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2014 DIGILAW 1707 (RAJ)

Mohd. Yakub v. State of Rajasthan

2014-10-27

P.K.LOHRA

body2014
JUDGMENT 1. - With the consent of rival parties, the matter if heard finally at this stage. 2. By the instant writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the impugned orders dated 5th January 2012 (Annex.'E'), and 29th November 2012 (Annex.'G'), respectively passed by the District Magistrate, Nagaur and Divisional Commissioner, Ajmer. The petitioner has further sought a direction against respondents for renewal of arms licence in his name. 3. By order dated 5th January 2012 (Annex.'E'), the learned District Magistrate declined restoration/renewal of the terms licence of the petitioner solely on the ground that criminal case is pending against him. On an appeal preferred by the petitioner, the learned Divisional Commissioner has upheld the said order by its order dated 29th November 2012 (Annex.'G'). 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sheetal Kumbhat, has urged that the District Magistrate, Nagaur, while declining the prayer of the petitioner for renewal of licence has not assigned plausible reasons for exercising as discretion, and therefore, the said order is not sustainable. Elaborating his submissions, learned counsel would contend that appellate authority has also not cared to examine the matter in right perspective more particularly in the light of Section 17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959 (for short, 'Act of 1959'). Mr. Mumbhat has further urged that mere pendency of criminal case cannot be considered as a valid ground for denying the prayer of the petitioner for renewal of arms licence as the same is not an impediment within the four corners of Section 17(3) of the Act of 1959. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has place reliance on a Division Bench's decision of this Court in case of Khem Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2005(2) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 907 , wherein the Court quashed the orders passed by the competent authority revoking the arms licence solely on the ground of pendency of a criminal case. The Division Bench held as under 5. From the reading of the provision it is manifest that the licensing authority may revoke a licence if it deem necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety. The power of suspension of Arms licence is necessary concomitant of power of revocation for effective control and regulation as also for the security of the public peace or public safety. Such a power has to be exercised with great circumspection. The power of suspension of Arms licence is necessary concomitant of power of revocation for effective control and regulation as also for the security of the public peace or public safety. Such a power has to be exercised with great circumspection. The satisfaction of the authority has to be objective and must be based upon relevant material. Mere fact that some reports have been lodged against the licence holder is not sufficient for cancelling the licence. A licence can be revoked under section 17(3)(b) if the licensing authority deem it necessary for the security of public peace or public safety. In absence of any finding that cancellation was necessary for public peace or public safety, such an order is liable to be quashed.The principle propounded in Khem Singh's case (supra) was further reiterated by this Court in case of Shiv Kumar v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 2013(2) WLC (Raj.) UC 393. 6. Lastly, learned counsel has urged that the competent authority while declining the prayer of the petitioner for renewal of arms licence has eschewed relevant aspects and has taken into consideration certain irrelevant aspects is sufficient to indicate that impugned order is having no nexus with the facts available on record warranting interference by this Court. 7. Per contra, learned Government Counsel, Mr. Boob, has argued that the competent authority while declining to renew the arms licence of the petitioner has recorded plausible reasons and the said order is in consonance and in conformity with Section 17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959, therefore, no interference is called for. Learned counsel Mr. Boob would contend that the appellate authority has also examined the matter threadbare and thereafter it has affirmed the order passed by the Licensing Authority and therefore in view of concurrent finding that the arms licence is likely to be misused by the petitioner, it is not desirable to interfere in exercise of extraordinary equitable jurisdiction of this Court enshrined under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Lastly, Mr. Boob has urged that the Licensing Authority as well as the appellate authority has taken note of the antecedents of the petitioner and thereafter has exercised its discretion judiciously, which cannot be made subject matter of judicial scrutiny in writ jurisdiction of this Court. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 9. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 9. Upon perusal of the impugned order Annex.'E, it is crystal clear that the learned District Magistrate has declined the prayer of the petitioner for renewal of arms licence solely on the ground that a criminal case is pending against him. Moreover, the Licensing Authority has also taken shelter of sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the Act of 1959 for refusing renewal of the arms licence. Sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the Act of 1959 reads as under : (3) The licensing authority may be order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence,- (a) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act; or (b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence; or (c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his behalf at the time of applying for it; or (d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened; or (e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under sub-section (1) requiring him to deliver-up the licence. 10. A bare reading of sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the Act of 1959, quoted supra, ipso facto, reveals that Licensing Authority can invoke the said power for suspending or revoking an arms licence. Be that as it may, even if such parameters are to be applied vis-a-vis an application for renewal of arms licence, in the considered opinion of this Court, petitioner has not incurred any disqualification for renewal of arms licence. Be that as it may, even if such parameters are to be applied vis-a-vis an application for renewal of arms licence, in the considered opinion of this Court, petitioner has not incurred any disqualification for renewal of arms licence. Well, it is true that clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the Act of 1959 empowers a Licensing Authority to suspend or revoke arms licence if holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition; but for recording this satisfaction, it is necessary for the Licensing Authority to examine the character and other antecedents of the incumbent minutely. Mere pendency of a criminal case cannot be taken as a valid ground for refusing to renew the arms licence. My this view is fully fortified from the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Khem Singh's case (supra). Moreover, clause (b) also cannot be applied vis-a-vis the petitioner because there is no cogent material available on record to conclude that renewal of arms licence can disturb security of the public peace, or renewal of arms licence may not be congenial for public safety. Therefore, the satisfaction of the Licensing Authority for non-renewal of the arms licence is perse not in consonance and conformity with sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the Act of 1959. Strangely, the appellate authority has also not cared to examine the matter in right perspective and has simply concurred with the findings and conclusions of the Licensing Authority. It is trite that 'public peace' and 'public safety' do not imply a stray or an ordinary disturbance of law and order. Law' mandates a refusal to grant licence even if the applicant has duly followed the procedure where the Licensing Authority has reasons to believe that he is, for any reason, 'unfit' for the licence under the Act. The word 'unfit' is used in the context of 'hardened criminals' or those involved in horrendous crime. Here, in the instant case, the only reason, which is cited by the Licensing Authority which also find favour from the appellate authority, for non-renewal of the arms licence is pendency of criminal case, which in my considered opinion cannot be sustained. Thus, both the impugned orders are laconic and therefore deserves to be annulled. 11. Here, in the instant case, the only reason, which is cited by the Licensing Authority which also find favour from the appellate authority, for non-renewal of the arms licence is pendency of criminal case, which in my considered opinion cannot be sustained. Thus, both the impugned orders are laconic and therefore deserves to be annulled. 11. Resultantly, the present writ petition is allowed, the impugned orders Annex.'E' & Annex.'G' are hereby quashed and set aside and the respondents are directed to reconsider the case of the petitioner for renewal of the arms licence afresh to accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of two months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. *******