JUDGMENT The appellant has been convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 of Indian Penal Code by the learned 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur, by his judgment and order dated 9th December, 1998, in Sessions Trial No. 326/ 1996. 2. The incident in question had occurred on 11th January, 1996 at about 9.30 a.m. at the house of the mother of the deceased (complainant). The appellant was married to the deceased on 21st May, 1995. It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant was subjecting the deceased Mamta to cruelty and was demanding home appliances and cash amount. Therefore, the deceased had been staying with her mother at Kanhan. The appellant is resident of village Yerkheda, Kamptee, which is nearby to Kanhan. 3. It is also the case of the prosecution that deceased was not keeping well and she was advised to abstain from physical intimacy with her husband. It is alleged against the appellant that appellant used to visit the house of his mother-in-law and used to beat the deceased. On the date of incident i.e. on 11th January, 1996, at about 6.30 a.m., the appellant had visited the house of his mother-in-law and had beaten the deceased. The sister of deceased Mrs. Seema Gajbhiye was also staying in the nearby premises. She had seen the incident. She had also seen that the deceased went inside the house after the incident of beating and set herself on fire. The deceased was thereafter removed to Hosptial, where her statement was recorded by the Police Head Constable, in which she had stated that the appellant had beaten her on the date of incident and thereafter she had poured kerosene on herself and set herself ablaze. It was further stated by her that since one month prior to the date of incident, the appellant had been visiting the house of his mother-in-law and had been abusing and assaulting the deceased. The statement of the deceased was recorded by the Head Constable at about 17.30 hours. The First Information Report was registered on the statement made by the mother of the deceased at about 23.20 hours on IIth January, 1996. 4. After registration of the First Information Report, statements of the witnesses including Mrs. Seema Gajbhiye and the friend of the deceased were recorded. The First Information Report was registered on the statement made by the mother of the deceased at about 23.20 hours on IIth January, 1996. 4. After registration of the First Information Report, statements of the witnesses including Mrs. Seema Gajbhiye and the friend of the deceased were recorded. It appears that the deceased had died by the time First Information Report was recorded and therefore, offence under Sections 498-A and 306 of Indian Penal Code was registered against the appellant. The dead body of the deceased was subjected to post mortem examination. The Doctor who examined the dead body of the deceased had reported that the deceased had died due to burn injuries. The deceased had died at about 5.45 p.m.. The panchnama of the spot was also drawn. 5. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed, which came up for hearing before the learned trial Judge on 14th November, 1997. A charge for the above stated two offences was framed vide Exh.5. The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The plea of the appellant is at Exh. 6. 6. The respondent had examined in all 11 witnesses in support of its case. PW-1 was the complainant, mother of the deceased. PW-2 was Mrs. Seema Gajbhiye, sister of the deceased. PW-3 was landlord of the premises where the mother of the deceased was staying and where the incident had occurred. PW-4 was Panch who was present on the spot of incident and in whose presence Panchnama Exh. 23 was drawn. PW-5 Dr. Ashesh had examined the dead body of the deceased and had opined that the deceased had died due to shock due to burn injuries. PW-6 was the friend of the deceased and she was daughter of landlord PW-3. PW-7 is the Police Officer who had recorded the First Information Report of PW-1. PW-8 is the Head Constable Buckle No. 823, who had reached the spot after receiving the information and had drawn seizure Panchnama in respect of articles found on the spot vide Exh. 21. He had also drawn Panchm ma of spot (Exh.22). The articles seized during the course of investigation were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory by this witness. PW-9 Police Head Constable was on duty in Medical College, Nagpur. He had visited the Ward after receiving intimation regarding admission of the deceased at Hospital. 21. He had also drawn Panchm ma of spot (Exh.22). The articles seized during the course of investigation were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory by this witness. PW-9 Police Head Constable was on duty in Medical College, Nagpur. He had visited the Ward after receiving intimation regarding admission of the deceased at Hospital. He had recorded the statement of the deceased vide Exh. 37. PW-10 is the Head Constable Buckle No. 604 who had drawn the inquest panchnama of the dead body on 12th January, 1996. PW 11 had intimated the Police about the death of deceased. 7. As such, the evidence against the appellant on which the respondent had relied upon before the trial Court was in the form of oral testimony of PW-1, PW-2, PW-4 and PW- 6 and the dying declaration recorded by PW-9 at Exh. 37. PW-l was not present on the date of incident. She had made some general allegations regarding earlier behaviour of the appellant, which were disclosed to her by the deceased. Therefore, the evidence of PW- 1 is hearsay evidence. The evidence of PW- 1 regarding the incident in question is also hearsay inasmuch as the incident in question was disclosed to her by PW-2 Mrs. Seema Gajbhiye. 8. The evidence of PW-2 Mrs. Seema Gajbhiye assumes great importance as she claimed to have seen the appellant beating the deceased and the deceased entering her house and setting herself on fire. However this witness in her cross examination had admitted that she did not listen to the talks between the appellant and the deceased. She had not disclosed to the police that appellant had slapped the deceased and pulled her hair and thereafter went away. She has further admitted that she learnt about the incident of deceased setting herself on fire after about 10 to 15 minutes of the incident. This clearly indicates that she had not seen the appellant assaulting the deceased, nor had she seen the deceased setting herself on fire. Her evidence is based on the information she might have received from some other source. As such, evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 in fact was worthless and could not have been relied upon to arrive at any conclusion. 9. PW-3 knew that some quarrel was going on between the deceased and the appellant. He had not stated anything more than this. As such, evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 in fact was worthless and could not have been relied upon to arrive at any conclusion. 9. PW-3 knew that some quarrel was going on between the deceased and the appellant. He had not stated anything more than this. PW-6 had stated that she was informed by the deceased that the appellant used to beat her and drag her. Though this witness had stated that Mrs. Seema had questioned the appellant as to why he was assaulting the deceased, this evidence stands falsified because of the admission given by the PW-2 in her cross examination. As such the evidence of this witness has become worthless. 10. It takes me to the other piece of evidence i.e. dying declaration given by the deceased to PW-9. The said dying declaration was disbelieved by the learned trial Court on the ground that the deceased was given Penzyl Tablet, which is little anesthetic and therefore, the deceased was not in a condition to give the statement. What may further be noted is that the dying declaration was stated to be recorded at 5.30 p.m. on 11th January, 1996. PW-11 had stated that deceased had died at 5.45 p.m.. As such it is very difficult to believe that the deceased was in a condition to make a statement 15 minutes before her death. Probably the deceased might be gasping at 5.30 p.m. The statement of deceased, therefore, appears to be manufactured later on. This view is possible to be taken because the First Information Report came to be registered on the complaint made by mother of the deceased at about 23.20 hours at Kanhan Police Station which is a nearby place, despite the fact that the statement of the deceased was recorded in the evening itself. In fact, the statement of deceased could have been treated as First Information Report and offence under Section 498-A could have been registered by the Police. The statement recorded by the Police at 5.30 p.m., became dying declaration after the death of the deceased. There is no explanation on the part of the respondent as to why the statement recorded at 5.30 p.m. was not treated as First Information Report. As such, there are all reasons to suspect the correctness of the dying declaration recorded by PW-9 at Exh. 37. There is no explanation on the part of the respondent as to why the statement recorded at 5.30 p.m. was not treated as First Information Report. As such, there are all reasons to suspect the correctness of the dying declaration recorded by PW-9 at Exh. 37. Moreover, the dying declaration mentions only one incident of 11th January, 1996 and does not indicate that the deceased was being subjected to cruelty. The dying declaration does not state anything about the demands made by the appellant as alleged by PW-1. The last line appears to have been added in the dying declaration to show that the deceased was being subjected to cruelty for about one month prior to the date of incident. As such the whole of the dying declaration Exh.37 has come under clouds of suspicion and it is not possible to accept that it was the statement of the deceased recorded by PW-9. 11. With these findings, it is not found necessary to discuss rest of the evidence which was incidental. It follows that appeal has to be allowed. 12. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial Court is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 of Indian Penal Code. His bail bond shall stand cancelled. Fine, if any, paid by the appellant shall be refunded to him. Appeal stands disposed of accordingly. Appeal allowed.