Judgment 1. The substantial questions of law formulated and to be answered by this Court in the plaintiff's second appeal are as under:- (i) Whether lower appellate Court was justified in affirming the judgment and decree by dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation ? (ii) Whether lower appellate Court was justified in not considering the explanation in condonation of delay in filing the appeal as sufficient ? [For sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status shown in the suit before the trial Court]. 2. The facts, briefly stated are as under:- 2.1 The appellant/plaintiff, namely Baharata filed a suit for specific performance of the contract against the defendants' No.1, 3 & 4 and consequent execution of the sale deed in his favour. 2.2 The Trial Court by its judgment and decree dated 10/03/2010 granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff, but simultaneously held that if the defendant No. 1 refuses to execute the sale deed, then he would be make payment of Rs. 13,000/- along with interest 18% from the date of agreement dated 07/03/2002 to the plaintiff. 2.3 Plaintiff levied execution on 16/7/2010 for execution of sale deed, where as defendant No. 1 made an application for deposit of the decreetal amount as per clause 2 of the decree. The Executing Court by its order dated 03/12/2010 directed the defendant No.1 to deposit the amount of Rs. 35,515/- and declared to direct execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. 2.4 Thereafter, the plaintiff obtained certified copy of the judgment and decree on 24/01/2011 and filed first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (henceforth 'CPC') on 29/04/2011 along with an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act explaining the delay of about 390 days. 2.5 The First Appellate Court by its impugned order/judgment dated 12/02/2013 dismissed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act holding that no sufficient cause has been shown for filing the appeal and consequently, also dismissed the first appeal. 3. Impugning the legal acceptability and sustainability of the order dated 12/02/2013 passed by the First Appellate Court, the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC has been preferred by the appellant/plaintiff, which has been admitted for final hearing on the substantial question of law as stated in opening paragraph of this judgment. 4. 3. Impugning the legal acceptability and sustainability of the order dated 12/02/2013 passed by the First Appellate Court, the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC has been preferred by the appellant/plaintiff, which has been admitted for final hearing on the substantial question of law as stated in opening paragraph of this judgment. 4. Mr. Amiyakant Tiwari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff would submit that the First Appellate Court has committed grave illegality in holding that no sufficient cause been shown in preferring the appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, whereas, Mr. Anil Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No.1, 3 & 4/defendants No.1, 3 & 4 would submit that the First Appellate Court has lightly rejected the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and thereby dismissal of first appeal is well merited. 5. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the records of both the Courts below with utmost circumspection. Since both the questions are interlinked and they are being answered collectively: 6. In order to decide as to whether the First Appellate Court is justified in holding that plaintiff has failed to shown sufficient cause for delay of 1 year and 14 days in filing the appeal, it would be profitable to note the contents of the decree passed by the trial Court: ^^oknh vius nkos dks fl) djus esa iw.kZr% lQy jgk gS vr% oknh ds i{k esa fuEukuqlkj vkKfIr ikfjr fd;k tkrk gS %& 1- oknh] izfroknh dzekad 1 dks cdk;k jkf’k 5]000@& :i;s nsdj okn Hkwfe dk fodz; i= fu”iknu djus dh ?kks”k.kk djk ldus dk vf/kdkjh gSA 2- ;fn izfroknh dzekad 1 okn Hkwfe ds fodz; i= ds fu”iknu ls badkj djrk gS rks ,slh n’kk esa og oknh dks 13]000@& :i;s dks 18 izfr’kr C;kt dh nj ls djkj fnukad 7-3-2002 ls nsunkj gksxkA 3- oknh dk okn O;; izfroknh dzekad 1] 2 ,oa 4 la;qDr :i ls i`Fkd~&i`Fkd~ ogu djsaxsA 4- vf/koDrk ‘kqYd izekf.kr gksus ij oknh dk vf/koDrk ‘kqYd fof/kor ns; gksA** 7. The appellant/plaintiff, namely Baharata levied execution before the Executing Court on 16/07/2010 for execution of the sale deed, whereas the defendant No. 1 submitted before the Executing Court that he is ready and willing to deposit the decreetal amount along with 18% interest as directed by the trial Court. 8. The appellant/plaintiff, namely Baharata levied execution before the Executing Court on 16/07/2010 for execution of the sale deed, whereas the defendant No. 1 submitted before the Executing Court that he is ready and willing to deposit the decreetal amount along with 18% interest as directed by the trial Court. 8. The Executing Court by its order dated 03/12/2000 ultimately directed the defendant No.1 to deposit Rs. 15,000/- as amount given by the plaintiff and Rs. 20,515/- as interest, i.e. total Rs. 35,515/-. 9. Thereafter appellant/plaintiff obtained certified copy of the order on 24/01/2011 and he preferred an appeal on 29/04/2011 along with an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act stating inter alia that appellant/plaintiff considered the decree absolutely in his favour, therefore, he did not prefer an appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. When ultimately, order was passed by the Executing Court on 03/12/2010, and then he consulted with his counsel and finally filed the first appeal on 29/04/2011. Thus, the delay in filing the appeal is on account of his understanding to the decree passed by the trial Court and when the order dated 03/12/2010 was passed, he came to know that passing of the conditional decree required to be challenged, then he consulted the lawyer and filed the appeal. 10. Application for condonation of delay was opposed by filing reply by the defendants stating inter alia that the plaintiff was earlier headmaster, now though he is retired but being the literate person and well aware of the Court proceeding, the delay is deliberate. 11. The question as to whether the delay in filing the appeal is bonafide or it is deliberate and malafide? 12. Sequence of events right from the passing of decree as enumerated above would clearly demonstrate that after passing of the decree, the plaintiff considering the decree absolutely in his favour and levied execution on 16/07/2010, claiming execution of sale deed in his favour in which, defendant also joined with a prayer for permission to deposit the decreetal amount, in which, the Trial Court on 03/12/2010 directed the defendant to deposit Rs. 35,515/- i.e. inclusive of interest, thereafter, plaintiff obtained certified copy on 24/01/2011 and filed the first appeal on 29/04/2011. 13. 35,515/- i.e. inclusive of interest, thereafter, plaintiff obtained certified copy on 24/01/2011 and filed the first appeal on 29/04/2011. 13. It is true that the plaintiff preferred an appeal on 29/04/2011, after obtaining certified copy of order on 24/01/2011, but the fact remain that though appellant/plaintiff is a teacher, residing at remote village of District Janjgir Champa and was prosecuting the suit diligently thereafter; in order to execute decree levied the execution on 16/07/2010. When ultimately Executing Court passed an order on 03/12/2010, then he obtained certified copy of the order on 24/01/2011 and preferred appeal on 29/04/2011. 14. The entire afore-stated sequence of events as highlighted above would show that the delay caused in preferring the appeal neither can be said to be malafide nor deliberate on the part of the plaintiff. 15. It is well settled law the Courts should adopt an justice-oriented approach in considering the application for condonation of delay. However, the Court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the delay. 16. The Supreme Court in case of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. Mst. Katiji and others, (1987) 2 SCC 107 has held that the legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963, in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits' and held as under:- 3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides. 17. The Supreme Court in case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 has held that the sufficient cause has to be construed liberally especially when the delay is not deliberate and malafide. Relevant portion of the report held as under:- 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [ AIR 1969 SC 575 ] and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [ AIR 1972 SC 749 ]. 18. Keeping in view the principles laid down in the above-stated cases and finding of this Court in the foregoing paragraphs, I find from the record that the plaintiff was appearing in the trial diligently and seriously contested the suit and he had succeeded in showing the 'sufficient cause' within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is neither deliberate nor outcome of malafide action and the cause shown for delay in filing the application is a "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 19. Thus, the First Appellate Court has committed illegality in rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The impugned order/judgment dated 12/02/2013 is hereby set aside subject to payment of cost of Rs. 19. Thus, the First Appellate Court has committed illegality in rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The impugned order/judgment dated 12/02/2013 is hereby set aside subject to payment of cost of Rs. 5,000/- to the defendant No.1 within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment. The delay in filing the appeal is condoned. The First Appeal (Baharta v. Bhim Lal and others) is restored to the original file on District Judge, Janjgir-Champa for hearing and disposal of appeal on merits in accordance with law. 20. The parties are directed to appear before the District Judge, Janjgir Champa on 06/05/2014. The First Appellate Court is directed to decide the appeal within the three months from the receipt of certified copy of this judgment. 21. Resultantly, the second appeal is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. Appeal Allowed.