JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan J. The petitioner has moved this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing order dated 3.6.2014 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (I), Amb, whereby the respondents/accused were ordered to be discharged. 2. The petitioner had preferred a complaint on the allegations that he was a co-sharer in joint possession of land comprised in Khewat No. 251 min, Khatauni No. 361, Khasra Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 14, measuring 2-25-43 hectares situated in Village Hamboli, Tehsil Amb, District Una. Upon this land there were many valuable trees like Khair, Kikkar, Sheesham etc. and the respondents had cut number of trees from the aforesaid land without prior consent of the complainant or the other co-sharers and without any proper sanction of the competent authority. The petitioner lead his preliminary evidence in support of his case, upon which cognizance against the accused persons for commission of offence punishable under Sections 379, 467, 471 read with Section 34 IPC was taken. Thereafter the complainant led pre-charge evidence, in which he examined four witnesses. The petitioner did not step into the witness box in the pre-charge evidence, resulting in an adverse inference being drawn by the learned trial Magistrate, consequently leading to discharge of the respondents. It is this order of the Magistrate below, which has been impugned in this proceeding, on the ground that there was sufficient material available with the Court below to frame the charge. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 4. While leading pre-charge evidence, petitioner-claimant examined CW-1, Sh. Janam Singh, Range Officer, Amb and proved copy of affidavit of the complainant Ex.CW-5/A. But a close scrutiny of this affidavit shows that the same does not pertains to the land in dispute, but pertains to land comprised in Khata No. 180, Khatoni No. 300, Khasra Nos. 448, 449, 467, 484, 485, 486 and 487. Though the petitioner had claimed this affidavit to be a forged document, but then he himself did not appear in the witness box to depose about the same. CW-2, Harbans Lal and CW-3 Amar Nath had claimed that one of the respondents Krishan Chand had felled trees standing over the land in dispute. However, there is nothing on record to suggest that they had obtained any demarcation to show felling of trees from the land in question. CW-2, Harbans Lal and CW-3 Amar Nath had claimed that one of the respondents Krishan Chand had felled trees standing over the land in dispute. However, there is nothing on record to suggest that they had obtained any demarcation to show felling of trees from the land in question. The tone and tenor of the cross-examination of these witnesses clearly suggest that there in fact is a dispute regarding share in consideration for felling of these trees with some society, but then there is nothing to show that there is some nexus or connection of any of the accused with such society. CW-3 Amar Nath had infact categorically deposed that he has no dispute with the accused person, as the land had not yet been demarcated and therefore, it was not ascertainable as to whether trees which were felled were in fact standing upon the land in question or some other land. In so far as testimony of CW-4, Chaman Lal is concerned, the same leads nowhere. Therefore, in this background, it was the petitioner alone, who was the best witness and could have depose about the entire case, but unfortunately he did not choose to step into the witness box. 5. The petitioner at this stage has though made a reference to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil Mehta and another Vs. State of Gujarat and another (2013) 9 SCC 209 to contend that the order of the Magistrate should be set aside and the matter be remanded back with a direction to proceed in accordance with the provisions of Sections 244 to 247 of the Code. But I fail to understand as to how the ratio of the aforesaid judgment can help the petitioner. Rather, it has been clearly held in this judgment that the deposition of the complainant and his witnesses recorded by the Magistrate under Chapter XV at the stage of taking cognizance of an offence when the accused does not appear, cannot be considered as evidence for framing charge under Chapter XIX of the Code, as would be clear from the following observations:- “7. Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with complaints made to Magistrates. Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with complaints made to Magistrates. Section 200 which appears in the said Chapter inter alia provides that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and signed by the complainant and the witnesses, as also the Magistrate. An exception to that general rule is, however, made in terms of the proviso to Section 200 in cases where the complaint is made by a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties, or where a Court has made the complaint, or the Magistrate makes over the case for enquiry or trial by another Magistrate under Section 192 of the Cr.P.C. 8. Section 201 deals with the procedure which a Magistrate not competent to take cognizance of the case is required to follow. Section 202 empowers the Magistrate to postpone the issue of process against the accused either to inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Sub-section (2) of Section 202 empowers the Magistrate to take evidence of witnesses on oath in an inquiry under sub-section (1) thereof. Section 203, which is the only other provision appearing in Chapter XV, empowers the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint if he is of the opinion that no sufficient ground for proceeding with the same is made out. 9. There is no gainsaying that a Magistrate while taking cognizance of an offence under Section 200, whether such cognizance is on the basis of the statement of the complainant and the witnesses present or on the basis of an inquiry or investigation in terms of Section 202, is not required to notify the accused to show cause why cognizance should not be taken and process issued against him or to provide an opportunity to him to cross- examine the complainant or his witnesses at that stage. 10. In contra distinction, Chapter XIX of the Code regulates trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. While Part A of that Chapter deals with cases instituted on a police report, Part B deals with cases instituted otherwise than on a police report. 10. In contra distinction, Chapter XIX of the Code regulates trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. While Part A of that Chapter deals with cases instituted on a police report, Part B deals with cases instituted otherwise than on a police report. Section 244 that appears in Part B of Chapter XIX requires the Magistrate to “proceed to hear the prosecution” and “take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution” once the accused appears or is brought before him. Section 245 empowers the Magistrate to discharge the accused upon taking all the evidence referred to in Section 244, if he considers that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction. Sub-section (2) of Section 245 empowers the Magistrate to discharge an accused even “at any previous stage” if for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate the charges are considered to be “groundless”. In cases where the accused is not discharged, the Magistrate is required to follow the procedure under Section 246 of the Code. 11. That provision may at this stage be extracted: “246. Procedure where accused is not discharged - (1) If, when such evidence has been taken, or at any previous stage of the case, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make. (3) If the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate shall record the plea, and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon. (4) If the accused refuses to plead, or does not plead or claims to be tried or if the accused is not convicted under sub-section (3), he shall be required to state, at the commencement of the next hearing of the case, or, if the Magistrate for reasons to be recorded in writing so thinks fit, forthwith, whether he wishes to cross-examine any, and, if so, which, of the witnesses for the prosecution whose evidence has been taken. (5) If he says he does so wish, the witnesses named by him shall be recalled and, after cross-examination and re-examination (if any), they shall be discharged. (6) The evidence of any remaining witnesses for the prosecution shall next be taken, and after cross-examination and re- examination (if any), they shall also be discharged.” A simple reading of the above would show that the Magistrate is required to frame in writing a charge against the accused “when such evidence has been taken” and there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter which such Magistrate is competent to try and adequately punish. 12. Sections 244 to 246 leave no manner of doubt that once the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate the prosecution has to be heard and all such evidence as is brought in support of its case recorded. The power to discharge is also under Section 245 exercisable only upon taking all of the evidence that is referred to in Section 244, so also the power to frame charges in terms of Section 246 has to be exercised on the basis of the evidence recorded under Section 244. The expression “when such evidence has been taken” appearing in Section 246 is significant and refers to the evidence that the prosecution is required to produce in terms of Section 244(1) of the Code. There is nothing either in the provisions of Sections 244, 245 and 246 or any other provision of the Code for that matter to even remotely suggest that evidence which the Magistrate may have recorded at the stage of taking of cognizance and issuing of process against the accused under Chapter XV tantamounts to evidence that can be used by the Magistrate for purposes of framing of charges against the accused persons under Section 246 thereof without the same being produced under Section 244 of the Code. The scheme of the two Chapters is totally different. While Chapter XV deals with the filing of complaints, examination of the complainant and the witnesses and taking of cognizance on the basis thereof with or without investigation and inquiry, Chapter XIX Part B deals with trial of warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report. The scheme of the two Chapters is totally different. While Chapter XV deals with the filing of complaints, examination of the complainant and the witnesses and taking of cognizance on the basis thereof with or without investigation and inquiry, Chapter XIX Part B deals with trial of warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report. The trial of an accused under Chapter XIX and the evidence relevant to the same has no nexus proximate or otherwise with the evidence adduced at the initial stage where the Magistrate records depositions and examines the evidence for purposes of deciding whether a case for proceeding further has been made out. All that may be said is that evidence that was adduced before a Magistrate at the stage of taking cognizance and summoning of the accused may often be the same as is adduced before the Court once the accused appears pursuant to the summons. There is, however, a qualitative difference between the approach that the Court adopts and the evidence adduced at the stage of taking cognizance and summoning the accused and that recorded at the trial. The difference lies in the fact that while the former is a process that is conducted in the absence of the accused, the latter is undertaken in his presence with an opportunity to him to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the prosecution. 14. There is, in our opinion, no merit in that contention which needs to be noticed only to be rejected. We say so for reasons more than one. In the first place, the expression “Magistrate shall proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution” appearing in Section 244 refers to evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 3 reads as under: “3. Interpretation clause - In this Act the following words and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears from the context:- * * * 'Evidence’.-'Evidence’ means and includes- (1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry, such statements are called oral evidence; (2) all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court, such documents are called documentary evidence.” 16. It is trite that evidence within the meaning of the Evidence Act and so also within the meaning of Section 244 of the Cr.P.C. is what is recorded in the manner stipulated under Section 138 in the case of oral evidence. Documentary evidence would similarly be evidence only if the documents are proved in the manner recognised and provided for under the Evidence Act unless of course a statutory provision makes the document admissible as evidence without any formal proof thereof. 17. Suffice it to say that evidence referred to in Sections 244, 245 and 246 must, on a plain reading of the said provisions and the provisions of the Evidence Act, be admissible only if the same is produced and, in the case of documents, proved in accordance with the procedure established under the Evidence Act which includes the rights of the parties against whom this evidence is produced to cross-examine the witnesses concerned. 18. Secondly, because evidence under Chapter XIX (B) has to be recorded in the presence of the accused and if a right of cross-examination was not available to him, he would be no more than an idle spectator in the entire process. The whole object underlying recording of evidence under Section 244 after the accused has appeared is to ensure that not only does the accused have the opportunity to hear the evidence adduced against him, but also to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses with a view to showing that the witness is either unreliable or that a statement made by him does not have any evidentiary value or that it does not incriminate him. Section 245 of the Code, as noticed earlier, empowers the Magistrate to discharge the accused if, upon taking of all the evidence referred to in Section 244, he considers that no case against the accused has been made out which may warrant his conviction. Whether or not a case is made out against him, can be decided only when the accused is allowed to cross-examine the witnesses for otherwise he may not be in a position to demonstrate that no case is made out against him and thereby claim a discharge under Section 245 of the Code. It is elementary that the ultimate quest in any judicial determination is to arrive at the truth, which is not possible unless the deposition of witnesses goes through the fire of cross-examination. It is elementary that the ultimate quest in any judicial determination is to arrive at the truth, which is not possible unless the deposition of witnesses goes through the fire of cross-examination. In a criminal case, using a statement of a witness at the trial, without affording to the accused an opportunity to cross-examine, is tantamount to condemning him unheard. Life and liberty of an individual recognised as the most valuable rights cannot be jeopardised leave alone taken away without conceding to the accused the right to question those deposing against him from the witness box. 19. Thirdly, because the right of cross-examination granted to an accused under Sections 244 to 246 even before framing of the charges does not, in the least, cause any prejudice to the complainant or result in any failure of justice, while denial of such a right is likely and indeed bound to prejudice the accused in his defence. The fact that after the Court has found a case justifying framing of charges against the accused, the accused has a right to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses under Section 246(4) does not necessarily mean that such a right cannot be conceded to the accused before the charges are framed or that the Parliament intended to take away any such right at the pre-charge stage. 21. This Court further clarified that the expression “or at any previous stage of the case” appearing in Section 246(1) did not imply that a Magistrate can frame charges against an accused even before any evidence was led under Section 24. This Court approved the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Sambhaji Nagu Koli v. State of Maharashtra 1979 Cri LJ 390 (Bom), where the High Court has explained the purport of the expression “at any previous stage of the case”. The said expression, declared this Court, only meant that the Magistrate could frame a charge against the accused even before all the evidence which the prosecution proposed to adduce under Section 244(1) was recorded and nothing more. This Court observed: “44. In Section 246 Cr.P.C. also, the phraseology is "if, when such evidence has been taken", meaning thereby, a clear reference is made to Section 244 Cr.P.C. The Bombay High Court came to the conclusion that the phraseology would, at the most, mean that the Magistrate may prefer to frame a charge, even before all the evidence is completed. In Section 246 Cr.P.C. also, the phraseology is "if, when such evidence has been taken", meaning thereby, a clear reference is made to Section 244 Cr.P.C. The Bombay High Court came to the conclusion that the phraseology would, at the most, mean that the Magistrate may prefer to frame a charge, even before all the evidence is completed. The Bombay High Court, after considering the phraseology, came to the conclusion that the typical clause did not permit the Magistrate to frame a charge, unless there was some evidence on record. For this, the Learned Single Judge in that matter relied on the ruling in Abdul Nabi v. Gulam Murthuza Khan 1968 Cri LJ 303 (AP).” 22. More importantly, this Court recognised the right of cross- examination as a salutary right to be exercised by the accused when witnesses are offered by the prosecution at the stage of Section 244(1) of the Code and observed: “51. The right of cross-examination is a very salutary right and the accused would have to be given an opportunity to cross- examine the witnesses, who have been offered at the stage of Section 244(1) Cr.P.C. The accused can show, by way of the cross-examination, that there is no justifiable ground against him for facing the trial and for that purpose, the prosecution would have to offer some evidence. While interpreting this Section, the prejudice likely to be caused to the accused in his losing an opportunity to show to the Court that he is not liable to face the trial on account of there being no evidence against him, cannot be ignored.” 6. The findings reproduced above rather support the case of the respondents. Therefore, taking into consideration all the aforesaid facts, as also the exposition of law in Sunil Mehta’s case supra, this Court find no infirmity or illegality in the order passed by the learned Magistrate below. Consequently, the petition being devoid of any merits is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.