JUDGMENT Mr. G.S. Sandhawalia, J.: - The present judgment shall dispose of nine civil revision petitions i.e. C.R. Nos. 4261 to 4264 and 4921 to 4925 of 2005, which have been filed by the same landlord against different tenants on the same set of grounds of ejectment and who are occupying different areas in the same and larger campus measuring approximately an acre. For reference of the facts, pleadings of C.R. No. 4261 of 2005, Amrik Singh Chana Vs. Punjab Weaving Mills, NIT, Faridabad is being taken up for consideration and convenience, since common questions of facts and law are involved in all the revision petitions. 2. The ejectment petition was instituted on 24.11.2000 for eviction of the respondent-tenant from area measuring 1781.5 sq. ft. which is part of Plot No. 11 situated in Sector 24, New Industrial Area, Urban Estate, Faridabad. The other premises are also situated in the same plot, the boundaries of which have been given in detail in other petitions and the details are mentioned as per the table below:- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- C.R. No. Name of the tenant Area Rate of rent Date of (in Rs.) lease Deed ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4261 of 2005 M/s. Punjab Weaving Mills, 1781.5 sq. ft. 500/- 04/08/76 NIT, Faridabad 4262 of 2005 M/s. Hindustan Weaving 1753 sq. ft. 490/- 04/08/76 Mills, NIT, Faridabad 4263 of 2005 M/s. Calico Textiles, 2237.5 sq. ft. 625/- 04/08/76 Faridabad 4264 of 2005 M/s. New India Textiles, 1781.5 sq. ft. 500/- 04/08/76 NIT, Faridabad 4921 of 2005 M/s. Bharat Cloth Industries, 2655.5 sq. ft. 740/- 04/08/76 NIT, Faridabad 4922 of 2005 M/s. Textiles Agency (Pvt.) 2237.5 sq. ft. 625/- 04/08/76 Ltd., NIT, Faridabad 4923 of 2005 M/s. Arun Textiles, NIT, 1781.5 sq. ft. 500/- 04/08/76 Faridabad 4924 of 2005 M/s. National Cloth 2636.5 sq. ft. 740/- 04/08/76 Manufacturers, NIT, Faridabad 4925 of 2005 M/s. New Era Textiles, NIT, 2636.5 sq. ft. 740/- 04/08/76 Faridabad ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. It was pleaded that the premises have been taken on rent vide lease deed dated 04.08.1976 @ Rs.500 per month beginning from 01.09.1976 for a term of 10 years. ft. 740/- 04/08/76 Manufacturers, NIT, Faridabad 4925 of 2005 M/s. New Era Textiles, NIT, 2636.5 sq. ft. 740/- 04/08/76 Faridabad ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. It was pleaded that the premises have been taken on rent vide lease deed dated 04.08.1976 @ Rs.500 per month beginning from 01.09.1976 for a term of 10 years. The premises were non-residential and the rent had not been paid for the last more than 3 years and that the petitioner was residing outside India and was wanting to shift to India and required the premises for bona fide use and occupation and lastly that the tenant had ceased to occupy the premises in question for a continuous period of 4 months preceding the date of filing the petition without reasonable cause. 4. The defence of the tenant was that the petitioner had let out to the respondent a portion of the property consisting of industrial shed and the tenant was ready to pay the rent but the petitioner was avoiding receiving the same. The averments that requirement was for bona fide necessity were flimsy and without any basis and that the respondent was in actual and physical possession of the premises and, therefore, had not ceased to occupy the premises. The following issues were framed by the Rent Controller:- “1. Whether the respondent is in arrears of rent for more than three years? OPP 2. Whether the premises-in-question is required for bonafide use of the petitioner and his family members? OPP 3. Whether the respondent has ceased to occupy the premises-in-question for a continuous period of four months? OPP 4. Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form? OPR 5. Relief.” 5. The landlord put in appearance as his own witness as AW-1 whereas, one I.N.K. Sinha appeared on behalf of the tenants being the Member of The Faridabad Power Loom Owners Association Ltd. and also the Secretary of the Association. 6. After considering the deposition of the landlord, the Rent Controller noticed that the landlord was residing at London and had stated that he wanted to shift to India shortly to do some business for himself and for his family. The intention of the landlord to start business was doubted as nothing had been brought on record that what business he wanted to start and what business he was doing in England. The intention of the landlord to start business was doubted as nothing had been brought on record that what business he wanted to start and what business he was doing in England. It was noticed that he was 63 years of age and, therefore, mere desire was not sufficient and a finding was recorded that the element of bona fide necessity was missing. On the issue of non-payment of rent, it was noticed that rent was tendered in Court and, therefore, respondent could not be ejected on this ground and there were no arrears as the entire rent had been paid, as claimed. On the third issue regarding the tenant had ceased to occupy, it was noticed that though there was an admission that there was lock out in premises due to some labour problems but the premises were continued to be used for office and building for day-to-day business and merely because manufacturing had been stopped for some time, it would not be sufficient to prove that the respondent had ceased to occupy the building and the allegations were vague and the evidence led was not sufficient that the premises in question were not being used. No person from the locality had been examined regarding the fact that the premises were locked for a continuous period of 4 months and whether there was any sufficient cause and accordingly, eviction petition was dismissed. 7. The Appellate Authority rejected the argument that the Secretary was not duly authorized to depose in Court as RW-1 since it was noticed that he was a Member of the Faridabad Power Loom Owners Association and, therefore, could be treated as an authorized person. It was accordingly noticed that assessment was made by the Rent Controller on 07.11.2011 of the rent, interest and costs and the same were tendered on the said date itself and accepted by the petitioner-landlord and accordingly, the ground of eviction on the point of non tender was held to be baseless. The said findings, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Rakesh Wadhawan and others vs. Jagdamba Industrial Corporation and others, 2002 (5) SCC 440 , cannot be held to be illegal in any manner. 8. The said findings, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Rakesh Wadhawan and others vs. Jagdamba Industrial Corporation and others, 2002 (5) SCC 440 , cannot be held to be illegal in any manner. 8. On the issue of personal necessity, the Appellate Authority noticed that apart from this self serving statement of the petitioner-landlord, no evidence had been led to substantiate the ground of bona fide requirement and held that it was not a genuine need and merely a desire. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1999 (6) SCC 222 . The reasoning given was that what type of business had to be started had not been brought on record in the form of project report etc. and the bona fide requirement as such was merely a desire or wish and not a genuine requirement and the finding was accordingly upheld. On the issue of cease to occupy, it was noticed that there was a labour unrest and a lock out had been declared in all the units of Faridabad regarding the manufacturing activities which had come from the respondent’s witness itself. However, a lock out being an industrial dispute in the functioning of the day-to-day business of the respondent did not lead to any conclusion that the tenants had ceased to occupy the premises in question for a continuous period of 4 months immediately preceding the date of the petition and, therefore, was not a good ground for ordering eviction. 9. The civil revision was admitted on 10.08.2006 but the petitioner failed to serve the respondent-tenants despite repeated opportunities being given. As last resort, the Court dismissed in default the petition for this reason on 31.10.2014 since repeated opportunities had been given and even dasti process was ordered to be given, but no steps were taken to serve the tenant. Thereafter, it has been restored vide order dated 27.11.2014 on the ground that the petitioner is allegedly staying in U.K. and by co-incident, he was present in Court on the same day when another case of his was pending bearing C.R. No. 3388 of 2011 and thus, came to know about the dismissal of the present revision petition. 10. Thereafter, it has been restored vide order dated 27.11.2014 on the ground that the petitioner is allegedly staying in U.K. and by co-incident, he was present in Court on the same day when another case of his was pending bearing C.R. No. 3388 of 2011 and thus, came to know about the dismissal of the present revision petition. 10. Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the Courts below were not justified in dismissing the eviction petition on the ground of bona fide necessity and cease to occupy. It is submitted that the bona fide requirement cannot be doubted by the Courts and neither it is essential to plead and prove what project the landlord is to set up in order to be successful since it is not for the tenant to dictate as to what business the landlord is to do. On the second issue regarding cease to occupy, it is submitted that once there is an admission that there was a lock out, in such circumstances, the ground for eviction was there on the record and the Courts below were not justified in dismissing the petition. 11. After hearing counsel for the petitioner, this Court is of the opinion that firstly one aspect has to be kept in mind that this Court is exercising its revisional powers and is not sitting as an Appellate Authority. A finding of fact has been recorded by both the Authorities under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 and only where they have failed to exercise jurisdiction or the correctness or legality of the order is on the misreading of the evidence, this Court would interfere. The said position has now being settled without any anvil of doubt by the Apex Court in a Constitutional Bench judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh, [2014(3) Law Herald (SC) 2488 : 2014(4) Law Herald (P&H) 3245 (SC)] : 2014 (9) SCC 78. The relevant observations read thus:- “45. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority below. The relevant observations read thus:- “45. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to reappreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.” 12. Accordingly, keeping in mind the above principles, the degree of requirement and the bona fides of the landlord have to be tested by an objective determination by the Court. As noticed above, the premises in question which have been let out are part of a large industrial plot as admitted by counsel for the petitioner having an area of one acre. As noticed above, the premises in question which have been let out are part of a large industrial plot as admitted by counsel for the petitioner having an area of one acre. The respondents are doing business in different areas in the said plot bearing Plot No. 11, Sector 24, New Industrial Area, Urban Estate, Faridabad as would be clear from the table reproduced in para no. 2 of the judgment. The bona fide and sincere requirement of the landlord has been judged by the Courts below. In the opinion of this Court also, though it is not necessary for the landlord to give details regarding the business which he is to conduct but the fact remains that the petitioner has been residing in U.K. and continues to reside there as has now come on record by virtue of the restoration application only shows that the bona fide requirement was only a mere desire. For the last 14 years from the date of filing of the petition, it is apparent that he has chosen to stay back in U.K. The business that he was wanting to do in such a large industrial plot was never specified. The petitions have been filed in a stereotype requirement against 9 tenants for the possession of all the portions without specifying the nature of business and how the premises were suitable and neither it has been specified that who would be helping the petitioner at that point of time also at the age of 63 years and whether his family members were also migrating or not. In such circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that the Courts below were well justified in coming to the conclusion that the bona fide element was missing for personal requirement and does not warrant any interference. 13. It is settled principle that the requirement of the landlord should be bonafide and just a mere wish or desire would not be a ground to direct ejectment. Reliance can be placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Kempaiah Vs. Lingaiah and others (2001) 8 Supreme Court Cases 718. The relevant paragraph reads as under: “8. Though it was pleaded that the appellant was under compulsion to vacate the premises under his occupation as his landlord was insisting to vacate the same, yet no evidence was led in that behalf. Lingaiah and others (2001) 8 Supreme Court Cases 718. The relevant paragraph reads as under: “8. Though it was pleaded that the appellant was under compulsion to vacate the premises under his occupation as his landlord was insisting to vacate the same, yet no evidence was led in that behalf. It may have been a wish or desire of the appellant to occupy the leased premises but he failed to prove the reasonable bonafide requirement as contemplated under Section 21(1)(h) of the Act. The word “require” used in clause (h) of sub-clause (1) of Section 21 of the Act implies something more than a mere wish or impulse or desire on the part of the landlord. Although the element of need is present in both the cases, the real distinction between “desire” and “require” lies in the insistence of the need. There is an element of “must have” in the case of “require” which is not present in the case of mere “desire”. The ground mentioned in clause (h) of Subsection (1) of Section 21 of the Act emphasises to the genuineness of the requirement of the landlord. The term “reasonable and bonafide requirement” are complementary and supplementary to each other in the context. Dealing with a similar provision under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, this Court in Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde held that when the Legislature employed the two terms together the message to be gathered is that requirement must be really genuine from any reasonable standard. Where eviction is sought on the aforesaid ground, a duty is cast upon the court to satisfy itself with the alleged requirement of the landlord. Even in a case where the tenant does not contest or dispute the claim of the landlord and the tenancy is governed by the Rent Control legislation, the court is obliged to look into the claim independently and give a specific finding in that regard.” 14. On the issue of cease to occupy, it is settled principle that the onus firstly lies upon the landlord. He should have placed sufficient material on the record that the premises were lying locked and not in occupation by the tenants. The electricity bills could have been got from the Electricity Board to show that electricity is not being consumed and the premises were lying locked. He should have placed sufficient material on the record that the premises were lying locked and not in occupation by the tenants. The electricity bills could have been got from the Electricity Board to show that electricity is not being consumed and the premises were lying locked. Merely because there was a lock out in the manufacturing unit would not mean that the tenants had ceased to occupy the premises. The term lock out which flows from the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 only defines the temporary closing of the place of employment or suspension of work and does not mean that the company is no longer occupying the premises and, therefore, even if there was an admission on the part of the tenant, it would not be a ground to order eviction and has rightly been declined by the Courts below. 15. Accordingly, keeping in view the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the orders passed by the Authorities below do not warrant any interference and the present revision petitions are dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------ —————————