JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal under Section 100 CPC is directed against judgment and decree dated 25.05.2013 passed by Additional District Judge, Sojat, District Pali, whereby, judgment and decree dated 17.09.2011 passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sojat, District Pali has been upheld. 2. JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal under Section 100 CPC is directed against judgment and decree dated 25.05.2013 passed by Additional District Judge, Sojat, District Pali, whereby, judgment and decree dated 17.09.2011 passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sojat, District Pali has been upheld. 2. The facts in brief may be noticed thus : the plaintiffs Vijay Singh and Dhanna Ram filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the defendants-appellants with the averments that plaintiffs were residents of village Sojat Road and look after the public interest issues; they were elected as Panch from their respective wards in the Panchayat Elections; in the urbanized area of Sojat Road a children's cremation place ( cPpksa dk 'e'kku ) is situated, which was marked as d] [k] x and ?k in the map annexed with the plaint; the land was comprised in Khasra No. 199 ad measuring 0.46 hectare, which was being used for over 100 years for burial of deceased children; there were hundreds of graves of children at the suit land and, on account of such user, the villagers have acquired easement; it was then averred that village Sojat Road was earlier a Jagirdar village, whose Jagirdar was Indrajeet Singh S/o Shri Narpat Singh; land on the eastern side of the suit land was sold by them to Sita Devi, Pushpa Devi, Rambha Devi and Sri Ram by registered sale deed, wherein, on the western side reference of disputed burial place is indicated; such land cannot be sold nor anybody gets any right in such land; however, defendant No. 1 claiming to have purchased the suit burial land comprised in Khasra No. 199 from the Jagirdar, got his name recorded in the revenue record, when in fact the Jagirdar had not executed any sale deed in favour of Pyare Lal; the Tehsildar for the purpose of correction of revenue entry and for declaration of suit land as burial place, filed a suit before the Assistant Collector, Sojat, which was decided on 20.03.1992 and the land was declared as flok; pd xSj eqefdu 'ke'kku (Government land, uncultivable burial place); against the said order, an appeal was filed before the Revenue Appellate Authority, who found that declaratory relief could not be granted by the revenue courts and, therefore, set aside the decree; it was alleged that the defendants despite resistance by the villagers, were bent upon trespassing on the suit land, if they succeed in their attempt, the villagers would be deprived of user; ultimately, it was prayed that it be declared that the land comprised in Khasra No. 199 ad measuring 0.46 hectare was a burial place, regarding which, the villagers have easementry rights and sought permanent injunction against the defendants from trespassing on the suit land. 3. Along with the suit, an application under Section 91 CPC was filed seeking leave of the Court to file the suit; the trial court granted the permission subject to objection. 4. Despite repeated attempts, the defendants did not file any written statement, therefore, right to file written statement was closed. 5. The trial court noticed that as written statement was not filed issues were not required to be framed, however, points for determination were framed. 6. On behalf of the plaintiffs - seven witnesses were examined; on behalf of the defendants - five witnesses were examined. 7. After hearing the parties, the trial court came to the conclusion that this fact was undisputedly proved that the suit land was being used by the villagers as burial ground for children for a long time; the necessary ingredients regarding dominant heritage and other ingredients for seeking various kinds of easements were not available; the plaintiffs were entitled to declaration regarding the suit land being a cremation ground/burial place and for permanent injunction; consequently, the trial court decreed the suit filed by the plaintiffs and declared the suit land as cremation ground/burial place for dead children and restrained the defendants from trespassing on the suit land. 8. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants filed first appeal under Section 96 CPC. 9. The first appellate court after hearing the parties, came to the conclusion that in absence of any written statement, no credence can be given to the statements of the defendants' witnesses regarding ownership of the suit land, neither any sale deed executed in favour of Pyare Lal nor any sale in favour of Bakta Ram (defendant) was produced; from the statements of the witnesses and the Commissioner report, the user of the suit land as burial place for children was amply proved, the finding regarding non-availability of plea of easement was upheld and, consequently, the appeal filed by the appellants was dismissed. 10. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that for the nature of suit filed by the plaintiffs, it was incumbent for them to adopt procedure under Order I, Rule 8 CPC and the proceedings under Section 91 CPC were not maintainable; the plaintiffs utterly failed to prove their case, the suit land is not recorded as 'ke'kku the suit filed by the plaintiffs could not have been decreed merely based on the Commissioner's report. The appeal involves substantial questions of law. 11. Reliance was placed on Bhiya & Ors. v. Mangla & Ors., ILR (1955) 5 Raj. 910, A.C. Muthiah v. B.C.C.I. & Anr., 2011 AIR SCW 3770 and Tirath Ram & Ors. v. Muhammad Abdul Rahim Shah & Ors., AIR 1923 Lahore 546. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents supported the judgments impugned passed by both the courts below; it was submitted that in absence of any written statement by the defendants-appellants, the plea sought to be raised by them is wholly meaningless and cannot even be looked into, both the courts have recorded concurrent findings of fact and, therefore, the second appeal is not maintainable and the same deserves to be dismissed. 13. I have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. 14. The suit was filed by the plaintiffs seeking declaration and permanent injunction against the respondents regarding the suit land being a cremation ground/burial place for children and restraint against the defendants from trespassing or interfering at the said land; along with the suit an application under Section 91 CPC was filed by the plaintiffs, inter alia, seeking leave to file the suit for preventing the public nuisance by the defendants; the trial court granted permission 'subject to objection'; despite service, the defendants-appellants did not file any written statement, where after the points for determination were framed by the trial court and evidence was led by the parties, resulting in the impugned judgments as noticed hereinbefore. 15. The emphasis of the defendants before the trial court, first appellate court and even before this Court has been that the suit was not maintainable under Section 91 CPC and as proceedings under Order I, Rule 8 CPC have not been adopted, the proceedings are vitiated.Section 91 CPC reads thus: "91. Public nuisances and other wrongful acts affecting the public. - (1) In the case of a public nuisance or other wrongful act affecting, or likely to affect, the public, a suit for a declaration and injunction or for such other relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the case, may be instituted, - (a) by the Advocate-General, or (b) with the leave of the Court, by two or more persons, even though no special damage has been caused to such persons by reason of such public nuisance or other wrongful act. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any right of suit which may exist independently of its provisions." 16. The said Section permits institution of a suit by two or more persons aggrieved by a public nuisance or wrongful act for a declaration and injunction or for such other relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 17. The word 'public nuisance' has not been defined in CPC, however, Section 3(48) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 ('the Act of 1897') defines public nuisance thus: "3(48) "public nuisance" shall mean a public nuisance as defined in the Indian Penal Code;" 18. Section 268 IPC defines offence of public nuisance as under:- "268. Public nuisance. - A person is guilty of a public nuisance who does any act or is guilty of an illegal omission which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, or which must necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public right. A common nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes some convenience or advantage." 19. A combined reading of Section 91 CPC, Section 3(48) of the Act of 1897 and Section 268 IPC reveals that any act, which causes common injury, danger or annoyance to the public, who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity or which causes injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public right is a public nuisance. Though for Section 268 IPC the requirement is that it must necessarily cause injury, but under Section 91(1)(b) CPC even though no special damage is caused to the plaintiffs by reason of public nuisance, the suit is maintainable. 20. Besides a suit in connection with a public nuisance, after the 1976 amendment in the Code of Civil Procedure, a suit in connection with 'other wrongful acts affecting the public' can also be instituted under Section 91 CPC. Wrongful act can be described as an act which unlawfully infringes upon the rights of another. 21. 20. Besides a suit in connection with a public nuisance, after the 1976 amendment in the Code of Civil Procedure, a suit in connection with 'other wrongful acts affecting the public' can also be instituted under Section 91 CPC. Wrongful act can be described as an act which unlawfully infringes upon the rights of another. 21. The act complained of by the plaintiffs in their suit i.e. obstruction and/or attempted trespass on the suit land being used by the public as 'children's burial place' would clearly amount to public nuisance as defined under Section 268 IPC as the same necessarily cause obstruction and/or annoyance to persons, who may have occasion to use the public right of burial at the site. 22. In any case, the very fact that allegations in the plaint pertained to obstruction/attempted trespass on a place of public use, which would clearly be a 'wrongful act affecting the public', the suit was clearly maintainable under Section 91 CPC. 23. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellants on judgments in the cases of Bhiya (supra) and A.C. Muthiah (supra) have no relevance whatsoever to the present case. The said judgments pertain to requirements under Order I, Rule 8 CPC, which have no application to the present case filed under Section 91 CPC, inasmuch as, requirements in a suit under Section 91 CPC and a suit under Order I, Rule 8 CPC are totally different and distinct and the requirements under Order I, Rule 8 CPC cannot be borrowed for the purpose of a suit under Section 91 CPC. 24. Interestingly, despite the fact that the plaintiffs were questioning the revenue entry in favour of Pyare Lal, which entry, though had been set aside by the Assistant Collector, but came to be set aside by the Revenue Appellate Authority on the ground of jurisdiction, except for producing the revenue entry in favour of Pyare Lal, from whom, the appellants claimed to have purchased the property, no other document i.e. sale deeds in favour of either Pyare Lal or the appellants herein were produced. The plaintiffs produced seven witnesses, who specifically stated that the land in question was being used for burial of children and also deposed that children from their family were also buried there. 25. The counsel for the appellants vehemently submitted that none of the witnesses gave out names of the children etc. The plaintiffs produced seven witnesses, who specifically stated that the land in question was being used for burial of children and also deposed that children from their family were also buried there. 25. The counsel for the appellants vehemently submitted that none of the witnesses gave out names of the children etc. It has to be remembered that the suit pertained to burial place for children, which essentially is utilised for burial of children, who are generally born premature and cannot survive and are of very tender age and, therefore, the same is not a very common phenomena which is evidence from the statement of witnesses, who have given out instances in past only. It is also an aspect of common knowledge that such premature children and/or children of tender age are not even given a name before they succumb and, therefore, to expect the witnesses to give out the names is wholly baseless and, absence of which, cannot render their statements unreliable. 26. The local Commissioner appointed by the Court indicated the following in his report dated 08.03.1994: " 1- ekdZ A LFkku ij yksgs ds irjksa dk 'ksM ( Nijk ) cuk gqvk gS ftlds uhps rhu csapsa tehu ij yxh gqbZ gSA os ekdZ B LFky ij cksMZ yksgs dk yxk gqvk gS ftl ij " cky eqfDr /kke " cM+s v{kjksa esa vafdr gSaA blh cksMZ ds Bhd ihNs ikl gh ,d pcwrjk {kr&fo{kr gkyr esa gS tks lek/kh gSA o iwjk oknxzLr LFky [kqyk LFkku gS ftlds dksbZ pkj nhokjh ckM+ /kjk oxsjk ugha gSA oknxzLr LFky ij txg&txg dbZ cPps nQu djus ds vykekr gS o cPps nQu fd;s gq, gSa mu ij iRFkj o Nh.kksa ds VqdM+s j[kdj nck;s gq, gS rkfd tkuoj yk'kksa dks ckgj fudky ldsaA iwjs oknxzLr LFky esa [k.Ms o Nh.kksa ds VqdM+s fc[kjs iM+s gSaA rFkk >kM+h;k o vkadM+ ds isM+ [kM+s gSaA oknxzLr LFky esa yk'kksa ds dQu] diM+s o dqYgM+ ( feV~Vh ds dqYgM+ ) iM+s o dczksa ds ikl j[ks gq, gSaA diM+s NksVs cPpksa ds lM+s iqjkus o rkts gSaA " 27. From the statements of witnesses and the above Commissioner report (Exhibit-3), it is apparent that the findings recorded by the trial court regarding existence of a children's burial place cannot be faulted on any ground and the factual findings recorded by the courts below cannot be said to be perverse so as to give rise to any substantial question of law. 28. So far as the judgment in the case of Tirath Ram (supra) is concerned, the Court in the said case opined that a judgment should not be based solely on the result of a personal local inspection made by the Judge. In the present case neither the local inspection has been made by the Judge nor the judgment is solely based on the result of local inspection done by the Commissioner appointed by the Court and, as such, the above judgment has no application to the facts of the present case as besides the fact that no objections to the inspection report were filed, the local inspection report was marked as Exhibit-3 by the plaintiffs and the witnesses were cross-examined on the said report as well and, therefore, it cannot be said that the report Exhibit-3 could not be relied on by the courts below. 29. In view of the above discussion, there is no substance in this appeal and the same along with the stay application are dismissed. No costs.Application Dismissed. *******