JUDGMENT : Paramjeet Singh, J. This order shall dispose of CWP No. 14650 of 2001 titled 'Bhag Singh v. State of Punjab and another' and CWP No. 14858 of 2001 titled 'Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab and another', as they arise out of common orders. 2. Instant writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India has been filed for quashing the order dated 30.09.1999 (Annexure P-3) passed by Sub Divisional Magistrate, Ludhiana, exercising the powers under the provisions of Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973 (for short 'the Act') and order dated 21.06.2000 (Annexure P-5) passed by Additional Commissioner (Appeals), Patiala Division, District Ludhiana. 3. Brief facts of the case are that State of Punjab filed an application under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act for eviction of the petitioners from the land fully described in the head-note of the application on the ground that land in question is the property of Punjab Government and so has been described in the revenue record. Earlier it was the property of Central Government. The said property has vested in the Punjab Government vide various notifications issued by the Central Government i.e. dated 03.06.1961 and 29.03.1963. Collector-cum- Sub Divisional Magistrate, Ludhiana, after considering the record ordered eviction of the petitioners vide order dated 30.09.1999 (Annexure P-3). Aggrieved against the order dated 30.09.1999 petitioners preferred appeal before the Commissioner, which has been dismissed vide order dated 21.06.2000 (Annexure P-5) whereby order of the Collector has been affirmed. Hence, this writ petition. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5. Admittedly, land in question has been described as Central Government property in the ownership column. Thereafter, that property has been transferred vide notifications dated 03.06.1961 and 29.03.1963 to the State of Punjab being evacuee property and as such the Punjab Government has become owner of the said property. Petitioners have claimed their possession over the land in question as gair marusi tenant. Perusal of jamabandi for the year 1996-97 (Annexure P-7) reveals that column No. 9 is blank. It is nowhere mentioned as to in what capacity petitioners came into possession of the property nor any other evidence has been led as to how they became tenant in the property in question either under the Central Government or State Government by way of lease or in any other manner.
It is nowhere mentioned as to in what capacity petitioners came into possession of the property nor any other evidence has been led as to how they became tenant in the property in question either under the Central Government or State Government by way of lease or in any other manner. In view of the settled principle of law that when rent column is blank and does not depict the status of cultivator shown in column No. 5, person cannot be treated as gair marusitenant. This Court in RSA No. 185 of 1986 titled 'Kuldip Chand v. Jagdish Lal and others' decided on 22.01.2014 has held as under: - "A perusal of jamabandi Ex.PA clearly indicates that in cultivation column word 'gair marusi' has been mentioned but column No. 9, which is rent column, is blank. When rent column is left blank it does not mean that appellant is tenant of this land, he is only occupant. Entry in rent column i.e. column No. 9 determines the capacity of the person in which he is occupant of the land. Division Bench of this Court in Mukhtiar Singh v. State of Haryana, 2013 (3) PLR 433 has held that phrase 'gair marusi' merely refers to an occupant of land and only if it was accompanied by an entry of payment of rent, in the relevant column of the revenue record, would raise inference of a tenancy. It is to be noticed that many a times word 'gair marusi' is mentioned in column No. 5, however, in the rent column it is mentioned as lessee or on chakota. If the rent column is left blank then it will be deemed that possession of the appellant is not as tenant." 6. In view of this, contention of the learned counsel for petitioners, on the basis of which notice of motion was issued, that they are tenants is not sustainable in the eyes of law. So far as other rights of the petitioners are concerned, they can avail remedy available to them in accordance with law. 7. In view of above, I do not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned orders. Dismissed.