JUDGMENT 1. - The appellants have preferred this appeal against the impugned order dated 22.3.1996 passed by the learned Judge, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rajsamand in Claim Case No. 234/1994 by which the learned Tribunal attested the compromise of parties and awarded Rs. 1,15,000/- in favour of the appellants-claimants along with interest @ 12% if the amount awarded is not deposited within two months. 2. The brief facts of the case are that a claim petition was filed under Section 140/166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 being Claim Case No. 234/1994 wherein it was pleaded that on 4.11.1993, at about 9.20 P.M. deceased Hansmukh Lal was slowly driving a matador bearing Registration No. JBO 289 from Kankroli towards Nathdwara, a truck bearing Registration No. DL-1G-1465 dashed into the matador which resulted into grievous and fatal injuries on the head and chest of the deceased Hansmukh Lal, driver of matador, which resulted into his death. It was also pleaded in the claim petition that the deceased was earning Rs. 1,500/- per month and was aged 30 years at the time of accident and as such compensation claimed under various heads was Rs. 8,40,000/- against the driver, registered owner and Insurance Company of the truck. 3. Notices were issued to the respondents by the learned Tribunal. Thereafter, on 22.3.1996, Counsel for the appellants-claimants Shri Basanti Lal Lodha entered into compromise with the Insurance Company on behalf of the appellants-claimants in the Lok Adalat and award of Rs. 1,15,000/- was passed in favour of the appellants-claimants. 4. Aggrieved by the said award, the appellants-claimants have preferred this appeal for setting aside of the award. 5. Vide order dated 22.11.2011, the appeal was admitted for hearing and notices were issued to the respondents. No-one put appearance on behalf of the driver and owner of the truck. Shri L.D. Khatri, put his appearance on behalf of the respondent-Insurance Company. 6. 5. Vide order dated 22.11.2011, the appeal was admitted for hearing and notices were issued to the respondents. No-one put appearance on behalf of the driver and owner of the truck. Shri L.D. Khatri, put his appearance on behalf of the respondent-Insurance Company. 6. A transfer petition was also filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by the appellants-claimants for transferring this matter from Rajsamand, Rajasthan to Nadiad, Gujarat, which was registered as Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 371/1996 with a stay application, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court issued ad interim stay, of further proceedings on 19.8.1996, i.e. after the disposal of the claim petition and thereafter vide order dated 7.10.1996, the Hon'ble Supreme Court transferred the claim petition from the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rajsamand, Rajasthan to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nadiad, Gujarat, that too after the disposal of the main claim petition. In ground No. (v) of the memo of appeal, the appellants mentioned that the appellants under advice filed another application in Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 371/1996 seeking clarification/direction for transfer of the claim petition from M.A.C.T., Rajsamand to M.A.C., Nadiyad notwithstanding the impugned order dated 22.3.1996 which however dismissed by the Supreme Court directing orally to file a petition before the Rajasthan High Court. In view of this, the appeal is entertained by this Court. 7. Heard Mr. Manish Shishodia, learned Counsel for the appellants-claimants and Mr. L.D. Khatri, learned Counsel for the respondent-Insurance Company. 8. Mr. Shishodia, appearing on behalf of the appellants-claimants, submitted that the learned Tribunal recorded the compromise without signature of the appellants-claimants and the Counsel was never instructed for compromise. He has not having any authority expressed or implied by the appellants-claimants for signing the compromise. He also submitted that the appellants-claimants claimed compensation to the tune of Rs. 8,40,000/- against the respondents and the earned Tribunal passed the award regarding compromise between the two parties without there being any authority on behalf of the appellants-claimants for Rs. 15,000/-, which is grossly inadequate. It was also submitted by him that the signature of the parties is necessary for attesting a compromise in absence of which only on the basis of signature of the Counsel, compromise should not be attested. He relied upon the judgment delivered in the case of Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi and Anr., (1993) 1 SCC 581 . 9. Per contra, Mr. He relied upon the judgment delivered in the case of Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi and Anr., (1993) 1 SCC 581 . 9. Per contra, Mr. Khatri, appearing on behalf of the respondent-Insurance Company, submitted that when an Advocate files vakalatnama on behalf of a party, then he authorises for compromise also as per the provisions enshrined under Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C. He supported the compromise and submitted that there is no ground for setting aside the compromise. He relied upon the Judgments delivered in the cases of Byram Pastonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India and Ors., AIR 1991 SC 2234 and Mohan Bai v. Jai Kishan, 1983 RLW 289. 10. I have considered the rival submissions made at the Bar. 11. From the perusal of the impugned judgment/award, it reveals that a compromise was filed on behalf of the appellants-claimants and the respondent-insurance before the learned Tribunal stating therein as under " izkFkhZx.k ds i{k esa rFkk foi{kh la[;k 3 vksfj;UVy bUl;ksjsal daiuh fy0 ds fo:) 1]15]000@& :i;s ,d yk[k iUnzg gtkj :i;s dk {kfriwfrZ dk ,okMZ fnyk;k x;kA fcuk C;kt ds mDr jkf'k nks ekg ds vanj vnk djuh gksxhA nks ekg ds vUnj mDr jkf'k vnk ugha gksus ij 12% C;kt ns; gksxkA " " vr% Jheku ls fuosnu gS fd gekjk jkthukek rLnhd dj eqdneksa dk fuLrkj.k djus dh d'ik djkosaA " 12. The compromise was signed by Shri B.L. Lodha on behalf of the appellants-claimants and Shri Basanti Lal Saruparia on behalf of the Insurance Company, which was attested by the learned Tribunal and passed the award as above. 13. As per Rule 10.13 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1990, the Claims Tribunal may in its discretion allow any party to appear before it through he legal practitioner and as per Rule 10.27, the Claims Tribunal may exercise any of the powers vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 sofar as they may be applicable. As per sub-rule (2) of Rule 10.27, for purpose there than specified in sub-rule (1), the Tribunal may exercise all or any of the towers vested in the Civil Court as may be necessary for functioning under the Vet and these rules. As per Rule 10.28 (sic) proceedings.Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C. reads as under:- "3. Compromise of suit. As per sub-rule (2) of Rule 10.27, for purpose there than specified in sub-rule (1), the Tribunal may exercise all or any of the towers vested in the Civil Court as may be necessary for functioning under the Vet and these rules. As per Rule 10.28 (sic) proceedings.Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C. reads as under:- "3. Compromise of suit. - Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject matter of the suit: Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other than an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Explanation - An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule." 14. Here, the phrase "in writing and signed by the parties" was inserted by Act No. 104 of 1976, which was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Byram Pestonji Gariwala (supra) and held as under.- "The words 'in writing and signed by the parties', inserted in Order 23, Rule 23 C.P.C. by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 necessarily mean and include duly authorised representative and Counsel. Thus a compromise in writing and signed by Counsel representing the parties, but not signed by the parties in person, is valid and binding on the ............. (sic) parties, but extending beyond the subject matter of the suit. Thus a compromise in writing and signed by Counsel representing the parties, but not signed by the parties in person, is valid and binding on the ............. (sic) parties, but extending beyond the subject matter of the suit. A judgment by consent is intended to stop litigation between the parties just as much as a judgment resulting from a decision of the Court at the end of a long drawn out fight." 15. The learned Counsel for the appellants-claimants drawn my attention towards Para No. 37 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads as under:- "We may, however, hasten to add that it will be prudent for Counsel not to act on implied authority except when warranted by the exigency of circumstances demanding immediate adjustment of suit by agreement of compromise and the signature of the party cannot be obtained without undue delay. In these days of easier and quicker communication, such contingency may seldom arise. A wise and careful Counsel will not doubt arm himself in advance with the necessary authority expressed in writing to meet all such contingencies in order that neither his authority nor integrity is ever doubted. This essential precaution will safeguard the personal reputation of Counsel as well as uphold the prestige and dignity of the legal profession." 16. From the perusal of the aforesaid, it reveals that it is regarding the ethics of the Counsel and it is expected from the Counsel that he should not enter into compromise without the consent of the party or without instructions of the party. But, here in the case in hand, no material was placed before the Court which shows that the Counsel was not authorised for compromise. Rather, the order-sheet dated 22.5.2002 states that the compromise was attested on 22.3.1996 and the cheque was received by the learned Tribunal on 30.4.1996 and from the order dated 22.5.2002, it reveals that the Counsel for the appellants-claimants informed the claimants regarding deposit of the award amount but still they did not come to receive the said amount. The transfer petition was filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court after that, which shows that before filing transfer petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the appellants-claimants were knowing regarding the compromise. Further, no action has yet been taken by the appellants-claimants against the Counsel for acting without their authority/consent. The transfer petition was filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court after that, which shows that before filing transfer petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the appellants-claimants were knowing regarding the compromise. Further, no action has yet been taken by the appellants-claimants against the Counsel for acting without their authority/consent. Therefore, mere allegation against a Counsel that he acted without their consent is of no consequence. 17. In Mohan Bais case (supra), a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court also considered the provisions enshrined under Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C. and held as under:- "I would like to observe that the object with which the recent amendment has been introduced in Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C. as mentioned in its objects and reasons is of avoiding the setting up of oral agreements or compromises to delay the progress of the suit and not to cut down the implied authority of the Counsel. It was thought proper by the Parliament in its wisdom that in order to avoid delay in the progress of the suit, often caused on account of setting up of oral compromises and taking lot of time in trying to prove the same, a compromise which can be given effect to be the Court must be in writing. Once the compromise is required to be in writing, then naturally it must be signed by the parties, which expression includes the Advocates for the parties. It may be respectfully submitted that there is no indication in the amended provisions that signatures by the Counsel on behalf of the parties were excluded, or that the parties were personally required to sign compromise petitions. In case the legislature intended to depart from the accepted proposition laid down in the Full Bench judgments of the Nagpur and Kerala High Courts and approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above, regarding the implied authority of the Advocate to enter into a compromise on behalf of his client, then specific provision would have been made to indicate that the parties should personally sign the compromise petitions, like the provisions contained in Order 6, Rule 14 C.P.C. about signing the pleadings. Where it has been made obligatory that the party should himself sign the pleadings; and if it is shown that by reasons of absence or otherwise, the party was unable to sign the pleadings and then it should be signed by a person duly authorised by him in this behalf. The signatures of the Pleaders would not be enough, so far as the pleadings is concerned, as has been made explicit in the provisions contained in Order 6, Rule 14 C.P.C. In the absence of any such specific provision, it would not be proper to cut down the inherent or implied authority of a Counsel derived by him on the basis of the provisions of Order 3, Rule 4 C.P.C., to act on behalf of the party. In my humble view, Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C. does not debar a Counsel from signing a compromise petition nor it interferes with his inherent right to enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of his client. Thus, the Court can act upon such a compromise petition which is signed only by the Counsel for the parties and has not been signed by the parties themselves personally." 18. Therefore, Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C. does not debar a Counsel from signing a compromise petition nor it interferes with his inherent right of entering into an agreement on behalf of his client and the Court can act on such compromise. 19. In the case of Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi (supra), compromise was not signed by the parties instead the plaintiffs Advocate recorded that thumb impression of the plaintiff had been given in his presence and the suit was dismissed as per compromise by the order of the Subordinate Judge. Thereafter, the plaintiff made an application before the Subordinate Judge that the compromise had been obtained by fraud and the Subordinate Judge, after recording the finding that there was fraud and material that the compromise was not signed by the parties, recalled the earlier order. Thereafter, the plaintiff made an application before the Subordinate Judge that the compromise had been obtained by fraud and the Subordinate Judge, after recording the finding that there was fraud and material that the compromise was not signed by the parties, recalled the earlier order. In revision, the High Court set aside the order treating the compromise petition as an application for withdrawal of the suit under Order 23, Rule 1 C.P.C. and in appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Subordinate Judge was justified in recalling its earlier order and the High Court erred in treating the compromise petition as one under Order 23, Rule 1 C.P.C. Therefore, the facts of this case are altogether different from the present case, which does not help the appellants-claimants. 20. As discussed above, in the present case, the compromise was signed by the authorised Counsel, which is not disputed. Therefore, as per the case law enshrined in the cases of Byram Pestonji Gariwala (supra) and Mohan Bai (supra) and further as per the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C., the Court can act on such compromise and the learned Tribunal rightly acted upon the compromise and passed the award, which does not require any interference by this Court. The appeal is, therefore, devoid of any merit and deserves to be dismissed, which is hereby dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******