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2014 DIGILAW 171 (TRI)

Harilal Debnath v. State of Tripura

2014-05-06

DEEPAK GUPTA, S.TALAPATRA

body2014
JUDGMENT S. Talapatra, J.:- This appeal by the convict under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974 (the Cr. P.C. in short) is directed against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 19.05.2011 delivered in Sessions Trial No. 15 of 2011 by the Additional Sessions Judge, No. 3, West Tripura, Agartala. By the said judgment and order, the appellant has been convicted for committing an offence punishable under Section 302 of the I.P.C. and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees Five thousand) and in default of payment of fine, to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for 1(one) year. 2. It has surfaced from the written complaint as filed by one Narayan Chandra Ghosh @ Nantu Ghosh (PW-1) to the Officer-in-Charge of Bishalgarh Police Station that on 10.03.2009 at about 7.30 pm. his uncle namely, Sunil Debnath had accompanied the appellant to escort Sukumar Sarkar and Haridas Mandal the sawyers who were working with his uncle up to Kalapania, But thereafter, on 11.03.2009 at about 7.30 am. the dead body of his uncle was recovered having grievous injury on his skull. 3. Based on the said Ejahar, Lefunga Police Station Case No. 09/2009 was registered under Section 302 of the I.P.C. against the appellant and taken up for investigation. After the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against the appellant under Section 302 of the I.P.C. The case having been committed to the Court of the Sessions for trial in accordance with law was transferred subsequently to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, No. 3, West Tripura, Agartala. The Additional Sessions Judge framed the charge against the appellant under Section 302 of the I.P.C. for committing murder of Sunil Debnath in the intervening night of 10.03.2009 and 11.03.2009. The appellant, however, pleaded total innocence and claimed to face the trial. 4. In order to substantiate the charge, the prosecution has adduced as many as 11 witnesses and introduced 10(ten) documentary evidence (Exbt. 1 to 10). When the appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. for purpose of having his response on the incriminating materials he had denied all such incriminating circumstances or the materials and stated to be entirely innocent. The Additional Sessions Judge on appreciating the evidence had returned the finding of conviction, which is under challenge in this appeal. 5. Mr. P.C. for purpose of having his response on the incriminating materials he had denied all such incriminating circumstances or the materials and stated to be entirely innocent. The Additional Sessions Judge on appreciating the evidence had returned the finding of conviction, which is under challenge in this appeal. 5. Mr. R. Datta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that after bare reading of the impugned judgment, it would transpire that no substantive evidence for returning the finding of judgment of conviction is available in the records. Basically on the oral testimony of PW-4, Sri Rati Debbarma, the discovery of a ’lathi’, the branch of a tree on the purported disclosure statement of the appellant while he was in the custody of the police and on the evidence of ’last seen together’, the said finding of conviction has been returned. 6. From the other side, Mr. R.C. Debnath, learned Addl. P.P. appearing for the State has submitted that the proximity between the ’last seen together’ and the recovery of the dead body is not wide to render that piece of evidence susceptible to suspicion. He has further submitted that from the statement of PW-11 namely, Tapan Chakraborty, it would be apparent that by help of the disclosure statement, the said police officer had been able to discover the weapon, the branch of a tree from a nearby jungle from the place of occurrence at Kalapania. PW-11 has categorically stated that the ’accused’ was taken to the place, wherefrom he had recovered the branch of tree. That was seized in presence of the witnesses on preparing the seizure list (Exbt. 5). According to Mr. Debnath, learned P.P. if these two pieces of evidence are considered together, it will complete the chain of circumstances pointing only at the guilt of the appellant in exclusion of any hypothesis of innocence. Therefore, he has strongly urged not to interfere with the judgment and order. 7. From the inquest report (Exbt. 2) and the postmortem examination report (Exbt. 6), it appears that there was a grievous injury on the skull of Sunil Debnath (the deceased) and the cause of deceased is massive shock and hemorrhage and homicidal in nature. 8. Dr. Hemendra Ch. 7. From the inquest report (Exbt. 2) and the postmortem examination report (Exbt. 6), it appears that there was a grievous injury on the skull of Sunil Debnath (the deceased) and the cause of deceased is massive shock and hemorrhage and homicidal in nature. 8. Dr. Hemendra Ch. Banik (PW-8) has stated that while he had been conducting the postmortem examination on the dead body of Sunil Debnath, he had found fracture on skull, left parietal area and left temporal area. Lacerated injury on left ear and black eye, fractured mandible of the left eye and multiple hematoma on face and back of the chest. According to him, the cause of death was due to massive shock and hemorrhage and was homicidal in nature. He has opined that that the ante mortem injures were sufficient to cause death of that person. 9. For purpose of ’last seen together’, the prosecution has relied on the oral testimonies of PW2, Sri Sukumar Sarkar, who had accompanied the deceased, Sunil Debnath. PW-2 has stated that on the previous day of incident I along with Haridas Mandal worked in the house of Sunil Debnath as Karati (sawyer). On that night Sunil had requested both of us to take meal in his house. He had prepared meat and also brought wine. Harilal Debnath had been staying in that house. He has also stated that on that night he himself, Sunil Debnath, Haridas Mandal and Harilal Debnath took meal with meat and wine his house. On that night at about 7.15 pm. Sunil Debnath and Harilal Debnath came along with us upto 1 km. and after that on seeing a vehicle Sunil, Harilal Debnath and Haridas Mandal had left the place assuming that vehicle as of the police. He has stated that he had been sitting in front of a shop of Mahim Debbarma. After crossing of that police vehicle he had searched all of them and found all of them in the house of Mahim Debbarma taking alcohol there. Thereafter, he had left his house. On the next day at about 9.30 am. he came to the house of Sunil Debnath for his usual work and came to learn that the dead body of Sunil Debnath had been lying on Jubatara to Kalapania road. He has also stated that he was detained by the local people and handed over him to the police. 10. On the next day at about 9.30 am. he came to the house of Sunil Debnath for his usual work and came to learn that the dead body of Sunil Debnath had been lying on Jubatara to Kalapania road. He has also stated that he was detained by the local people and handed over him to the police. 10. PW-1, Sri Amrit Debnath has reported what he has narrated in the written Ejahar (Exbt. 1). However, he has further stated that he was witness to the inquest proceeding and he had signed the inquest report (Exbt. 2) and was witnessed to the seizure of wearing apparels of the appellant from his house etc. 11. PW-3, Sri Sudhir Debnath has not reveled anything of material importance. However, he has stated that he was witnessed to the seizure of the wearing apparels of the appellant. 12. PW-4, Sri Rati Debbarma has stated that after about 3/4 days of the occurrence, one day at about 1.30 pm. Harilal Debnath being accompanied by the police personnel come to a vacant land having some wild plant. He went to that land and the appellant had confessed that he had killed Sunil Debnath, the deceased by a branch of a tree and the said branch of a tree was left there. He has submitted that the appellant brought out the said branch of a tree (Exbt. 5) in their presence and the police office had seized that branch. He has also identified the said branch of tree as Exbt. M.O.1 but he has admitted in the cross-examination that there was no special mark on the branch neither the said branch was sealed within a packet or tagged with identity mark. 13. PW-5, Smt. Lalita Debnath and PW-6 Smt. Gita Debnath were tendered by the prosecution and there was no cross-examination as well. PW-7, Smt. Gita Debnath, sister of the deceased is a hearsay witness and she has stated nothing of relevance. 14. PW-9, Sri Benu Lal Kar was the officer-in-charge of Lefunga police station at the relevant point of time and he had registered the complaint which was received from S.I. Tapan Chakraborty, by filling the printed FIR form. He has introduced the said printed form in the evidence as Exbt. 7. 15. 14. PW-9, Sri Benu Lal Kar was the officer-in-charge of Lefunga police station at the relevant point of time and he had registered the complaint which was received from S.I. Tapan Chakraborty, by filling the printed FIR form. He has introduced the said printed form in the evidence as Exbt. 7. 15. PW-9, Sri Mahim Debbarma in whose house both the appellant and the deceased took shelter having been frightened by the presence of a police vehicle has stated that on the preceding night from the day of recovery of dead body of Sunil Debnath, four persons namely, Sunil Debnath, Haridas Manda, Sukumar and Harilal Debnath had come to my shop at about 9 pm. On that point of time, one vehicle had been passing through and on noticing that vehicle, except Sukumar all other three persons had fled away from his shop. After the vehicle had crossed, they again re-appeared. They had purchased wine from his shop and they went to that house where they took alcohol. Thereafter, Sukumar and Haridas Mandal left his shop towards west for their house. 16. PW-11, Sri Tapan Chakraborty, who investigated the case has narrated how he had conducted the investigation by recording the statement of the witnesses, preparing the site map with index. He has stated that Harilal Debnath was suspected to be involved in the murder of Sunil Debnath. He was arrested on 12.03.1999. On 13.03.2009, Harilal Debnath, the appellant was produced to the Court with a prayer for 7(seven) days police remand and the police remand was allowed. During interrogation in the police remand, Harilal Debnath had confessed his guilt stating that he had killed Sunil Debnath with one branch of a tree. He had also disclosed that he would be able to discover the weapon of offence, the branch of a tree to the nearby jungle from the place of occurrence at Kalapania. Accordingly, the appellant was taken to that place from where he had recovered the branch of a tree which was seized by the police. He has also identified the same branch of tree as Exbt. 5. 17. On scrutinizing the records, it has appeared that there is no history of animosity. Moreover, the appellant had a cordial relation with Sunil Debnath and he had been staying in the house of Sunil Debnath for quite a long time. He has also identified the same branch of tree as Exbt. 5. 17. On scrutinizing the records, it has appeared that there is no history of animosity. Moreover, the appellant had a cordial relation with Sunil Debnath and he had been staying in the house of Sunil Debnath for quite a long time. Following two circumstances have surfaced in the evidence: (i) The deceased was last seen with the appellant at about 9.30 am on the night of 10.03.2003 as stated by PW-2 and PW-10 and at about 6.30 am on 11.03.2003, the dead body of Sunil Debnath was recovered from a place nearby Kaliapania jungle. (ii) The discovery of the branch of a tree at the instance of the appellant in accordance with his statement made during interrogation by the police custody to PW-11. 18. It is well settled that the ’last seen together’ theory comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of crime becomes impossible. That apart it is unsafe to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases where there is no positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were together last before the death. 19. In Bodhraj @ Bodha and Others vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, reported in (2002) 8 SCC 45 , it has been held that: 9. Before analyzing factual aspects it may be stated that for a crime to be proved it is not necessary that the crime must be seen to have been committed and must, in all circumstances be proved by direct ocular evidence by examining before the Court those persons who had seen its commission. The offence can be proved by circumstantial evidence also. The principal fact or factum probandum may be proved indirectly by means of certain inferences drawn from factum probans, that is, the evidentiary facts. To put it differently, circumstantial evidence is not direct to the point in issue but consists of evidence of various other facts which are so closely associated with the fact in issue that taken together they form a chain of circumstances from which the existence of the principal fact can be legally inferred or presumed. 20. To put it differently, circumstantial evidence is not direct to the point in issue but consists of evidence of various other facts which are so closely associated with the fact in issue that taken together they form a chain of circumstances from which the existence of the principal fact can be legally inferred or presumed. 20. In Bodhraj @ Bodha (supra) it has been further held that: 10. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan : 1977 2 SCC 99 ; Eradu v. State of Hyderabad : AIR 1956 SC 316 ; Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka : (1983) 2 SCC 330 ; State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi : 1985 Supp SCC 79; Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab : (1987) 1 SCC 1 and Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. : 1989 Supp (1) SCC 560. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab : AIR 1954 SC 621 , it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring home the offences home beyond any reasonable doubt. 11. We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P. : (1996) 10 SCC 193 , wherein it has been observed thus: 21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. 12. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. 12. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. : 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706, it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: 10. (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. 13. In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava : (1992)2 SCC 86 , it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. 21. In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh : AIR 1952 SC 343 , it has been observed that : It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 22. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra : (1984) 4 SCC 116 , the apex court has held that: while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in the prosecution cannot be cured by a false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of the this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned must or should and not may be established; (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so compete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 23. There is no dispute that the prosecution has failed to produce any record to establish what the appellant had disclosed during his interrogation in the police custody but PW-1 has stated that in his presence the appellant had confessed that he had killed Sunil Debnath with a branch of tree and he would be able to discover the weapon i.e. the branch of a tree from the nearby jungle, about the place of occurrence, at Kalapania. In the cross-examination, he has admitted that the dead body was found nearby one tribal basti. In the cross-examination, he has admitted that the dead body was found nearby one tribal basti. But the weapon of offence had been ’discovered’ from a vacant land not from the jungle as stated by PW-11. Whether the said disclosure statement or the discovery can be admitted in the evidence to except the provisions of Section 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act is a vital questions which requires some analysis. 24. Section 25 of the Evidence Act completely bars confession of an accused person, made to a police officer, from being proved against the accused. Section 26 of the Evidence Act bars from being proved a confession made by an accused person to anyone whomsoever if the accused person was, at the time of making the confession, in the custody of the police, unless the confession has been made in the immediate presence of a magistrate. However, Section 27 of the Evidence Act carves out an exception inasmuch as it provides that when any fact is deposed to be discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, while the accused person is in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact as regards the discovery may be proved. 25. Thus, Section 27 of the Evidence Act acts as proviso to Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. Such disclosure statement can be used in view of Section 27 of the Evidence Act for a limited purpose. While considering the scope of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, what needs to be borne in mind is that the first condition, which is necessary in order to apply Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872, is that there must be discovery of a fact, albeit a relevant fact, in consequence of information received from a person, who is accused of an offence. The most important part for utilizing the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act is that the discovery must be discharged. This, in turn, means that the factum of discovery has to come on record by way of evidence and not otherwise and such disclosure has to be made when the accused in the police custody and only "so much of the information", as relates ’distinctly’ to the ’fact thereby discovered’, is admissible. This, in turn, means that the factum of discovery has to come on record by way of evidence and not otherwise and such disclosure has to be made when the accused in the police custody and only "so much of the information", as relates ’distinctly’ to the ’fact thereby discovered’, is admissible. The rest of the information, which an accused person might have given, must be kept excluded. 26. The meaning of the expression ’so much of the information’ and ’distinctly means’ is that part of the information as supplied by the accused, which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. 27. The idea behind the partial lifting of the ban against the use of a confessional statement, made by a person, accused of any offence, to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the information given by the accused, it provides some guarantee of truth to that part of the information, which was the clear, immediate and approximate cause of discovery. To put it a little differently, the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true and consequently, the said information can safely be allowed to be given in the evidence, because if such an information is further fortified and confirmed by the discovery of articles or the weapon of crime and which leads to the belief that the information availed from the confession made as to the articles of crime cannot be false. 28. At one time, it was held that the ’fact discovered’, as envisaged in Section 27 of the Evidence Act, is restricted to a physical or material fact. However, it is no longer doubted that the expression, ’fact discovered’, includes not only the physical object produced, but also the place from where it was so produced and the knowledge of the accused as to such fact. In this regard, a reference can be made to Palukuri Kotayya v. Emperor, reported in AIR 1947 PC 67 and Udai Bhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in AIR 1962 SC 1116 . 29. In this regard, a reference can be made to Palukuri Kotayya v. Emperor, reported in AIR 1947 PC 67 and Udai Bhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in AIR 1962 SC 1116 . 29. The scope and ambit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act has been illuminatingly stated, in Phulukuri Kottaya (supra), which have become locus classicus, in the following words: It is fallacious to treat the ’fact discovered’ within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. 30. In Bodhraj (supra) it has been provided as under: It is, therefore, necessary for the benefit of both the accused and prosecution that information given should be recorded and proved and if not so recorded, the exact information must be adduced through evidence. The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered as a search made on the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The information might be confessional or non-exculpatory in nature but if it results in discovery of a fact, it becomes a reliable information. It is now well settled that recovery of an object is not discovery of fact envisaged in the section. Decision of Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. Emperor: AIR 1947 PC 67 is the most-quoted authority for supporting the interpretation that the "fact discovered" envisaged in the section embraces the place from which the object was produced, the knowledge of the accused as to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that effect. (see State of Maharashtra v. Damu Gopinath Shinde) : (2000) 6 SCC 269 . No doubt, the information permitted to be admitted in evidence is confined to that portion of the information which "distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered". But the information to get admissibility need not be so truncated as to make it insensible or incomprehensible. The extent of information admitted should be consistent with understandability. No doubt, the information permitted to be admitted in evidence is confined to that portion of the information which "distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered". But the information to get admissibility need not be so truncated as to make it insensible or incomprehensible. The extent of information admitted should be consistent with understandability. Mere statement that the accused led the police and the witnesses to the place where he had concealed the articles is not indicative of the information given. 31. Yet another important aspect of Section 27 of the Evidence Act that makes only "so much of the information, as relates "distinctly" to the fact thereby "discovered" provable. It clearly follows that a Court is required to know as to what exactly the accused had stated to the police so that the Court, before acting upon the evidence given, knows as to how much of the information, given by the accused, relates ’distinctly’ to the fact thereby discovered. The word, ’distinctly’, as pointed out in Mohmed Inayatullah vs. The State of Maharashtra, reported in (1976) 1 SCC 828 has been has been used in order to define the scope of provable information. 32. In Mohd. Inayatulla (supra) it has been held that: 16. After culling out and rejecting the inadmissible portion, is was to be considered further whether the admissible portion of the information taken in conjunction with the facts discovered was sufficient to draw the presumption that the accused was the thief or receiver of stolen property knowing it to be stolen. The answer to this question, in the circumstances of the case, had to be in the negative. The drums in question were found in the compound or yard of a musafirkhana which was a place of rest and waiting for musafirs (travellers). It was not alleged by the prosecution-much less proved-that the drums were lying concealed, or that the compound was under the lock and key of the accused. There is not even an oblique hint that the place of the deposit of the drums was in any way under the control or occupation of the accused. The place being a musafirkhana, was from its very nature accessible to all and sundry. 33. In the present case also, the appellant was taken to a vacant land and he brought out a branch of a tree. The place being a musafirkhana, was from its very nature accessible to all and sundry. 33. In the present case also, the appellant was taken to a vacant land and he brought out a branch of a tree. It has not been found to be inaccessible to other people and such branch of a tree cannot be available in the jungle. From the seizure list (Exbt. 5), it is apparent that the said piece of the branch when seized did not bear any stain of blood. But did look like a piece of fire wood. 34. In State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Navjot Sandhu, reported in (2005) 11 SCC 600 , the apex court has made a comprehensive discourse on the scope of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. In para-143, the apex court held in Navjot Sandhu (supra) as under: How the clause-"as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered" has to be understood is the next point that deserves consideration. The interpretation of this clause is not in doubt. Apart from Kotayya’s case (supra), various decisions of this Court have elucidated and clarified the scope and meaning of the said portion of Section 27. The law has been succinctly stated in Inayatullah’s case (supra). Sarkaria, J. analysed the ingredients of the section and explained the ambit and nuances of this particular clause in the following words: ...The last but the most important condition is that only "so much of the information" as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. The rest of the information has to be excluded. The word ’distinctly’ means ’directly’, ’indubitably’, ’strictly’, ’unmistakably’. The word has been advisedly used to limit and define the scope of the provable information. The phrase ’distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered’ is the linchpin of the provision. This phrase refers to that part of the information supplied by the accused which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban against confessions and statements made to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part only, of the information which was the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban against confessions and statements made to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part only, of the information which was the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. No such guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the statement which may be indirectly or remotely related to the fact discovered. In the light of the legal position thus clarified, this Court excluded a part of the disclosure statement to which we have already adverted. 35. The prosecution did not produce any record including the general diary entry in the trial to establish that such disclosure was made by the appellant and in terms of that disclosure, the Investigating Officer had started from the police station to the place where the accused person had stated to have concealed the said branch of tree. It is also not understandable how the witnesses had appeared in that place. The Investigating Officer (PW-11) did not disclose when such disclosure statement was made to him or when he took the accused person to that place on revelation made in the disclosure statement and he has also not made any endeavour to state from where he had seized some blood stained soil. The place of recovery of the branch of a tree was from the same place and if not, how far the place of occurrence from that place. Even PW-11 did not state that wherefrom the weapon of offence, the branch of a tree had been recovered by the appellant. Unless, it is established that the said branch of tree was used for striking the deceased, there cannot be any confirmation. 36. In State of Maharashtra vs. Damu S/O-Gopinath Shinde and Others, reported in (2000) 6 SCC 269 , it has been held by the apex court that: 37. How did the particular information led to the discovery of the fact? No doubt, recovery of dead body of Dipak from the same canal was antecedent to the information which PW 44 obtained. If nothing more was recovered pursuant to and subsequent to obtaining the information from the accused, there would not have been any discovery of any fact at all. No doubt, recovery of dead body of Dipak from the same canal was antecedent to the information which PW 44 obtained. If nothing more was recovered pursuant to and subsequent to obtaining the information from the accused, there would not have been any discovery of any fact at all. But when the broken glass piece was recovered from that spot and that piece was found to be part of the tail lamp of the motorcycle of A-2 Guruji, it can safely be held that the Investigating Officer discovered the fact that A-2 Guruji had carried the dead body on that particular motorcycle upto the spot. 37. As such, it can be safely held that there was no discovery as the prosecution has failed to establish that the said branch of tree was used as the weapon of assault for causing death of Sunil Debnath (the deceased). The prosecution even did not show that branch of tree to the Medical Officer to take his opinion whether the ante mortem injuries could have been caused by the said branch of tree or not. Apart that, it has been admitted by PW-4 that the said branch of tree was not sealed or properly marked. That part of the evidence as purportedly disclosed by the appellant is inadmissible. None of the prosecution witnesses has stated that the appellant had an inimical relation with the deceased or none of them has stated that they had suspected the appellant to have killed Sunil Debnath (the deceased) rather they have stated that Harilal Debnath and Sunil Debnath were the close friends. Even though the ’last seen together’ has created a strong suspicion against the appellant but the chain of circumstance cannot be held to be complete inasmuch as nobody has stated whether the appellant suffered death in the morning or on that night. The wearing apparels of Harilal Debnath, the appellant was seized but the prosecution did not produce those wearing apparels in the trial nor did they submit any report of the scientific examination to demonstrate the appellant’s involvement in the murder. The wearing apparels of Harilal Debnath, the appellant was seized but the prosecution did not produce those wearing apparels in the trial nor did they submit any report of the scientific examination to demonstrate the appellant’s involvement in the murder. From the time of ’last seen’ to the discovery of the dead body of Sunil Debnath, it is a long time gap and it has not been explained by the prosecution how the dead body of Sunil Debnath was found near the tribal basti or what is the significance of recovery of the dead body from the tribal basti. Both the circumstances are open ended. Situated thus, the circumstances as relied by the prosecution had failed to complete the chain of events in exclusion of all hypotheses of innocence and thus, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 38. Having held so, the impugned judgment and order are set aside and quashed. Accordingly, the appellant is acquitted from the charge under Section 302 of the I.P.C. The appellant shall be released forthwith if he is not wanted in any other case. In the result, the appeal stands allowed. Send down the LCRs forthwith.