Judgment Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This appeal is directed against judgment and decree dated 19.10.2001 passed in Civil Appeal No. 97 of 1996 by learned Additional District Judge, Mandi whereby he accepted the appeal of the plaintiff/respondent against judgment and decree dated 31.10.1996 passed by learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Court No.1, Mandi in Civil Suit No. 171/1993. 2. Briefly stated, the case of the plaintiff/respondent is that the defendants/appellants had agreed to sell the land comprised in Khewat No. 105, Khatauni No. 143 min, Khasra No. 555 measuring 0-5-12 bighas situated at Village Tawan, H.B. No. 231, Illaqua Balh, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi (hereinafter referred to as the suit land) to the plaintiff. The defendant through an agreement dated 11.8.1992 duly executed by him had delivered the possession of the land to the plaintiff in presence of the witnesses after having sold the said land for a consideration of Rs.17,000/- which was duly received by him. Not only this, the parties had entered into an agreement to sell and the sale deed could not be executed because the defendant was yet to liquidate the bank loan raised against the suit land whereafter he was to get the suit land redeemed on or before 30.7.1993 and was required to execute the sale deed. Despite the said redemption, the defendant had not got the sale deed registered while the plaintiff on his part was still ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement. The legal notice dated 28.7.1993 was issued to the defendant for getting the sale deed registered on 30.7.1993. Despite this, the defendant did not perform his part of the agreement and had not got the sale deed registered in favour of the plaintiff. 3. The original defendant Mania died before filing the written statement and the written statement thereafter was filed by his son and legal representative Shankar. Preliminary objections qua maintainability, enforceable cause of action were raised. On merits, it was pleaded by the defendants/appellants that late Mania had not executed an agreement in question nor had agreed or received the alleged sale consideration of Rs.17,000/- from the plaintiff. As a matter of fact, no such agreement had been executed between the plaintiff and late Mania and the agreement relied upon by the plaintiff was a forged one. As a matter of fact, no such agreement had been executed between the plaintiff and late Mania and the agreement relied upon by the plaintiff was a forged one. The suit land was worth more than Rs.20,000/- per biswa and, therefore, there was no question of the land having sold for meager consideration of Rs.17,000/-. The handing over of physical possession was also denied and the defendants claimed themselves to be in possession of the suit land. The defendants also denied that deceased Mania had agreed to liquidate the bank loan and after redeeming the same, had undertaken to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. It was denied that Mania had agreed that in default of execution of the sale deed, he would pay double of the amount of sale consideration to the plaintiff as damages. The defendants also denied having received the alleged notice. In the alternative, it was pleaded that in case there was any such notice, then the same was false and bogus. Accordingly, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. The plaintiff filed replication wherein preliminary objections alongwith the contents of the written statement on merits were denied, while the facts given in the plaint were reiterated. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court on 14.9.1995 framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff and predecessor-in-interest of defendants have entered into an agreement dated 11.8.92, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff has paid Rs.17,000/- to the predecessor-in-interest of defendants as full consideration, as alleged? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiff is in possession of suit land? OPP 4. Whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of agreement as alleged? OPP 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree of specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 11.8.1992? OPP 6. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 7. Whether the plaintiff has no legally enforceable cause of action, as alleged? OPD. 8. Relief. 5. The learned trial Court after recording the evidence of both the parties dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the learned lower Appellate Court. The appeal was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 19.10.2001 by the learned lower Appellate Court. Relief. 5. The learned trial Court after recording the evidence of both the parties dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the learned lower Appellate Court. The appeal was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 19.10.2001 by the learned lower Appellate Court. It is this judgment and decree, which has been questioned by the defendants/ appellants before this Court. 7. This Court on 22.2.2002 was pleased to admit the appeal on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the first Appellate Court has misconstrued and misinterpreted the pleadings and other evidence adduced by the parties on record? 2. Whether the document agreement to sell mark Ext.PW-1/A dated 11.8.1992 has been validly executed by Mania in favour of Maghu? 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case carefully and meticulously. Since both the substantial questions of law are inter-connected and interrelated, I proceeded to dispose of both these questions through common reasoning. 9. Since the appeal arises out of decree of reversal, therefore, the learned trial Court findings were mainly based on facts, it is required to be seen as to whether the findings recorded by the learned lower Appellate Court for reversing the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court are within the frame work of law. It must discuss the evidence in light of the points for determination and come to its own independent conclusion. While reversing the findings of fact, the Appellate Court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial Court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the Court hearing a further appeal that the first Appellate Court had discharged the duty expected of it. The duties of the Appellate Court have been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRS (2001) 3 SCC 179 wherein it was held as follows: “15. A perusal of the judgment of the trial Court shows that it has extensively dealt with the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties for deciding the issues on which the parties went to trial. A perusal of the judgment of the trial Court shows that it has extensively dealt with the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties for deciding the issues on which the parties went to trial. It also found that in support of his plea of adverse possession on the disputed land, the defendant did not produce any documentary evidence while the oral evidence adduced by the defendant was conflicting in nature and hence unworthy of reliance. The first appellate court has, in a very cryptic manner, reversed the finding on question of possession and dispossession as alleged by the plaintiff as also on the question of adverse possession as pleaded by the defendant. The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put-forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate Court. The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial Court is an easier one. The appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (See Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 . We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. (See Madhusudan Das v. Narayanibai (1983) 1 SCC 35 ). The rule is – and it is nothing more than a rule of practice – that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge’s notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lie, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. (See Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1951 SC 120 ). Secondly, while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate Court had discharged the duty expected of it. We need only remind the first appellate courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. We need only remind the first appellate courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate court is also a final court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one.” 10. The plaintiff in support of his claim examined himself as PW-1 and stated that Mania had sold the suit land to him for sale consideration of Rs.17,000/- and entire sale consideration had been paid to Mania and in lieu thereof, Mania handed over the physical possession of the suit land to him on 11.8.1992. The agreement of sale Ex.PW-1/A was executed on 11.8.1992 itself wherein it was undertaken by Mania to execute the sale deed after redeeming the same on payment of the loan amount from the bank. Since the defendants had failed to execute the sale deed even after redeeming the suit land, he was constrained to issue a legal notice Ex.PW-1/B wherein he informed the defendants that he was ready to perform his part of the agreement for the execution of the sale deed, however, Mania had refused to execute the sale deed resulting in filing of the suit. In cross-examination, he had stated that Mania was accompanied by his son Shankar (present respondent). He denied that in the agreement to sell, it had been agreed that in case Mania failed to execute the sale deed, he would be liable to pay an amount of Rs.34,000/-. However, he confirmed that after the agreement was scribed, it was signed/thumb marked by the executant and the witnesses. The agreement was alleged to have been executed firstly by Mania and by him and thereafter it was signed by the witnesses. Whether Mania had signed the document in Hindi, English was not known to him since he was an illiterate. However, he confirmed that after the agreement was scribed, it was signed/thumb marked by the executant and the witnesses. The agreement was alleged to have been executed firstly by Mania and by him and thereafter it was signed by the witnesses. Whether Mania had signed the document in Hindi, English was not known to him since he was an illiterate. He admitted that he did not report about his possession to the Patwari at the time of girdawari. He denied the suggestion that he had prepared a false agreement in connivance with the witnesses. 11. Chuganu appeared as PW-2 and is alleged to be the marginal witness of the agreement Ex.PW-1/A. This witness admitted his signatures on the agreement and stated that Maghu had paid an amount of Rs.17,000/- to Mania. He also admitted that Shankar son of Mania was present there. He also admitted the presence of Gurdas Ram (PW-5) and Kalu (PW-4). In his cross-examination, he feigned ignorance regarding the scribe of the document and its contents on the ground of his being illiterate. 12. Bhagirath, petition writer and the scribe of the document appeared as PW-3 and stated that he had scribed the agreement Ex.PW-1/A as per the instructions of Mania. After typing the same, he had read over and explained the contents of the same to both the parties and they admitted the contents as correct and only thereafter the parties affixed their thumb impression and signatures to this document. He further stated that the entries regarding this agreement Ex.PW-1/A was made in his register and he affixed his seal on the document. In his cross-examination, he once again confirmed having scribed the agreement Ex.PW-1/A. He reiterated that the agreement Ex.PW-1/A had been scribed by him at the instance/instruction of Mania. He had enquired from the purchaser as to whether he had purchased the land from Mania and the purchaser had confirmed this fact. He had also obtained the signatures of both the parties on his register. 13. Kalu Ram another alleged signatory to the document Ex.PW-1/A appeared as PW-4 and admitted his signatures on this document. He also admitted the presence of Shankar Dass, respondent No.1, Maghu Ram and Mania. He had also obtained the signatures of both the parties on his register. 13. Kalu Ram another alleged signatory to the document Ex.PW-1/A appeared as PW-4 and admitted his signatures on this document. He also admitted the presence of Shankar Dass, respondent No.1, Maghu Ram and Mania. He further stated that Maghu had told that he had paid Rs.17,000/- to Mania for the purchase of land and had signed the agreement Ex.PW-1/A. In his cross-examination, though, he has stated that he is not aware as to where the land in question was situated nor he knew anything about its measurement and even feigned ignorance regarding the consideration having paid in his presence, but he still claimed to have signed the agreement Ex.PW-1/A in the presence of Maghu, Mania and Shankar. 14. Gurdas Ram appeared as PW-5, who also confirmed that agreement Ex.PW-1/A was executed between Mania and Maghu. He further stated that this agreement Ex.PW-1/A was scribed at the instance of Mania and Maghu. According to him, Maghu had paid Mania an amount of Rs.17,000/-. The agreement had been read over and explained to the parties before executing the same. He also confirmed that Shankar, the present respondent No.1 was also present there at that time. He confirmed in his cross-examination that in case Mania failed to execute the registered sale deed, then it was agreed that he would pay the double amount of consideration as damages to Maghu. 15. The defendant on the other hand appeared as DW-1 and stated that his father Mania was 80 years of age at the time of his death. For the last 5-6 years prior to his death, he was not in a fit mental state. He further goes on to state that his father had never agreed to sell the suit land in question and the possession of the same was never delivered to respondent and was still with him. He further stated that during the life time of his father, he had not received any money as sale consideration from the plaintiff. In his cross-examination, he admitted that his father had taken a loan of Rs.1,30,000/- from SBI, Mandi, which had been repaid. However, he added that loan had been repaid by selling 3 bighas of land which statement he lateron qualified that the land was of his father. Rest of the cross-examination is based on denial. 16. In his cross-examination, he admitted that his father had taken a loan of Rs.1,30,000/- from SBI, Mandi, which had been repaid. However, he added that loan had been repaid by selling 3 bighas of land which statement he lateron qualified that the land was of his father. Rest of the cross-examination is based on denial. 16. DW-2 Sant Ram in his statement has stated that the possession of the suit land was with the defendant and he had never seen the plaintiff in possession of the same. In his cross-examination, he feigned ignorance regarding the agreement in question and denied that after the year 1992 the possession of the suit land was with the plaintiff. This is the sum and substance of the total evidence led by the parties. 17. Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants has argued that once PW-1 had failed to prove on record the agreement dated 11.8.1992 and in fact had categorically stated that there was no condition of payment of Rs.34,000/-(double the amount of sale consideration) on the part of the defendant in case of default incorporated in the agreement. He also referred to the condition of the agreement Ex.PW-1/A to contend that the statement of PW-1 was contrary to it. It was further contended that Mania had never put his signature on the document Ex.PW-1/A. He further contended that PW-2 in his cross-examination had categorically stated that no transaction of money had taken place in his presence. According to him, statement of scribe, who has appeared as PW-3 and other witnesses Kalu Ram, PW-4 were no avail and did not in any manner prove the case of the plaintiff. Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants vehemently argued that the plaintiff had tried to improve his case by examining PW-5 Gurdas Ram. According to him, the plaintiff as also three other witnesses (PW-2 to PW-4) had been examined on 22.1.1996, while PW-5 came to be examined on 1.3.1996. According to him whatever lacuna had been left out in the statement of PW-1 to PW-4 was sought to be filled up by the plaintiff by examining PW-5. According to him, the plaintiff as also three other witnesses (PW-2 to PW-4) had been examined on 22.1.1996, while PW-5 came to be examined on 1.3.1996. According to him whatever lacuna had been left out in the statement of PW-1 to PW-4 was sought to be filled up by the plaintiff by examining PW-5. Yet according to him, the plaintiff had failed to prove his case on record as PW-5 Gurdas Ram in examination had categorically stated that the sale consideration had been paid by the plaintiff one day prior to the agreement which demolishes the case of the plaintiff completely. He further contended that there was no evidence to show that the amount taken by the plaintiff from the defendant had been deposited in the bank for redeeming the loan. He then relied upon the observations made by learned trial Court in para-8 of its judgment which reads as under: “Keeping in view the aforesaid principles of law in mind, I would like to discuss the evidence led by the plaintiff to prove the execution of the agreement Ex.PW-1/A between him and deceased Mania. According to the plaintiff this agreement Ex.PW-1/A was executed between him and Mania in presence of witnesses, Chuganu Ram, Kalu and Guru Datt and it was scribed by document writer Bhagirath Sharma. Now PW-2, Chuganu alleged witness of the agreement has stated in his statement that he is not aware about the contents of the agreement, he simply put the signature upon it. The document was already written when he was called by the parties. So this witness is not aware about the contents of the agreement Ex.PW-1/A. PW-3, Bhagirath, who has scribed the agreement Ex.PW-1/A has stated that the parties were not known to him, nor the parties were identified by anybody to him, so he could not tell that Maghu put his thumb impression on the agreement Ex.PW-1/A or some body else put the thumb impression. PW-4, Kalu another witness of the agreement Ex.PW-1/A has stated that he is not aware about the land with respect to which the agreement was executed. He has further stated that he was busy in his own work and he put the signature on the agreement on the request of the parties. PW-4, Kalu another witness of the agreement Ex.PW-1/A has stated that he is not aware about the land with respect to which the agreement was executed. He has further stated that he was busy in his own work and he put the signature on the agreement on the request of the parties. Furthermore, according to plaintiff Maghu, it was not agreed between him and deceased Mania that in case Mania fails to execute the sale deed, he will pay Rs.34,000/- and portion ‘A to A’ of the agreement Ex.PW-1/A is wrong and no such condition was agreed between him and Mania, whereas PW-3, Bhagirath has stated that the portion ‘A to A’ of the agreement was written on the direction of Mania and Maghu and Maghu also admitted it to be correct. Again according to PW-3, Bhagirath, he typed the agreement Ex.PW-1/A on the direction of Mania, whereas PW-5, Guru Datt, another witness of the agreement has stated that the agreement was scribed by Mania and Maghu themselves. The evidence led by the plaintiff as discussed above has in fact failed to prove on record that the agreement Ex.PW-1/A was executed between Mania and Maghu Ram. In view of the aforesaid discussion, issue No.1 is decided against the plaintiff.” 18. Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand controverted all the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants. He has stated that there is no reason forthcoming as to why the original defendant Mania had not filed the written statement so as to know his defence. According to him, the suit was filed on 6.8.1993 and service of the suit had been effected upon Mania on 23.9.1993 when he appeared and sought time to file written statement, the next date fixed for this purpose was 11.10.1993. Even on 11.10.1993 he had sought time to file his written statement and the case had been fixed on 30.11.1993. Even on 30.11.1993 the written statement was not filed and the case was adjourned to 21.1.1994. It was on 13.1.1994 that Mania had died and by that time had availed sufficient opportunities to submit his written statement. It was on account of the non-performance of contract on the part of the defendant that the plaintiff had been constrained to send a legal notice Ex.PW-1/B on 28.7.1993 specifically informing the defendant to execute the sale deed on 30.7.1993. It was on account of the non-performance of contract on the part of the defendant that the plaintiff had been constrained to send a legal notice Ex.PW-1/B on 28.7.1993 specifically informing the defendant to execute the sale deed on 30.7.1993. The factum regarding the loan was clearly depicted in the jamabandi Ex.PW-1/D. 19. From a close scrutiny of the record it cannot disputed that PW-2 to PW-5 are illiterate rustic villagers and, therefore, were definitely not in a position to read the contents of agreement Ex.PW-1/A. However, the cumulative reading of their statements clearly establishes on record that agreement Ex.PW-1/A had been duly executed between the parties. Not only this, it is established on record that at the time of execution of this agreement, not only Mania but even a son was present. The scribe Bhagirath (PW-3) had typed the agreement Ex.PW-1/A at the instance of Mania. This document was thereafter signed by the witnesses. It is otherwise unimaginable that the agreement of sale Ex.PW-1/A would contain the details of the land to be sold which could have only been conveyed by Mania to the scribe. Simply because some witnesses were not personally knowing Mania or Maghu or the other co-witnesses cannot be a circumstance to draw any inference that agreement Ex.PW-1/A was a forged document prepared at the instance of Maghu or at the instance of any witness. Rather the statement of the scribe Bhagirath (PW-3), clearly suggest that he was not knowing any of the parties and had scribed the agreement of sale Ex.PW-1/A at the instance of the parties. This clearly belies the stand of the defendant that the plaintiff had connived with the scribe Bhagirath (PW-3). 20. The cumulative reading of the statements made by PW-1 to PW-5 clearly establishes on record that as a matter of fact agreement Ex.PW-1/A had been executed. The fact that sale consideration was paid at the time of the agreement or a day prior to the same, cannot be termed to be a very major contradiction affecting the merits of the case set up by the plaintiff. This is particularly so when the presence of the respondent Shankar Dass at the time of execution of the agreement of sale Ex.PW-1/A on 11.8.1992 was proved beyond any doubt. This presence of the appellant has been duly proved not only by the plaintiff as PW-1 but his witnesses PW-2 to PW-5. This is particularly so when the presence of the respondent Shankar Dass at the time of execution of the agreement of sale Ex.PW-1/A on 11.8.1992 was proved beyond any doubt. This presence of the appellant has been duly proved not only by the plaintiff as PW-1 but his witnesses PW-2 to PW-5. While on the other hand, the defendant while appearing as DW-1 has not stated that the agreement Ex.PW-1/A dated 11.8.1992 had not been thumb marked by his father Mania. He also failed to controvert the version given by PW-1 and other witnesses regarding his presence at the time of scribing of the agreement Ex.PW-1/A. 21. What surprise me is that in case the defendant was serious to prove that the agreement of sale Ex.PW-1/A was in fact not executed by then why no recourse was taken to scientifically prove that the alleged thumb impression of Mania appearing in this agreement was in fact not his. It is not that there were no documents bearing his thumb impression available at that time wherein the admitted thumb impressions of the defendant were available. Rather, it is proved on record that the defendant had obtained loans and had executed various sale deeds and, therefore, conveniently the admitted thumb impression along with the thumb impression appearing in Ex.PW-1/A could have been sought to be scientifically examined to prove that the alleged thumb impression of Mania appearing in agreement Ex.PW-1/A in fact is not his thumb impression. Having failed to do so, I am left with no option but to draw an adverse inference against the defendant. 22. Another factor which cannot be lost sight of is that it is established on record that Maghu was not having any closeness with the other witnesses and there is otherwise no other reason forthcoming as to why these witnesses along with the scribe would assist Maghu in preparing a forged agreement of sale Ex.PW-1/A. 23. I fully agree with the observations of the learned lower Appellate Court that the learned trial Court has not at all considered all the aforesaid facts and more particularly the fact that the witnesses examined by the plaintiff and even the plaintiff himself were totally illiterate and could not be expected to know the contents of the agreement of sale Ex.PW-1/A in its entirety. Needless to observe that these witnesses, however, have given a complete gist of the documents. Needless to observe that these witnesses, however, have given a complete gist of the documents. The learned lower appellate Court has rightly observed that the evidence is required to be appreciated keeping in view the illiteracy and ignorance of the witnesses. 24. The learned lower Appellate Court has dealt with all the reasons assigned by the trial Court and then assigned its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. I am satisfied that the first Appellate Court had discharged the duty expected of it as laid down in Santosh Hazari’s case (supra). 25. Consequently, I find no infirmity with the judgment and decree passed by learned Additional District Judge, Mandi, whereby he reversed the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court and decreed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent. Accordingly, the judgment and decree dated 19.10.2001 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Mandi in Civil Appeal No. 97 of 1996, is upheld and affirmed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.