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2014 DIGILAW 1696 (PNJ)

Sakshi v. Abhinandan Sharma

2014-12-08

AJAY KUMAR MITTAL, SNEH PRASHAR

body2014
Sneh Prashar, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 10.07.2014 vide which the application under Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (in short "the Act of 1955") seeking permission to file a petition for divorce by mutual consent before expiry of statutory period of one year of the marriage, filed together by appellant-wife Sakshi and respondent-husband Abhinandan Sharma, was dismissed. The facts quoted in the impugned order are as under:-- "Appellant Smt. Sakshi was married to respondent Abhinandan Sharma on 08.02.2014. After the marriage, they resided together as husband and wife at Ludhiana upto 16.03.2014. It was alleged that the marriage could not be consummated because of incompatibility of temperaments and certain misunderstanding between the parties. Ultimately, both the parties fell apart and were residing separately since 16.03.2014. All efforts made for reconciliation and reunion failed and ultimately to resolve the dispute the parties by way of mutual agreement dated 01.07.2014 decided to seek divorce by mutual consent invoking the provisions of Section 13 of the Act of 1955. Alongwith the petition, an application under Section 14 of the Act of 1955 was filed seeking permission to present the petition before expiry of stipulated period of one year from the date of marriage." 2. Considering all facts and circumstances put forth by the parties, learned trial Court finding that the petitioner could not make out a case of exceptional hardship or exceptional depravity declined to condone the period and dismissed the application. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant preferred the instant appeal. 4. Heard the submissions made by Mr. Ajay Kaushik, Advocate for the appellant. 5. Section 14(1) of the Act of 1955 postulates that it shall not be competent for any Court to entertain any petition for dissolution of a marriage by a decree of divorce, unless on the date of the presentation of the petition one year has elapsed since the date of marriage. Ajay Kaushik, Advocate for the appellant. 5. Section 14(1) of the Act of 1955 postulates that it shall not be competent for any Court to entertain any petition for dissolution of a marriage by a decree of divorce, unless on the date of the presentation of the petition one year has elapsed since the date of marriage. However, there is a save clause to the statutory condition in the proviso to Section 14 of the Act of 1955, which reads as follows:-- "Provided that the Court may, upon application made to it in accordance with such rules as may be made by the High Court in that behalf", allow a petition to be presented before one year has elapsed since the date of the marriage on the ground that the case is one of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent, but, if it appears to the Court at the hearing of the petition that the petitioner obtained leave to present the present by misrepresentation or concealment of the nature of the case, the Court may, if it pronounces a decree, do so subject to the condition that the decree shall not have effect until after the expiry of one year from the date of the marriage or may dismiss the petition without prejudice to any petition which may be brought after the expiration of the said one year upon the same or substantially the same facts as those alleged in support of the petition so dismissed." 6. The above proviso crystallizes that if the Court is satisfied about the existence of the ingredients of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act of 1955 i.e. that the parties are able to make out a case of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent that the Court can grant permission to present the petition for divorce even before the expiry of one year since the date of marriage. 7. 7. Coming to the instant case, learned counsel for the appellant argued with vehemence that since the marriage between the parties had not been consummated and there was no possibility of reconciliation and with the help of respectables and elders of both the families they had resolved to seek divorce by mutual consent, the petition under Section 13Bof the Act of 1955 before expiry of stipulated period of one year from the date of marriage was filed and alongwith the petition the required application as provided in the proviso to sub section (1) Section 14 of the Act of 1955 was filed before the Matrimonial Court at Panchkula. The learned trial Court erroneously could not properly appreciate the exceptional hardship expressed by the parties. 8. The following findings of learned trial Court rejecting the plea of exceptional hardship of the parties reads thus:-- "Accordingly after considering the above said proposition of law and applying to the facts alleged in this case to justify the case for permission, the question comes whether in the given facts and circumstances the petitioners could make out a case of exceptional hardship or exceptional depravity to allow them to file this divorce petition before the expiry of statutory period of one year from the date of marriage. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners tried to impress that since the marriage in hand subsists only for few days and has not even been consummated and the parties are residing separately from 16.03.2014 and ultimately the matter was settled and the parties decided to go for mutual divorce, it is a fit case where permission be granted to them. However, apart from this plea, which is always there is all such like cases, there is nothing on record to show that any exceptional hardship or exceptional depravity will cause to the petitioners in case they will not be permitted to file the present petition before the expiry of statutory period of one year. Both the parties are residing separately from 16.03.2014 and there is no more dispute between the parties as they have settled all their disputes and as such, no hardship will cause to the parties if they will wait for a period of one year. Both the parties are residing separately from 16.03.2014 and there is no more dispute between the parties as they have settled all their disputes and as such, no hardship will cause to the parties if they will wait for a period of one year. On the contrary if permission to file the petition is granted on such a plea, it will open a Pandora box and every broken marriage will be dissolved with these considerations without resorting to the requisite statutory waiting period and without there being any serious efforts for reconciliation. As such, it is not a fit case of exceptional hardship so as to make it impossible for the parties to wait for a period of one year, especially when after filing of this divorce petition, the court is required to comply with the provisions of Section 23 of the Act by making efforts for reconciliation between the parties, which is a mandatory provision." 9. In our opinion, there appears to be absolutely no illegality or perversity in the aforesaid findings recorded by the learned trial Court. There are no two thoughts over the proposition of law that only if the parties are able to make out that it was a case of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent that permission to file a divorce petition before the expiry of statutory period of one year from the date of marriage can be granted. The facts and circumstances of the case in hand which led to initiation of a petition under Section 13-B of the Act of 1955 for a decree of divorce by mutual consent, were just normal. They failed to show and explain anything which would result in exceptional hardship to them if they were asked to wait for the statutory period of one year. The very spirit and object of the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Act of 1955 will be lost, if in such normal situation also the parties are allowed to part ways by obtaining a decree of divorce by mutual consent even before expiry of one year period from the date of marriage. The object underlying the provision is to give the couple time to breathe and reconcile, if possible, the dispute/misunderstanding that had cropped up between them. The object underlying the provision is to give the couple time to breathe and reconcile, if possible, the dispute/misunderstanding that had cropped up between them. Thus, the requirements enunciated in the provision have to be strictly observed and complied with unless the parties are able to make out a case of exceptional hardship. With the above observations, finding no merit in the appeal, it is hereby dismissed. No costs.