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2014 DIGILAW 1630 (MAD)

M. Maniannan v. B. Chandrika

2014-06-23

N.KIRUBAKARAN

body2014
Judgment 1. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed against the order of the VII Judge, Court of Small Causes dated 28.11.2012 in M.P.No.545 of 2012 in M.P.No.384 of 2012 in RCA No.419 of 2012. 2. If the petitioner's interpretation has to be accepted, there will be a chaos and there will be violation of hierarchy of courts. If any of the courts in the hierarchy has passed wrong or erroneous order, it is only for the higher forum to decide about the plea as to whether the lower forum/court committed error or illegality while passing the order. On the contrary, in this case, an order which was passed by the Small Causes Court was confirmed by the Appellate Court and later by this Court. This said order very curiously is challenged before the Small Causes Court in the guise of Section 47 application contending that this court erred in confirming the order passed by the courts below. By filing this petition, the petitioner has to put the lowest forum namely, the Small Causes Court in an embarrassing position to decide about the validity of the order passed by the highest court of the state which is never contemplated under the law. 3. The contention regarding non-consideration or passing of erroneous order by this court has to be decided only by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and not by filing of Section 47 petition, after loosing before the High Court, which will make the people loose faith in the very system itself and the people who approach the court with fond hope of getting justice will ultimately be frustrated and would drive them to take extra constitutional methods or illegal methods to get instant justice in the hands of thugs and similar groups which are all very active nowadays which this court cannot loose sight of it. If this court is going to sustain the contention being made by the petitioner, it will only make the litigation prolonged for ever and blame is put on the courts for delay. On the contrary, it is only the parties who are dragging on the proceedings and ultimately the victims is the party who comes to the court and finally the image is of the justice delivery system is deserted. Therefore, serious view is required to be taken. This case is only a tip of iceberg. On the contrary, it is only the parties who are dragging on the proceedings and ultimately the victims is the party who comes to the court and finally the image is of the justice delivery system is deserted. Therefore, serious view is required to be taken. This case is only a tip of iceberg. Even after confirmation by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the parties very casually either file another suit or file Section 47 petition or set up some third parties to see that the decree is not executed and thereby prevent the decree-holder from enjoying the fruits of the decree which the said party obtained after many years of waiting in the court in queue. 4. The respondent who is the landlady approached the rent controller in RCOP No.1635 of 2007 against the petitioner herein, the tenant for eviction on the ground of wilful default and ceasing to occupy under Section 10 (2) (i) and 10(2) (vi) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1990 as amended by Act 23 of 1973and Act 1 of 1980. The monthly rent payable by the petitioner in respect of a flat at premise No.23, Plot No.104/A2, North Avenue, First Floor, Srinagar Colony, Saidapet, Chennai – 600 015 is Rs.7500/- from 18.04.2006 onwards. 5. The period of default alleged is from October 2006 to upto date. A cheque dated 01.06.2007 which was given towards arrears of rent by the petitioner for a sum of Rs.50,000/- was also returned for the reason "insufficient funds". Moreover, it was also mentioned in Para 6 of the eviction petition that the petition premises namely the flat was kept under lock and key by the petitioner as the petitioner ceased to occupy the premises. In the said RCOP, notice was ordered to the petitioner. After service of summons, the matter was called on 31.01.2007. Since the petitioner either appeared in person or through counsel, he was called absent and set exparte giving one month time to the petitioner to vacate the premises. Thereafter, the petitioner filed M.P.No.545 of 2007 to set aside the exparte decree dated 31.10.2007. Even that said petition was also allowed to be dismissed for default on 13.12.2007. 6. Again, M.P.No.22 of 2008 was filed to restore M.P.No.545 of 2007. On hearing both the parties on merits, the said restoration petition M.P.No.22 of 2008 was dismissed on 22.02.2008. Thereafter, the petitioner filed M.P.No.545 of 2007 to set aside the exparte decree dated 31.10.2007. Even that said petition was also allowed to be dismissed for default on 13.12.2007. 6. Again, M.P.No.22 of 2008 was filed to restore M.P.No.545 of 2007. On hearing both the parties on merits, the said restoration petition M.P.No.22 of 2008 was dismissed on 22.02.2008. RCA No.175 of 2008 was filed on 28.02.2008 against the dismissal of M.P.No.22 of 2008. In the said RCA, M.P.No.624 of 2008 was filed by the respondent/landlady under Section 11(3) and (4) of the Act seeking direction to the petitioner to pay the arrears of rent and the said petition was dismissed on 20.10.2009 as not maintainable. After hearing both the parties, RCA No.175 of 2009 was dismissed. Therefore, CRP No.2419 of 2010 was filed against that order on 14.06.2010. The said revision was dismissed on 05.03.2012. 7. The respondent/landlady filed EP No.574 of 2008 to execute the eviction order. In the said execution petition, E.A.No.80 of 2012 was filed seeking time to move SLP. The said petition was dismissed. Again, E.A.No.85 of 2012 was filed stating that SLP has already been filed against the order passed in CRP No.961 of 2010 and CRP No.2419 of 2010. The said petition was also dismissed. Against the said order passed in E.A.No.85 of 2012, CRP No.2486 of 2012 was filed by the petitioner and the same was dismissed by this court on 30.07.2012. 8. When things stands so, E.A.No.87 of 2012 was filed under Section 47 of the CPC by the petitioner/tenant alongwith stay petition E.A.No.88 of 2012 to declare the exparte order of eviction as non-est in law or nullity. The said Section 47 petition in E.A.No.87 of 2012 was dismissed on 04.07.2012 and the appeal in RCA No.419 of 2012 was filed against the said dismissal. In the said RCA, M.P.No.321 of 2012 was filed to stay the EP proceedings. Stay was granted and the landlady filed M.P.No.384 of 2012 in MP No.321 of 2012 to vacate the stay. The stay already granted was not extended on 19.10.2012. Again the petitioner/tenant took out another M.P.No.545 of 2012 in M.P.No.384 of 2012 on 30.10.2012 to extend the stay granted in M.P.No.321 of 2012. The said M.P.No.545 of 2012 was dismissed by the Appellate Court on 28.11.2012. The stay already granted was not extended on 19.10.2012. Again the petitioner/tenant took out another M.P.No.545 of 2012 in M.P.No.384 of 2012 on 30.10.2012 to extend the stay granted in M.P.No.321 of 2012. The said M.P.No.545 of 2012 was dismissed by the Appellate Court on 28.11.2012. Against the dismissal of M.P.No.545 of 2012 seeking extension of stay in RCA No.419 of 2012, the present CRP has been filed. 9. Mr. G.R.S. Chandra Rao, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that (i) the order passed by the rent controller is a non-speaking order; (ii) that the learned rent controller has not applied his mind and satisfied as to whether the provisions of the law under Section 10(2) (i) and 10(2) (vi) of the Rent Control Act has been satisfied (iii) if the order has been passed mechanically without application of mind and it is nullity in law. He relied upon the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court : 1. Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal and another reported in AIR 1970 Supreme Court 794 2. Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur vs. Gokul narain and another reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1819 3. S.S. Khader Mohammed Rowther and Co., represented by its Proprietor S. Syed Aswudeen vs. G.S. Sundaram and Brothers reported in 1978 (1) MLJ 79 4. Vummidi Bangaru Chetty (P) Ltd. v. Spencer & Co. Ltd. Reported in 2002 (2) CTC 385 The above judgments have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner stating that the rent controller has to satisfy himself even before passing an exparte order. If the exparte order is not a speaking order, it is a nullity. 10. With regard to the violation of court order and causing aspersion on this court whether any contempt proceedings can be initiated against the petitioner, the learned counsel for the petitioner would rely upon a judgment of this Court in Abdul Razack Sahib v. Mrs. Azizunnissa Begum and others reported in AIR 1970 Madras 14 and would submit that mere failure to deposit the amount into the court as ordered does not amount to contempt and the contempt of court should not be used as legal thumb screw by a party against his opponent for enforcement of his claim. Azizunnissa Begum and others reported in AIR 1970 Madras 14 and would submit that mere failure to deposit the amount into the court as ordered does not amount to contempt and the contempt of court should not be used as legal thumb screw by a party against his opponent for enforcement of his claim. Therefore, he would submit that the order passed by the rent controller is nullity and cannot be executed and the issue was not considered by the appellate authority and also by this court and therefore the executing court has got all powers to decide the said issue under Section 47 of the Act. 11. Mr. A. Venugopal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would contend that it is not open to the tenant to put forth all the points with regard to the nature of the order, after passing of the order in the CRP by this court. The issue was already decided by this court. Therefore, he cannot reopen the matter by filing a petition under Section 47 of the Act. 12. Heard the parties and perused the records. 13. As stated in the opening paragraphs of the order, it is an attempt by the tenant to drag on the matter indefinitely without justification so that the landlady is not able to get the possession of the property. The trend noticed nowadays by this court is to file one petition after another making the court to spend the precious time in this kind of MPs and in the process, the unscrupulous parties are unjustly benefited by prolonging the matter. This is nothing but abuse of process of court. 14. In this case, the respondent/landlady filed a petition and approached the court for lawful eviction on 14.09.2007. Notice was sent and was received by the petitioner. Inspite of that, the petitioner neither appeared in person nor through advocate. Therefore, the rent controller was compelled to pass exparte order on 31.10.2007. The said order has become the center of controversy, as the petitioner tried to paint a picture as if the order has been passed without giving any details in a mechanical way by the rent controller and therefore nullity. The order passed by the rent controller reads as follows - “PW1 examined in chief. Ex.P1 marked. Claim proved. Claim proved. Petition allowed. Eviction ordered. Time for eviction. One month. The order passed by the rent controller reads as follows - “PW1 examined in chief. Ex.P1 marked. Claim proved. Claim proved. Petition allowed. Eviction ordered. Time for eviction. One month. No cost.” Therefore the said order cannot be said to be an order passed mechanically without application of mind. The respondent was examined as PW1 in chief, Ex.P1 was marked. After convinced with the oral evidence and documentary evidence only, the court expressed its satisfaction by employment of the following words namely "claim proved". Proving of claim could be concluded only when the learned rent controller applied his mind with regard to the pleadings and the evidence of PW1 and the documents marked. Otherwise, the words "claim proved" would not have been employed. Only after subjective satisfaction, the order of eviction has been passed. Therefore, neither the order could be called as nullity nor non-est in law, as claimed by the petitioner. 15. The learned counsel relied upon a judgment of this court in 1978 (1) MLJ 79 [S.S. Khader Mohammed Rowther and Co., represented by its Proprietor S. Syed Aswudeen vs. G.S. Sundaram and Brothers] wherein an exparte order of eviction was passed. The said exparte order of eviction was challenged by the tenant before this court. A perusal of the said order would show that the learned rent controller observed that "respondent absent, no representation, set exparte, PW1 examined, eviction ordered with costs". The said order is completely different from the order which is sought to be challenged before this court in this case. There is no subject to satisfaction in the order passed in the rent control petition which was the subject matter of 1978 (1) MLJ cited supra. There is no words which were used in this case as “claim proved”. Therefore the order in this case is different and therefore the said facts cannot be applicable to the facts of the present case. That apart, what was challenged in the said case is the authority of the exparte order straight away before this court; whereas in this case, set aside petition was filed which was allowed to be dismissed for default and thereafter restoration was filed and on contest that restoration petition was dismissed on merits. That apart, what was challenged in the said case is the authority of the exparte order straight away before this court; whereas in this case, set aside petition was filed which was allowed to be dismissed for default and thereafter restoration was filed and on contest that restoration petition was dismissed on merits. Against the said dismissal, RCA was filed and other miscellaneous petitions were filed and finally extension of stay order in RCA was the subject matter of the CRP No.2419 of 2010 which was also dismissed. Therefore, facts in 1978 (1) MLJ are totally different from this case for the reason that Section 47 has been filed in this case after dismissal of the CRP. Therefore both the facts are different and the judgment cannot be made use. 16. With regard to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur vs. Gokul Narain and another reported in AIR 1996 SC 1819 is concerned, where the subject matter is regarding the execution of the decree which was passed by the court which lacked jurisdiction and therefore the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the court granting benefits was not having jurisdiction to entertain the claims and the said decree was held to be nullity that the question of nullity could be set up at any stage including execution. In paragraph 16, the court made a distinction between erroneous decree and a decree which can be termed as nullity. Erroneous decree cannot be said to be nullity nor can a decree based on a error be a nullity and that nullity has to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires the powers of the court passing the decree and not merely avoidable decree. Para 15 & 16 are usefully extracted as follows - “15. The question then is: whether the objections can be raised in execution? This controversy is no longer res integra. In Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (Dead) through his Lrs. (1990) 1 SCC 193 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court was to consider whether the nullity of a decree can be raised in execution. Under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973) the building was governed by the provisions of the said Act. The civil court granted decree of eviction. When objection was raised in execution the executing court rejected the same. Under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973) the building was governed by the provisions of the said Act. The civil court granted decree of eviction. When objection was raised in execution the executing court rejected the same. On appeal, this Court had held that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction over the subject-matter or on any other ground which goes to the root of its exercise of jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction, is a nullity. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the court to pass a decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party. If the court has jurisdiction but there is any defect in its exercise of jurisdiction it does not go to the root of its authority. Such a defect like territorial jurisdiction could be waived by the party which could be corrected only by way of an appeal or revision. In that case it was held that since the decree was a nullity the validity was upheld in execution. 16. In Jaipur Development Authority v. Radhey Shyam, (1994) 4 SCC 370 , this Court had upheld the same objection raised under Section 47 CPC when the decree awarding allotment of land in addition to compensation was held to be a nullity. That objection was allowed to be raised in execution and was upheld. Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas18 relied on by the respondents is of no avail. In that case though nullity of a decree on the basis of a compromise for eviction of a tenant governed by the provisions of the Rent Act was pressed for acceptance, this Court had held that the party cannot be permitted to lead fresh evidence as to the existence of that ground for eviction. On the facts in that case, it was held that the tenant impliedly admitted existence of statutory ground for eviction. Therefore, the decree was held to be not a nullity. On the facts in that case, it was held that the tenant impliedly admitted existence of statutory ground for eviction. Therefore, the decree was held to be not a nullity. As regards the nullity or lack of inherent jurisdiction, this Court observed that the decree can be said to be a nullity if it is passed by a court having no inherent jurisdiction. Erroneous decree cannot be said to be a nullity; nor can a decree based on an error be a nullity. Nullity has to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires the power of the court passing the decree and not merely avoidable decree. As stated earlier, if the decree strikes at the jurisdiction of the court or the court lacks jurisdiction it strikes at the very root of the authority to pass the order or the decree. As seen, the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 has no application to the lands acquired under the Act. It was amended only w.e.f. 1-8-1987 and it was made applicable only to the pending proceedings. It would, therefore, be clear that the order awarding additional benefits is clearly without jurisdiction and thereby it is a nullity. Its nullity can be assailed at any stage including at the execution or in a collateral proceedings since it strikes at the very jurisdiction and authority of the court.” [Emphasis supplied] In that case, the order has been set aside as the court below passed the order without jurisdiction and therefore it was held as nullity whereas in this case, the learned rent controller is competent to entertain the eviction petition filed by the respondent and an order of eviction has been passed. Therefore the decree cannot be nullity and it is valid and executable. Therefore, Section 47 petition itself is not maintainable. Therefore the Section 47 petition has been rightly dismissed by the executing court. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi Vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman reported in 1970 (1) SCC 670 explained about the nullity of the decree which was followed in Bhawarlal Bhandari Vs. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprises reported in 1999 (1) SCC 588. Paras 6 & 7 of 1970 91) SCC 670 are usefully extracted as follows - “6. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi Vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman reported in 1970 (1) SCC 670 explained about the nullity of the decree which was followed in Bhawarlal Bhandari Vs. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprises reported in 1999 (1) SCC 588. Paras 6 & 7 of 1970 91) SCC 670 are usefully extracted as follows - “6. A court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree: between the parties or their representatives it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. 7. When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representative on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record: where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. In Jnanendra Mohan Bhaduri v. Rabindra Nath Chakravarti reported in LR 60 IA 71, the Judicial Committee held that where a decree was passed upon an award made under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, an objection in the course of the execution proceeding that the decree was made without jurisdiction, since under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, there is no provision for making a decree upon an award, was competent. That was a case in which the decree was on the face of the record without jurisdiction.” [Emphasis supplied] 18. That was a case in which the decree was on the face of the record without jurisdiction.” [Emphasis supplied] 18. As far as the judgment in Vummidi Bangaru Chetty (P) Ltd. vs. Spencer & Co. Ltd. reported in 2002 CTC 385 is concerned, the landlady filed eviction petition on the ground of additional accommodation and the tenant remained exparte and exparte order was passed. In the execution petition, the tenant entered appearance and filed M.P contending that the relationship between the landlord and the tenant was one of licensor and licensee and there was no landlord relationship and therefore the act itself was not applicable to the facts of that case and therefore it was held that there was no jurisdiction for the rent controller and the said petition filed by the tenant under Section 47 of CPC was dismissed and the dismissal order was challenged before this court and this court gave a judgment setting aside the lower court order. As far as judgment in Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal and another reported in AIR 1970 Supreme Court 794, the Apex Court held that where the court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties, the court was not competent to pass the decree and hence the decree was held to be a nullity. The facts of the above case are different from the case on hand and hence it is not applicable to the facts of the case. In this case, after approval of the exparte order of eviction by the Appellate court as well as by this court which gave categorical finding that the petitioner is a chronic defaulter, as a second thought only, again the tenant approached the rent controller at the stage of execution petition, filing Section 47 petition to reagitate the matter. Therefore the facts are different and the stage is different and the judgment is not applicable to the facts of this case. 19. The eviction order passed by the rent controller, as already observed, was approved by the Appellate Court and also by this court in CRP No.2419 of 2010 and CRP No.961 of 2010 on 05.03.2012. Paragraph 8 and 9 are extracted as follows - “8. 19. The eviction order passed by the rent controller, as already observed, was approved by the Appellate Court and also by this court in CRP No.2419 of 2010 and CRP No.961 of 2010 on 05.03.2012. Paragraph 8 and 9 are extracted as follows - “8. Nevertheless having regard to the conduct of the petitioner during the pendency of the proceedings, in my opinion, the petitioner does not deserve any sympathy and the order of the eviction passed by the court below should not be interfered with. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted the statement of accounts stating the manner in which rents are being paid by the tenant during the proceedings. It is seen from the details of payment that on 29.08.2008, the tenant presented six demand drafts purchased on various dates representing the arrears for six months from February 2008 to July 2008 and three demand drafts were presented on 29.06.2009 representing the arrears for three months rent for the month of May 2009 and on 27.07.2009, two months rent were paid by two demand drafts and on 28.01.2010 three demand drafts were presented and on 19.07.2010, five demand drafts were presented purchased on various dates representing five months rent and on 01.12.2010, three demand drafts were presented purchased o various dates for three months rent. Therefore, he submitted that having regard to the conduct of the revision petitioner in committing default in the payment of rent and paying the rent in lumpsum for three or four months at a time it only proves that the tenant is a regular defaulter in the payment of the rent and subsequent events can be taken into consideration to arrive at a decision and having regard to subsequent conduct of the tenant, the revision has to be dismissed. 10......................... This conduct of the tenant in purchasing the demand drafts at an earlier point of time and presented demand drafts later, will only reflect that the tenant is a chronic defaulter and he is not interested in paying rent regularly and his conduct is nothing but willful. 10......................... This conduct of the tenant in purchasing the demand drafts at an earlier point of time and presented demand drafts later, will only reflect that the tenant is a chronic defaulter and he is not interested in paying rent regularly and his conduct is nothing but willful. Therefore, according to me, the tenant does not deserve any sympathy and the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in MARAGATHJAMMAL v. KAMALAMMAl reported in 2006 (8) SCC 152 that when the tenant has committed default in presentation of lodgment schedule by one day, tenant is liable to be vacated and in this case, tenant has committed default for six months in the payment of rent even during the pendency of the proceedings, he did not pay the rents regularly and therefore the conduct of the revision petitioner is willful and on that ground, these revisions are liable to be dismissed.” From the above, one can understand that this court has taken a very strong view about the conduct of the petitioner that the petitioner does not deserve any sympathy and the order of eviction passed by the court below should not be interfered with. When this, court confirmed the order of eviction by dismissing the CRP filed by the petitioner. There is nothing to be decided by way of Section 47 petition before the rent controller. The procedure adopted by the petitioner is something unknown in law. The order passed by this court has sought to be nullified by way of Section 47 petition before the learned rent controller. If this is accepted, it would amount to destroying the very heirarchy of the institution itself. Every party who gets adverse order which is confirmed by the highest court of the State or Country, would casually challenge the same by approaching the lowest forum. It is a clear case of misuse and abuse process of law and an attempt to damage the image of the court and this court cannot be a spectator to an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice. 20. If the petitioner is aggrieved over the order passed by this court, the proper course is to approach the highest court namely the Hon'ble Supreme Court. He did not approach the court and allowed the orders passed by this court to reach finality. 20. If the petitioner is aggrieved over the order passed by this court, the proper course is to approach the highest court namely the Hon'ble Supreme Court. He did not approach the court and allowed the orders passed by this court to reach finality. When such is the position, it is not open to the petitioner to file a Section 47 petition and indirectly challenging the order passed by this court and that itself is violation of this court order. Even the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Abdul Razack Sahib v. Mrs. Azizunnissa Begum and others reported in AIR 1970 Madras 14 would go against him. The said judgment declares that contempt of jurisdiction is reserved and excised for what essentially brings the administration of justice into contempt, or unduly weakens it, as distinguished from a wrong that might be inflicted on a private party by infringing a decreetal order of the court. Para 2 of the order reads as follows - “2. It is submitted that there was only non-compliance with a simple order, no doubt of this Court, for payment of money claimed by the landlord as due for rents and such non-compliance does not carry with it penal sanctions as contempt of Court. From the record it does not appear that the appellant before us who had succeeded in the final Court and who was only the respondent here had even bargained to deposit these arrears of rent and continue to deposit the future rent pending the civil revision petition, as a condition of his being allowed to continue in possession of the lands undisturbed till the disposal of the civil revision petition. His answer to that petition for deposit was that he was not in possession of the lands. We do not find recorded any undertaking by him to the Court at any stage of the proceeding to deposit the moneys into Court. The petitioners in the civil revision petition moved for committal of the appellant for contempt only for disobedience of the order dated 28-1-1966 in C. M. P. No. 5345 of 1965. We do not find recorded any undertaking by him to the Court at any stage of the proceeding to deposit the moneys into Court. The petitioners in the civil revision petition moved for committal of the appellant for contempt only for disobedience of the order dated 28-1-1966 in C. M. P. No. 5345 of 1965. The learned Judge appears to be of the view that the failure to deposit the amount as directed by this Court is itself contempt of Court, for the learned Judge observes- "Till now, it does not appear that the respondent has deposited any amount as directed by this Court. The respondent is, therefore, guilty of contempt of Court." We fail to see how mere failure to deposit into Court moneys claimed by the opposite party and ordered to be deposited can amount to contempt of Court. Counsel for the petitioners cannot place a single decision before us: nor do we recollect a single instance where default of an order for payment of money has been held to constitute contempt of Court and the defaulting party sent to prison. While it is difficult to rigidly define contempt, in a general way contempt of Court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect or disregard or to interfere with or prejudice parties to the action or their witnesses during the litigation. For an act to amount to contempt punishable under the summary jurisdiction of this Court, it must fail within the principle of those cases in which the power to punish has been decided to exist, the unfailing criterion being whether or not there has been an interference or a tendency to interfere with the administration of justice. Contempt jurisdiction is reserved and exercised for what essentially brings the administration of justice into contempt, or unduly weakens it, as distinguished from a wrong that might be inflicted on a private party by infringing a decretal order of Court.” 21. Contempt jurisdiction is reserved and exercised for what essentially brings the administration of justice into contempt, or unduly weakens it, as distinguished from a wrong that might be inflicted on a private party by infringing a decretal order of Court.” 21. A perusal of the petition filed under Section 47 would reveal that the petitioner deliberately intended to case aspersion on this court and it is evident from para 5 of the petition which is usefully extracted as follows - The petitioner submit that the CRP 961 of 2010 and CRP NPD 2419 of 2010 were taken up together for final disposal on 05.03.2012 by His Lordship Justice R.S. Ramanathan. Even though, His Lordship has held "it cannot be stated that the petitioner should not be heard on merits" referring to the orders of dismissal passed by the lower courts erred in confirming the orders passed by the courts below without gleaning into the judgment rendered in 1978 1 MLJ Page 79 which is squarely applicable to the petitioner's case now questioning the legality of the order of eviction passed, the High Court entirely on an irrelevant factor which was not the grounds before it and completely overlooking the actual issue as well settled by several decided cases by confirming the order of eviction passed by the lower courts without due application of Scope u/s.25 of TN Act 18 of 1960 as amended by Act 23 of 1973. [Emphasis supplied] From the above, it is clear that before the rent controller, the petitioner contended that this court erred in confirming the orders passed by the lower courts. The use of words erred is nothing but the contempt of court and it lowers the authority of the court. This court is not only competent to take cognizance of contempt of its own order, but also has got power under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 to punish for violation of subordinate courts order also. Therefore, judgment in AIR 1970 Mad 14 (DB) squarely applies against the petitioner. 22. By paragraph 5, the petitioner has written certain statements which lowers or tends to lower the authority of this court and thereby interfering with the administration of justice. For abuse process of court, this court slaps Rs.25,000/- to be paid by the petitioner to the respondent within four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. By paragraph 5, the petitioner has written certain statements which lowers or tends to lower the authority of this court and thereby interfering with the administration of justice. For abuse process of court, this court slaps Rs.25,000/- to be paid by the petitioner to the respondent within four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 23. Even the order passed by the Appellate authority in M.P.No.545 of 2012 for extension of stay would reveal that the Appellate authority had taken note of the dismissal of CRP No.2419 of 2010 by this court on 05.03.2012 and non-filing of SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the tenant to deposit Rs.6,88,761/- as a pre-condition for interim stay. Though this court is convinced with the non-extension of stay order passed by the Appellate Court, the direction to deposit Rs.6,88,761/- by the tenant is not warranted. The issue is only as to whether the tenant is entitled to the stay of the EP proceedings or not and therefore the question of directing the tenant to deposit Rs.6,88,761/- does not arise. Therefore, the said condition is set aside. It is made clear that this court is upholding the dismissal of the stay petition by the Appellate Court, i.e. refusal to extend the stay is being confirmed. 24. As stated above, Section 47 petition filed by the tenant after approval of eviction passed by this court is nothing but abuse of process of law and it is not maintainable, as the issue attained finality. In the name of petition under Section 47, the petitioner wants to indirectly challenge the eviction order, after the said order was confirmed by this Court contending that it is a nullity. Every proceedings has to reach a finality and it cannot be re-agitated indirectly. There is a categorical finding given by this court in order dated 05.03.2012 in CRP No.2419 & 961 of 2010 that petitioner is a chronic defaulter. The only remedy for the petitioner is to challenge this court order passed in CRP No.2419 of 2010 only before the superior court and he cannot go to the lowest forum and challenge this court's order and re-open the decided issue. Therefore, petition under Section 47 itself is not maintainable. The only remedy for the petitioner is to challenge this court order passed in CRP No.2419 of 2010 only before the superior court and he cannot go to the lowest forum and challenge this court's order and re-open the decided issue. Therefore, petition under Section 47 itself is not maintainable. By holding that Section 47 petition, this court strikes of RCA 419 of 2012 filed by the petitioner and all connected proceedings as not maintainable and the learned rent controller is directed to order delivery of possession and to direct the petitioner to hand over possession to the respondent within three (3) months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. As far as the arrears of rent is concerned, the respondent is entitled to file appropriate proceedings before the proper forum for recovery of the same. 25. In the result, Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with a cost of Rs.25,000/- payable by the petitioner to the respondent, within a period of four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.