Hon'ble SIRADHANA, J.—The petitioner/defendant (for short 'the petitioner), in the instant writ application, has projected a challenge to the order dated 10th April, 2013 passed on an application dated 30th March,2013 wherein the respondent/plaintiff (for short 'the respondent') prayed for withdrawal of the 'agreement for sale' from Part-'D' of the record, and sought permission to mark the same as 'exhibit', in view of the fact of having deposited the deficient stamp duty along with ten times penalty thereon. The learned Trial Court granted the application vide impugned order. 2. Shorn of the unnecessary details, the essential material facts necessary for appreciation of the controversy raised in the instant writ application are : that the respondent filed a suit for specific performance of contract on the basis of an unregistered agreement dated 24th October, 2003. On an objection raised by the petitioner in view of Section 35 and 36 of the Rajasthan Stamps Act, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1998', for short), made an order dated 6th December, 2005 directing the respondent to make good the deficiency within 20 days along with the ten times penalty and in default thereof, the document would be impounded and sent to the Collector (Stamps). Aggrieved of the order dated 6th December, 2005, the respondent preferred S.B. Civil Writ Petition Number 10134 of 2005 (M/s. Gaurav Private Limited Versus Harlal Choudhary), which was ultimately dismissed vide order dated 23rd December, 2011 along with the stay application. The order on the writ application dated 23rd December, 2011 was further challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) Number CC-21019-21020/2012, which was also dismissed on 21st January, 2013. The respondent thereafter filed an application on 30th March, 2013 detailing out the facts with reference to the remedies available under the law, and availed of, by the respondent. The petitioner did not file any reply to the application. However, after hearing the parties, the learned Trial Court allowed the application vide impugned order dated 10th April, 2013. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order dated 10th April, 2013 on the ground that the respondent having failed to comply with the directions issued vide order dated 6th December, 2005 by the learned Trial Court, to make good the deficiency within twenty days, was precluded from getting the document marked as an 'exhibit'. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order dated 10th April, 2013 on the ground that the respondent having failed to comply with the directions issued vide order dated 6th December, 2005 by the learned Trial Court, to make good the deficiency within twenty days, was precluded from getting the document marked as an 'exhibit'. Further, the learned Trial Court vide order dated 8th August, 2012, declined the application of the respondent for not impounding the document i.e., agreement for sale dated 24th October, 2003, as per the mandate of Section 44 of the Act of 1998; while determining the deficient stamp duty and ten times penalty itself, to be deposited within twenty days. It is further urged that neither this Court nor the Hon'ble Apex Court of the land granted any permission to the respondent to deposit the deficient amount on account of stamp duty and at the same time, no time extension was allowed to make good the deficiency. Therefore, the learned Trial Court committed serious error and illegality while granting the permission to mark the document as an 'exhibit' and thus, exceeded the jurisdiction. Referring to Rule 50 and 51 of the General Rules (Civil), 1986, it is further urged that once the document was declared irrelevant or inadmissible, the same cannot be exhibited. The order is also assailed in the light of the mandate of Section 39 of the Act of 1998 as well as in view of Order 13 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'the CPC'). 4. To reinforce the submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Abhai Maligai Partnership Firm & Anr. Versus K.Santhakumaran & Ors. : (1998) 7 SCC 386 ; and Sree Narayana Dharmasanghom Trust Versus Swami Prakasananda & Ors. : (1997) 6 SCC 78 ; and emphasized that since the matter has been concluded even by the Hon'ble Apex Court of the land, in view of dismissal of the SLP, it was not open for the learned Trial Court to reconsider the issue, which is against the judicial discipline and the impugned order also suffers with jurisdictional error. 5. : (1997) 6 SCC 78 ; and emphasized that since the matter has been concluded even by the Hon'ble Apex Court of the land, in view of dismissal of the SLP, it was not open for the learned Trial Court to reconsider the issue, which is against the judicial discipline and the impugned order also suffers with jurisdictional error. 5. Per contra, repelling the contentions made on behalf of the petitioner, and supporting the impugned order, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it is not in dispute that the order dated 6th December, 2005 was challenged by the respondent before this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.10134 of 2005, which was decided vide order dated 23rd December, 2011. Thereafter, Review Application Number 12 of 2012 was preferred in the above-noted writ application for review of the order dated 23rd December, 2011, which was dismissed vide order dated 10th February, 2012. The orders were further subjected to scrutiny before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) Number CC-21019-21020/2012 (Gaurav Pvt. Ltd. Versus Harlal Choudhary & Anr.), which was dismissed on 21st January, 2013 and thereafter, the respondent submitted an application dated 30th March, 2013; decided vide impugned order dated 10th April, 2013. Thus, it is apparent on the face of record that the respondent has been pursuing the remedies available under the law. It is further urged that there was a stay operating in favour of the respondent in the writ application preferred against the order dated 6th December, 2005, which was ultimately dismissed vide order dated 23rd December, 2011 and the review application being dismissed on 10th February, 2012 and thereafter, the respondent availed of the remedy by way of SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Moreover, the respondent could not have gained by the delay in the proceedings before the learned Trial Court. 6. Moreover, the respondent could not have gained by the delay in the proceedings before the learned Trial Court. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent further urged that a bare perusal of Section 39 of the Act of 1998, would reveal that the inadmissibility in evidence of the document is a curable defect and does not prohibited its admissibility in the event of removal of the deficiency, as is evident from the text of clause (a) of Section 39 of the Act of 1998, which provides for admissibility on payment of the duty with which the document is chargeable, or in the case of instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty and a penalty of one one hundred rupees, or, ten times of the amount of deficient portion thereof, whichever is higher. 7. The learned counsel further stressed that the object underlying Section 39 of the Act of 1998 is general rule, founded of principles of natural justice, that the proceeding in a Court of justice should not be conducted to the disadvantage of the party and not to do injustice. Procedure should be adopted, that does not exclude the litigant from presentation of the best evidence, which is necessary for complete and proper adjudication of the real questions of the controversy brought before the court of law. It is further pointed out that soon after the dismissal of the SLP on 21st January, 2013, the respondent did not lose any time in filing the application on 30th March, 2013 whereupon the learned Trial Court granted permission to mark the document in dispute as an 'exhibit'. The learned counsel placed reliance upon the verdict of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sahara India Real Estate Exchange Corporation Ltd. & Anr. Versus Securities & Exchange Board of India : 2013 (1) WLC (SC) Civil 277, and submitted that in the event of genuineness, even time can be extended. 8. Mr. Rajendra Prasad further urged that having regard to the nature of the dispute and the amount involved as well as in view of the remedies availed of by the respondent, available under the law, the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court dated 10th of April, 2013 calls for no interference by this Court in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction. 9. 9. The learned Trial Court while considering the objection raised in the light of Section 35 and 36 of the Act of 1998 and after a detailed consideration, itself determined the stamp duty @ 11% on the document in dispute i.e. agreement for sale dated 24th October, 2003 and concluded the deficiency amounting to Rs.5,14,640/- and ten times penalty i.e. Rs.51,46,400/-. Accordingly, the respondent was directed to deposit the stamp duty and penalty, as aforementioned, within twenty days, failing which the document will not be 'exhibited' and would be impounded under Section 33 of the Act of 1998. Here it will be gainful to consider the text of Section 33, 35, 36 and 39 of the Act of 1998, which reads thus:- “33 - Obligation to give receipt in certain cases Any person receiving any money exceeding ''five thousand rupees' in amount, or any bill of exchange, cheque or promissory note for an amount exceeding receiving in satisfaction or part satisfaction of a debt, any movable property exceeding shall, on demand by the person paying or deliver-ing such 'five thousand rupees', or 'five thousand rupees' in value, money, bill, cheque, note or property, give a duly stamped receipt for the same and any person receiving or taking credit for any premium or consideration for any renewal of any contract of fire-insurance, shall within one month after receiving or taking credit for such premium or consideration, give duly stamped receipt for the same. 35 - Adjudication as to proper stamp.-(1) When any instrument, whether executed or not and whether previously stamped or not, is brought to the Collector, and the person bringing it applies to have the opinion of that officer as to the duty, if any, with which it is chargeable, and pays a fee of such amount (not exceeding fifty rupees and not less than ten rupees) as the Collector may in each case direct, the Collector shall determine the duty, if any, with which in his judgment, the instrument is chargeable. (2) For this purpose the Collector may require to be furnished with an abstract of the instrument, and also with such affidavit or other evidence as he may deem necessary to prove that all the facts and circumstances affecting the chargeability of the instrument with duty, or the amount of the duty with which it is chargeable, are fully and truly set forth therein, and may refuse to proceed upon any such application until such abstract and evidence have been furnished accordingly: Provided that, - (a) no evidence furnished in pursuance of this section shall be used against any person in any civil proceeding, except in an inquiry as to the duty with which the instrument to which it relates is chargeable; and (b) every person by whom any such evidence is furnished shall, on payment of the full duty with which the instrument to which it relates, is chargeable, be relieved from any penalty which he may have incurred under this Act by reason of the omission to state truly in such instrument any of the facts or circumstances aforesaid. (3) Where the Collector has reason to believe that the market value of the property has not been truly set forth in the instrument brought to him for determining the duty under sub-section (1) he may, after such inquiry as he may deem proper and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the person bringing the instrument, determine the market value of such property for the purpose of duty. 36 - Certificate by Collector.- (1) When an instrument brought to the Collector under section 35 is, in his opinion, one of a description chargeable with duty, and (a) the Collector determines that it is already fully stamped, or (b) the duty determined by the Collector under section 35, or such a sum as, with the duty already paid in respect of the instrument, is equal to the duty so determined, has been paid, the Collector shall certify by endorsement on such instrument that the full duty (stating the amount) with which it is chargeable, has been paid. (2) When such instrument is, in his opinion, not chargeable with duty, the Collector shall certify in the manner aforesaid that such instrument is not so chargeable. (2) When such instrument is, in his opinion, not chargeable with duty, the Collector shall certify in the manner aforesaid that such instrument is not so chargeable. (3) Any instrument upon which an endorsement has been made under this section, shall be deemed to be duly stamped or not chargeable with duty, as the case may be; and, if chargeable with duty, shall be receivable in evidence or otherwise, and may be acted upon and registered as if it had been originally duly stamped: Provided that nothing in this section shall authorize the Collector to endorse any instrument chargeable with a duty not exceeding ten paise or any bill of exchange or promissory note, when brought to him, after the drawing or execution thereof, on paper not duly stamped. Provided further that, : (a) any instrument executed or first executed in the State and brought to the Collector within one month of its execution or first execution, as the case may be; or (b) any instrument executed or first executed out of State and brought to the Collector within three months after it has been first received in the State; shall be chargeable with duty as applicable at the time of its execution and where any instrument is presented to the Collector after the period specified above, such instrument shall be chargeable with duty as applicable at the time of its presentation and calculated on the basis of market value, wherever applicable, prevalent on the date of its presentation before the Collector and he may certify accordingly. 39 - Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence, etc.- No instrument chargeable with duty under this Act shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped: Provided that, - (a) any such instrument shall, subject to all just exceptions, be admitted in evidence on payment of, - (i) the duty with which the same is chargeable, or in the case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty, and (ii) a penalty of one hundred rupees or, ten times the amount of deficient portion thereof, which ever is higher. (b) where a contract or agreement of any kind is effected by correspondence consisting of two or more letters and any one of the letters bears the proper stamp; the contract or agreement shall be deemed to be duly stamped. (c) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument as evidence in any proceeding in a criminal court, other than a proceedings under Chapter IX or Part D of Chapter X of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974). (d) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in any court when such instrument has been executed by or on behalf of the Government or where it bears the certificate of the Collector as provided by section 36 or any other provision of this Act. (e) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of a copy of any instrument or of an oral account of the contents of any instrument, if the stamp duty or a deficient portion of the stamp duty and penalty as specified in clause (a) is paid. (f) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in evidence in any court when stamp duty on such instrument has already been paid in advance in the form of a consolidated lump sum. (g) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in any court when such document has been executed by or on behalf of the Government or where it bears the Certificate of the Collector as provided by section 36 or any other provision of this Act.” 10. In view of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner with reference to Order 13 Rule 8 CPC, it will be gainful to consider the text of Rule 8 CPC, which reads thus:- “8. Court may order any document to be impounded – Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 5 or rule 7 of this Order or in rule 17 or Order VII, the Court may, if it sees sufficient cause, direct any document or book produced before it in any suit to be impounded and kept in the custody of an officer of the Court, for such period and subject to such conditions as the Court thinks fit.” 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that about the inadmissibility of the document in view of Rule 50 and 51 of the General Rules (Civil), which also reads thus:- “50. Documents produced how to be dealt with – All documents produced must be received by the court and must be dealt with in one or other of the following ways, viz.- (a) returned, (b) placed on the record, or (c) impounded 51. Duty of court upon production of documents – The court shall inspect and consider all documents as soon as possible after issues are framed and before evidence is produced and shall - (a) Where they are held by the Court under Order XIII, rule 3 of the Code to be irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, forthwith reject them. (b) Where not rejected under Order XIII, rule 3 of the Code, and held to be relevant and admissible in evidence, dealt with them as follows:- (1) Documents, which do not require proof e.g public documents and documents admitted by the party against whom they are produced in evidence shall be admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits in the manner prescribed in rule 50. (2) Documents which required proof by oral evidence shall be kept on the record pending proof. They shall be admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits in the manner prescribed in rule 50 when evidence is tendered in proof of them. They shall be returned at the close of the evidence if no evidence is tendered in proof of such documents. Note – The endorsement referred to in Order XIII, Rule 4 of the Code shall be made on the documents which are admitted in evidence. No document shall be marked as an exhibit unless it is admitted in evidence.” 12. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondent and with their assistance perused the material available on record. 13. A bare perusal of Section 39 of the Act of 1998 would reveal that legislature has used words “for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence”. The execution of the agreement for sale is undoubtedly an instrument as defined under Section 2(xi)(ii) of the Act of 1998. 13. A bare perusal of Section 39 of the Act of 1998 would reveal that legislature has used words “for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence”. The execution of the agreement for sale is undoubtedly an instrument as defined under Section 2(xi)(ii) of the Act of 1998. Therefore, in the instant case at hand, on account of statutory interdiction, the instrument chargeable on the duty under the Act of 1998, cannot be admitted in evidence for any purpose unless such instrument is “duly stamped”, as defined under Section 2(xii). However, Section 39(a) provides that any such instrument shall, subject to all just exception, be admitted in evidence on payment of duty with which the same is chargeable, or in the case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty, and a penalty of hundred rupees or, ten times the amount of deficient portion thereof, which ever is higher. 14. It is not in dispute that the learned Trial Court while considering the objections raised in the light of Section 35 and 36 of the Act of 1998, determined stamp duty @ 11% on the document/instrument in dispute i.e., agreement for sale dated 24th October, 2003 and concluded the deficiency amounting to Rs.5,14,640/- and ten times penalty i.e. Rs.51,46,400/-, which was to be deposited within twenty days from the order dated 6th December, 2005. The respondent/ plaintiff availing of the legal remedy, available under the law, filed a writ application, which was dismissed on 23rd December, 2011 and the review application preferred was dismissed on 23rd December, 2011. Therefore, the Special Leave to Appeal preferred was dismissed on 21st January, 2013. The deficiency as determined vide order dated 6th December, 2005, was made good and submitted the application on 30th March, 2013, which has been allowed vide impugned order dated 10th April, 2013. 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Abdul Razak (Dead) through LRs & Anr. Versus Mangesh Rajaram Wagle & Ors. : (2010) 2 SCC 432 cautioned the High Court to keep in view the limitations of certiorari/ supervisory jurisdiction and refrain from deciding the writ petitions filed under Article 226 or petitions/applications filed under Article 227 of the Constitution. In case of Abdul Razak (supra), their Lordships held thus:- “22. If respondent Nos. Versus Mangesh Rajaram Wagle & Ors. : (2010) 2 SCC 432 cautioned the High Court to keep in view the limitations of certiorari/ supervisory jurisdiction and refrain from deciding the writ petitions filed under Article 226 or petitions/applications filed under Article 227 of the Constitution. In case of Abdul Razak (supra), their Lordships held thus:- “22. If respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had invoked the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226, then the learned Single Judge ought to have considered whether the trial Court committed a jurisdictional error by refusing to strike off the additional written statement filed by the appellants or it was a case of failure on the part of the trial Court to exercise the power vested in it under Order VI Rule 16 CPC or the order under challenge was vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record or there was violation of the rules of natural justice. In either case, the learned Single Judge was also required to consider whether there has been substantial failure of justice or manifest injustice has been caused to respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on account of the trial Court's refusal to strike off the additional written statement. These are the parameters laid down by this Court in Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan AIR 1964 SC 477 . 23. If the petition filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 was under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, then the learned Single Judge should have taken note of the often quoted judgment in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675 , in which a two-Judge Bench, after threadbare analysis of Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution and considering large number of judicial precedents on the subject, recorded the following conclusions: "(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction -- by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction -- by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case." 16. Thus, applying the principles aforesaid, it is not at all justified to interfere with an order under the certiorari/supervisory jurisdiction, unless the Court below assumed jurisdiction, which it does not have or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction, which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is exercised in a manner not permitted by the law, resulting into failure of the justice or grave injustice. A patent error which can be perceived without any lengthy or complicated arguments or a long drawn process of reasoning, is another ground where such jurisdiction could be invoked. 17. The Hon'ble Apex Court of the land in a recent pronouncement in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. Versus Rajendra Shankar Patil : (2010) 8 SCC 329 , again examined the nature power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Their Lordships observed that the power to issue writs had undergone a sea change since the commencement of the Constitution from 26th January, 1950. Now, the writs can be issued by the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution and by the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. According to their Lordships, neither writ petition can be moved under Article 227 of the Constitution nor can a writ be issued under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after a survey of various earlier judgments with reference to exercise and nature of power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution; concluded that the two Articles stand substantially on different footing. While the power conferred to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution has been treated to be one during the course of original proceedings whereas the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is neither original nor appellate. Thus, the powers conferred under Article 226 and 227 have been held to be separate and distinct and operate in different fields. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) has been considered and explained thus:- “48. The jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. The jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their fundamental rights or other statutory rights. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by the High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the State. In certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief under Article226 of the Constitution can be claimed ex-debito justicia or as a matter of right. But in cases where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 227, such exercise is entirely discretionary and no person can claim it as a matter of right. From an order of a Single Judge passed under Article 226, a Letters Patent Appeal or an intra Court Appeal is maintainable. But no such appeal is maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge of a High Court in exercise of power under Article 227. In almost all High Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. No such rule appears to have been framed for exercise of High Court's power under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise entirely in the domain of the discretion of High Court. 62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v.Union of India and Ors. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v.Union of India and Ors. reported in : (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 18. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case at hand, I find that the writ petition projects a challenge to the order passed by the Civil Court dated 9th October, 2013 involving a dispute between two private parties. It hardly needs to be reiterated that writ petition is a remedy in a public law against either a State or an instrumentality of a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and therefore, private parties cannot be equated with the 'State' or the instrumentality of the 'State'. Their Lordships in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) have sounded a note of caution while entertaining the petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution in view of law declared in case of Surya Dev Rai Versus Ram Chander Rai & Ors. : (2003) 6 SCC 675 , holding that even the petition Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be called a writ application. Their Lordships further explaining the scope of exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in view of amendment of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, held thus:- “66. We may also observe that in some High Courts there is tendency of entertaining petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution by terming them as writ petitions. This is sought to be justified on an erroneous appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev (supra) and in view of the recent amendment to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section115 of CPC has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding High Court's power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law. 67. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding High Court's power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law. 67. As a result of frequent interference by Hon'ble High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious problems in the administration of justice. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, Hon'ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. Those principles have been formulated by this Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the highest Courts of justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly.” 19. The document/instrument, which suffers with the deficiency chargeable with duty, under the Act of 1998, may be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable, or in case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty and further, subject to payment of one hundred or ten times of the amount of deficient portion thereof, whichever is higher. The respondent deposited the stamp duty as well as penalty as determined by the learned Trial Court vide order dated 6th December, 2005. Therefore, in view of Section 39 of the Act of 1998, the document i.e. agreement for sale dated 24.10.2003; has rightly been permitted to be marked as an exhibit vide impugned order dated 10th of April, 2013; by granting application preferred on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff. Other objections raised on behalf of the petitioner, referring to the provisions of Rule 8 of Order 13 CPC and Rule 50 and 51 of the General Rules (Civil) are devoid of any substance and therefore, rejected. 20. Having considered the facts, circumstances and material available on record in totality, the view of the learned Trial Court, in acceding to the prayer of the respondent/plaintiff, appears to be reasonable and sound. 21. For the reasons and discussions herein above, the writ application is devoid of any substance and therefore, merits rejection. Ordered accordingly. 22. In the result, the writ application is hereby dismissed. 21. For the reasons and discussions herein above, the writ application is devoid of any substance and therefore, merits rejection. Ordered accordingly. 22. In the result, the writ application is hereby dismissed. In view of the final adjudication on the writ application, the stay application stands closed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.