Nagar Palika, Ghazipur Through Its Administrator v. Babu Lal (Dead) Through LR
2014-05-28
MOHD.TAHIR
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Mohd. Tahir, J. – This second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 21.3.1989 passed by Ist Additional District Judge, Ghazipur in Civil Appeal No.3 of 1987 Sri Babu Lal and another vs. Nagar Palika Ghazipur, whereby the appeal filed by the defendants Babu Lal and another was allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial court was set aside and the plaintiff-Nagar Palika's suit for demolition of construction and possession over the disputed land was dismissed. 2. The case of the plaintiff/appellant, in brief, is this that the U.P. Government acquired the suit property in 1896 for the benefit of B.N.W. Railway and the Railway remained in possession of the suit property till 1940. In 1941, it was realised by the Railway authorities as the area mentioned in the schedule were no longer required by the Railway for its purpose. So, with the sanction of the Provincial Government some of the area of these plots were released in favour of Nagar Palika and since then the Nagar Palika is the owner in possession of the said property. The defendants have no title over these plots and they have, without any lease or licence from the plaintiff, raised construction on the land in question. The construction, according to the plaintiff, is liable to be demolished but the defendants have not demolished the construction in spite of the notice from the plaintiff. The plaintiff has given a site plan at the foot of plaint to explain the circumstances of the case. According to the site plan, the defendants' constructions are marked by letters E, F, F1, F4 and the Ahata are marked by letters F1, F2, F3, F4. According to the plaintiff, these are unauthorized constructions over Patri of the road. The property released by the railway in favour of Nagar Palika in 1940 has been shown in the map and the road had been constructed therein in 30 ft. wide strips. In the north and in the south of the road land were left to be let out to different persons. In the south of the road plots were let out by Municipal Board in favour of the persons. The defendants did not take any lease but have raised constructions. 3.
wide strips. In the north and in the south of the road land were left to be let out to different persons. In the south of the road plots were let out by Municipal Board in favour of the persons. The defendants did not take any lease but have raised constructions. 3. The case of the defendants is this that the suit property has never been acquired by the State Government and has never been released by the railway administration in favour of the Municipal Board, but the same was taken by the ancestors of the defendants in 1876-77 through Patta. After taking Patta, kuchcha constructions were raised and after some times pucca constructions were raised after getting the plan sanctioned by the Municipal Board in 1945. Certain objections of estoppel and acquiescence, and limitation etc. have also been raised by the defendants. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed the following issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff is owner of the land shown by letters E F F1 F2 G G1 F3 F4 E in the sketch map? (ii) Whether the defendants have encroached upon the land shown by letters E F F1 F2 F3 F4 E out of the land E F F1 F2 G1 F3 F4 E belonging to the plaintiff by making constructions complained of thereon, if so, its effect? (iii) Whether the constructions complained of are new or more than twelve years old and if so, its effect in either case? (iv) Whether the suit is under-valued and the court fee paid is insufficient? (v) Whether the suit is barred by Articles 64 and 65 of Indian Limitation Act? (vi) Whether the suit is barred by principles of estoppel and acquiescence? (vii) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 5. The trial court on the basis of the evidence on record recorded the finding to the effect that the defendants' constructions fall within the limits of the land released by the railway administration in favour of Nagar Palika Ghazipur in 1941 and also recorded the finding that the defendants constructions are without any permission in the form of lease or licence by the Municipal Board. On these conclusions, the defendants were directed to remove the construction and to hand over possession of the disputed land to the plaintiff.
On these conclusions, the defendants were directed to remove the construction and to hand over possession of the disputed land to the plaintiff. The defendants filed appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court (Civil Judge, Ghazipur). 6. The appellate court allowed the appeal of the defendants with costs and the judgment and decree of the trial court was set aside and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed, inter alia, on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. Hence, this second appeal. 7. At the admission stage, the following substantial question of law was framed: - Whether the finding recorded by the lower appellate court that the suit is barred by time is correct? 8. I have heard Sri A.P. Tewari, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri A.K. Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record. 9. The counsel for the appellant has submitted that the trial court has recorded the finding that the construction over the land in dispute was raised by the respondents-defendants in the year 1950 and the suit was filed on 11.10.1966 and that the disputed land was the road of the railway before the release of the same in favour of Municipality. So in this case by virtue of Article 111 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation is 30 years from the date of dispossession/discontinuance. The suit was filed in the year 1966. So the suit was filed well within time. 10. Per contra, the counsel for the respondents has submitted that the ancestors of the defendants-respondents took the land in question from the cultivators through patta in the year 1876-77 and since then constructions exist thereon. Earlier the constructions were kuchcha in nature but around the year 1950 pucca constructions were raised thereon after getting the plan sanctioned by the Municipal Board in the year 1945. So the suit is time barred. 11. I have considered the rival submissions of the counsels for the parties. 12. There is clear finding of the lower appellate court that the construction over the land in dispute exists from before 1936. This finding of the lower appellate court is based on reasonings and evidence on record. The defendant-respondent Babu Lal has entered into witness box and has categorically stated that his constructions exist from before the year 1936.
12. There is clear finding of the lower appellate court that the construction over the land in dispute exists from before 1936. This finding of the lower appellate court is based on reasonings and evidence on record. The defendant-respondent Babu Lal has entered into witness box and has categorically stated that his constructions exist from before the year 1936. Apart from his statement, there are on-oath statements of the defendants witnesses, namely, Abdul Baqi, Abdul Bari and Narain Das, who also supported the case of the defendants-respondents. According to witness Abdul Baqi (D.W.2), the house of defendant-respondent Babu Lal is about 150 feet x 40 feet and exists for the last about 40-50 years. He states that his house was kachcha previously and now his house is pucca. Even the plaintiff witness Sri Chaterjee has supported the case of the defendants-respondents. He has stated in the court that in 1962 he had an occasion to see the assessment register of 1936 and then people told him that Babu Lal got his name entered in that assessment register fraudulently. Thus, there was an entry in favour of defendant Babu Lal in the assessment register of 1936. In this way, the assessment register of 1936, maintained by the plaintiff, itself shows the building of the defendants on the disputed land. The plaintiff/appellant did not produce that assessment register in the court while the same was in his custody. So non-production of the same by the appellant Municipality goes against the Municipality under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act and it may be presumed that the said assessment register, if had been produced by the appellant Municipality that would be unfavourable to it. The entry of the building of the defendants-respondents in the assessment year of 1936 goes to show that the defendants-respondents were in possession of the disputed property from before the year 1936 and if the possession of the defendants-respondents over the disputed property is presumed to be on 31.12.1935, in the maximum side in that case the suit ought to have been filed by the plaintiff-appellant up to 31.12.1935 as per Article 111 of the Limitation Act but the same was filed on 11.10.1996. So the finding of the lower appellate court that the suit is barred by time, is well founded, supported with reasoning and is based on evidence.
So the finding of the lower appellate court that the suit is barred by time, is well founded, supported with reasoning and is based on evidence. Even if it is presumed that the pucca construction was raised on the disputed land in the year 1950, in that case also the period of limitation cannot be said to start from the year 1950 because the day of change of nature of construction cannot be the day of starting the period of limitation. Therefore, I find no perversity in the finding of the lower appellate court as regards the suit being time barred. In this reference, the ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court given in Kuldeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police and others, AIR 1999 SC 677 , may be referred to. In this ruling, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusion of the lower appellate court would not be treated as perverse and the finding of the lower appellate court would not be interfered with. As I have already stated that the finding of the lower appellate court that the suit is time barred, is based on evidence and reasoning, so I find no ground to interfere with this finding. The finding of the lower appellate court is correct. The answer of the question formulated at the admission stage is accordingly answered. 13. In the result, this appeal is dismissed and the judgment and order of the lower appellate court are affirmed. 14. No order as to costs.