Raj Mohan Singh, J. 1. Defendants are in second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 16.1.1988 passed by Learned Additional District Judge, whereby the judgment and decree dated 5.8.1986 passed by learned Sub Judge, Faridabad, dismissing the suit, has been set aside and the suit has been decreed in appeal. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs filed suit for declaration and joint possession to the effect that they are owner in possession of the suit land according to the shares as mentioned in para No. 1 of the plaint. Plaintiffs submitted that according to jamabandi for the year 1939-40, Suleman Khan, Sultan Khan and Mehmood, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, were owners in possession of 1/3rd share in the land and defendants were owners of 2/3 rd share of the said land, which at the relevant time bore khewat No. 80 Khatauni No. 190-193 and Khasra No. 61, 62, 271, 65 and 168. Consolidation took place in the village in the year 1950-51 and Panchayat deh came to be recorded as owner of the suit land in the revenue record. 2. On 26.2.1969, defendants filed suit against the gram sabha claiming that they are co-sharers in possession since 1939-40 and the area under their ownership and possession should be excluded from being vested in Panchayat as shamlat deh. The said suit was decreed on 7.3.1970 and the land measuring 104 kanals 15 marla out of the total shamlat land measuring 314 kanals 1 marla was brought out from the purview of vesting and mutation No. 740 was also sanctioned on 13.6.1972. 3. It has also been alleged that since Sulekhan etc., predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs were also co-sharers in possession of the shamlat land with the defendants, they automatically became co-sharers in the land so brought out from the purview of vesting in panchayat as shamlat deh by the dint of aforesaid civil court decree and, therefore, the plaintiffs are also entitled to 1/3rd share of the land in question. 4. The suit was contested by the defendants on all possible fronts viz. maintainability, non-joinder of necessary parties, estoppel, res judicata and Order 2 Rule 2 CPC etc. 4. The suit was contested by the defendants on all possible fronts viz. maintainability, non-joinder of necessary parties, estoppel, res judicata and Order 2 Rule 2 CPC etc. The defendants alleged that the plaintiffs have nothing to do with the land in question and they projected larger connotation in terms of co-sharership in the entire shamlat land of which they claimed themselves to be co-sharers in their own right, irrespective of unit arising of common ancestor, namely, Maglu. Defendants asserted that the land was allotted only to the defendants by the dint of aforesaid Civil Court decree and the mutation was rightly sanctioned in their favour and the plaintiffs have no share in the property in question. 5. Replication was also filed by the plaintiffs and on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are owners in possession of the suit land according to the shares mentioned in para No. 1 of the plaint? OPP 2. Whether the defendants have wrongly been shown as owners of 104 kanals 15 marlas instead of 80 kanals, if so to what effect? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the suit? OPD 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the suit? OPD 6. Whether the suit is time barred? OPD 7. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD 8. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the suit? OPD 9. Whether the suit is barred by the principles of res judicata and under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC? OPD 10. Whether the suit is not properly valued? OPD 11. Whether the suit is false and frivolous? OPD 12. Relief. 6. Both the parties led evidence before the learned trial Court. Under Issues No. 1 and 2, the trial Court took cognizance on Ex. P-5 i.e., jamabandi for the year 1939-40 showing Suleman Khan, Sultan Khan and Mahmood Khan, sons of Shadi Khan to be in possession of 1/3rd share in the land shown in the jamabandi forming khasra Nos. 61, 61 and 65 etc. In the jamabandi for the year 1951-52, the land was again shown in possession of aforesaid three persons to the extent of 1/3rd share in the same khasra numbers. 61, 61 and 65 etc. In the jamabandi for the year 1951-52, the land was again shown in possession of aforesaid three persons to the extent of 1/3rd share in the same khasra numbers. In both the jamabandis, the ownership is shown to be of shamlat deh. However, the learned trial Court has observed that the entries in these aforesaid revenue record do not advance the case of the plaintiffs in any manner because the land has been shown to be a gair mumkin kallar and banjar kadim and, therefore, it cannot be presumed to be in cultivating possession of any one and there could not be any actual physical possession over such type of land. Secondly, the learned trial Court emphasized upon that after the consolidation, the land so vested in the gram panchayat, the land in question was brought out from the vesting of the same in the gram panchayat by way of civil court decree after satisfying the ingredients of being in actual individual cultivating possession as on 26.1.1950. 7. Admittedly, consolidation took place after the year 1950-51 and the land which came to be vested in Panchayat as shamlat deh was recorded in the jambandi for the year 1967-68 and the land in question was shown to be in possession of panchayat deh. Thereafter, the suit in question came to be filed against the panchayat and the land measuring 104 kanals 15 marla was released from the pool of the panchayat and the panchayat was divested of the same. 8. Learned trial Court pointed out that the plaintiffs have not brought the revenue record between 1950-51 and 1967-68 to connect that in lieu of earlier khasra Nos. 61 and 62 etc., the present khasra numbers were allotted which are in dispute herein and it was the same land, which was allotted to the defendants by way of civil court decree. 9. According to the plaintiffs, the land was 21 bighs 7 biswas in the joint unit of the parties and that comes out to be almost 105 kanals, which has been released in favour of the defendants and this area fully coincide with the area on record. 9. According to the plaintiffs, the land was 21 bighs 7 biswas in the joint unit of the parties and that comes out to be almost 105 kanals, which has been released in favour of the defendants and this area fully coincide with the area on record. Learned trial Court further observed that the plaintiffs also should have asserted their right against the panchayat as in the case of the defendants and they should have got their area released in the manner as has been done by the defendants. Learned trial Court took cognizance of the statement of DW-1 Yasin to the effect that the plaintiffs and their predecessor were not living in the village since the time of their forefathers and they were originally residents of Uttar Pradesh and they have come to the village recently. On the other hand, there was a rebuttal in the form of PW-2 i.e., plaintiff No. 6 Maksood Ahmad but his deposition was ignored by the learned trial Court on the ground that the same is not in conformity with the evidence on record. Learned trial court, thereafter, proceeded to discuss the statement of PW-3 Tika Ram, Patwari with reference to goshwara Ex. P-1 to show that the possession of the land so released from shamlat deh was delivered in favour of the defendants. PW-4 Hari Ram, Numbardar was also critically analysed so as to show that the predecessor of the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit land. Learned trial Court, ultimately held that the plaintiffs have miserably failed to prove their title over the suit land and consequently, the suit was ordered to be dismissed by way of judgment and decree dated 5.8.1986. 10. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs filed appeal before the learned Additional District, Faridabad. The learned Appellate Court, by referring to the pedigree table, in para No. 9 of the judgment, held that the entry in the jamabandi for the year 1939-40, Ex. P-5, was considered to be the relevant entry in which the entire entitlement of the parties in total shamlat land is shown to be 21 kanals 7 marla, which comes out to be approximately 105 kanals or 104 kanals 15 marlas. P-5, was considered to be the relevant entry in which the entire entitlement of the parties in total shamlat land is shown to be 21 kanals 7 marla, which comes out to be approximately 105 kanals or 104 kanals 15 marlas. Learned lower Appellate Court observed that out of total shamlat land, the share of both the parties were brought out by the defendants alone from the pool of shamlat by the dint of Civil Court decree and, therefore, nothing remained for the plaintiffs to seek from the total shamlat land. Learned lower Appellate Court pointed out that since plaintiffs and defendants are co-sharers in the total proprietary body i.e., total shamlat land, therefore effort in bringing out the land from shamlat pool by one set of co-sharer would be deemed to be an effort on behalf of all co-sharers and in that eventuality total land so received from the shamlat pool i.e. 21 bighas 7 biswas = approximately 105 kanals would be shares/apportioned according to the entitlement in the revenue record. In this way, the land so brought out from the shamlat pool was held to be owned and possessed by the co-sharers in the ratio of 1/3rd: 2/3rd. On this broad outline, the learned lower Appellate Court accepted the appeal and held that the civil court decree obtained by the defendants was in the capacity of co-sharers and the filing of the civil suit and getting the whole land, which was jointly owned and possessed by the parties on or before 1954 included the share of the plaintiffs also and in view of this, the land in question would have reverted back to the original owner automatically but the defendants took the whole land included the share of the plaintiffs, which ultimately gave birth to the dispute in question. 11. The learned lower Appellate Court also noted the grounds put forward by the defendants that in the year 1954, the plaintiffs lost their right except the land in question vested in the gram panchayat and thereafter, the land in question was got/brought out by the defendants alone and, therefore, the filing of the suit on 10.11.1984 would not disturb that title on the basis of adverse possession. The plea of adverse possession was raised by the defendants at this juncture. No such plea of adverse possession was pleaded in the written statement by the defendants. The plea of adverse possession was raised by the defendants at this juncture. No such plea of adverse possession was pleaded in the written statement by the defendants. Plea of adverse possession, as projected, has to have roots in the pleadings as well as in the evidence. A party claiming adverse possession must prove his title as "nee vi, nee clam, nee precario' i.e., peaceful, open and continuous and it should be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful dispossession of the original owner and is actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. The plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law that can be raised at any stage. Rather it is a mixed question of law and facts. In the absence of pleadings on record, no such plea was possibly conceivable and the learned lower Appellate Court has rightly ignored the same. The claim of adverse possession must be evident in terms of following ingredients: (i) On what date, the person came into possession? (ii) What was the nature of his possession? (iii) Whether the factum of possession was known to the other party? (iv) How long his possession has continued? (v) His possession was open and undisturbed? Plea of adverse possession has no equities, rather this right has some instinct of piratical right. 12. The aforesaid analogy is squarely fortified by the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in 2004 (2) RCR (Civil) 702 titled Karnatka Board Wakf v. Govt. of India. 13. The plaintiffs successfully demonstrated before the learned lower Appellate Court that the parties are co-sharers in joint khewat and each of the co-sharer would be deemed to be trustee on behalf of other. of India. 13. The plaintiffs successfully demonstrated before the learned lower Appellate Court that the parties are co-sharers in joint khewat and each of the co-sharer would be deemed to be trustee on behalf of other. Possession of one of the co-sharer would be deemed to be possession on behalf of all and by relying upon the dictum laid down in 1981 PLJ 204 (Full Bench) titled Bhartu v. Ram Sarup, the plaintiffs successfully contended before the learned lower Appellate Court that every co-sharer has a right to use the joint property in the husband-like manner not in consistent with similar rights of other co-sharers and plea of ouster cannot be taken by the defendants because the entire land of the parties i.e. 105 kanasls was the subject matter of civil court decree and the analogy that the plaintiffs also could have resorted to same process was not applicable because there was no surviving share left in the shamlat deh after the civil court decree having been passed in favour of the defendants. Therefore, the property so received by the defendants by way of civil court decree dated 7.3.1970 would be deemed to be a decree having shares of plaintiffs also. Learned lower Appellate Court emphasized upon the concept of co-sharership that the co-sharer in possession would become constructive trustee on behalf of other co-sharers, who are not in possession of the land and the right of such co-sharer would be deemed to be protected by the trustee. Even one of the co-sharer can institute a suit regarding declaration or possession or injunction against the person who threatens their title without joining other co-sharers for the benefit of all the co-sharers. The total land, which was jointly owned and possessed by the parties was successfully got decreed by the defendants from the gram panchayat without leaving the share of the plaintiffs and the position would have been otherwise that they would have got only 2/3rd share in those circumstances, the remaining 1/3rd share would have been obtained by the plaintiffs from the gram panchayat. When the whole of the share has been taken by the defendants, in those circumstances, the claim of the plaintiffs against the defendants regarding 1/3rd share is just and proper and they are accordingly entitled to the same. When the whole of the share has been taken by the defendants, in those circumstances, the claim of the plaintiffs against the defendants regarding 1/3rd share is just and proper and they are accordingly entitled to the same. The learned lower Appellate Court calculated that out of 104 kanals and 15 marlas, the share of the defendants comes out to be 80 kanals and that of plaintiffs comes out to be 34 kanals 15 marlas and accordingly, the appeal was allowed. 14. The defendants have come in second appeal. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the appellants have successfully brought out the land in question from the purview of vesting in panchayat as shamlat deh on the basis of protection given in Section 2(g) of the Punjab Village Common Land Act, 1961. The appellants/defendants have successfully demonstrated before the Civil Court that they were in individual cultivating possession of the land in question as on 26.1.1950 and by showing that they successfully proved before the Court that the land in question was not capable of vesting as shamlat deh in panchayat and the learned Civil Court rightly brought out the land in question from the purview of vesting and, therefore, the appellants draw wider connotation of co-sharership of entire proprietary bodies of shamlat deh, thereby showing that whosoever is successful in proving individual cultivating possession out of entire proprietary body has to have the share accordingly. The argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellants has fallacy in terms of material on record in the form of jamabandi for the year 1939-40 in which total share of the plaintiffs and the defendants is shown to be 21 bighas and 7 biswas that approximately comes out to be total 105 kanals. The share of the defendants alone cannot be equated to be 105 kanals from the total shamlat land belonging to the proprietary body. The defendants cannot go beyond their entitlement in terms of jamabandi for the year 1939-40 (Ex. P-5). The pedigree table on record shows that the defendants are descendants from Sule Khan, Nabi Khan, Bhagmal etc. The pedigree table on record, Ex. P-15 and P-16 depicts the connectivity between the parties, who had Maglu to be the common ancestor. The defendants cannot go beyond their entitlement in terms of jamabandi for the year 1939-40 (Ex. P-5). The pedigree table on record shows that the defendants are descendants from Sule Khan, Nabi Khan, Bhagmal etc. The pedigree table on record, Ex. P-15 and P-16 depicts the connectivity between the parties, who had Maglu to be the common ancestor. In view of categoric finding based on evidence more particularly the entitlement of the parties arising out of jamabandi for the year 1939-40, the defendants cannot claim entitlement in the joint land over and above the share shown in Ex. P-5. This Court has considered the aforesaid aspect and has found the same to be worth credence. The filing of the suit by one of the co-sharer would be deemed to be an effort on behalf of all the co-sharers and, therefore, the Civil Court decree dated 7.3.1970 would be deemed to be an instrument, deriving benefit in favour of all concerned. The aforesaid decree cannot be construed to be the judgment and decree in favour of the defendants alone because nothing remained thereafter, making the plaintiffs entitled to resort to any action for re-claiming the land in any manner. The defendants being the co-sharers claimed the rights on behalf of themselves as well as on behalf of other co-sharers and the decree so obtained would be deemed to be a decree on behalf of all the co-sharers in the land as depicted in the jamabandi for the year 1939-40. 15. The claim of the defendants on the basis of adverse possession further shows hollowness in the claim of the defendants inasmuch as that the plea presupposes admission of title in favour of the plaintiffs. Since the plea has not been followed by any material on record, much less the foundation in terms of the written statement, therefore, the plea has been rightly discarded by the learned lower Appellate Court. 16. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, the following substantial questions arise for consideration by this Court:- "1. Whether the defendants can claim right of ownership on the basis of civil court decree over and above their entitlement in shamlat deh as a unit? 2. Whether the judgment and decree dated 7.3.1970 would be deemed to be a decree obtained by the defendants-co-sharers on behalf of all the co-sharers? 3. Whether the defendants can claim right of ownership on the basis of civil court decree over and above their entitlement in shamlat deh as a unit? 2. Whether the judgment and decree dated 7.3.1970 would be deemed to be a decree obtained by the defendants-co-sharers on behalf of all the co-sharers? 3. Whether the possession of one of the co-sharer would be deemed to be possession of all the other co-sharers unless and until the land is partitioned by metes and bounds? 4. Whether the plea of adverse possession in the absence of material ingredients can be read in favour of the defendants particularly when there is no foundation made in the written statement? 5. Whether the defendants can claim ownership on the basis of civil court decree dated 7.3.1970 on the basis of wider connotation to show that they were in individual possession of the land in question on or before 26.1.1950 irrespective of their entitlement in the unit arising in the jamabandi for the year 1939-40? 17. This Court has considered all the aforesaid questions and has answered in the preceding paragraphs to hold that the defendants have no subsisting right over and above their entitlement in total 104 kanals 15 marla of land, which was so obtained by them by virtue of civil court decree dated 7.3.1970, because the said decree would be deemed to be involving entire share of the unit as per jamabandi for the year 1939-40 and the non-applicant therein would also derive the same title as is applicable in favour of the plaintiffs of that suit. Consequently, the appeal is totally devoid of merits and the same is dismissed as such, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. _