discontinued because of completion of the contract period. However, by order dated 19.11.2013 (in WP No. 8866/2013) offer was given to the petitioner that if he is interested to continue in employment he may fulfill certain formalities. Shri Kirar submits that only difference in WP No. 1260/2014 is that in the case of Prem Chand Yadav, the respondents in place of giving an offer, issued a direction that he needs to be reengaged on contract and therefore, he should approach respondents and fulfill the requirements. 4. Shri N.S. Kirar further contended that in obedience of the order (Annexure P/1), the petitioner approached the respondents and contract was entered into between them. One such contract is placed on record as (Annexure P/8) in WP No. 8866/2013. It is further submitted that after entering into the said contract, the petitioner started working. The relevant pages of diary are filed as Annexure P/11. It is contended that respondents are not paying the salary and also not treated such contract as a valid contract. By taking this Court to para (vii) of the rejoinder, it is contended that similarly situated employees, whose names are mentioned in the said para, were reengaged but petitioner was subjected to step motherly treatment. 5. It is contended that respondents are not paying the salary and also not treated such contract as a valid contract. By taking this Court to para (vii) of the rejoinder, it is contended that similarly situated employees, whose names are mentioned in the said para, were reengaged but petitioner was subjected to step motherly treatment. 5. Shri Kirar submits that discretion for the purpose of granting employment cannot be used in arbitrary, capricious or unfettered manner. Reliance is placed on, AIR 1973 SC 205 (The D.F.O. South Kheri & Osr. Vs. Ram Sanehi Singh), AIR 1979 SC 1588 (Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Radhakrishan and Ors.), (2001) 8 SCC 491 (Union of India and Ors. Vs. Dinesh Engineering Corporation and Another) & (2013) 5 SCC 1 (State of Punjab Vs. Salil Sablok and Ors.). It is submitted that despite order of this court dated 27.01.2014, respondents have not chosen to file any additional return which shows that they have not given discriminatory treatment to the petitioner. 6. Shri Vivek Jain and Shri Praveen Newaskar, Learned counsel for the other side, contended that petition is devoid of merits. By taking this Court to the Contract (Annexure P/8, page 37) it is contended that alleged contract contains the signatures of petitioner and surety witness etc. It does not contain signatures of the employer at all. Thus, no contract exists in the eyes of law. By taking this Court to para 5.10 of the return, it is submitted that no contract of similarly situated employees have been renewed. It is contended that it is the discretion of the employer to decide whether petitioner's services are required or not. This discretion can be exercised on the basis of need of their services and other kind of ground realities for which employer is the best judge. It is prayed that no interference be made by this Court. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. The legal principle flowing from the judgments cited by Shri Kirar are well established and cannot be doubted. The statutory authority cannot use his discretion in unfettered, uncanalized and arbitrary manner. He has to exercise his discretion in a judicious, transparent and proper manner which is in consonance with the principles flowing from Article 14 of the Constitution. 8. The legal principle flowing from the judgments cited by Shri Kirar are well established and cannot be doubted. The statutory authority cannot use his discretion in unfettered, uncanalized and arbitrary manner. He has to exercise his discretion in a judicious, transparent and proper manner which is in consonance with the principles flowing from Article 14 of the Constitution. However, in the present case, the petitioners are unable to show that the contract contains signature of employer and contract has taken a legal shape. The respondents although have not filed any additional return for denying that similarly situated employees have been reengaged, there is no material on record which shows that ground realities i.e. need at a particular place where person is to be reengaged is same for all the persons i.e. petitioner and the persons who are allegedly reengaged. 9. As analyzed above, it cannot be said that any valid contract was entered into between the petitioner and employer for the purpose of reengagement. Shri N.S. Kirar, submits that original contract is in the possession of the employer in which employer's signatures may be there. In view of diametrically opposite stand of the parties, on the factum of presence of signature of employer on the contract, it is clear that highly disputed question of facts are involved in this matter. The employees, who were reengaged and with whom parity is claimed, are really similarly situated or not is also not fully established. 10. Considering the aforesaid, I deem it proper to dispose of these petitions with following directions :- (i) Petitioners may file a comprehensive representation along with relevant documents before Chief General Manager of respondent company. (ii) If such representation is preferred, it will be the duty of the said authority to decide the said representation by a reasoned and speaking order dealing with every point raised. (iii) The said authority shall decided it within 30 days from the date of submission of representation. (iv) It is made clear that it will be the duty of said authority to examine the claim of the petitioner for reengagement on the principle of parity. (v) If petitioners are eligible on the basis of principle of parity and their services are required, employer shall do the needful within aforesaid time. Outcome shall be communicated to the petitioner. 11. (v) If petitioners are eligible on the basis of principle of parity and their services are required, employer shall do the needful within aforesaid time. Outcome shall be communicated to the petitioner. 11. Petitions are disposed of without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. No costs.