JUDGMENT : Sanjay Yadav, J. 1. Heard on admission. 2. This is plaintiffs' second appeal directed against judgment and decree dated 07.02.2003 passed in Civil Appeal No. 25- A/2001 by Additional District Judge, Sihora, District Jabalpur affirming judgment and decree dated 31.03.2000 passed in Civil Suit No. 42-A/1997 by First Civil Judge Class-II, Sihora, District Jabalpur. 3. Plaintiffs having succeeded in establishing that transfer of land bearing Khasra No. 58 admeasuring 0.338 Hectare, Mauja Gada, Patwari Halka No. 19, Tehsil Sehora, District Jabalpur by virtue of instrument dated 26.05.1986 was in lieu of security towards the loan tendered by defendant No. 1-Triveni Prasad led the trial Court decree the suit declaring registered instrument dated 26.05.1986 as null and void with a direction to defendants not to cause any interference on a finding that defendant No. 1- Triveni Prasad did not enter the witness box to demolish the contentions in the plaint that the suit property was infact kept as a security and was not an outright sale. 4. That, defendant No. 2 specifically admitted in paragraph 2 and 3 of his cross-examination that his father is engaged in the profession of money lending and that too alleged transaction was in lieu of the money/loan which was tendered to the plaintiffs. 5. That, defendant, resident of village Bahoriban, being a money lender, the suit land was situated in other village and that as per admission in paragraph 9 by defendant No. 1 that they have not physically seen the property. 6. That, the market value of land at the time of transaction was Rs.30,000/- whereas the transaction was for an amount of Rs.3,400/- (Exhibit-D/1). That, steps were taken for mutation within close vicinity of year 1986 and in the year 1994 when an application for mutation was filed, the same was not pursued and was allowed to be dismissed for want of prosecution and that plaintiffs remained in physical possession of the suit property. 7. These factors having weighed with the trial Court led the trial Court declare the alleged sale deed dated 25.06.1986 as null and void as it was not a sale but was a mortgage. 8. 7. These factors having weighed with the trial Court led the trial Court declare the alleged sale deed dated 25.06.1986 as null and void as it was not a sale but was a mortgage. 8. Trite it is that in case of existence of debt, the continuance of grantor in possession, a stipulation for payment of interest on repayment, a price below the true value, the fact that no application for transfer of name was made till long after alleged sale, absence of right of mortgagee for redemption indicates mortgage are the factors which are considered to understand real intention of the parties entering into the transaction of land. 9. Furthermore, it is a settled principle of law that the form of transaction is not a final test of determination whether it is a sale or mortgage. The true test is the intention of parties in entering into the transaction (please see: 1916 PC 49 (50) : AIR 1946 PC 178 ). 10. True it is, as is evident from Exhibit P/1 and D/1 that, the recital depicting the sale, however, the same being ostensible established through the evidence led by the parties and the findings thereon arrived at by the trial Court as apparent from paragraph 16 extracted herein below : - and no material evidence having been brought on record as would suggest that the findings arrived at by the trial Court are perverse and the same having been affirmed by the Appellate Court, no substantial question of law arises for consideration as would warrant any interference. 11. Consequently, Appeal fails and is dismissed in limine. No costs.