JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 13.01.2014 passed by the learned Additional District Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, Camp at Baijnath, in Civil Misc. Appeal No.32-B/XIV/13/08, whereby he dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioners/appellants and affirmed the order dated 14.11.2008 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Baijnath, in CMA No.103/2008 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. The facts, in brief, may be noticed thus. 2. Respondent herein has filed a suit for mandatory and permanent prohibitory injunction against the petitioners herein in which an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC was filed and prayed for issuance of ad interim mandatory injunction against the petitioners directing them to remove the lock unauthorizedly and illegally put on the gate of respondent in land comprising Khata No.315min, Khatauni No.612, Khasra No. 1834, situate in Mohal Dharehrr, Mauza Deol, Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, whereby the passage =IJKL' shown in site plan passing through the land comprising Khata No.315min, Khasra Nos.1834, 1838 and 1839, has been permanently blocked. It is averred that the petitioners be restrained from creating any sort of obstacle/obstruction in the use of said passage leading from main Baijnath-Phatahar Road to the land and house of the respondent situate in Khasra No.1836 and 1838 of Khata No.315 min. The land comprising Khasra No.1836 measuring 0-41-68 hectares is exclusively owned and possessed by the respondent as the same has been purchased from Bishan Dass, son of Kunda Ram vide registered sale deed dated 02.02.1996. The respondent is a co-owner in possession to the extent of 280/3472 share of the land comprising Khata No. 315, Khatauni No.614, Khasra No. 1838 measuring 0-37-72 hectares i.e. 0-02-80 hectares, situate in Mohal Dharehrr, Mauza Deol, Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra. The said land has been purchased vide sale deed dated 13.01.2004. The land comprising Khata No.315, Khatauni No.640, Khasra No.1835 measuring 0-05-00 hectares described as =Gair Mumkin Kuhal' is recorded in the column of possession as =Aabpash- Kunindgaan'. There was existing one metre wide passage abutting the said =kuhal' on its southern side and the same was in use of the respondent, his predecessor-in-interest and other right holders since the time of their forefathers. 3. There was existing one metre wide passage abutting the said =kuhal' on its southern side and the same was in use of the respondent, his predecessor-in-interest and other right holders since the time of their forefathers. 3. It is also averred that the respondent after purchase of the above lands with the consent of the owners of Khasra No.1834, 1838 and 1839 extended the existing width of said path to three metres from PWD road up to the land comprising Khasra No.1836 and the said passage in the site plan is depicted as =IJKL' and this passage was constructed by the respondent in the year 1997. After construction of the said passage, the respondent started construction work of his house shown as H1 in the site plan in the year 1997 and completed the same in October, 1999. The entire construction material was carried by the respondent through trucks and tractors through the said passage and the said passage is used by the respondent and his family members as access for coming and going to from their house from the main road without any hindrance or objection. The gate as depicted as GI in the site plan was constructed just adjacent to the main PWD road in September, 2004, in the land comprising Khasra No.1834 with the consent of the owners through which passage has been constructed. An agreement to sell 32/120299 share of the land comprising Khata No.315min, Khatauni No.612, Khasra Kita 92, measuring 12-02-99 hectares i.e. measuring 0-00-32 hectares on 07.05.2008 has been entered into by Mani Ram with the respondent and entire sale consideration has been paid by the respondent to Mani Ram and the possession of land in Khasra No. 1834 abutting main Baijnath-Phatahar Road has been delivered to him. 4. The petitioners in order to cause inconvenience and harassment to the respondent and his family members illegally put their lock on the main gate G1 on 24.07.2008 thereby depriving them from its use. The respondent purchased a car in the year 2005 and the same was in use of the said passage but now the same is lying stranded in his courtyard. The respondent and his family members now have to cross a four feet high retaining wall abutting the said gate in order to have access to their house and road. The respondent purchased a car in the year 2005 and the same was in use of the said passage but now the same is lying stranded in his courtyard. The respondent and his family members now have to cross a four feet high retaining wall abutting the said gate in order to have access to their house and road. The said act of putting lock on the gate is illegal and unlawful on the part of the petitioners and the respondent requested the petitioners to remove the same but in vain, hence this application was filed. 5. The petitioners filed reply wherein it is averred that the land comprising Khata No.315min, Khatauni No.623min, Khasra Nos.1839 and 1841 measuring 0-25-88 hectares situate in Mohal Dharehrr, Mauza Deol, Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, is exclusively owned and possessed by the petitioners since the time of their predecessor-in-interest and the petitioners have constructed a passage therein to go to their fields. The petitioners have also installed an iron gate over the same in the year 2003 with a safety measure to save the crops from the stray animals. The Khasra No.1835 is recorded in the column of possession as =Aabpashi Kunindgaan' but there does not exist any path in this Khasra Number. 6. It is further averred that the respondent has a separate passage which leads to his house on the Southern side and he carried the construction material by mules through this separate passage and he along with his family members is using the same. The respondent till 20.07.2008 used to park his car somewhere else but on the said date the petitioners had gone to Village Patti to attend the funeral of their close relative, the respondent by opening the gate drove his vehicle to his house through their lands. The petitioners protested this unlawful act of the respondent and put lock on the gate as the respondent has no right, title or interest in the said land of the petitioners. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record of the case. 7. The learned trial Court after going through the pleadings and the documents placed on record by each of the parties allowed the application and directed the petitioners/defendants to remove the lock placed on the gate and further restrained them from causing interference with the passage. 8. 7. The learned trial Court after going through the pleadings and the documents placed on record by each of the parties allowed the application and directed the petitioners/defendants to remove the lock placed on the gate and further restrained them from causing interference with the passage. 8. Aggrieved against such findings, the petitioners/defendants preferred an appeal before the learned lower appellate Court, who too after detailed findings dismissed the appeal. Undeterred, the petitioners have come up before this Court in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India questioning the orders passed by the learned Courts below. 9. What factors have to be borne in mind while granting or refusing an injunction have been succinctly dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.Gurudas and others versus Rasaranjan and others (2006) 8 SCC 367 in the following manner:- ?18.While considering an application for injunction, it is well-settled, the courts would pass an order thereupon having regard to: (i) Prima facie case (ii) Balance of convenience (iii) Irreparable injury. 19. A finding on 'prima facie case' would be a finding of fact. However, while arriving at such finding of fact, the court not only must arrive at a conclusion that a case for trial has been made out but also other factors requisite for grant of injunction exist. There may be a debate as has been sought to be raised by Dr. Rajeev Dhawan that the decision of House of Lords in American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd. (1975) 1 All ER 504 would have no application in a case of this nature as was opined by this Court in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. (1999) 7 SCC 1 and S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd. (2000) 5 SCC 573 , but we are not persuaded to delve thereinto. 20. We may only notice that the decisions of this Court in Colgate Palmolive (supra) and S.M. Dyechem Ltd (supra) relate to intellectual property rights. The question, however, has been taken into consideration by a Bench of this Court in Transmission Corpn. of A.P. Ltd. v. Lanco Kondapalli Power (P) Ltd. (2006) 1 SCC 540 stating: (SCC pp. 552-53, paras 36-40) "36.The Respondent, therefore, has raised triable issues. What would constitute triable issues has succinctly been dealt with by the House of Lords in its well-known decision in American Cyanamid Co. of A.P. Ltd. v. Lanco Kondapalli Power (P) Ltd. (2006) 1 SCC 540 stating: (SCC pp. 552-53, paras 36-40) "36.The Respondent, therefore, has raised triable issues. What would constitute triable issues has succinctly been dealt with by the House of Lords in its well-known decision in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. (1975)1 All ER 504 holding: ( All ER p.510 c-d) =Your Lordships should in my view take this opportunity of declaring that there is no such rule. The use of such expression as 'a probability', 'a prima facie case', or 'a strong prima facie case' in the context of the exercise of a discretionary power to grant an interlocutory injunction leads to confusion as to the object sought to be achieved by this form of temporary relief. The court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious; in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried.' It was further observed (All ER pp.511 b-c & 511j) =Where other factors appear to be evenly balanced it is a counsel of prudence to take such measures as are calculated to preserve the status quo. If the defendant is enjoined temporarily from doing something that he has not done before, the only effect of the interlocutory injunction in the event of his succeeding at the trial is to postpone the date at which he is able to embark on a course of action which he has not previously found it necessary to undertake; whereas to interrupt him in the conduct of an established enterprise would cause much greater inconvenience to him since he would have to start again to establish it in the event of his succeeding at the trial. * * * The factors which he took into consideration, and in my view properly, were that Ethicon's sutures XLG were not yet on the market; so that had no business which would be brought to a stop by the injunction; no factories would be closed and no workpeople would be thrown out of work. They held a dominant position in the United Kingdom market for absorbable surgical sutures and adopted an aggressive sales policy.' 37. We are, however, not oblivious of the subsequent development of law both in England as well as in this jurisdiction. They held a dominant position in the United Kingdom market for absorbable surgical sutures and adopted an aggressive sales policy.' 37. We are, however, not oblivious of the subsequent development of law both in England as well as in this jurisdiction. The Chancery Division in Series 5 Software v. Clarke (1996) 1 All ER 853] opined: (All ER p.864 c-e) =In many cases before American Cyanamid the prospect of success was one of the important factors taken into account in assessing the balance of convenience. The courts would be less willing to subject the plaintiff to the risk of irrecoverable loss which would befall him if an interlocutory injunction was refused in those cases where it thought he was likely to win at the trial than in those cases where it thought he was likely to lose. The assessment of the prospects of success therefore was an important factor in deciding whether the court should exercise its discretion to grant interlocutory relief. It is this consideration which American Cyanamid is said to have prohibited in all but the most exceptional case. So it is necessary to consider with some care what was said in the House of Lords on this issue.' 38. In Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. (1999) 7 SCC 1 , this Court observed that Laddie, J. in Series 5 Software (supra) had been able to resolve the issue without any departure from the true perspective of the judgment in American Cyanamid. In that case, however, this Court was considering a matter under Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969. 39.In S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd. (2000) 5 SCC 573 , Jagannadha Rao, J. in a case arising under Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 reiterated the same principle stating that even the comparative strength and weaknesses of the parties may be a subject matter of consideration for the purpose of grant of injunction in trade mark matters stating : (SCC p.591, para 21) =21…..Therefore, in trademark matters, it is now necessary to go into the question of "comparable strength" of the cases of either party, apart from balance of convenience. Point 4 is decided accordingly.' 40.The said decisions were noticed yet again in a case involving infringement of trade mark in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001) 5 SCC 73 ." 21. Point 4 is decided accordingly.' 40.The said decisions were noticed yet again in a case involving infringement of trade mark in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001) 5 SCC 73 ." 21. While considering the question of granting an order of injunction one way or the other, evidently, the court, apart from finding out a prima facie case, would consider the question in regard to the balance of convenience of the parties as also irreparable injury which might be suffered by the plaintiffs if the prayer for injunction is to be refused. The contention of the plaintiffs must be bona fide. The question sought to be tried must be a serious question and not only on a mere triable issue. (See Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden and Others, (1990) 2 SCC 117 , Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh (1992) 1 SCC 719 , United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India (1981) 2 SCC 766 , Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. (1995) 5 SCC 545 , Bina Murlidhar Hemdev v. Kanhaiyalal Lokram Hemdev (1999) 5 SCC 222 and Transmission Corpn. of A.P. Ltd (supra).? 10. Now, reverting to the case in hand, it would be seen that the learned Courts below have discussed the pleadings and the documents in detail and it is only after that an injunction order has been passed in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. The learned Courts below on the basis of the revenue record have come to the conclusion that Khasra No.1836 had been purchased by the respondent, who thereafter had constructed a house over this land. Khasra No.1835 is classified as =Gair Mumkin Kuhal' and this fact was recorded to have been admitted by both the parties. The respondent/plaintiff had constructed the path adjoining this =kuhal' to go to his house and the path has been mentioned as =IJKL' in the attached site plan. It is over this path that the respondent has installed an iron gate over Khasra No.1834. Though, the petitioners/defendants have disputed this position and claim to have installed the gate, but then they have not produced any document on the file which could show or prove this fact. Only a bill in the name of Parkash Chand showing that some gate was prepared has been produced. 11. Though, the petitioners/defendants have disputed this position and claim to have installed the gate, but then they have not produced any document on the file which could show or prove this fact. Only a bill in the name of Parkash Chand showing that some gate was prepared has been produced. 11. On the contrary, the respondent/plaintiff has produced on record certificate issued by the vice President of Gram Panchayat, Dharer dated 01.11.2008 in which it has been mentioned that the respondent had started the construction work of his house about 11 years back and he had carried the construction material from the path in question through vehicle. He has also mentioned that the link road was open which was being used by the respondent/plaintiff and now the gate has been blocked. This was the only path available to the respondent/plaintiff for going to his house. No document whatsoever has been produced by the petitioners/defendants to rebut this document. It is on the basis of this certificate that the learned Courts below have concluded that the disputed path was in use for the last more than 11 years. 12. Besides, the aforesaid documents, compromise deed dated 21.07.2008 has also been produced on the file which was made in Civil Suit titled Trilok Chand versus Kolto Devi wherein also it has been admitted that there is house of the respondent on Khasra No.1836 and the path goes to his house from Khasra Nos. 1834, 1839 and 1838. It has been mentioned in this compromise that the respondent has installed an iron gate. The path on the spot is four metres wide which is being used by the respondent for going to his house for the last 11 years. The learned Courts below on the basis of such evidence have concluded that the documents produced by the respondent, prima facie, show that there is a disputed path which path alone is available to the respondent to go to his house from the main road over which the respondent had installed the gate by the side of the road but the petitioners had illegally put their lock over the same. 13. The other question required to be determined is as to what is the scope of interference with the orders concurrently passed by the learned Courts below in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 13. The other question required to be determined is as to what is the scope of interference with the orders concurrently passed by the learned Courts below in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In Surya Dev Rai versus Ram Chander Rai and others (2003) 6 SCC 675 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed the entire case law and culled out the following principles:- ?38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder:- (1) Amendment by Act No.46 of 1999 with effect from 01.07.2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e., when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction- by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step into exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.? 14. After culling out the aforesaid broad principles and working rules, it was cautioned that these should not be tied down in a strait-jacket formula or rigid rules. But then, it would be clear from the reading of conclusion of paragraph 38 (4) to (9) (supra) that mere error in exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Courts below is not sufficient to interfere in the absence of showing of failure of justice resulted therefrom; without which jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not available. 15. Moreover, this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation and evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inference or correct errors of mere formal and technical character. 16. Lastly, this Court cannot be unmindful of the fact that the suit is pending trial for the last more than six years having been instituted on 19.09.2008 and, therefore, at this stage, this Court has to act with due care, caution and circumspection to ensure that the rights of the parties are balanced. 16. Lastly, this Court cannot be unmindful of the fact that the suit is pending trial for the last more than six years having been instituted on 19.09.2008 and, therefore, at this stage, this Court has to act with due care, caution and circumspection to ensure that the rights of the parties are balanced. Even if, it is assumed that there is error calling for correction, I feel the same is capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal preferred there against and entertaining a petition under the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court would obstruct the smooth flow and disposal of the suit. This is not one of those cases where this Court must intervene at this very moment. 17. In view of the aforesaid, I find no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application (s), if any, also stands disposed of. 18. However, taking into consideration that the suit has been instituted on 19.09.2008 and is on the dockets of the learned trial Court for the last more than six years, it is expected that the trial of the suit shall be expedited and the learned trial Court shall make every endeavour to decide the suit as expeditiously as possible and in no event later than 30th June, 2015.