JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard Sri Ashok Khare, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Siddharth Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri D.K.Singh, learned counsel for respondents and perused the record. 2. The petitioner claimed compassionate appointment but having failed to obtain the same, came to this Court in Writ Petition No. 50 of 2004, in which an interim order was passed on 5.9.2005, which reads as under: “Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Notice have already been issued to the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 for which steps have already been taken and the notices have been dispatched on 16.1.2004. A perusal of Annexure-8 to the writ petition which is an order issued by the Regional Higher Education Officer dated 16.12.1993 leaves no room for doubt that the appointment of respondent No. 5 was subject to the condition that the appointment shall be offered to the petitioner on his attaining the age of majority. Let the resondent No. 3 and 4 show-cause as to why action be not taken against them for not implementing the order dated 16.12.1993, Annexure-8 to the writ petition. The aforesaid response shall be filed by the respondents by the next date fixed immediately upon the expiry of 3 weeks. List on 20.10.2005. A certified copy of this order shall be produced by the petitioner before the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 within a week.” 3. Pursuant to the aforesaid interim order dated 5.9.2005, respondents granted compassionate appointment to the petitioner vide order dated 28.4.2006. Subsequently, the writ petition was dismissed on 7.5.2007 holding that petitioner was not entitled for compassionate appointment after 15 years from the date of death of his father. The order passed by this Court dismissing writ petition on merits reads as under: “Petitioner is claiming compassionate appointment in lieu of death of his father which took place on 22.6.1990. Petitioner’s claim has been rejected vide order dated 30.9.2003 on the ground that claim for compassionate appointment of the petitioner after 12 years of the death of his father cannot be entertained. The purpose of providing compassionate appointment is to save the family from the crisis in the event of death of bread earner. 12 years period is big period and after such a long duration the purpose of providing compassionate appointment stood exhausted. The purpose of providing compassionate appointment is to save the family from the crisis in the event of death of bread earner. 12 years period is big period and after such a long duration the purpose of providing compassionate appointment stood exhausted. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of J. & K. v. Sajjad Ahmed Mir, 2006 AIR SCW 3706, has taken the view that compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as matter of right, at the cost of others, and when matter was taken up, fifteen years period had already passed from the date of death, and said fact was relevant and material fact that family survived, in spite of death of employee. In view of the law laid down by Apex Court in the aforesaid case, claim of petitioner has rightly been rejected. Consequently writ petition is dismissed.” 4. Thereagaint, petitioner initially filed recall application No. 125841 of 2007, which was dismissed on 18.5.2007 with following order: “This Court has already passed final order on 7.5.2007. There is no justification to recall the order dated 7.5.2007 as by no stretch of imagination compassionate appointment could have been provided to the petitioner after sixteen years of death. The reasons which are made in the order dated 7.5.2007 are valid reason. Consequently present recall/Restoration application is rejected.” 5. Then the petitioner facing termination, preferred special appeal No. 753 of 2007 wherein an interim order was passed on 1.6.2007 as under: “Admit. Issue notice. Learned Standing Counsel representing the respondents 1 to 3 prays for and granted one month to file counter-affidavit. The appellant shall have three weeks thereafter to file rejoinder-affidavit. Appellant shall take steps to serve respondents 4 and 5 by registered post. Step may be taken within a week. Office shall send notice returnable at an early date. List on the date fixed by office in the notice. Until further orders of this Court effect and operation of the orders dated 7.5.2007 and 18.5.2007 passed by learned single judge in writ petition No. 50 of 2004 and the recall application No. 125841 of 2007 shall remain stayed. It is further provided that the appellant shall be continued in service and paid his salary pursuant to the appointment letter dated 28.4.2006.” 6. It is further provided that the appellant shall be continued in service and paid his salary pursuant to the appointment letter dated 28.4.2006.” 6. Nothing further happened during pendency of appeal but the petitioner on its own made a statement as if he has got appointment during pendency of appeal and got special appeal dismissed as infructuous by making statement that he has been provided appointment. The appeal thus was dismissed on 2.12.2010 with the following order: “Sri H.R.Misra, learned counsel for the appellant has made a statement at the bar that this appeal has become infructuous as the service has already been provided to the appellant. As prayed by learned counsel for the appellant, the special appeal is dismissed as having become infructuous.” 7. It is after dismissal of special appeal, impugned order has been passed directing that petitioner could not have been appointed on compassionate basis, and, since his appointment was made pursuant to interim order passed in writ petition, which was dismissed on merits, he was bound to be terminated. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since order of Hon’ble Single Judge merged with final order passed in special appeal and, therefore, authorities below have committed error of law by relying upon judgment of Single Judge. The submission is thoroughly misconceived. The Hon’ble Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition on merits. This order does not merge with order of special appeal having the effect of reversal as it is on the statement made by petitioner-appellant himself, the special appeal was dismissed. Even otherwise, the appeal having dismissed, the result is that no relief has been granted by this Court. 9. The judgment of the learned Single Judge continued to operate and hold field as it has decided the issue on merits. Moreover, the appointment of petitioner was not made during pendency of appeal but it was provided pursuant to interim order passed by learned Single Judge in writ petition No. 50 of 2004, which ultimately resulted in dismissal. The effect of dismissal of writ petition is that, as if, no interim order was passed. 10. It is well-settled, when writ petition is dismissed it results as if no interim order was ever passed. The effect of dismissal of writ petition is that, as if, no interim order was passed. 10. It is well-settled, when writ petition is dismissed it results as if no interim order was ever passed. This aspect has been clarified by several judgments of this Court and this view has been affirmed by the Apex Court in Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. and others v. U.P. State Electricity Board and others, (1997) 5 SCC 772 . In Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. (supra) the Apex Court has observed: “It is equally well-settled that an order of stay granted pending disposal of a writ petition/suit or other proceeding, comes to an end with the dismissal of the substantive proceeding and it is the duty of the Court in such a case to put the parties in the same position they would have been put for the interim orders of the Court”. 11. Instead of saddling this judgment with several other authorities on the same point it would be useful to refer a recent judgment of this Court in Avinash Mohan (Dr.) v. State of U.P. and others, 2008(4) ADJ 394 (DB), where most of these cases are relied and referred. 12. A Division Bench of this Court (of which I was also a member) in Shri Ajai Kumar Dubey v. The Farrukhabad District Cooperative Bank Limited and others, 2009 (3) ADJ 555 , while considering the effect of interim order on dismissal of the writ petition has said: “There is another facet of the issue. An ex parte interim order is normally granted considering a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss but the Court cannot simultaneously put other side in a situation where on account of interim order other side would suffer irreparable loss. “Actus curie neminem gravapit” is now well accepted doctrine applicable in these circumstances. The act of the Court shall prejudice none. No person can claim that because of the interim order of the Court he is entitled to retain certain benefit, for which he is otherwise not entitled. The respondents despite having won the case cannot be put to a disadvantageous position, which it would not have faced. If the said litigation would not have commenced. No person can claim that because of the interim order of the Court he is entitled to retain certain benefit, for which he is otherwise not entitled. The respondents despite having won the case cannot be put to a disadvantageous position, which it would not have faced. If the said litigation would not have commenced. Mere filing of a case and obtain of an interim order can never result in a situation giving a permanent advantage to petitioner and permanent disadvantage to the respondents, though, ultimately, the writ petition is found to be frivolous or lacking merit and is dismissed. In order to claim benefit of certain statutory provisions, which require continuance of person’s service on a particular date, if would mean that such continuance is based on his own rights of the incumbent and not on the clutches founded on interim order of Court of law. This aspect has also been dealt with in detail by this Court in Smt. Vijay Rani v. Regional Inspectress of Girls’ Schools, Region-I, Meerut and others, 2007 (2) ESC 987 and we are in respectful agreement of the exposition of law laid down thereunder, which is fully applicable in the case in hand also. We have no hesitation in observing that the appellant here also cannot take any advantage flowing from the interim order, which he has obtained in the writ petition, which has ultimately been dismissed.” 13. A Division Bench of this Court (in which I was also a member) in Smt. Vijay Rani v. Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, Region-1, Meerut and others, 2007(2) ESC 987 , held : “An interim order passed by the Court merges with the final order and, therefore, the result brought by dismissal of the writ petition is that the interim order becomes non est. A Division Bench of this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1968 All 139 , while considering the effect of dismissal of writ petition on interim order passed by the Court has laid down as under: “It is well-settled that an interim order merges in the final order and does not exist by itself. So the result brought about by an interim order would be non est in the eye of law if the final order grants no relief. So the result brought about by an interim order would be non est in the eye of law if the final order grants no relief. The grant of interim relief when the petition was ultimately dismissed could not have the effect to postponing implementation of the order of compulsory retirement. It must in the circumstances take effect as if there was no interim order.” 14. The same principal has been reiterated in the following cases: (A) Sri Ram Charan Das v. Pyare Lal, AIR 1975 All 280 “In Shyam Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1968 All 139 , a Bench of this Court has held that orders of stay of injunction are interim orders that merge in final orders passed in the proceedings. The result brought about by the interim order becomes non est in the eye of law in final order grants no relief. In this view of the matter it seems to us that the interim stay became non est and lost all the efficacy, the commissioner having upheld the permission which became effective from the date it was passed.” (B) Shyam Manohar Shukla v. State of U.P., 1986 (4) LCD 196 “It is settled law that an interim order passed in a case which is ultimately dismissed is to be treated as not having been passed at all (see Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh) Lucknow, AIR 1968 All 139 and Sri Ram Charan Das v. Pyare Lal, AIR 1975 All 280 (DB).” (C) Kanoria Chemicals & Industries Ltd. v. U.P. State Electricity Board, AIR 1994 All 273 . “After the dismissal of the writ petitions wherein notification dated 21.4.1990 was stayed, the result brought about by the interim orders staying the notification, became non est in the eye of law and lost all its efficacy and the notification became effective from the beginning.” 15. Recently also in Raghvendra Rao etc. v. State of Karnataka and others, JT 2009 (2) SC 520, the Apex Court has observed: “It is now a well-settled principle of law that merely because an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. .............” 16. In this case, even doctrine of merger either way cannot help petitioner. I may examine this aspect from two angles. .............” 16. In this case, even doctrine of merger either way cannot help petitioner. I may examine this aspect from two angles. Firstly, judgment of Hon’ble Single Judge had merged with order of Division Bench dismissing appeal. The situation and consequence would remain the same. The Special Appeal i.e. Intra Court Appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 is a continuation of writ proceeding and dismissal thereof means that judgment of Hon’ble Single Judge stands confirmed. That being so, consequence of dismissal of writ petition would continue to operate as a result of dismissal of special appeal also and nothing can help the petitioner as a consequence thereof. It is not the case of the petitioner that special appeal has been allowed and judgment of Hon’ble Single Judge has been set aside. Therefore, even applying doctrine of merger, nothing can help the petitioner. 17. Secondly, if doctrine of merger does not apply, even then nothing comes to help petitioner for the reason that appeal has been dismissed on a statement made by petitioner-appellant himself, who did not allow intra appellate Court to look into correctness of judgment of Hon’ble Single Judge and take a particular stand. The Court was not persuaded to look into merits of judgment of Hon’ble Single Judge and without going into the merits, appeal was requested to be dismissed. Reason may be anything but that is personal to the petitioner. Once he says that he does not press appeal or he want to withdraw it, and/or it has rendered infructuous, it is not for the Court to look into correctness of his statement since request made for dismissal of a lis is normally allowed unless during pendency of that matter, some undue advantage has been obtained by such petitioner-appellant, which the Court may intend to restore back so as to compensate respondents and for that purpose, only some direction may be issued. A request for dismissal of a cause, if allowed, it result as if nothing has been done or given to petitioner-appellant by the Court. Dismissal of a cause means no relief has been given. 18. A request for dismissal of a cause, if allowed, it result as if nothing has been done or given to petitioner-appellant by the Court. Dismissal of a cause means no relief has been given. 18. If that be so, the petitioner cannot contend that he obtained an order of appointment pursuant to an interim order and he is entitled to continue to retain despite the fact that ultimately writ petition, in which interim order passed, was dismissed and even special appeal, in which initially an interim order was passed, he got it dismissed without requesting the Court either to set aside the judgment of Hon’ble Single Judge or to look into the merits thereof. 19. In view thereof, I find no error in the impugned order. 20. Dismissed. ————