Judgment M. Venugopal, J. 1. The Appellant/Applicant/Respondent has preferred the instant Original Side Appeal as against order, dated 30.04.2014, in A.No.3086 of 2014 in A.No.391 of 2014, passed by the Learned Single Judge. 2. According to the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant/Applicant, the impugned order passed by the Learned Single Judge, in A.No.3086 of 2014 in A.No.391 of 2014, dated 30.04.2014, is contrary to law and materially an irregular one. 3. It is the contention of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant that the Learned Single Judge ought to have allowed A.No.3086 of 2014 praying to set aside the order of an attachment inasmuch as the same was a non speaking order. 4. Added further, the main plea projected by the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent that the Learned Single Judge had failed to consider an important fact that the Appellant/Applicant's Company Board meeting could not be held due to the non- availability of its Directors, as they were travelling and in fact, the Board Meeting was convened only on 14.03.2014 and one of its Director was given the authorisation for representing the company. 5. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant vehemently contends that the Application praying to set aside ex parte order of attachment even on the very first day of listing of the Application and without appreciating vital fact that his earlier order was not passed on merits but because of the prime fact that no counter was filed. 6. Lastly, it is the submission of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant that the Learned Single Judge should have considered the objections of the Appellant/Applicant on merits before dismissing A.No.3086 of 2014. 7. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent relies on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court, dated 27.07.2011, in O.S.A.No.231 of 2011, whereby and whereunder, in paragraph 9, it is, inter alia, stated as follows: “9. ... The appellant has not stated the reasons for filing the present application under Section 9 of the Act before the arbitral proceedings commenced. In fact, a notice was issued by the appellant expressing their intention to invoke the arbitration proceedings and also appointed an arbitrator. After such appointment of an arbitrator, the appellant could have ventilated their grievance before the arbitrator appointed by them and not before this Court. In fact, a notice was issued by the appellant expressing their intention to invoke the arbitration proceedings and also appointed an arbitrator. After such appointment of an arbitrator, the appellant could have ventilated their grievance before the arbitrator appointed by them and not before this Court. It is well settled law that security can be ordered only in cases where the other party is likely to abscond or there is positive evidence to show that the other party is taking steps to dispose of the property with an intention to deceive or defeat the decree or award to be passed by the Courts or Tribunal. In this case, the respondent being a company, it is not possible for them to abscond so easily or they could dispose of their asset immediately. Therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge that the present application has been filed by the appellant only to pressurise the respondent to settle the amount is well founded. It is needless to mention that filing of an application under Section 9 of the Act can be entertained by this Court only in exceptional case and this is not a case where this Court find it fit and proper to entertain the application of the appellant.” 8. Conversely, it is the submission of the Learned Counsel for the Respondent/Respondent/Applicant that the Appellant/Applicant was served with the Court Notice in A.No.391 of 2014 and also, the Private Notice was served on 25.01.2014. 9. As such, it is contended on behalf of the Respondent/ Respondent/Applicant that the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent had slept over the matter and in fact, when A.No.391 of 2014 filed by the Respondent/Respondent/Applicant [praying for passing of an order by this Court in directing the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent to furnish security for a sum of Rs.15,28,717/-etc.] came up for hearing before this Court on 17.03.2014, in the cause list of the Original Side at Serial No.39, the name of the Appellant/Applicant was printed and since the Appellant/Applicant had not chosen to appear in person or through counsel, this Court on 17.03.2014, passed an order directing the Appellant/Applicant to furnish security within a period of three weeks, failing which, it was informed that this Court shall be constrained to pass an order of attachment and directed the Registry to post the Application after three weeks. 10. 10. Proceeding further, the Respondent/Respondent/Applicant contends that the Learned Single Judge, on 30.04.2014, dismissed A.No.3086 of 2014 filed by the Appellant/Applicant praying to set aside the ex parte order dated 17.03.2014 made in A.No.391 of 2014 on the ground that the Appellant had not shown any just and reasonable cause as to why it had not entered appearance in time to defend the matter. As such, the said order is a just, fair and an equitable one and the same need not be set aside by this Court at this distance point of time. 11. At this juncture, the Learned Counsel for the Respondent/Respondent/Applicant brings it to the notice of this Court that when A.No.3086 of 2014 filed by the Appellant/Applicant was dismissed by this Court on 30.04.2014, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Applicant, who appeared before the Learned Single Judge, sought extension of time to furnish security within two weeks i.e. on or before 16.05.2014 and an oral undertaking to the said effect was also given by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Applicant and recording the said oral undertaking, A.No.3085 of 2014 was allowed by the Learned Single Judge, whereby and whereunder, an extension of time was granted till 16.05.2014 to furnish security. 12. This Court has heard the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent and the Learned Counsel for the Respondent/Respondent/Applicant. 13. At this stage, this Court pertinently points out that in A.No.391 of 2014 [filed by the Respondent/Respondent/Applicant] against the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent, notice was served on the Appellant/Applicant on 06.02.2014, as per endorsement of the Bailiff. However, the private notice taken by the Respondent/Respondent/ Applicant was served on the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent on 25.01.2014. 14. It is to be noted that a cursory perusal of ingredients of Order 5 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code clearly shows that service through Process of Court is mandatory, as per decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indu Bhushan V. Munna Lal and another, AIR 2007 Supreme Court 1114. 15. 14. It is to be noted that a cursory perusal of ingredients of Order 5 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code clearly shows that service through Process of Court is mandatory, as per decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indu Bhushan V. Munna Lal and another, AIR 2007 Supreme Court 1114. 15. A mere running of the eye over the contents of Affidavit in A.No.3086 of 2014 in A.No.391 of 2014 filed by the Authorised Signatory of the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent, in paragraph No.2, categorically states that notice in the Application was served on them and the Board Resolution was passed on 14.03.2014 authorising him to enter appearance on behalf of the Appellant and accordingly, they engaged their counsel and they entered appearance on 26.03.2014 and thereafter, a copy of the typed set of papers was served on the counsel on 27.03.2014. When matters stood thus, the Appellant received a copy of the ex parte order dated 17.03.2014 from this Court on 03.04.2014 and only then they came to understand that orders were passed. 16. Apart from the above, in paragraph 3 of the Affidavit in A.No.3086 of 2014, the Authorised Signatory of the Appellant/Applicant had categorically stated that it is a Joint Venture Company and the Directors, who were travelling, were present for the Board Meeting and hence, they could not enter appearance immediately on receipt of notice and as such, the non-appearance of the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent was neither wilful non wanton when the matter was called on 17.03.2014 but for the reasons mentioned and hence, the Application to set aside the ex parte order is to be allowed, in the interest of justice. 17. Besides the above, the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent, in para 4, in A.No.3086 of 2014, had stated that by an order dated 17.03.2014, it was directed to furnish security on or before 14.04.2014 and since they had a good case on merits and they filed an Application to set aside theex parte order, which was pending. 18. At this stage, this Court recalls and recollects the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raj Kishore Pandey V. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2009) 2 Supreme Court Cases 692, whereby and whereunder, it is held as follows: “Whether the applicant has made out sufficient cause or not in the application for restoration, the Court is required to look at all facts pleaded in the application. Though the consideration regarding existence of sufficient cause is the discretionary power with the Court, yet such discretion has to be exercised on sound principles and not on mere technicalities. The approach of the Court in such matters should be to advance the cause of justice and not the cause of technicalities. A case, as far as possible, should be decided on merits and the party should not be deprived of getting the case examined on merits.” 19. It cannot be gainsaid that an 'Attachment' does not create any charge in property. Undoubtedly, an order of attachment is a matter of relief and not procedure. Further, the said order is, indeed, harsh remedy which affects the fundamental right of a person to deal with his property. 20. As far as the present case is concerned, it is not in dispute that the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent was duly served with a Court Notice in A.No.391 of 2014 on 06.02.2014 and private notice on 25.01.2014. Even in the cause list dated 17.03.2014 of Original Side of this Court at Serial No.39, A.No.391 of 2014 was mentioned and the names of the counsels for the Respondent/Respondent/Applicant were printed and the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent's name was printed. Under such circumstances, this Court was perforced to crystal clearly observe, in paragraph No.2 of its order in A.No.391 of 2014, on 17.03.2014, to the effect that though the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent's name was printed in the cause list, it had not chosen to appear either in person or through counsel and consequently, directed the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent to furnish security within a period of three weeks etc. In this connection, it cannot be lost sight of that the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent in A.No.391 of 2014 filed Vakalat, through its counsels, on 26.03.2014 in Diary No.11976. 21. However, on going through the impugned order passed by the Learned Single Judge in A.No.3086 of 2014, dated 30.04.2014, this Court is of the considered view that the Learned Single Judge had merely observed in paragraph No.4, that the Appellant/Applicant/ Respondent slept over the matter and Board Resolution was passed only on 14.03.2014 authorizing the Learned Counsel to enter appearance etc. and for its fault, there was no just and reasonable cause shown as to why it had not entered appearance in time to defend the matter. and for its fault, there was no just and reasonable cause shown as to why it had not entered appearance in time to defend the matter. More pin pointedly, the Learned Single Judge, in the impugned order, had not adverted to the averment of the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent's Authorised Signatory, in para 3 in A.No.3086 of 2014 to the effect that it is a Joint Venture Company and the Directors were travelling, were to be present for the Board Meeting and therefore, they could not enter appearance immediately on receipt of notice and therefore, its non-appearance on 17.03.2014 was neither wilful nor wanton, but due to the reasons assigned and also that, no definite finding was rendered so to say that the nonappearance of the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent was wilful and wanton. 22. It is to be remembered that when a litigant specifies a reasonable cause for its absence, ordinarily, it should be accepted as satisfactory cause explaining the absence. Indeed, the term 'Satisfactory' is a relative term and the difficulties of a party/litigant has to be appreciated and understood by keeping oneself in circumstances in which it was placed, as opined by this Court. Even an insufficiency of ground does not make the Application to set aside the ex parte order as a misconceived one. Also that, when an Advocates' name is not printed in the 'Cause List' of a High Court, then, it is certainly a 'Sufficient Cause' to set aside the Ex parte Order/Ex parte Decree, in the considered opinion of this Court. 23. It is to be pointed out that a narrow and technical approach unnecessarily prolongs the litigation, the ends of justice required giving an opportunity to prove his case as per decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in G.P. Srivastava V. R.K. Raizada and others, (2000) 3 Supreme Court Cases 54 at page 58. 24. Be that as it may, even though the consideration in regard to the existence of sufficient cause is within the discretionary power of a Court of Law, yet, the same is to be exercised based on sound principles and not on mere technicalities, as opined by this Court. As far as possible, it is just and necessary that a proceeding/case/cause ought to be decided on merits to avoid procrastination and a party ought not to be deprived of an opportunity of getting his case examined, by a Competent Court of Law on merits. As far as possible, it is just and necessary that a proceeding/case/cause ought to be decided on merits to avoid procrastination and a party ought not to be deprived of an opportunity of getting his case examined, by a Competent Court of Law on merits. Viewed in that perspective, this Court, by adopting a lenient and liberal pragmatic approach and also exercising its judicial discretion in favour of the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent, to sub-serve the ends of justice, sets aside the impugned order, dated 30.04.2014, passed by the Learned Single Judge, in A.No.3086 of 2014, based on the primordial view that an opportunity to the Appellant/Applicant/Respondent should be granted to contest the case on merits and accordingly, allows the A.No.3086 of 2014. 25. In the result, the Original Side Appeal is allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The Order of the Learned Single Judge, dated 30.04.2014, in A.No.3086 of 2014 is set aside by this Court for the reasons assigned in this Appeal. Resultantly, A.No.391 of 2014 is directed to be restored to file for fresh disposal on merits [by affording enough opportunities to all parties concerned], in accordance with law. Liberty is granted to the respective parties to raise all factual and legal pleas at the time of fresh disposal of A.No.391 of 2014.