JUDGMENT P.C. By these petitions, petitioner seeks an order and direction against the Prothonotary and Senior Master to release the security submitted by the Petitioner pursuant to the order passed by this court on 25th July, 2012 in Arbitration Petition (L) No. 985 of 2012 and other four companion matters. 2. On 25th July, 2012 this court in the above referred petitions, had directed the petitioner to furnish security to the extent of 3.29 crores to the satisfaction of the Prothonotary and Senior Master within the period of four weeks from the date of the said order. It was directed that upon the petitioner furnishing the said security to the satisfaction of the Prothonotary, respondent shall not deduct any amount from the bills payable by the respondent to the petitioner on account of service tax as set out in the notice dated 8th May, 2012. This court further directed the arbitrator to render the award within four months from the date of his appointment keeping all the rights and contentions of the parties open. 3. Pursuant to the said order passed by this court, petitioner furnished security to the extent of Rs. 3.29 Crores to the satisfaction of the Prothonotary and Senior Master. The parties appointed the sole arbitrator who has rendered the award on 17th September, 2012. By the said award the learned arbitrator has rejected the claims made by the respondent and directed the respondent to refund the security deposit in case of concluded contracts as per the terms of the contract with interest. My attention is invited by the learned counsel for the parties to the order dated 24th March, 2014 passed by this court in Arbitration Petition No. 210 of 2014 and companion petitions which are filed by the respondents herein under section 34 of the Act thereby impugning the arbitral awards rendered by the learned arbitrator rejecting the claims made by the respondents. This court has admitted all the five petitions filed by the respondent by the said order. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner in all the aforesaid petitions submits that even if the award rendered by the learned arbitrator is stayed by virtue of section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 order directing the petitioner to furnish security passed on 25th July, 2012 during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings is not restored. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner in all the aforesaid petitions submits that even if the award rendered by the learned arbitrator is stayed by virtue of section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 order directing the petitioner to furnish security passed on 25th July, 2012 during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings is not restored. It is submitted that since the claims made by the respondents are rejected by the learned arbitrator, security furnished by the petitioner during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings cannot be allowed to be continued during the pendency of the petition filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the other hand submits that in view of this court admitting the petitions filed by the respondents under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the award rendered by the learned arbitrator has been automatically stayed in view of section 36 of the Act and thus the securities furnished by the petitioner pursuant to the order passed by this court on 25th July, 2012 shall be continued and the petitioner shall not be permitted to withdraw such securities. It is submitted that if the respondent ultimately succeeds in the petition filed under section 34 of the Act and if the prayers of the petitioner as claimed in this petition are granted, the respondent would not be able to recover any amount from the petitioner. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of National Buildings Construction Corporation Limited Versus Lloyds Insulation India Limited, (2005) 2 SCC 367 and in particular paragraph 6 therein support of his submissions that if the petition filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 is filed within the time prescribed under section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the award is automatically stayed and cannot be executed. Paragraph 6 of the said judgment reads thus : “6. We are of the view that the award clearly states that after an adjustment of accounts the only amount payable by the appellant to the respondent was Rs.4,11,756. How the arbitrator arrived at this figure is not for us to see. Paragraph 6 of the said judgment reads thus : “6. We are of the view that the award clearly states that after an adjustment of accounts the only amount payable by the appellant to the respondent was Rs.4,11,756. How the arbitrator arrived at this figure is not for us to see. For the purposes of Section 36 of the Act, the court cannot be called upon to go behind the awarded amount and deal with the processes by which the amount was arrived at. There is on record only one award for the amount of Rs.4,11,756. Even though the respondent claims that the application under Section 34 was filed in respect of part of the award, it is in fact only a process by which the arbitrator has arrived at the awarded amount. This would mean that the award as a whole cannot be enforced under Section 36 of the Act. As held by this court in National Aluminium Co. Ltd. Versus Pressteel & Fabrications (P) Limited, (2004) 1 SCC 540 (SCC p.546, para 10). “the mandatory language of Section 34 (Section 36) of the 1996 Act, that an award, when challenged under Section 34 within the time stipulated therein, becomes unexecutable. There is no discretion left with the court to pass any interlocutory order in regard to the said award except to adjudicate on the correctness of the claim made by the applicant therein. Therefore, that being the legislative intent, any direction from us contrary to that, also becomes impermissible.” 6. There is no dispute in the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in case of National Buildings (supra) that if the arbitration petition is filed within the time prescribed under section 34(3) of the Act, the impugned award cannot be executed in view of section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The question however, that arises for consideration of this court in this case is that whether securities furnished by the petitioner during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings pursuant to the order dated 25th July, 2012 shall be continued till the disposal of the petitions filed under section 34 of the Act or not. 7. The question however, that arises for consideration of this court in this case is that whether securities furnished by the petitioner during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings pursuant to the order dated 25th July, 2012 shall be continued till the disposal of the petitions filed under section 34 of the Act or not. 7. Perusal of the prayers in these petitions clearly indicate that the petitioner is not seeking enforcement of the award rendered by the learned arbitrator by which the learned arbitrator has rejected the claims made by the respondent directing the respondent to refund the security deposit with interest. What the petitioner seeks by this petition is to release its security furnished by the petitioner pursuant to the interim order passed by this court during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings. 8. In my view, in view of the petitions filed by the respondent under section 34 of the Act within the time prescribed under section 34(3) of the Act, execution of the impugned award is automatically stayed. However, the stay of the impugned award will not automatically amount to continuation of the securities which are furnished by the petitioner under the interim order passed by this court during the pendency of the petitions filed under section 34 of the Act. This court has not passed any order in the petitions filed by the respondent to continue the security furnished by the petitioners during the pendency of the petitions filed by the respondent under section 34. 9. Division Bench of this court in the case of Dirk India Private Limited Vs. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Company Limited, 2013 (7) Bom.C.R. 493 has held that where the arbitral award has been rejected by the arbitral tribunal, the court under section 34 may either dismiss the objection to the arbitral award or in the exercise of its jurisdiction set aside the arbitral award. To hold that the petition under section 9 would be maintainable after the passing of arbitral award at the behest of the petitioner whose claim is rejected by the learned arbitrator would result in perversion of the object and purpose underlying section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This court has taken a view that there can be no occasion to take recourse to section 9 in such situation. This court has taken a view that there can be no occasion to take recourse to section 9 in such situation. In my view, the request of the respondent not to permit the petitioner to withdraw securities furnished and to continue such security during the pendency of their petition filed under section 34 of the Act, though their claim has been rejected by the learned arbitrator, is contrary to principles laid down by the Division Bench of this court in the case of Dirk India Private Limited (supra). I am respectfully bound by the judgment of the Division Bench which in my view applies to the facts of this case. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the said judgment read thus : “12. Two facets of Section 9 merit emphasis. The first relates to the nature of the orders that can be passed under clauses (i) and (ii). Clause (i) contemplates an order appointing a guardian for a minor or a person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings. Clause (ii) contemplates an interim measure of protection for: (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; and (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration; (d) an interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; and (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. The underlying theme of each one of the sub-clauses of clause (ii) is the immediate and proximate nexus between the interim measure of protection and the preservation, protection and securing of the subject-matter of the dispute in the arbitral proceedings. In other words, the orders that are contemplated under clause (ii) are regarded as interim measures of protection intended to protect the claim in arbitration from being frustrated. The interim measure is intended to safeguard the subject-matter of the dispute in the course of the arbitral proceedings. The second facet of Section 9 is the proximate nexus between the orders that are sought and the arbitral proceedings. When an interim measure of protection is sought before or during arbitral proceedings, such a measure is a step in aid to the fruition of the arbitral proceedings. The second facet of Section 9 is the proximate nexus between the orders that are sought and the arbitral proceedings. When an interim measure of protection is sought before or during arbitral proceedings, such a measure is a step in aid to the fruition of the arbitral proceedings. When sought after an arbitral award is made but before it is enforced, the measure of protection is intended to safeguard the fruit of the proceedings until the eventual enforcement of the award. Here again the measure of protection is a step in aid of enforcement. It is intended to ensure that enforcement of the award results in a realisable claim and that the award is not rendered illusory by dealings that would put the subject of the award beyond the pale of enforcement. Now it is in this background that it is necessary for the Court to impart a purposive interpretation to the meaning of the expression "at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36". Under Section 36, an arbitral award can be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court. The arbitral award can be enforced where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired or in the event of such an application having been made, it has been refused. The enforcement of an award enures to the benefit of the party who has secured an award in the arbitral proceedings. That is why the enforceability of an award under Section 36 is juxtaposed in the context of two time frames, the first being where an application for setting aside an arbitral award has expired and the second where an application for setting aside an arbitral award was made but was refused. The enforceability of an award, in other words, is defined with reference to the failure of the other side to file an application for setting aside the award within the stipulated time limit or having filed such an application has failed to establish a case for setting aside the arbitral award. The enforceability of an award, in other words, is defined with reference to the failure of the other side to file an application for setting aside the award within the stipulated time limit or having filed such an application has failed to establish a case for setting aside the arbitral award. Once a challenge to the arbitral award has either failed under Section 34 having been made within the stipulated period or when no application for setting aside the arbitral award has been made within time, the arbitral award becomes enforceable at the behest of the party for whose benefit the award enures. Contextually, therefore, the scheme of Section 9 postulates an application for the grant of an interim measure of protection after the making of an arbitral award and before it is enforced for the benefit of the party which seeks enforcement of the award. An interim measure of protection within the meaning of Section 9 (ii) is intended to protect through the measure, the fruits of a successful conclusion of the arbitral proceedings. A party whose claim has been rejected in the course of the arbitral proceedings cannot obviously have an arbitral award enforced in accordance with Section 36. The object and purpose of an interim measure after the passing of the arbitral award but before it is enforced is to secure the property, goods or amount for the benefit of the party which seeks enforcement. 13. The Court which exercises jurisdiction under Section 34 is not a court of first appeal under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. An appellate court to which recourse is taken against a decree of the trial Court has powers which are coextensive with those of the trial Court. A party which has failed in its claim before a trial Judge can in appeal seek a judgment of reversal and in consequence, the passing of a decree in terms of the claim in the suit. The court to which an arbitration petition challenging the award under Section 34 lies does not pass an order decreeing the claim. Where an arbitral claim has been rejected by the arbitral tribunal, the court under Section 34 may either dismiss the objection to the arbitral award or in the exercise of its jurisdiction set aside the arbitral award. The court to which an arbitration petition challenging the award under Section 34 lies does not pass an order decreeing the claim. Where an arbitral claim has been rejected by the arbitral tribunal, the court under Section 34 may either dismiss the objection to the arbitral award or in the exercise of its jurisdiction set aside the arbitral award. The setting aside of an arbitral award rejecting a claim does not result in the claim which was rejected by the Arbitrator being decreed as a result of the judgment of the court in a petition under Section 34. To hold that a petition under Section 9 would be maintainable after the passing of an arbitral award at the behest of DIPL whose claim has been rejected would result in a perversion of the object and purpose underlying Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. DIPL's application under Section 9, if allowed, would result in the grant of interim specific performance of a contract in the teeth of the findings recorded in the arbitral award. The interference by the Court at this stage to grant what in essence is a plea for a mandatory order for interim specific performance will negate the sanctity and efficacy of arbitration as a form of alternate disputes redressal. What such a litigating party cannot possibly obtain even upon completion of the proceedings under Section 34, it cannot possibly secure in a petition under Section 9 after the award. The object and purpose of Section 9 is to provide an interim measure that would protect the subject-matter of the arbitral proceedings whether before or during the continuance of the arbitral proceedings and even thereafter upon conclusion of the proceedings until the award is enforced. Once the award has been made and a claim has been rejected as in the present case, even a successful challenge to the award under Section 34 does not result an order decreeing the claim. In this view of the matter, there could be no occasion to take recourse to Section 9. Enforcement for the purpose of Section 36 as a decree of the Court is at the behest of a person who seeks to enforce the award.” 10. In this view of the matter, there could be no occasion to take recourse to Section 9. Enforcement for the purpose of Section 36 as a decree of the Court is at the behest of a person who seeks to enforce the award.” 10. For the reasons recorded aforesaid, I am inclined to accept prayer sought by the petitioner in this petition for release of the security furnished pursuant to the interim order passed by this court on 25th July, 2102. Petition therefore succeeds. Petition is made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) in all the five petitions. There shall be no order as to costs. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent seeks stay of operation of this order which is opposed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Application for stay of this order is rejected.