JUDGMENT 1. - Appellant-defendant has laid this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, `CPC') against the judgment and decree passed by learned Addl. District Judge No.1, Sri Ganganagar, whereby it has affirmed the judgment and decree of eviction passed by learned Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Sri Ganganagar (for short, `learned trial Court'). 2. The facts, necessary and germane to the matter, are that in January 2003, first respondent instituted a suit for eviction against his tenant Omprakash (respondent No.6) from shop No.100 measuring 9.3 x 7.9 sq.ft. situated at Old Dhanmandi, Sri Ganganagar. In the suit for eviction, appellant was also arrayed as defendant as sub-tenant in the premises. The suit for eviction filed by the first respondent landlord was based precisely on three grounds, which are default in payment of rent, sub-letting and reasonable and bonafide necessity of the premises for business of his wife. The learned trial Court issued summons to 6th respondent as well as appellant but none appeared on behalf of 6th respondent and therefore Court proceeded ex-parte. However, appellant joined the issue with the first respondent and contested the suit. The learned trial Court proceeded with the trial of the suit and during pendency of the trial shop in question was sold by the landlord to respondent No.2 to 5 and therefore at their behest an application under Order 1, Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC was laid for impleading them as plaintiffs and deleting the name of original plaintiff. Although in the application, prayer was made for deleting the name of original plaintiff but the learned trial Court without acceding to that prayer of respondents No.2 to 5 permitted them to be impleaded as plaintiffs. The learned trial Court framed six issues for determination and on behalf of respondent-plaintiffs PW1 Sanjay Pediwal and PW2 Ravikant appeared in the witness box and testified on oath. Besides that 10 documents were also produced on their behalf which were exhibited. The appellant himself appeared in the witness box as DW1. In view of subsequent developments and sale of the suit property, the respondent-plaintiffs abandoned the plea of eviction on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity and that being so the learned trial Court decided Issue No.4 to 6 as not pressed. The appellant himself appeared in the witness box as DW1. In view of subsequent developments and sale of the suit property, the respondent-plaintiffs abandoned the plea of eviction on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity and that being so the learned trial Court decided Issue No.4 to 6 as not pressed. While adverting to Issue No.1 to 3, the learned trial Court, on appreciation of evidence has found that the respondent tenant is defaulter in payment of rent. While deciding issue No.2, the learned trial Court has found that monthly rent of the premises was Rs. 1,000 and the respondent plaintiffs are entitled to receive rent at the rate of Rs. 1000 per month. The crucial issue, i.e. issue No.3, relating to subletting of the premises was examined threadbare by the learned trial Court and eventually it is found that the 6th respondent tenant has sub letted the rented premises to the appellant and as such the respondent-plaintiffs are entitled for decree of eviction. 3. Feeling disgruntled with the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, appellant-defendant preferred an appeal before the learned first appellate Court, District & Sessions Judge, Sri Ganganagar, which was thereafter transferred to the Addl. District Judge No.1, Sri Ganganagar. The learned first appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the evidence and other materials available on record, fully concurred with the findings and conclusions of the learned trial Court and dismissed the appeal of the appellant. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. S.L. Jain has vehemently argued that both the Courts below have not examined the matter in right perspective in the light of provisions contained under Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act 1950 (for short, `Act of 1950') and therefore the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below cannot be sustained. Learned counsel would contend that finding of both the Courts below that appellant is not a tenant but a sub-tenant is contrary to evidence and other materials available on record therefore the said finding is perverse. Learned counsel has also urged that finding of both the Courts below are inconsistent and self contradictory inasmuch as while adjudging the appellant to be sub-tenant he has been declared defaulter in payment of rent. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs, Mr. Learned counsel has also urged that finding of both the Courts below are inconsistent and self contradictory inasmuch as while adjudging the appellant to be sub-tenant he has been declared defaulter in payment of rent. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs, Mr. K.S. Rajpurohit, has urged that there is a concurrent finding of fact recorded by both the Courts below which is not liable to be interfered with in this second appeal as no substantial question of law is involved in the matter. Mr. Rajpurohit would contend that the appellant has throughout maintained that he is tenant but has miserably failed to prove his status as a tenant by producing cogent documentary and oral evidence and therefore in these circumstances the findings and conclusions of both the Courts below that that he is subtenant cannot be faulted and no interference with the impugned judgments and decree is called for. Mr. Rajpurohit has further argued that after determination of rent appellant failed to deposit the rent within the stipulated period after seeking three months extended period entailed striking of his defence and therefore no indulgence can be granted to the appellant in this second appeal. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below. 7. Upon perusal of the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below, in my opinion, the positive assertion of the appellant that he was tenant of the respondent-plaintiffs is per-se an ambitious plea inasmuch as no material has been placed on record by the appellant to substantiate the same. Well it is true that burden of proving subletting was on the plaintiff respondents, but said burden has been discharged by the respondent-plaintiffs by asserting that disputed shop was let out to 6th respondent and by producing the rent receipts. In that background, when the initial burden was discharged by the respondent-plaintiffs, it was obligation of the appellant to have proved his status as tenant in the disputed premises. From the impugned judgments and decrees of both the Courts below it is crystal clear that appellant has miserably failed to prove his status as a tenant in the premises by producing any cogent and convincing proof to establish his status as tenant. From the impugned judgments and decrees of both the Courts below it is crystal clear that appellant has miserably failed to prove his status as a tenant in the premises by producing any cogent and convincing proof to establish his status as tenant. As per Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 (for short, `Act of 1872'), burden of proving a fact rests on a party who substantially assert the affirmative of the issue and not upon the party who denies it. The Section is based on the rule "ei incumbit probation qui dicit, non quit negat". 8. From the impugned judgments and decrees it is amply clear that respondent-plaintiffs have discharged their burden in adherence of Section 101 of the Act of 1872. After discharging its burden by the respondent plaintiffs it was obviously for the appellant to prove that he is tenant in the premises. The status of the appellant as tenant is a particular fact, which was asserted by him with a wish that Court has to believe existence of his said status. Section 103 of the Act of 1872 envisaged this principle with clarity and precision. The mandate of Section 103 of the Act of 1872 is that if a person wishes the Court to believe in the existence of a particular fact the onus of proving that fact is on him, unless the burden of proving it is cast by any law on any particular person. From the materials available on record and the findings which are arrived at by both the Courts below, it is abundantly clear that though appellant has asserted a particular fact but has not been able to discharge his burden to prove the same inasmuch as he has not been able to prove his status as tenant in the premises. Thus, viewed from any angle, in my opinion, the learned Courts below have not committed any illegality in passing the impugned judgments and decrees. As a matter of fact, there is no question of law much less substantial question of law involved in this appeal requiring determination in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. Therefore, I am not inclined to interfere with the concurrent finding of facts recorded by both the Courts below.Resultantly, the appeal lacks in merit and the same is accordingly dismissed summarily.Appeal dismissed. *******