ORDER Both these writ applications filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India were heard together as a common question pertaining to maintainability of these applications before this court arose on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction and are being disposed of by the present common order as this court is not satisfied with the plea of maintainability of the writ applications in this court. 2. The facts pleaded for the purpose of deciding the question of territorial jurisdiction are not in dispute. The petitioner of CWJC No. 15095/2011 has challenged an order dated 22.07.2010 (annexure-1) passed by the Senior Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force (hereinafter referred to as the CRPF), BSP, Bhilai (respondent No.4) by which a punishment of compulsory retirement has been imposed upon him. The impugned order also contemplates reduction in retiral benefits. In terms of the said order, the petitioner has been held to be entitled only for subsistence allowance for the period during which he remained under suspension. At the time of passing of the said order, the petitioner was posted as Head Constable, CISF Unit, BSP, Bhilai. The order was served upon him at Bhilai. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order dated 22.07.2010 before the DIG, CISF, BSP, Bhilai (respondent No.3) who rejected the said appeal by an order dated 11.09.2010. The petitioner’s revision/memorial against the revisional order and the appellate order was also dismissed by the Inspector General, WS, CISF, Mumbai vide order dated 18.03.2011. Naturally, after imposition of punishment of compulsory retirement by order dated 22.07.2010, which was served upon the petitioner at the place of his posting, i.e. at Bhilai, the petitioner left the place of his posting and, accordingly, the communication of rejection of his appeal and revision was made to residential address of his village home, Barharia, district Lakhisarai (Bihar). The place where the appellate order and the revisional order were communicated falls within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. The order of compulsory retirement was passed and communicated to the petitioner at Bhilai. The appellate order was passed at Bhilai and the revisional order at Mumbai. 3. In CWJC No. 12850/2010, the petitioner is aggrieved by an order dated 20.08.2009 passed by the Commandant, CISF Unit ECL, Seetalpur district Burdwan, West Bengal by which he has been dismissed from service. The appellate order was passed at Bhilai and the revisional order at Mumbai. 3. In CWJC No. 12850/2010, the petitioner is aggrieved by an order dated 20.08.2009 passed by the Commandant, CISF Unit ECL, Seetalpur district Burdwan, West Bengal by which he has been dismissed from service. The petitioner was posted as Constable, SRP campus, CISF Unit ECL, Seetalpur and the order of dismissal was served upon him at Seetalpur in West Bengal. The petitioner’s appeal came to be dismissed by an order dated 04.11.2009 passed by the DIG, CISF, North Eastern Region, Kolkata. His revision application was dismissed by an order dated 06.02.2010 passed by IG, CISF, North Eastern Zone, Kolkata. In his case also the appellate order as well as the revisional order were communicated to his home village, Sarva in the district of Munger (Bihar) which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. 4. To sum up, the orders of dismissal/ compulsory retirement of the petitioners in both the cases were passed and communicated to them at places not within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. The appellate orders and the revisional orders were passed by the authorities outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court and were communicated to them at their respective home village falling within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. 5. In the background of the admitted facts, as noted above, it has been strenuously argued by learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that communication of the appellate order and revisional order to the petitioners at their respective home villages, which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of this court, constitute cause of action within the meaning Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India and, therefore, this court has jurisdiction over the matters. 6. Mr. Umesh Prasad Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in CWJC No. 15095/2011 has placed reliance upon various judgments of the Supreme Court in support of his contention to the effect that:- (i) Central Industrial Security Force being an organization of the Union of India having its offices throughout the country including Patna, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this court; this court has the jurisdiction to issue writ to the Chief of the Force, irrespective of the place where his office is located. He has relied upon the Apex Court judgment reported in (2001) 9 SCC 359 (Himalayan Construction Company vs. Executive Engineer, Irrigation Division, J&K and Anr). (ii) An order of punishment having the effect of cessation of relationship of employer and employee, becomes effective only upon service of such order upon the concerned employee and, therefore, service of such order also constitute cause of action and though the original order imposing punishment of compulsory retirement was served upon the petitioner at Bhilai but that order was not final and the order merged with the orders of the appellate authority and finally with the order of the revisional authority. According to him, the original order of compulsory retirement attained finality only after passing of the revisional order which was communicated to the petitioner at his home village, which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of this court and, therefore, this court has jurisdiction. He has placed reliance in this regard upon judgments of the Supreme Court reported in (2000) 6 SCC 359 (Kunhayammed & Ors vs. State of Kerala & anr.) and (2010) 13 SCC 158 (Omprakash Verma & Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & anr.) primarily to contend that the original order passed by the disciplinary authority lost its identity and individuality after passing of the appellate order and the revisional order in the appellate order and finally in the revisional order. (iii) In support of his plea that the cause of action arose at the place where such communication is made, he has placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this court reported in 2011 (4) PLJR 427 (Lt. Col. Vijoy Kumar Prasad vs. Union of India). (iv) The Apex Court judgment reported in (2001) 9 SCC 521 (Dinesh Chandra Gahtori vs. Chief of Army Staff and another) has not been taken into consideration by this court as well as the Apex Court in subsequent judgments, while laying down the law that mere communication of rejection of a claim will not constitute cause of action. (v) Counter affidavit in the present writ application has been sworn by an officer having his office at Patna within the territorial jurisdiction of this court and, therefore, this court does not lack territorial jurisdiction. 7. I have heard at length learned senior counsel, Mr. Basant Kumar Choudhary also appearing in CWJC No. 12850 of 2010 on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. 7. I have heard at length learned senior counsel, Mr. Basant Kumar Choudhary also appearing in CWJC No. 12850 of 2010 on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. N.A. Shamsi, learned Assistant Solicitor General, Union of India appearing on behalf of the respondents in both the cases. 8. Before I advert to the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, I must take note of the fact that Commandant, CISF, Patna has been impleaded as respondent no. 8 in CWJC No. 15095 of 2011, but neither any action of respondent No.8 is under challenge in the present writ application nor any direction has been sought to be issued upon him. 9. To begin with, I consider it appropriate to quote relevant provision of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as, in my opinion jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue writs/directions/orders under the said provision is primarily dependant upon the location of the persons/authorities to whom such writs/ orders or directions are sought to be issued and the place where the cause of action has arisen wholly or in part:- “226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including [writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part-III and for any other purpose]. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.” 10. On a bare reading of the said provision it will appear that this court can exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if:- (i) Any cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such territory, notwithstanding the fact that seat of such Government or authority or residence of such person to whom writs/orders are said to be issued is not within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises such jurisdiction. (ii) A High Court may issue writs or directions throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises its jurisdiction to any person or authority or the appropriate Government. 11. The provision as contained in Article 226 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of India can be easily summarized by saying that a High Court shall have the territorial jurisdiction to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if a person/authority/appropriate Government to whom a writ/order/direction is sought to be issued resides or located within the territorial jurisdiction of the court or if any cause of action has arisen wholly or in part within its jurisdiction, notwithstanding the seat of such Government/authority or residence of such person. 12. There is no difficulty so far as application of Article 226 (1) of the Constitution of India is concerned in the present case for the purpose of deciding territorial jurisdiction. None of the persons/authorities whose actions are under challenge in the present writ applications reside within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. 13. Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India confers territorial jurisdiction upon a High Court to issue writs if “cause of action” arises within its jurisdiction. From the facts as noted above, it would be evident that apart from the fact that the orders dismissing the appeal and the revision preferred by the petitioners were communicated to them on their respective home villages falling within the territorial jurisdiction of this court, nothing has happened within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. Whether such communications would constitute cause of action even in part, is primarily the issue involved in the present case, for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Whether such communications would constitute cause of action even in part, is primarily the issue involved in the present case, for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This is also to be considered as to whether CISF, an all India organization having offices throughout the country including at Patna would be, for that reason, amenable to the jurisdiction of all High Courts in the country, as has been submitted by learned senior counsel, relying upon the Apex Court judgment in (2001) 9 SCC 525 (Dinesh Chandra Gahtori vs. Chief of Army Staff and another). 14. The question as to whether communication of an order will constitute cause of action has been considered by a Division Bench of this court reported in 1983 PLJR 55 (Nand Kishore Singh vs. Union of India) which arose out of an order by which the petitioner of that case was dismissed from service while posted as a Constable in CISF in State of Punjab. He had preferred his appeal and revision from his home village which were rejected and the orders rejecting the appeal and revision were communicated to him at his home village. The plea that such communication would also constitute a cause of action was turned down by this court in following terms:- “Examining the facts of the present case, however, it is clear that consequence of the order of dismissal of the petitioner and his removal from the service took place at Naya Nangal itself and the petitioner when returned to his village home, came as dismissed employee, having no claim whatsoever in the service, except a right to prefer an appeal. Simply, therefore, the filing of an appeal from his village home where the petitioner might have chosen to proceed after his dismissal in our opinion did not or should not furnish any part of the cause of action to clothe the High Court of that place the territorial jurisdiction to exercise any of the powers under Clause (1) of Article 226.” 15. What would constitute cause of action within the meaning of under Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India has been very succinctly laid down by the Apex Court in case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India & Anr reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254 , paragraph 6 of which reads thus:- “6. What would constitute cause of action within the meaning of under Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India has been very succinctly laid down by the Apex Court in case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India & Anr reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254 , paragraph 6 of which reads thus:- “6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any Statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. Negatively, put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance, is beyond any doubt. For every action there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily.” 16. The Supreme court held that the facts pleaded in the writ petition must have nexus on the basis whereof prayer can be granted and such facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action, which would confer jurisdiction on the court. 17. In the case of State of Rajsthan vs. M/s Swaika Properties & Anr. reported in 1985(3) SCC 217 their Lordships of Supreme Court held that service of notice would give rise to cause of action only if service of notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The Apex Court laid down the law in case of State of Rajsthan vs. M/s Swaika Properties & Anr. reported in 1985(3) SCC 217 in following terms:- “The mere service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajsthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajsthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench.” 18. Reference may also be made in this regard to the Supreme Court judgment reported in (1994) 4 SCC 710 , Aligarh Muslim University & anr. Vs. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. & Anr wherein the Court held that residence or place of communication cannot be a crucial factor for deciding the cause of action, within the meaning of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India. 19. Reference may also be made in this regard to another judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711 (Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu & Ors.) wherein the Supreme Court held that communication did not form an integral part of cause of action within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 20. The submission that the Director General of CISF can be sued anywhere in the country, placing reliance upon the Supreme Court judgment in case of Dinesh Chandra Gahtori (supra) cannot be accepted for the reason that the said order was passed in the facts and circumstances of that case where the matter had remained pending for seven years at the stage of admission and the writ petition was preferred against the Chief of Army Staff. The facts and circumstances of the present case are different where the order of dismissal has been passed by an officer having his office outside the jurisdiction of this court and it was served also outside the jurisdiction of this court. In my opinion, the communication of rejection of appeal and revision does not constitute integral part of cause of action, in the light of law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Aligarh Muslim University (Supra), Oil and Natural Gas Commission (supra) and National Textile Corp. Ltd & Ors. Vs. Haribox Swalram & Ors reported in (2004) 9 SCC 786 . 21. Ltd & Ors. Vs. Haribox Swalram & Ors reported in (2004) 9 SCC 786 . 21. The plea that the order of dismissal merged with the appellate order and finally with the revisional order and, therefore, communication of such orders to the petitioners at their villages home would be an integral part of cause of action is not acceptable to me in view of Division Bench judgment of this court in case of Nand Kishore Singh vs. Union of India (supra) since the consequence of communication of such order did not fall at the village home of the petitioners. The consequence of appellate order and revisional order fell the moment they were passed by the concerned authorities and at the respective places where they were passed. In my opinion, there would be difference between the communication of order of dismissal from service upon an employee and communication of the decision on statutory appeal or revision preferred by such employee. Consequence of the order of dismissal will fall only when such order is communicated to an employee as communication has the effect of cessation of relationship of employer and employee. It becomes effective only when it is made known to such employee and, therefore, communication of an order of dismissal may also constitute a crucial part of cause of action. This would not be the case with communication of appellate order or revisional order rejecting the appeal or revision against such order of dismissal for the reason that the rejection of such appeal or revision becomes effective the moment it is passed, at the place where such order is passed. I do not agree with the submission that the order of dismissal merged with the order by the appellate authority and the revisional order and, therefore, such orders partake the nature of the original order of dismissal and, therefore, communication of such appellate order would form part integral part of cause of action. 22. Mr. Umesh Prasad Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has placed much emphasis upon the Supreme Court judgment reported in (2000) 6 SCC 359 (Kunhayammed vs. State of Kerala) paragraph 12 of which reads thus:- “12(1) The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by an inferior court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way- whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges, the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. (2) However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view.” (Emphasis mine) 23. There can be no issue over the doctrine of merger as enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of Kunhaymmed (supra). However, for the purpose of deciding cause of action on the basis of communication, in my opinion, consequence of such communication is most important factor to be kept in mind. If without such communication, the matter so communicated has no effect then it can be said that part cause of action accrues also at the place of such communication, otherwise not. In other words in a situation where, for a transaction to be complete, communication is must, part cause of action would certainly arise also at the place of such communication, as such communication becomes an integral part of that transaction and cause of action would also accrue on the communication being effected. 24. A Division Bench of this court in the case of Amar Kumar Choubey v. Union of India reported in 2009 (1) PLJR 555 had occasion to consider in detail as to whether communication would in fact constitute cause of action within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 24. A Division Bench of this court in the case of Amar Kumar Choubey v. Union of India reported in 2009 (1) PLJR 555 had occasion to consider in detail as to whether communication would in fact constitute cause of action within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This court referring to various precedents held in paragraph 14 as follows:- “ Thus any and every part of his cause of action for claiming grant of disability pension had arisen beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this court and the contention of the learned counsel for the appellate/ writ petitioner that as the communication refusing grant of disability pension was made to his permanent village home address the district of Saran of the State of Bihar within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court by itself given him a cause of action to maintain his writ petition is wholly misconceived and must be rejected.” 25. The order of this court in case of Lt. Col. Vijoy Kumar Prasad vs. Union of India reported in 2011(4) PLJR 427 , reliance upon which has been placed by learned senior counsel for the petitioner, will also not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case as in that case the impugned communication was received by the petitioner of that case at Danapur Cantt. This court held in that circumstance that consequence of impugned communication fell upon him at Danapur Cantt. The said order is distinguishable on this ground alone. 26. Having considered the submissions advanced by learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners with reference to the judgments of the Apex Court as well as this court, I am of the view that:- (i) Communication of an order/notice would constitute the accrual of part of the cause of action where the consequence of the order is to fall, (ii) Communication of rejection of appeal or revision against the order of dismissal from service of an employee will not amount to cause of action as its consequence does not fall at the place of communication and that cannot be a ground for the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 27. These writ applications are, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. It is made clear that I have not gone into the merits of the case. 27. These writ applications are, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. It is made clear that I have not gone into the merits of the case. The petitioners shall have liberty to take such recourse to law, as they may be advised, for the reliefs prayed for in the present writ applications.