JUDGMENT S. Talapatra, J.:- This appeal survives for the appellant No. 1, namely Sri Joydeb Ghosh as the appellant No. 2, Jogomaya Ghosh has expired in jail. This appeal has abated for the appellant No. 2 subject to the legality of the impugned finding of conviction. 2. By the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 21.12.2010 delivered by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 3, West Tripura, Agartala in Sessions Trial No. 10 of 2008 the appellants have been convicted for committing the offence of murder, with common intention to do so, punishable under Section 302/34 of the I.P.C. They are sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000 and in default of payment of fine, to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for 1(one) year. In addition, they have been convicted for committing cruelty under Section 498A of the I.P.C. 3. From the written complaint filed by one Narayan Chandra Ghosh @ Nantu Ghosh (PW-1) to the Officer-in-Charge of Bishalgarh Police Station it had been disclosed that his daughter, Rinku Ghosh was married to Joydeb Ghosh, the appellant No. 1 herein. His daughter had been subjected torture for not satisfying the unlawful demand. On 04.07.2007, his daughter was noticed ablaze by the people from the neighbourhood of her matrimonial home. On having the information as such, he had rushed to her matrimonial house but found none in that house. Her daughter was found lying in a place in that house with severe burnt injuries and in a critical condition. She was brought to the G.B.P. hospital for treatment. When the complaint was filed, his daughter was alive. But later on, she had succumbed to her injuries on 24.07.2007. 4. Based on the said complaint, Bishalgarh Police Station Case No. 111/2007 was registered under Sections498A/326 of the I.P.C. against the appellants and two other accused persons and the case was taken up for investigation. After the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against the appellants and other two accused persons as the adequate materials were available to hold prima-facie that the appellants had set her ablaze with common intention to kill her in the afternoon of 04.07.2007. After the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against the appellants and other two accused persons as the adequate materials were available to hold prima-facie that the appellants had set her ablaze with common intention to kill her in the afternoon of 04.07.2007. On commitment and transfer, the Additional Sessions Judge had framed the charge against the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. and under Section 498A of the I.P.C. against the appellants and two other accused persons namely, Birendra Ghosh and Sahadeb Ghosh. The appellants including the accused persons, however, pleaded total innocence and claimed to face the trial. 5. In order to substantiate the charge, the prosecution has adduced as many as 22(twenty two) witnesses including the complainant, Sri Narayan Chandra Ghosh @ Nantu Ghosh, the Investigating Officers and the witnesses from the neighbourhood. The prosecution has also introduced as many as 16(sixteen) documentary evidence including the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate (Exbt. 2) and the statement of Rinku Ghosh, the victim as recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. For the defence, no evidence was adduced, save and except bringing the excerpt of the statements of Ratan Kr. Ghosh (PW-19) into the evidence (Exbt. A) and of Dinesh Ch. Roy (PW-4). The Additional Sessions Judge on appreciating the evidence has returned the finding of conviction, which is under challenge in this appeal. 6. Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant No. 1, hereinafter referred to as the appellant has contended that the judgment of conviction has been returned by the Additional Sessions Judge solely relying on the dying declaration of the victim is not legally sustainable. According to Mr. Biswas, learned senior counsel that those dying declarations cannot be relied by the court as there is no record in the evidence to indicate that the victim was fit when she had purportedly made those declarations. One dying declaration was recorded by one Executive Magistrate (PW-18) in presence of a Doctor, namely Niladri Sen Gupta (PW-12), a police officer and PW-1. PW-18, the Executive Magistrate in his cross-examination has minced no word to say that he has not mentioned in the report that the victim was in a fit condition to make the declaration or that the victim was physically and mentally fit for such declaration to make. PW-18, the Executive Magistrate in his cross-examination has minced no word to say that he has not mentioned in the report that the victim was in a fit condition to make the declaration or that the victim was physically and mentally fit for such declaration to make. He has also admitted that he did not even go through the bed head ticket of the victim before recording the dying declaration. Mr. Biswas, learned senior counsel has further referred to the testimony of the Medical Officer (PW-12) who had stated in his cross-examination that "without seeing the record, I cannot say the physical and mental condition of a particular time. Bed head ticket is the relevant record which speaks about the condition of the patient at the particular time. There is no mention in the report wherefrom it can be said that the patient was mentally and physically fit to make the statement." Mr. Biswas, learned senior counsel has also stated that the Investigating Officers, PW-21 and PW-22, did not gather any material to say that at the time of recording the dying declaration, the victim was in a fit mental and physical condition. The dying declaration was recorded on 12.07.2004 even though the requisition (Exbt. 12) of recording the dying declaration of the victim was made on 06.07.2007 to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, West Tripura, Agartala and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar had asked the Executive Magistrate to record the dying declaration forthwith and report back. Mr. Biswas, learned senior counsel has further contended that no allegations had been made in the complaint that the appellant had set the victim ablaze despite the fact that the said complaint was filed on 05.07.2007, on the following day of the occurrence. An irreconcilable different version has appeared in the dying declaration. Mr. Biswas, learned senior counsel has therefore asserted that by way of embellishment, the appellant has been framed falsely and the complaint is the outcome of a false perception. 7. To buttress his submission, Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant No. 1 has referred a Constitutional Bench decision of the apex court in Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 2002 SC 2973 where it has been held that: 3. 7. To buttress his submission, Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant No. 1 has referred a Constitutional Bench decision of the apex court in Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 2002 SC 2973 where it has been held that: 3. The justice theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on death bed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the court insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however has to always be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and in any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and in any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a magistrate is absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise. 8. While dilating his contention on the voluntariness and truthfulness of the dying declaration of the deceased, Mr. Biswas, learned senior counsel has also referred a decision of the apex court in Sher Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab, reported in 2008 AIR SCW 1437. In Sher Singh (supra) the apex court has held in the perspective of the multiple dying declarations that: 15. In the present case, the first dying declaration was recorded on 18.7.1994 by ASI Hakim Singh (DW-1). The victim did not name any of the accused persons and said that it was a case of an accident. However, in the statement before the court, Hakim Singh (DW-1) specifically deposed that he noted that the declarant was under pressure and at the time of recording of the dying declaration, her mother-in-law was present with her. The victim did not name any of the accused persons and said that it was a case of an accident. However, in the statement before the court, Hakim Singh (DW-1) specifically deposed that he noted that the declarant was under pressure and at the time of recording of the dying declaration, her mother-in-law was present with her. In the subsequent dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate Rajiv Prashar (PW 7) on 20.7.1994, she stated that she was taken to the hospital by the accused only on the condition that she would make a wrong statement. This was reiterated by her in her oral dying declaration and also in the written dying declaration recorded by SI Arvind Puri (PW 8) on 22.7.1994. The first dying declaration exonerating the accused persons made immediately after she was admitted in the hospital was under threat and duress that she would be admitted in the hospital only if she would give a statement in favour of the accused persons in order to save her in-laws and husband. The first dying declaration does not appear to be coming from a person with free mind without there being any threat. The second dying declaration was more probable and looks natural to us. Although it does not contain the certificate of the doctor that she was in a fit state of mind to give the dying declaration but the Magistrate who recorded the statement had certified that she was in a conscious state of mind and in a position to make the statement to him. Mere fact that it was contrary to the first declaration would not make it untrue. The oral dying declaration made to the uncle is consistent with the second dying declaration implicating the accused persons stating about their involvement in the commission of crime. The third dying declaration recorded by the SI on the direction of his superior officer is consistent with the second dying declaration and the oral dying declaration made to her uncle though with some minor inconsistencies. The third dying declaration was recorded after the doctor certified that she was in a fit state of mind to give the statement. 9. In Sher Singh (supra), the Supreme Court has followed Laxman (supra). The same principle has also been reiterated by the apex court in Anjanappa vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 2014 CRI. L.J. 368. 10. Mr. The third dying declaration was recorded after the doctor certified that she was in a fit state of mind to give the statement. 9. In Sher Singh (supra), the Supreme Court has followed Laxman (supra). The same principle has also been reiterated by the apex court in Anjanappa vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 2014 CRI. L.J. 368. 10. Mr. Biswas, learned senior counsel has further contended that the presence of the father of the deceased at the time of recording the dying declaration has in all probability affected the version of the deceased. As such, it cannot be stated that the dying declaration was voluntary and truthful or basing on such dying declaration, the accused can be convicted or sentenced. 11. From the other side, Mr. A. Ghosh, learned P.P. appearing for the State has emphatically submitted that while overruling the decision of Paparambaka Rosamma and others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in 1999(7) SCC 695 , the Constitutional Bench of the apex court in Laxman (supra) has held that: It is indeed a hyper-technical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind specially when the magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the questions he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind whereafter he recorded the dying declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this court in Paparambaka Rosamma and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh: 1999(7) SCC 695 must be held to be not correctly decided and we affirm the law laid down by this court in Koli Chunilal Savji and Anr. v. State of Gujarat: 1999(9) SCC 562 case. 12. According to Mr. Ghosh, learned P.P. that reading of the evidence in its entirety would establish that in both the dying declarations, the deceased has made a statement how the appellants had set ablaze her and there is no contradiction whatsoever. The Magistrate as well as the Doctor have categorically submitted that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make such dying declaration. On the face of such declaration, there cannot be any doubt that even if they are questioned as to how they had formulated their opinion. 13. The Magistrate as well as the Doctor have categorically submitted that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make such dying declaration. On the face of such declaration, there cannot be any doubt that even if they are questioned as to how they had formulated their opinion. 13. For appreciation of the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court has scrutinized the records and it appears from the records that PW-12, the Medical Officer, who was present at time of recording the dying declaration by PW-18, the Executive Magistrate has categorically stated that at the time of recording the statement, the patient was in physical and mental good condition to make the statement. However, he has stated in the cross examination that "without seeing the record, I cannot say the physical and mental condition of a particular time. Bed head ticket is the relevant record which speaks about the condition of the patient at the particular time. There is no mention in the report wherefrom it cannot be said that the patient was mentally and physically fit to make the statement. At the moment I have no document before me referring which I can say the mental and physical condition of the patient. In the report I did not give any certificate to the affect that Rinku Ghosh was mentally and physically fit to make the statement." The Executive Magistrate (PW-18) has stated that he has not mentioned in his report that the patient was a fit condition to make the declaration and the patient was both physically and mentally fit. PW-18 has categorically stated while deposing in the trial that "the statement was recorded in presence of a doctor, a police officer and Sri Narayan Ghosh, father of the lady." It is noteworthy that Narayan Ghosh, the father of the victim lady, PW-1 has stated that "during the period of hospitalization Rinku Ghosh one day a Magistrate went to the hospital and recorded her statement in my presence and also in presence of a Doctor. My signature was obtained in the written documents." 14. In order to appreciate the respective contention as advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties; let us appreciate the evidences briefly led by the prosecution. My signature was obtained in the written documents." 14. In order to appreciate the respective contention as advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties; let us appreciate the evidences briefly led by the prosecution. PW-1, Sri Narayan Ghosh, is the elder brother of the deceased has stated that the deceased had faced serious turbulence in her matrimonial life. Even the Women’s Commission had intervened in the matter. When he received the information that her daughter (the deceased) had been admitted in the hospital, he had immediately rushed there. He found her daughter with serious injuries. According to him, his daughter had informed him that her husband assaulted her in the morning and at around 5 pm. her husband held her neck and her mother-in-law had poured kerosene oil on her body. Her husband set fire lighting a match stick. She had informed that to save her life, she had jumped into a nearby pond. She had also informed that her father-in-law and mother-in-law brought her to the G.B.P. hospital and thereafter, they left the hospital. On the following day, PW-1 had informed the police. He has stated that for his state of shock, he could not file the complaint on the day of occurrence. He has stated that the Magistrate recorded her statement. To the query of the Court PW-1 has stated that his daughter was talking freely when the Magistrate recorded her statement. He has denied the suggestion from the defence that the deceased was not fit mentally or physically at the time of recoding her dying declaration. But no suggestion was put to him as regards his role at the time of recording the statement of the deceased. 15. PW-2, Sri Swapan Ghosh is a related witness who has corroborated that the deceased was subjected to torture for realising unlawful demand. Having informed by the deceased, he had informed about that torture to the parents of the deceased. Two meetings were held in the Panchayat and one in the Women’s Commission. But the appellant did not attend those meetings. He has stated that when he had visited the hospital to see her niece (the deceased) she had stated to him that her husband, father-in-law and another person brought to her to the hospital and left. Two meetings were held in the Panchayat and one in the Women’s Commission. But the appellant did not attend those meetings. He has stated that when he had visited the hospital to see her niece (the deceased) she had stated to him that her husband, father-in-law and another person brought to her to the hospital and left. Her niece had also informed him that on that day, her husband caught hold of her neck and her mother-in-law poured kerosene oil and lit a match stick on her body. She had also informed that prior to that altercation broke out between her mother-in-law and herself, mother-in-law and she collided when she was returning after taking bath on her menstrual days. When the police recorded her statement he was also present there. But in the cross-examination he has admitted that he did not state to the Investigating Officer that her niece (the deceased) told her that her husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law used to torture her demanding money and in respect of the Panchayat meetings or of the intervention by the Women’s Commission. 16. PW-3, Mihir Debnath, a co-villager of PW-1 has also corroborated PW-2 by stating that when he had asked her as to what had happened on that day, the deceased had informed that in the morning on that day, her husband had assaulted her and in the afternoon, her husband caught hold of her. Her mother-in-law had poured kerosene oil on her body. Thereafter, her husband set her on fire by lighting a match stick. In the cross-examination, he however had admitted that he did not state to the Investigating Officer that he had heard the deceased crying on the day of occurrence. 17. PW-4, Sri Dinesh Roy, is another co-villager of PW-1 has stated that when intervention of the village elders failed to bring any positive change, the deceased had approached the Women’s Commissions for their intervention. 18. From the statements of PW-5, Sri Dilip Debnath, PW-6, Smt. Khela Ghosh and PW-7, Sri Shibaprasad Sur, no material fact of relevance has surfaced but they have corroborated the fact relating to the meeting and the statement that the deceased made to one of the witnesses (PW-6) that her mother-in-law poured kerosene oil and her husband set her on fire. 19. 19. PW-8, Sri Jahar Saha has corroborated the statement of PW-1 that the deceased Rinku had stated in the meeting that she was being tortured by her husband and mother-in-law demanding money. 20. PW-9, Smt. Dipa Saha is a formal witness whereas PW-10 Smt. Sabita Debbarman is a member of the Women’s Commission, who has confirmed the veracity of the statement that there had been a meeting in the Women’s Commission on complaint of torture by the appellant No. 1. The statement of the deceased was recorded and is Exbt. 7 in the proceeding. Exbt. 9, according to PW-10, contains that the deceased was subjected to torture for non-realization of dowry etc. 21. PW-11, Sri Biswajit Singh, the Medical Officer, who had conducted the post mortem report. Since there is no dispute as regards the cause of the death of the deceased, no further elaboration on the testimony of PW-11 is required. 22. PW-12, Sri Niladri Sengputa was present at the time of recording the evidence and he had put his signature on the dying declaration recorded by PW-18. He has categorically stated in the examination-in-chief that at the time of recording the statement, the patient was in a physical and mental good condition to make the statement. But in the cross-examination, no doubt he has stated that without seeing the record, he could not say about the physical and mental condition of the patient on that particular time. Bed head ticket is the relevant record which speaks about the condition of the patient on a particular time. He has admitted that there is nothing affixed on the report to say that the patient was mentally and physically fit to make the statement. 23. PW-13, Smt. Maya Rani Ghosh, is a relative witness. When PW-13 had visited the hospital, the deceased stated her that on the previous morning there was quarrel between her (the deceased), her husband and the father-in-law and in the afternoon her mother-in-law had poured kerosene oil on her and her husband put a lighted match stick on her person and thus she sustained the burn injuries. 24. PW-13 (mistakenly two witnesses marked as PW-13), Sri Dhiraj Laskar is the person who had sent the requisition for recording the dying declaration by one Executive Magistrate. He had deputed one Asstt. Sub-Inspector of police namely, Sri Shibaprasad Sur to prepare the inquest report. 25. 24. PW-13 (mistakenly two witnesses marked as PW-13), Sri Dhiraj Laskar is the person who had sent the requisition for recording the dying declaration by one Executive Magistrate. He had deputed one Asstt. Sub-Inspector of police namely, Sri Shibaprasad Sur to prepare the inquest report. 25. PW-14, Sri Rana Laskar is another related witness. He is a hearsay witness and did not reveal anything of relevance. PW-15, Sri Shiba Pada Ghosh is another related witness. He has stated that Rinku (the deceased) had informed him that "her mother-in-law caught hold of her and her husband poured kerosene on her and thereafter set fire on her." He had scribed the written complaint filed by PW-1. 26. PW-16, Sri Rabindra Deb Roy is the seizure witness of the burnt clothes and other materials seized from the place of occurrence. PW-17, Sri Kali Das Ghosh is a constable who had escorted the dead body of the deceased for post mortem examination from G.B. hospital to Dr. BRAM hospital. 27. PW-18 is the Executive Magistrate namely, Gopal Ch. Debnath who recorded the dying declaration on the said requisition. But he has stated nothing as regards the mental state of the lady but he has categorically stated the lady was not in a position to put her signature or giving thumb impression. But in the cross-examination he has stated that it is not mentioned in his report that the patient was in a fit condition to make the declaration and that the patient was both in physically and mentally fit. 28. PW-19, Sri Ratan Kr. Ghosh is another relative witness. He has also corroborated that the deceased told him that her husband and mother-in-law had quarreled with her and thereafter, her mother-in-law poured kerosene oil on her body and her husband set fire on her by lighting a match stick. She has also informed him that being unable to bear the sensation generated by fire she had jumped into the pond of the house. But her husband and others had shifted her to the G.B.P. hospital. In the cross-examination, she has stated that from the police station PW-1 had returned to the hospital and thereafter they had returned their home. On the following day, they got the information of Rinku’s death. 29. But her husband and others had shifted her to the G.B.P. hospital. In the cross-examination, she has stated that from the police station PW-1 had returned to the hospital and thereafter they had returned their home. On the following day, they got the information of Rinku’s death. 29. PW-20, Smt. Laxmi Ghosh is the mother of the deceased has stated in the similar vein of PW-1 that there were several meetings in the local Panchayat on unlawful demand of money. She has also stated that Rinku had informed her that on the fateful day her husband and mother-in-law picked up quarrel with her on the ground that she had touched the salt container and that she was abused by them. She had also informed her that for this reason she left the house with her children but her uncle-in-law brought her back to the house. It has been further stated that PW-20 that on that day her husband had assaulted her and mother-in-law poured kerosene oil and her husband set her fire on lightening a match stick. She has elaborately stated how the deceased was being tortured. 30. PW-21, is one of the Investigating Officers namely, Sri Nripendra Narayan Das. He has stated that he had examined the deceased on 07.07.2007 on obtaining permission from the concerned doctor. On the requisition, the Executive Magistrate (the Deputy Collector and Magistrate) in presence of the witnesses recorded the dying declaration of the victim on 25.07.2007. He had handed over the case docket to Sri Dilip Roy, the S.D.P.O. (PW-22). 31. PW-22, Sri Dilip Roy has given the personal details as collected by him and stated that he had received the dying declaration of the deceased and after receipt of the said dying declaration and post mortem report etc. he found the prima-facie case and accordingly, he had filed the charge sheet. 32. While scrutinizing the dying declaration what has transpired is as under: Last Wednesday (04.07.2007), I was having my menstrual periods and I was coming with my son after giving him a bath. At that time my body came in touch with my mother-in-law’s body. Then, on being severely annoyed, my mother-in-law started abusing me in a bad way. Later my husband came and started assaulting me by pressing me on the throat. At that time my body came in touch with my mother-in-law’s body. Then, on being severely annoyed, my mother-in-law started abusing me in a bad way. Later my husband came and started assaulting me by pressing me on the throat. Consequently, being highly sorrowful and disappointed/hurt, I decided to come away from my father-in-law’s house and accordingly when I came out, a relative of mine (Manindra Ghosh-my uncle-in-law) persuaded me and thus brought me back again. Entering the room, when I was trying to change my wearing apparels, my mother-in-law poured kerosene over my body from a bottle, in front of my husband, and my husband lit a match (stick) and set fire to my body. After that, I plunged into the adjacent pond while crying/shouting in pain. Later my father-in-law and brother-in-law together with other, lifted me up from the pond and got me admitted to the hospital. 33. In the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. Exbt. 8, it appears that the deceased had stated to the Investigating Officer that her mother-in-law and her husband pressed her on the throat and her mother-in-law poured kerosene oil on her body from the bottle that was there in the hut. Later on, her husband set fire to her body with a matchstick. Being unable to bear the pain she had plunged into the pond. Later on, her brother-in-law and father-in-law took her from the pond and had shifted her to the G.B.P. hospital but after getting her admitted, they all left. 34. It has also transpired from the dying declaration that PW-1, PW-12, PW-18 & PW-21 and another person signed over the said dying declaration. In the dying declaration, the Executive Magistrate (PW-18) has given note that the patient is not capable to sign or give her thumb impression due to 70% burn injury of the whole body. 35. Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant No. 1 even though has stated that the finding of conviction has been returned solely relying on the dying declaration recorded by PW-18 and PW-21 but we find that there are other materials including the oral dying declaration made to the several witness as stated when they visited the hospital. Even though, some of these witnesses are related witnesses but on the face, those oral dying declarations cannot be disbelieved. Even though, some of these witnesses are related witnesses but on the face, those oral dying declarations cannot be disbelieved. What the deceased had stated to the witnesses, who visited the hospital, has exactly been replicated in the dying declaration made to the Executive Magistrate or to the police officer, may be not with mechanical precision. The pertinent question, which is required determination by this Court, is whether the deceased was in a fit mental and physical condition to make the declaration or not. Even though both PW-12 and PW-18 have stated that they have not written or endorsed any opinion on the dying declaration that was recorded by the Executive Magistrate. But they have also stated that the mental state of the deceased was fit to make declaration. In absence of any note or record that the deceased was mentally fit to give the declaration whether the dying declaration made by the deceased is to be brushed aside. 36. In Sher Singh (supra) the Supreme Court has held that even though the dying declaration did not contain the certificate of the doctor that she was in a fit state of mind to give the dying declaration but the Magistrate who recorded the statement had certified that she was in a conscious state of mind and in a position to make the statement to him. In this case also even no such certificate was endorsed on the dying declaration either by the Executive Magistrate or by the Medical Officer who attended the deceased at the relevant point of time but the Medial Officer (PW-12) has categorically stated that the patient (the deceased) was in a fit condition to make such declaration. Apart that, there is an endorsement by the Executive Magistrate that the deceased was not in a state of mind to sign her name or to give thumb impression on the statement. If the deceased was not in a position to give the statement, the Executive Magistrate would not have recorded her statement. Even though, the Executive Magistrate has not given any certificate or he had not gone through the medical records, but he has taken the permission from the Medical Officer to record the dying declaration of the victim lady which shows that the deceased at the relevant point of time was in the fit mental condition. 37. Even though, the Executive Magistrate has not given any certificate or he had not gone through the medical records, but he has taken the permission from the Medical Officer to record the dying declaration of the victim lady which shows that the deceased at the relevant point of time was in the fit mental condition. 37. After taking the cautious scrutiny of the oral testimonies as well as the dying declaration and the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. by PW-21, which is equivalent to a dying declaration and the un-rebutted testimony of the other witnesses, this Court is of the considered opinion that there cannot be any reason not to rely on the dying declarations as made by the deceased and as such, the impugned judgment and order calls for no interference. As corollary, this appeal fails and accordingly, the same is dismissed. Send down the LCRs forthwith. Before parting, we are constrained to observe that the way both the Executive Magistrate and the Medical Officer conducted themselves may impair the fair investigation resulting the miscarriage of justice. The Executive Magistrate ought to have attended the victim at the earliest after the requisition is made. He should have attached a certificate on the dying declaration as a measure of abundant caution that the injured was examined by the Medical Officer and had opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind to make the declaration. Even the observation of the Medical Officer could have optionally be attached to the said dying declaration. In future, it is directed that whenever a requisition is made for recording the dying declaration, the Executive Magistrate shall given priority to such requisition over his other assignments for recording the declaration. He should have recorded the dying declaration at the earliest. If the person who is in critical stage is not attended without delay, the investigation may in some cases lose the vital or even the solitary piece of evidence to do justice to the victim and similarly when the Medical Officer had examined the injured expecting death, he shall also give a separate note to be attached with the dying declaration by the Executive Magistrate as regards the state of mind of the injured person particularly in regard to the mental state to make the declaration. Those are extremely serious job. Casual approach be buried. Those are extremely serious job. Casual approach be buried. In future, the procedure as indicated be followed to ensure that the justice is not denied to the victim for lapses as indicated. Since certain directions have been issued which must be followed by the Executive Magistrates and the attending Medical Officers at the time of recording dying declaration in future, the Registrar General of this Court is directed to send a copy of this judgment and order to the Chief Secretary, State of Tripura, who shall ensure that the copy of the judgment and order is circulated to all the relevant departments.