Judgment Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The substantial questions of law formulated and to be answered by this Court in Plaintiffs' second appeal are as under:- (i) Whether Ramcharan, Malgujar was in possession of the suit lands prior to the date of vesting? (ii) Whether the said Ramcharan (Malgujar), who was the grand father of plaintiff No. 1, acquired the right and interest in the lands on account of he being in possession earlier to the date of vesting and the plaintiff succeeded his right and interest through Gayaram and became the owner of the suit properties? [For sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status shown in the suit before the trial Court] 2. Sans unnecessary details, the facts which are essential to be stated for the purpose of disposal of the present second appeal are as under:- 2.1 Shri Ramcharan was proprietor of village Bundeli. Tahsil Mungeli, District Bilaspur. He died in the year 1954, leaving son Gayaram. Gayaram died in the year 1982, leaving two sons Ramswaroop and Ramgulam. In mutual partition, the suit land came in to possession of Ramswaroop. Plaintiff No. 1 is son of Gayaram and plaintiff No. 2 is son of Ramswaroop. They instituted a suit for declaration of their title and permanent injunction with respect to land situated at village Bundeli, Tahsil Mungeli, District Bilaspur. The description of the lands and their area are as under:- S. No. Khasra No. Aera 1. 28/1 3.17 acre 2. 30/2 0.58 acre 3. 222/1 0.20 acre 4. 222/2 0.09 acre 5. 222/3 0.10 acre 6. 224 0.08 acre 7. 331 0.12 acre 8. 25 0.01 acre 9. 335 0.10 acre 10. 365 0.20 acre 11. 228 1.05 acre Total 5.70 acre 2.2 It is the case of the plaintiffs that grandfather of the plaintiff No. 1-Shri Ramcharan being proprietor was holding the lands as a title holder and continuing in possession for last 60-70 years i.e. prior to coming into force of Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (hereinafter called as "the Act of 1950"). 2.3 It was further pleaded that Shri Ramcharan died in the year 1954 and the lands were inherited by his son Gayaram. Gayaram died in the year 1982, thereafter, Ramswaroop and Ramgulam being the sons of Gayaram, inherited the suit property. 2.3 It was further pleaded that Shri Ramcharan died in the year 1954 and the lands were inherited by his son Gayaram. Gayaram died in the year 1982, thereafter, Ramswaroop and Ramgulam being the sons of Gayaram, inherited the suit property. In mutual partition, the suit land came in to possession of Ramswaroop, but the suit land bearing Khasra No. 28/1, area 3.17 acres has wrongly been recorded as a grass land ¼?kkl t+ehu½ in revenue records, due to mistake on the part of State authorities and the encroachment proceeding has been drawn by State, in which they are likely to be dispossessed from the suit land leading to filing of the suit for declaration of title and further relief of permanent injunction restraining the State and its Authorities from interfering with their peaceful possession. 2.4 The defendant/State filed his written statement stating inter alia that the part of suit land stood recorded in the name of the Government in the revenue record as Nistar Land earmarked for the Nistar rights of the villagers, and the part of suit lands are earmarked for roads and the name of the plaintiffs have been corrected by order dated 30/09/1995 passed by the Additional Collector Bilaspur, which has been affirmed in revision by Commissioner on 27/08/1999. Therefore, the suit deserves to be dismissed. 2.5 The Trial Court upon consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, by its judgment and decree dated 06/08/2005, dismissed the suit finding inter alia that:-- (i) Plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit land as Khasra No. 28/1 and 28/2 are entered into revenue record as grass land ¼?kkl t+ehu½ ; (ii) Khasra Nos. 525 and 30/2 are recorded as land beneath the water ¼ikuh ds uhps t+ehu½ ; (iii) Khasra Nos. 222/1, 2, 3, 224, 331, 335, 365 are recorded as grass land ¼?kkl t+ehu½ ; (iv) Khasra No. 228 is meant for road ¼dPph lM+d½ ; and, (v) Khasra No. 25 is recorded as land beneath the water ¼ikuh ds uhps t+ehu½ in the name of the Government. 2.6 On appeal being preferred by the plaintiffs under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'the CPC'), the First Appellate. 2.6 On appeal being preferred by the plaintiffs under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'the CPC'), the First Appellate. Court accepted the finding of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal finding inter alia that:-- (i) Shri Ramcharan, proprietor grandfather of plaintiff No. 1 was not cultivating the suit land personally and it was not a home-farm land within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act of 1950; (ii) Shri Ramcharan was not in physical possession of the suit land on the date of vesting i.e. 31/03/1951; and (iii) the suit land had vested to the Government under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1950 with effect from 31/03/1951 and the right of the plaintiffs, if any, had already extinguished by operation of Act of 1960. 3. Questioning the legal acceptability and sustainability of the impugned judgment and decree dated 13/03/2006 passed by Second Additional District Judge (F.T.C.) Mungeli, District Bilaspur in Civil Appeal No. 53-A/2005, this instant second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiffs under Section 100 of the CPC, in which, two substantial questions of law has been formulated as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment. 4. Mr. Somnath Verma, learned counsel appearing for the appellants/plaintiffs, while criticizing the judgment and decree passed by two Courts below would vehemently submit that both the Courts below have fallen into palpable error of jurisdiction in holding that proprietor-Shri Ramcharan was not in possession of the suit land on the date of vesting, and further fallen into error in holding that the suit land was not a home-farm land. He would lastly submit that the findings recorded by two Courts below are perverse and contrary to the record, and is liable to be set aside and plaintiffs suit be decreed with cost. 5. Combating the submissions of Mr. Verma, Mr. Vinay Harit, Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State/defendant would submit that the scheduled suit land is not a home-farm land and the plaintiffs' grand father Late Shri Ramcharan proprietor was neither in possession of the suit land on the date of vesting i.e. before 31/03/1951 nor it was under personal cultivation in the agricultural year 1948-49, duly recorded in the annual papers for the said year therefore, the judgment and decree passed by two Courts below deserves to be affirmed. 6. 6. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, and considered their rival submission made and perused the records of both the Courts below with utmost circumspection. Re-substantial questions of law No. 1 & 2: 7. Since both the questions are interlinked, they are being considered collectively--In order to have proper comprehension of the attack made to the decree of two Courts below, it would be profitable to take note of Section 2(g) as well as Section 4(2) of the Act of 1950. Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act of 1950 defines "home-farm". It runs as under:-- "2. Definitions.--In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-- (g) "home-farm" means-- (1) in relation to the Central Provinces, (i) land recorded as sir and Khudkasht in the name of a proprietor in the annual papers for the year 1948-49, and (ii) land acquired by a proprietor by surrender from tenants after the year 1948-49 till the date of vesting; (2) in relation to merged territories, that part of the land under the personal cultivation of the proprietor on the date of vesting which was similarly under cultivation in the agricultural year 1949-50 and which he is entitled to retain on the termination of proprietary tenure under any instrument having the force of law and applicable to such tenure. Explanation.--Land under personal cultivation includes land allowed to lie fallow in accordance with the usual agricultural practice; but does not include any land in lawful possession of a raiyot or tenant. (3) Omitted." 8. From the careful reading of the afore-quoted provisions, it would appear that in order to succeed in the instant suit filed, claiming land in dispute is not vested with the State, by virtue of provision contained. Section 4(1) & (2) of the Act of 1950, the plaintiffs were required to establish the following facts:-- (i) that the schedule suit land is 'home-farm land' within the meaning of Section 2(g)(1)(i) of the Act of 1950 on the date of vesting and recorded in the name of the proprietor in the annual papers for the year 1948-49. (ii) that they are in possession of the said home-farm land on the date of vesting i.e. 31/03/1951; and (iii) that they are in personal cultivation of the land after the agricultural year 1948-49 but prior to date of vesting i.e. 31/03/1951. 9. (ii) that they are in possession of the said home-farm land on the date of vesting i.e. 31/03/1951; and (iii) that they are in personal cultivation of the land after the agricultural year 1948-49 but prior to date of vesting i.e. 31/03/1951. 9. The first question to be considered is whether the scheduled suit land is a home farm land of proprietor within the meaning of Section 2(g)(1)(i) of the Act of 1950. 10. A close reading of the definition of the 'home-farm land' would show that the only condition requisite for the proprietor having certain land to be home-farm land, land is actually recorded as Sir and Khudkasht land in the annual papers of 1948-49. 11. In case of Haji Sk. Subhan vs. Madhorao, AIR 1962 SC 1230 , the Supreme Court considered the question in light of provisions contained in Abolition Act, after quoting the definition of the 'home-farm land' in Section 2(g) of the Act of 1950, their Lordships discussed the matter as under:-- "It is significant to note in this connection that sub-clause (i) refers to land actually recorded as sir and khudkasht in the annual papers of 1948-49 and dose not refer in terms to land which was the sir and khudkasht of the proprietor in that year and which ought to have been recorded as such in those papers but had not been so recorded." Further: "It is also significant to notice that in sub-section (2), the land answering the description of "home-farm" is described differently. Only that land comes within the expression "home-farm" which had been under the personal cultivation of the proprietor on the date of vesting and which had been similarly under cultivation in the agricultural year 1949-50, and which he is entitled to retain even on the termination of his proprietary tenure under any instrument having the force of law and applicable to that tenure. Personal cultivation of the proprietor at two relevant dates was the main criterion. Such cultivation was not made the criterion in the definition in sub-clause (i) of sub-section (1). It is not necessary, according to that sub-clause, that the proprietor be personally cultivating that land. The only condition requisite for the proprietor having certain land treated as his home-farm was the fact that the annual papers of 1948-49 recorded that land as his sir and khudkasht. It is not necessary, according to that sub-clause, that the proprietor be personally cultivating that land. The only condition requisite for the proprietor having certain land treated as his home-farm was the fact that the annual papers of 1948-49 recorded that land as his sir and khudkasht. The basis was the record and not the fact of actual cultivation or his title to that land." The definition evinces the intention of the Legislature to remove the question of certain land be "home-farm" or not from the sphere of litigation. Recorded entry was treated to be the basis for adjudging the land to be 'home-farm'." 12. Thus, it has been held and settled by their Lordship of Supreme Court that land which was not recorded as 'home-farm land' (sir and khudkasht land) in the annual papers of 1948-49 would not be retained by proprietor as 'home-farm land'. 13. Having examined and ascertained the legal position that the suit land must be the 'home-farm land' (sir or khudkasht land) of the proprietor within the meaning of Section 2(g)(1)(i) of the Act of 1950 and it must be recorded in the annual papers of 1948-49, turning back to the facts of the present case, it appears that the total land, which the plaintiffs have claimed is 5.70 acres. According to the plaint averments stated by the plaintiffs that Khasra No. 28/01, area 3.17 acres is recorded in the revenue records as grass land ¼?kkl t+ehu½ . Exhibit P-4 is the copy of the Misal Bandobast in which column No. 4 land has been described as either beneath the water ¼ikuh ds uhps t+ehu½ or grass land ¼?kkl t+ehu½ . Exhibit P-6 filed by the plaintiffs is the copy of the Nistar Patarak, in which, suit land bearing Khasra No. 28/01 is recorded as land reserved for grassing ¼pjkbZ½ . Exhibit P-8 is the copy of the Misal Bandobast of the year 1943-44, in which, the land bearing Khasra No. 28, area 6.33 acres has been recorded as grass land ¼?kkl t+ehu½ like is a situation in the Exhibits P-9 & P-10, in which, suit land either being recorded as grass land ¼?kkl t+ehu½ or beneath the water ¼ikuh ds uhps t+ehu½ . 14. Mr. 14. Mr. Somnath Verma, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs would submit that though in the instant case, suit land is recorded as grass land ¼?kkl t+ehu½ or beneath the water ¼ikuh ds uhps t+ehu½ , yet it should be considered equivalent to khudkasht land as khudkasht is merely description to which, the land is put and not a right. 15. The Submission of Mr. Verma cannot be accepted for the two reasons, firstly, the plaintiffs have not filed any village papers for the year 1948-49, in which, the suit land is recorded as sir or khudkasht land in the name of proprietor-Ramcharan and, secondly, the legislature in adopting the village record of 1948-49, specifying the land as "sir" or "khudkasht" land chose to base the rights in this type of 'home-farm land' on a record of description only and chose to confine the rights to land recorded as sir and khudkasht only and legislature in its own wisdom did not extend the home-farm land to grass land ¼?kkl t+ehu½ or beneath the water ¼ikuh ds uhps t+ehu½ , it is an end of the matter. Thus, the plaintiffs have failed to establish the suit land is a 'home-farm land' (sir or khudkasht land) recorded in the annual papers of 1948-49 in the name of the proprietor. 16. Now coming to the next question would be whether the proprietor (Ramcharan) was in possession of the 'home-farm land' on the date of vesting i.e. 31/03/1951 and land was under the personal cultivation after the agricultural year 1948-49 and prior to date of vesting i.e. 31/03/1951. 17. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 runs as under:- "4. Consequences of the vesting.-- (1) * * * * (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the proprietor shall continue to retain the possession of his home-stead, home-farm land, and in the Central Provinces also of land brought under cultivation by him after the agricultural year 1948-49 but before the date of vesting." 18. A close and careful perusal of sub-section (2) of Section 4 would show that proprietor in possession of home-farm land on the date of vesting is entitled to retain the possession notwithstanding the vesting of all his rights in the State Government. 19. In case of Haji Sk. A close and careful perusal of sub-section (2) of Section 4 would show that proprietor in possession of home-farm land on the date of vesting is entitled to retain the possession notwithstanding the vesting of all his rights in the State Government. 19. In case of Haji Sk. Subhan (supra), the Supreme Court held as under:- "In accordance with the provisions of this section, the proprietary rights in an estate, mahal, alienated village or alienated land in the area specified in the notification vesting in a proprietor of such estate, etc., were to pass from such proprietor and vest in the State for purposes of the State free from all encumbrances. These provisions themselves were sufficient to divest the proprietor of such estate, etc., of his proprietary right. The consequences of such vesting are further specified in Section 4. In view of sub-section (2) of Section 3, no right could be acquired over the land which had vested in the State except by succession or under a grant or contract in writing made or entered into by or on behalf of the State." Thereafter reference was made to various provisions of the Act and dealing with sub-section 2 of Section 4, it was held as under:- "Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act provides that the proprietor can continue to retain possession of home-farm land after the vesting of his proprietary right in the State. The respondent cannot take advantage of this provision even if the land in suit be held to be home-farm. He was not in possession of the land in suit on the date of vesting and no question of continuing to retain possession arose." (emphasis supplied) Later:- "It is also significant to notice that in sub-section (2), the land answering the description of 'home-farm' is described differently. Only that land comes within the expression 'home-farm' which had been under the personal cultivation of the proprietor on the date of vesting and which had been similarly under cultivation in the agricultural year 1949-50, and which he is entitled to retain even on the termination of his proprietary tenure under any instrument having the force of law and applicable to that tenure. Personal cultivation of the proprietor at two relevant dates was the main criterion." 20. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court Haji Sk. Personal cultivation of the proprietor at two relevant dates was the main criterion." 20. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court Haji Sk. Subhan, AIR 1962 SC 1230 (supra) was reiterated and followed by Supreme Court in case of Ramkhilawandhar and others vs. Gajodharprasad (Dead) By LRS., (1985) 2 SCC 58 , and observed as under:- "A reading of sub-section (2) of Section 4 with the definition of "home-farm land" shows that while all rights of the proprietor vest in the State Government on the specified date, the proprietor shall continue to retain the possession of his home-farm land. In other words, notwithstanding the vesting of all his rights in the State Government, the proprietor may continue to retain the possession of his home-farm land. The necessary implication is that the proprietor is in possession of the land on the date of vesting. If he is in physical possession of the land on the date of vesting, he may continue to retain the possession of such home-farm land. In the present case, admittedly the plaintiffs were not in possession of the lands in dispute on the date of vesting and, therefore, their suit must necessarily fail." 21. Though the plaintiffs have pleaded that firstly, Shri Ramcharan and after his death son Gayaram was in possession of the suit land. After the death of Gayaram, his two sons, namely, Ramswaroop and Ramgulam inherited the suit property and thereafter plaintiff No. 1 is in possession of suit land. In order to establish the possession, documents Exhibit P-4 Misal Bandobash for the year 1927-28, Exhibit P-8 Misal Bandobash for the year 1943-44 recording the name of Shri Ramcharan has been brought on record and Exhibits P-9 & P-10 copy of Khasra have been filed, but none of the document establishes that the suit land was in possession of Shri Ramcharan-proprietor and the said land was under his cultivation. 22. Apart from this, the plaintiffs have failed to bring the document on record, annual paper of 1948-49 as, required under Section 4(2) of the Act of 1950 showing personal cultivation by proprietor after agricultural year 1948-49 and before the date of vesting i.e. 31/03/1951. 23. 22. Apart from this, the plaintiffs have failed to bring the document on record, annual paper of 1948-49 as, required under Section 4(2) of the Act of 1950 showing personal cultivation by proprietor after agricultural year 1948-49 and before the date of vesting i.e. 31/03/1951. 23. In order to bring the case within the purview of Section 4(2) of the Act of 1950, it was incumbent on the part of the plaintiffs to file the documents demonstrating that 'home-farm land' had been under his personal cultivation on the date of vesting and which had been under his personal cultivation in the agricultural year 1948-49, by which he is entitled to retain the possession. Thus, personal cultivation of the proprietor on above-stated two relevant dates are to be established on record in order to succeed, which the plaintiffs have failed to establish. 24. Plaintiffs have not brought on record any document demonstrating that the suit land was personal cultivation of the proprietor Ramcharan in the agricultural year 1948-49 and has also not brought any document showing that on or before the date of vesting proprietor was in possession of the suit land. 25. The Trial Court as well as First Appellate Court has clearly and categorically recorded a finding that the suit land is not a 'home-farm' land within the meaning of Section 2(g)(1)(i) of the Act of 1950 and further that recorded a finding the proprietor-late Shri Ramcharan was neither in possession of the suit land on or before the date of vesting i.e. 31/03/1951 nor the suit land was in his under personal cultivation on the two relevant dates by considering the entire evidence brought on record. 26. Thus, the concurrent finding recorded by two Courts below holding that plaintiffs have failed to establish the nature of suit land to be 'home-farm land' and further finding that at two relevant dates proprietor was not personal cultivation of the suit land is concurrent finding based on record. I do not find any illegality in the said findings and same is hereby affirmed. 27. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion, the second appeal deserves to and is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs. A decree be drawn up accordingly. Appeal dismissed.