JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 31.10.2014 passed by respondent No.2, whereby he ordered the rectification of the zones as approved by respondent No.3 vide order dated 18.10.2014 with the prayer to quash and set-aside the same being illegal and without jurisdiction. 2. The facts giving rise to the present petition are that at the end of the completion of the term of the committee of the petitioner No.1-Society, a schedule was prepared and after preparing the zones, which were prepared after calling the objections, the election programme was sent to respondent No.3 for approval. Certain persons filed objections before respondent No.3, who after hearing the concerned parties, decided the objections and gave his final approval for conducting the elections vide order dated 18th October, 2014. He also appointed the Returning Officer, Registration Officer and Election Manager. 3. Respondents No. 4 to 10 filed revision petition under Section 94 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act (for short =Act') before respondent No.2 seeking rectification of the zones by challenging the aforesaid order of respondent No.3. The revision petition was allowed by respondent No.2 on 31.10.2014. The petitioner has assailed this decision as being unjust, unfair and without jurisdiction. 4. During the pendency of the petition, an application for amendment of the petition was preferred wherein the following prayer was sought to be incorporated : ?and also the order dated 10.11.2014 may very kindly be ordered to be quashed and set aside by ordering the respondents to restore the zones as these were approved by AR, CS originally?. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case carefully. 6. The petitioner though not in many words has questioned the jurisdiction of respondent No.2 to entertain the revision petition, however, during the course of argument, he vehemently argued that the revision petition was not maintainable as the order passed by respondent No.3 was purely an administrative order against which no revision was competent. In support of his proposition, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in CWP No. 533 of 2000 titled K.D. Sharma and others vs. Financial Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Co-operation) to the Govt. of H.P. and others, decided on 6th June, 2001, wherein the Court held: ?6. In support of his proposition, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in CWP No. 533 of 2000 titled K.D. Sharma and others vs. Financial Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Co-operation) to the Govt. of H.P. and others, decided on 6th June, 2001, wherein the Court held: ?6. On the other hand, the Bank in its reply has pointed out various infirmities. It has been pointed out that the Registrar had no powers to review his earlier order dated 8.9.1998 passed by his predecessor without the bank making any request in this regard. The Bank has also tried to find fault not only in the decree and judgment dated 16.1.1997 but also in its own decisions and actions taken for the appointment of the petitioners as Mobile Guides. But in the present petition the controversy is limited to the extent whether the revision petition filed by the Bank against the order dated 27.6.2000 passed by the Registrar before respondent No. 1 is maintainable under Section 94 (1) of the Act or not? Reference to Section 94 of the Act is desirable. It is:- ?94. Review and Revision: (1) The State Government except in a case in which an appeal is preferred under Section 93 may call for and examine the record of any inquiry or inspection held or made under this Act or any proceedings of the Registrar or of any person subordinate to him or acting on his authority, and may pass thereon such orders as it thinks fit. (2). The Registrar may at any time, - (a) review any order passed by himself; or (b) call for and examine the record of any inquiry or inspection held or made under this Act or the proceedings of any person subordinate to him or acting on his authority and if it appears to him that any decision, order or award or any proceedings so called or should for any reason be modified, annulled or reversed, may pass such order thereon as he thinks fit ; Provided that, before any order is made under sub-section (1) and (2), the State Government or the Registrar as the case may be shall afford to any person likely to be affected adversely by such orders an opportunity of being heard. Provided further that every application under sub-section (1) and (2), to the State Government or the Registrar, as the case may be shall be made within ninety days from the date of the communication of the order sought to be reviewed or revised.? 7. The perusal of Section 94 (1) of the Act makes it clear that State Government has the revisional powers in respect of any inquiry or inspection held or made under the Act and also any proceedings of the Registrar or of any person subordinate to him or acting on his authority. So far the case in hand is concerned, it is to be examined whether the order dated 29.6.2000 passed by the Registrar can be considered =the proceedings of the Registrar'. If the answer is in positive, the State Government has the revisional powers to examine the said order and pass such orders as it thinks fit. But if the answer is in negative, the revision against the order dated 29.6.2000 presently pending before respondent No.1 is without jurisdiction and not maintainable. The answer depends upon the interpretation of the word =proceedings of the Registrar'. 8. In Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition the word =proceeding' means: ?In a general sense, the form and manner of conducting juridical business before a court or judicial officer. Regular and orderly progress in form of law, including all possible steps in an action from its commencement to the execution of judgment. Term also refers to administrative proceedings before agencies, tribunals, bureaus, or the like. An act which is done by the authority or direction of the court, agency, or tribunal, express or implied; an act necessary to be done in order to obtain a given and a prescribed mode of action for carrying into effect a legal right………… =Proceeding means any action, hearing investigation, inquest or inquiry (whether conducted by a court, administrative agency, hearing officer, arbitrator, legislative body, or any other person authorized by law) in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given.? 9. 9. In Babu Lal v. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal and others, (1982) 1 SCC 525 , learned Judges of Supreme Court while interpreting the words at any stage of the proceedings 'occurring in proviso to sub section (2) of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act which provides for the amendment of the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim for possession' at any stage of the proceedings have observed in para 17: ?The word =proceeding' is not defined in the Act. Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines it as ?carrying on of an action at law, a legal action or process, any act done by authority of a court of law; any step taken in a cause by either party?. The term =proceeding' is a very comprehensive term and generally speaking means a prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right. It is not a technical expression with a definite meaning attached to it, but one the ambit of whose meaning will be governed by the statute. It indicates a prescribed mode in which judicial business is conducted. The word =proceeding' in Section 22 includes execution proceedings also……..? 9. In M/s K.J. Lingan and A.V. Mahayalam and others v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1968 Madras 76, the learned Judge held the notice of compounding under Section 46 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act as proceedings under the said Act treating it a step in aid or action taken by the concerned authority in the whole process of assessing a dealer on his turnover. For coming to this conclusion the learned Judge has referred to the earlier judgments of his Court in re: Ramanathan Chettiar AIR 1942, Mad. 390; Ganga Naicken v. Sunderam Aiyar, AIR 1956 Mad. 597 and Kochadai Naidu v. Nagayasami Naidu, AIR 1961 Mad. 247 . 10. Following the above quoted judgments of the Madras High Court, the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Sm. Reba Sircar and others v. Bisweswar Lal Sharma alias B.L.Sharma, AIR 1980 Calcutta 328, have held that a proceeding is a prescribed course of action for the enforcement of a legal right. 11. Therefore, as per the dictionary meaning and the interpretation given by the Supreme Court and the High Courts the term =proceedings' is comprehensive one. Reba Sircar and others v. Bisweswar Lal Sharma alias B.L.Sharma, AIR 1980 Calcutta 328, have held that a proceeding is a prescribed course of action for the enforcement of a legal right. 11. Therefore, as per the dictionary meaning and the interpretation given by the Supreme Court and the High Courts the term =proceedings' is comprehensive one. It does not have a definite meaning and its scope will depend upon the context in which it is used. If its meaning in the general sense is taken, it is a prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right or the requisite steps by which judicial action is invoked. So far the case in hand is concerned, against =proceedings of the Registrar' revisional powers have been given to the State. In other words, the =proceedings of the Registrar' would be his prescribed course of action whereby the Registrar will exercise powers conferred on him under the various provisions of the Act and pass orders. The orders against which appeal lies are prescribed under Section 93 of the Act and the remaining orders are subjected to revision by the State; for example, appeal lies against the order of the Registrar made under Section 8 (4) of the Act refusing to register a Society but if somebody is aggrieved by the order registering a Society or any other order passed during the course of passing the final order of the Registration, it may file revision against the said order. The perusal of Section 93 of the Act shows that number of the orders passed by the Registrar in exercise of his powers under various provisions of the Act are made appellable but we can easily comprehend many more orders passed or actions taken by the Registrar in discharge of his statutory functions which may entail decisions on the rights of parties, against which the remedy provide is the revision and review under Section 94 of the Act.? 7. There is no quarrel with the exposition of law laid down by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case because there the Court was dealing with an order passed by the Registrar which was purely an administrative order. 7. There is no quarrel with the exposition of law laid down by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case because there the Court was dealing with an order passed by the Registrar which was purely an administrative order. However, a bare perusal of the underlined portion would clearly go to show that this Court has clearly held that the proceedings of the Registrar would be his prescribed course of action whereby the Registrar will exercise powers conferred on him under the various provisions of the Act and pass orders. The orders against which appeal lies are prescribed under Section 93 of the Act and the remaining order are subjected to revision by the State. The perusal of Section 93 of the Act would show that number of the orders passed by the Registrar in exercise of his powers under various provisions of the Act are made appealable but all orders passed or actions taken by the Registrar in discharge of his statutory functions may not attract the applicability of the revision or review under Section 94 of the Act. Thus, where only an administrative power is exercised by the Registrar, a revision petition would not be maintainable before the State Government. I may emphasis at the cost of repetition that most of the functions of the Registrar, in terms of the Act and Rules are in the sphere of administration and governance with few additional duties having quasi-judicial character. 8. Rule 37 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Rules, 1971 (for short =Rules') provides for election of the Committee and reads thus: ?37. Election of Committee – Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing rules, the members of the managing committee of a Co-operative Society shall be elected in accordance with the rules given in Appendix =A'. Appendix =A' contends the Rule of election of the Committee wherein Rule-4 reads thus: ?4. Election – (1) The Manager shall draw up a detailed programme of election in accordance with the instructions issued by the Registrar from time to time. Appendix =A' contends the Rule of election of the Committee wherein Rule-4 reads thus: ?4. Election – (1) The Manager shall draw up a detailed programme of election in accordance with the instructions issued by the Registrar from time to time. (2) The Manager , shall, when so required by the Registrar for the purpose of such election, divide the area of operation of the cooperative society into such number of zones, as there are members to be elected, or into such lesser number as may be specified by the Registrar and communicate the zones so constituted to the Registrar for his prior approval. The members residing in the zone concerned shall from the general body for purpose of election of the Committee member/members for that zone and one third of the membership of the zone or 30 whichever is less, shall form the quorum for such general meeting. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 28, the notice of the general meeting for the election together with the zones constituted, if any , shall be exhibited not less than 10 days before the date fixed for such general meeting at the registered office of the society and at some common place in the area of operation of the co-operative society for intimation of all the members of the cooperative society indicating :- (a) the number of members to be elected zone-wise if any; (b) the date, hour and place of holding the general meeting and polling; (c) the last date of making nominations, which shall not be later than seven days before the date fixed for holding the said meeting; (d) the date on which, the place at which, and hours between which the scrutiny of nomination papers shall be made; and (e) the last date for the withdrawal of candidatures. This could be in addition to any other mode of notice which may be laid down these rules, or the bye-laws of the society, or laid down in a resolution of the Committee, or as may be specified by the Registrar by a general or special order (4) The nomination papers duly completed on the forms prescribed by the Registrar and supplied by the co-cooperative society to its members on demand shall reach the head office of the society by such date and time as may be specified by the Manager in the programme drawn up in sub-rule (1) or this rule. (5) A candidate shall not be entitled to file his nomination paper for more than one office of the Committee. If nomination paper, for more than one office are filed, the nomination paper filed for the first office shall only be considered, and the nomination papers for the other office/offices shall be deemed to be rejected. (6) The person who is to receive the nomination paper under sub-rule (4), shall on receiving the nomination paper, enter thereon the serial number of its receipt and shall endorse thereon the date on which, and the hour at which the nomination was delivered to him. Nomination papers received after the date and time fixed under clause (b) of sub-rule (3) shall not be valid. The person submitting nomination paper shall be entitled to a receipt in writing from the person who is to receive nomination papers as an acknowledgement of having it received by the later. (7) After the nomination papers are scrutinised by the Returning Officer , the list of the validly nominated candidates for election shall be announced, where necessary zonewise, four days before the general meeting is held. (8) The Registrar may by general or special order grant exemption from the provisions of the rule 3 and 4 to any cooperative society or any class of co-operative societies.? 9. The question which would arise for determination is as to whether the process of dividing the area of operation of the co-operative society into zones can be termed to be merely an administrative exercise or is it in the nature of quasi judicial function. 10. However, before answering this question, the Court would be required to determine the difference between the quasi judicial act and an administrative act. 10. However, before answering this question, the Court would be required to determine the difference between the quasi judicial act and an administrative act. This question has been elaborately dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in recent judgment in State of Maharashtra and others etc.etc. vs. Saeed Sohail Sheikh etc.etc. AIR 2013 Supreme Court 168 in the following manner: ?29. "Prof. De Smith in his book on 'Judicial Review' (Thomson Sweet &Maxwell, 6th Edn. 2007) refers to the meaning given by Courts to the terms 'judicial', 'quasi-judicial', 'administrative', 'legislative' and 'ministerial' for administrative law purposes and found them to be inconsistent. According to the author 'ministerial' as a technical legal term has no single fixed meaning. It may describe any duty the discharge whereof requires no element of discretion or independent judgment. It may often be used more narrowly to describe the issue of a formal instruction, in consequence of a prior determination which may or may not be of a judicial character. Execution of any such instructions by an inferior officer sometimes called ministerial officer may also be treated as a ministerial function. It is sometimes loosely used to describe an act that is neither judicial nor legislative. In that sense the term is used interchangeably with 'executive' or 'administrative'. The tests which, according to Prof. De Smith delineate 'judicial functions', could be varied some of which may lead to the conclusion that certain functions discharged by the Courts are not judicial such as award of costs, award of sentence to prisoners, removal of trustees and arbitrators, grant of divorce to petitioners who are themselves guilty of adultery etc. We need not delve deep into all these aspects in the present case. We say so because pronouncements of this Court have over the past decades made a distinction between quasi-judicial function on the one hand and administrative or ministerial duties on the other which distinctions give a clear enough indication and insight into what constitutes ministerial function in contra-distinction to what would amount to judicial or quasi-judicial function. 30. In Province of Bombay v. Khusaldas Advani ( AIR 1950 SC 222 ) this Court had an occasion to examine the difference between a quasi-judicial order and an administrative or ministerial order. 30. In Province of Bombay v. Khusaldas Advani ( AIR 1950 SC 222 ) this Court had an occasion to examine the difference between a quasi-judicial order and an administrative or ministerial order. Chief Justice Kania, in his opinion, quoted with approval an old Irish case on the issue in the following passage: "…..the point for determination is whether the order in question is a quasi-judicial order or an administrative or ministerial order. In Regina (John M' Evoy) v. Dublin Corporation [1978] 2 L.R. Irish 371, 376, May C.J. in dealing with this point observed as follows: "It is established that the writ of certiorari does not lie to remove an order merely ministerial, such as a warrant, but it lies to remove and adjudicate upon the validity of acts judicial. In this connection, the term 'judicial' does not necessarily mean acts of a judge or legal tribunal sitting for the determination of matters of law, but for the purpose of this question a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority, upon consideration of facts and circumstances, and imposing liability or affecting the rights of others." This definition was approved by Lord Atkinson in From e United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices [1926] A.C. 586, 602, as the best definition of a judicial act as distinguished from an administrative act.? 31. In Khushaldas Advani's case (supra) the Court was examining whether the act in question was a ministerial/administrative act or a judicial/quasi-judicial one in the context of whether a writ of certiorari could be issued against an order under Section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance, 1947. The Court cited with approval the observation of L.J. Atkin in The King v. The Electricity Commissioner [1924] 1 K.B. 171that laid down the following test:: "Whenever anybody of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs.? 32. 32. "The Court quoted with approval the decision in The King v. London County Council [1931] 2 K.B. 215 according to which a rule of certiorari may issue; wherever a body of persons (1) having legal authority (2) to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and (3) having the duty to act judicially (4) act in excess of their legal authority-a writ of certiorari may issue. 33. Justice Fazl Ali, in his concurring opinion in Khushaldas' case (supra) made the following observations as regards judicial and quasi-judicial orders: "16. Without going into the numerous cases cited before us, it may be safely laid down that an order will be a judicial or quasi- judicial order if it is made by a court or a judge, or by some person or authority who is legally bound or authorised to act as if he was a court or a judge.To act as a Court or a judge necessarily involves giving an opportunity to the party who is to be affected by an order to make a representation, making some kind of enquiry, hearing and weighing evidence, if any, and considering all the facts and circumstances bearing on the merits of the controversy before any decision affecting the rights of one or more parties is arrived at. The procedure to be followed may not be as elaborate as in a court of law and it may be very summary, but it must contain the essential elements of judicial procedure as indicated by me. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx. ……….The mere fact that an executive authority has to decide something does not make the decision judicial. It is the manner in which the decision has to be arrived at which makes the difference and the real test is: Is there any duty to decide judicially? 34. The detailed concurrent opinion of Justice Das, in the same case, also agreed with the above test for determining whether a particular act is a judicial or an administrative one. Das J., observed: "The real test which distinguishes a quasi-judicial act from an administrative act is the third item in Atkin L.J.'s definition, namely the duty to act judicially.? 35. In State of Orissa v. Dr. Das J., observed: "The real test which distinguishes a quasi-judicial act from an administrative act is the third item in Atkin L.J.'s definition, namely the duty to act judicially.? 35. In State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei ( AIR 1967 SC 1269 ) Justice Shah, speaking for the Court observed that the duty to act judicially arose from the very nature of the function intended to be performed. It need not be shown to be superadded. The Court held: "If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power.? 36. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 262 , Hegde, J., as His Lordship then was, recognised that the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power was fast vanishing. What was important, declared the Court, was the duty to act judicially which implies nothing but a duty to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The Court observed: "13. The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi- judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. Under our Constitution the rule of law pervades over the entire field of administration. Every organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power.? 37. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Mohinder Singh Gill. v. Chief Election Commission (1978) 1 SCC 405 : ( AIR 1978 SC 851 ) where Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Court observed: "48. Once we understand the soul of the rule as fair play in action - and it is so - we must hold that it extends to both the fields. After all, administrative power in a democratic set-up is not allergic to fairness in action and discretionary executive justice cannot degenerate into unilateral injustice. Nor is there ground to be frightened of delay, inconvenience and expense, if natural justice gains access. For fairness itself is a flexible, pragmatic and relative concept, not a rigid, ritualistic or sophisticated abstraction. It is not a bull in a china shop, nor a bee in one's bonnet. Its essence is good conscience in a given situation: nothing more - but nothing less. The "exceptions" to the rules of natural justice are a misnomer or rather are but a shorthand form of expressing the idea that in those exclusionary cases nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present or meet a case. Text-book excerpts and ratios from rulings can be heaped, but they all converge to the same point that audi alter am partem is the justice of the law, without, of course, making law lifeless, absurd, stultifying, self-defeating or plainly contrary to the common sense of the situation. 38. "Recently this Court in Jamal Uddin Ahmad v. Abu Saleh Najmuddin (2003) 4 SCC 257 dealt with the nature of distinction between judicial or ministerial functions in the following words: "14. 38. "Recently this Court in Jamal Uddin Ahmad v. Abu Saleh Najmuddin (2003) 4 SCC 257 dealt with the nature of distinction between judicial or ministerial functions in the following words: "14. The judicial function entrusted to a Judge is inalienable and differs from an administrative or ministerial function which can be delegated or performance whereof may be secured through authorization." The judicial function consists in the interpretation of the law and its application by rule or discretion to the facts of particular cases. This involves the ascertainment of facts in dispute according to the law of evidence. The organs which the State sets up to exercise the judicial function are called courts of law or courts of justice. Administration consists of the operations, whatever their intrinsic nature may be, which are performed by administrators; and administrators are all State officials who are neither legislators nor judges." (See Constitutional and Administrative Law, Phillips and Jackson, 6th Edn., p. 13.) P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon defines judicial function as the doing of something in the nature of or in the course of an action in court. (p. 1015) The distinction between "judicial" and "ministerial acts" is: If a Judge dealing with a particular matter has to exercise his discretion in arriving at a decision, he is acting judicially; if on the other hand, he is merely required to do a particular act and is precluded from entering into the merits of the matter, he is said to be acting magisterially. (pp. 1013-14). Judicial function is exercised under legal authority to decide on the disputes, after hearing the parties, maybe after making an enquiry, and the decision affects the rights and obligations of the parties. There is a duty to act judicially. The Judge may construe the law and apply it to a particular state of facts presented for the determination of the controversy. A ministerial act, on the other hand, may be defined to be one which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to, or the exercise of, his own judgment upon the propriety of the act done. (Law Lexicon, ibid., p. 1234). In ministerial duty nothing is left to discretion; it is a simple, definite duty.? 11. (Law Lexicon, ibid., p. 1234). In ministerial duty nothing is left to discretion; it is a simple, definite duty.? 11. Now, in case the provisions of Rule 4 are minutely scrutinized, it would be seen that the drawing up of the election programme and the act of dividing the area of operation into zones cannot be termed to be an administrative act simpliciter because while doing so, the members of the Society have a right to object and such right cannot be curtailed on the ground that the Registrar was only performing administrative duties when he assigned the Manager the task of drawing up a detailed programme of election. It is the members of the Society, who ultimately would be affected by drawing up of the election process, more particularly, when it pertains to the carving of zones and when a grievance is made by any member (s) challenging the constitution of the zones in terms of Rule 4 (supra), the same shall have to be adjudicated by exercising quasi judicial powers and would therefore not be an administrative act. 12. Now, when the functions required to be performed by an authority while exercising the powers under the provisions of Rule 4 are tested on the exposition of law laid down in Saeed Sohail's case (supra), it can safely be concluded that respondent No.3 while determining the validity of the objections regarding carving out of zones, was essentially acting as a quasi judicial authority because he was required to adjudicate on the dispute after hearing the parties and may be after making an inquiry. Obviously, this decision would affect the rights and obligations of the parties. Moreover, while adjudicating upon the dispute, there was a duty cast upon respondent No.3 to act judicially. Manifestly this was not merely a ministerial act where one was to perform his duty in a given state of facts in a prescribed manner or in obedience to the mandate of legal authority without regard to, or the exercise of, his own judgment upon the propriety of the act done. Respondent No.3 had wide discretion to accept or reject the objections and, therefore, was essentially performing judicial functions. 13. The next question now required to be determined is regarding the validity of the order passed by respondent No.2. Respondent No.3 had wide discretion to accept or reject the objections and, therefore, was essentially performing judicial functions. 13. The next question now required to be determined is regarding the validity of the order passed by respondent No.2. The only direction passed by respondent No.2 in the impugned order reads as under: ?……Thus, to suffice the interest of justice, the Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies Solan is directed to ensure that the zones are constituted in such a way that members from contiguous areas are included in a particular zone and the provisions of Rule 4 (2) of the Rules have been complied with in letter as well as in spirit. While doing so, he will take the zones of 2009 as base and thereafter add the newly enrolled members in a particular zone in such a way that contiguity of area is maintained as per provisions of the law. He will complete this exercise on or before 10.11.2014 without disturbing the already approved election schedule. It must be ensured that election process should not be stopped. It is also noticed that election programme has been approved in cursory and hasty manner and the election programme has been approved for one ward only, for this, he is directed to correct the mistake and also advise to be careful and cautious in future in dealing such matters.? 14. I fail to understand as to how the petitioner can be aggrieved by such an innocuous order which only directs the authorities to ensure that the zones are constituted in such a manner that members from contiguous areas are included in a particular zone and the provisions of Rule 4 (2) of the Rules are complied with in letter as well as in spirit. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner would then argue that though the order may appear to be an innocuous one, but the authorities below are not implementing it in its letter and spirit and that is why he has moved an application for amendment whereby he has questioned the order passed by respondent No.3 on 10.11.2014. I am afraid that as per the provisions of the Act the remedy to question the order passed by respondent No.3 on 10.11.2014 lies elsewhere and not before this Court. 16. I am afraid that as per the provisions of the Act the remedy to question the order passed by respondent No.3 on 10.11.2014 lies elsewhere and not before this Court. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, so also the pending application (s) if any. The parties are left to bear their own costs.