ORDER Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The Root question that falls for consideration in this revision is whether civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain the suit for declaration of title and permanent Injunction in respect of the any action/measure taken by applicant-Bank under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (henceforth 'the Act of 2002')? This is revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'the CPC') filed by the applicant/defendant No. 1 questioning the legality and propriety of the order dated 19.03.2013 passed by 2nd Civil Judge, Class-II, Mahasamund in Civil Suit No. 2-A/2011 deciding the issue of jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal under Section 34 of the Act of 2002 in negative. 2. Imperative facts required to be noticed for consideration of this revision are as under:- (3.1) The applicant - Punjab National Bank (hereinafter referred to as 'the applicant-Bank') provided financial assistance to one M/s. Shankar Paddy Processor. Shri Sanjay Agrawal is the proprietor of the firm. The loan was granted to him under two separate heads i.e. one loan of Rs. 15 lakhs was granted under the cash credit hypothetication and another loan of Rs. 5 lakhs was granted in shape of Bank guarantee in which non-applicant No. 3 Mr. Vibhash Agrawal herein stood as a guarantor and mortgaged his property bearing Khasra No. 39/4, Advocates Appeared : measuring 10,500 sq.ft. situated at Bagbahara at Lalpur, District Mahasamund, which is "secured asset" as defined in Section 2(zc) of the Act of 2002. (3.2) Borrower - Company failed to re-pay the loan and the same resulted into non-performing assets (NPA). Accordingly, the applicant-Bank in exercise of its power under Section 13(2) of the Act of 2002 served notice to the borrower to make payment of the loan. Borrower having failed to re-pay the loan within the statutory period, applicant-Bank proceeded under the Act of 2002 and issued possession notice of the mortgage property and ultimately possession was taken on 18.1.2011 vide Ex. Borrower having failed to re-pay the loan within the statutory period, applicant-Bank proceeded under the Act of 2002 and issued possession notice of the mortgage property and ultimately possession was taken on 18.1.2011 vide Ex. A-2 which was duly published on 20.01.2011 and sale notice was served upon the guarantor by Annexure A-3 and sale notice was published on 24.6.2012 vide Annexure A-5 to sell the mortgaged property under Section 13(4) of the Act, thereafter, respondents No. 1 & 2 herein, being the daughter and son of respondent No. 3-Vibhash Agrawal, guarantor filed instant suit for declaration of their title and permanent injunction contending inter alia that in the mortgage suit property (secured asset), each one of them has 2/3rd share and, therefore, the applicant-Bank be restrained from alienating the suit property; and also filed application for temporary injunction restraining the applicant-Bank from auctioning the Scheduled suit property. (3.3) The applicant-Bank filed its written statement and raised a specific plea that suit is barred by provisions of Section 34 of the Act of 2002 and the suit is liable to be dismissed as barred by Act of 2002. 3. The trial Court framed issues including the issue of jurisdiction of civil Court under Section 34 of the Act of 2002 and decided the issue of jurisdiction as preliminary issue against the applicant and by the impugned order held that the suit is not barred by the provisions of Section 34 of the Act of 2002 and it has jurisdiction to entertain and hear the suit as there is no provision in the Act of 2002 for granting decree for partition and same can only be granted by civil court. 4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order holding the Civil Court has jurisdiction in the matter, the instant revision under Section 155 of the CPS has been filed. 5. 4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order holding the Civil Court has jurisdiction in the matter, the instant revision under Section 155 of the CPS has been filed. 5. Shri S.S. Rajput, learned counsel appearing for the applicant would submit that the instant suit has been filed by respondents No. 1 & 2 being the son and daughter of respondent No. 3-Vibhash Agrawal (guarantor) only to circumvent the provisions of Act of 2002 and would further submit that in view of section 34 of the Act of 2002, jurisdiction of Civil Court is expressly barred in respect of any measures taken under Section 13(4) of the Act of 2002 and the trial Court has committed palpable error of jurisdiction in holding that jurisdiction of Civil Court is not barred under Section 34 of the Act of 2002 in respect of measures taken under the Act. 6. Despite service of notice to the respondents, no one has appeared in their behalf to prosecute the case. 7. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the applicant and considered his submissions. 8. In order to decide the question raised in this civil revision, it would be profitable to notice certain statutory provisions contained in the Act of 2002. 9. Section 34 of the Act reads thus: "34. Civil Court not to have jurisdiction-No civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect by any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993)." 10. Section 13 of the Act, to the extent relevant, reads thus: "13. Enforcement of security interest:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 69 or Section 69A of the Transfer of Property act, 1882 (4 of 1882), any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced, without the intervention of the Court or Tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Enforcement of security interest:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 69 or Section 69A of the Transfer of Property act, 1882 (4 of 1882), any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced, without the intervention of the Court or Tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) Where any borrower, who is under a liability to a secured creditor under a security agreement, to makes any default in repayment of secured debt or any installment thereof, and his account in respect of such debt is classified by the secured creditor as non-performing asset, then, the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice in writing to discharge in full his liabilities to be secured creditor within sixty days from the date of notice failing which the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights under Sub-section (4). (3) The notice referred to in Sub-section (2) shall give details of the amount payable by the borrower and the secured creditor in the event of non-payment of secured debts by the borrower. (3A). If, on receipt of the notice under Sub-section (2) the borrower makes any representation or raises any objection, the secured creditor shall consider such representation or objection and if the secured creditor comes to the conclusion that such representation or objection is not acceptable or tenable, he shall communicate within one week of receipt of such representation or objections the reasons for non-acceptance of the representation or objection to the borrower: Provided that the reasons so communicated or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons shall not confer any right upon the borrower to prefer and application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 or the Court of District Judge under Section 17A. (4) In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in fully within the period specified in Sub-section (2), the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the following measures to recover his secured debt, namely- (a) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale of realizing the secured asset; (b) take over the management of the business of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realizing the secured asset; Provided that the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale shall be exercised only where the substantial part of the business of the borrower is held as security: Provided further that where the management of whole, of the business or part of the business is severable, the secured creditor shall take over the management of such business of the borrower which is relatable to the security or the debt. © appoint any person (hereinafter referred to as the manager), to manage the secured assets the possession of which has been taken over by the secured creditor; (d) require at any time by notice in writing, any person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower and from whom any money is due or may become due to the borrower, to pay secured creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay to the secured debt. 11. Section 17 of the Act reads thus: "17. Right to appeal-(1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorized officer under this Chapter, may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed to be Debt recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measured had been taken: Provided that different fee may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower. Explanation-For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor from not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Sub-section (1) of Section 17. (2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made there under, and require restoration of the management of the secured assists to the borrower or restoration of possession of the secured assets to the borrower, it may, by order, declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured assets as invalid restore the possession of the secured assets to the borrower, as the case may be, and pass such order as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourses taken by the secured creditor under Sub-section (4) of Section 13. (4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under Sub-section (4) of Section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled tc take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 to recover his secured debt. (5) ………………… (6) …………………. (7) …………………… 12. From a careful reading of the above provisions of the Act, the Scheme of the Act, broadly, appears to be that the financial Institutions shall not be unnecessarily subjected to lengthy and arduous procedure for the recovery of monies lent by them to the borrowers. (5) ………………… (6) …………………. (7) …………………… 12. From a careful reading of the above provisions of the Act, the Scheme of the Act, broadly, appears to be that the financial Institutions shall not be unnecessarily subjected to lengthy and arduous procedure for the recovery of monies lent by them to the borrowers. In fact, there are several other statutes, covering different financial institutions (e.g., State Financial Corporation Act) for expeditious recovery of debts. The reasons are mainly two-fold-firstly, the borrowers may be trying to delay or evade repayment of the amounts borrowed from the Financial Institutions/Bank secondly money of the financial institution/Bank is the money of the public. Therefore, while dealing with public money, particularly for the purpose of recovering the money, lent by such financial institution/Banks, stringent measures have to be permitted and for that purpose statutory sanctions have been accorded to such institutions, Precisely that is the reason why the procedural law under the Civil Procedure Code, i.e. filing of a suit in a Civil Court was expressly barred under the Act. The impact and seriousness of such step is more visible from the language employed in Section 34 of the Act while debarring the ordinary Civil Courts from granting any orders of injunction. Obviously, this is intended only to safeguard the public money, despite which, it is common knowledge that the Banking Institutions are unable to effect recoveries of the money lent to borrowers at the expected rate and pace. 13. The Supreme Court in case of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. And others Vs. Union of India and others, : (2004) 4 SCC 311 , while upholding the constitutional validity of the Act of 2002, has made certain important observations with regard to jurisdiction of Civil court. "34. Some facts which need be taken note of are that the Banks and the financial institutions have heavily financed the petitioners and other industries. It is also a fact that a large sum of amount remains unrecovered. Normal process of recovery of debts through Courts is lengthy and time taken is not suited for recovery of such dues. For financial assistance rendered to the industries by the financial institutions, financial assistance rendered to the industries by the financial institutions, financial liquidity is essential failing which retard the economic progress followed by a large number of other consequential ill effects. For financial assistance rendered to the industries by the financial institutions, financial assistance rendered to the industries by the financial institutions, financial liquidity is essential failing which retard the economic progress followed by a large number of other consequential ill effects. Considering all these circumstances, the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act was enacted in 1993 but as the figures show it also did not bring the desired results. Though it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that it so happened due to inaction the part of the government in creating Debt Recovery Tribunals and appointing Presiding Officers for a long time. Even after leaving that margin, it is to be noted that things in the concerned spheres are desired to move faster. In the present day global economy it may be difficult to stick to old and conventional methods of financing and recovery of dues. Hence, in our view, it cannot be said that step taken towards Securitization of the debts and to evolve means for faster recovery of the NPAS was not called for or that it was superimposition of undesired law since one legislation was already operating in the field namely the Recovery of Debts due to Banks Financial Institutions Act. It is also to be noted that the idea has not erupted abruptly to resort to such legislation. It appears that a thought was given to the problems and Narasimham Committee was constituted which recommended for such a legislation keeping in view the changing times and economic situation whereafter yet another expert committee was constituted then alone the impugned law was enacted. Liquidity of finances and flow of money is essential for any healthy and growth oriented economy. But certain, what must be kept in mind is that the law should not be in derogation of the rights which are guaranteed to the people under the constitution. The procedure should also be fair, reasonable and valid, though it may vary looking to the different situations needed to be tackled and object sought to be achieved." 36. In its Second Reports, the Narasimhan Committee observed that the NPAS in 1992 were uncomfortably high for most of the public sector Banks. The procedure should also be fair, reasonable and valid, though it may vary looking to the different situations needed to be tackled and object sought to be achieved." 36. In its Second Reports, the Narasimhan Committee observed that the NPAS in 1992 were uncomfortably high for most of the public sector Banks. In Chapter VIII of the Second Report the Narasimhan Committee deals about legal and legislative framework and observed- '8.1 A legal framework that clearly defines the rights and liabilities of parties to contracts and provides for speedy resolution of disputes is a sine qua non for efficient trade and commerce, especially for financial intermediation. In our system, the evolution of the legal framework has not kept pace with changing commercial practice and with the financial sector reforms. As a result, the economy has not been able to reap the full benefits of the reforms process. ALC an illustration, we could look at the scheme of mortgage in the Transfer of Property Act, which is critical to the work of financial intermediaries…………' One of the measures recommended in the circumstances was to vest the financial institutions through special statues, the power of sale of the asset without intervention of the court and for reconstruction of the assets. It is thus to be seen that the question of non-recoverable or delayed recovery of debts advanced by the Banks or financial institutions has been attracting the attention and the matter was considered in-depth by the committees specially constituted consisting of the experts in the field. In the prevalent situation where the amount of dues are huge and hope of early recovery is less, it cannot be said that a more effective legislation for the purpose was uncalled for or that it could not be resorted to. It is again to be noted that after the report of the Narasimhan Committee, yet another committee was constituted headed by Mr. Andhyarujina for bringing out the needed steps within the legal framework. We are, therefore, unable to find much substance in the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that while the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act was in operation it was uncalled for to have yet another legislation for the recovery of the mounting dues. Andhyarujina for bringing out the needed steps within the legal framework. We are, therefore, unable to find much substance in the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that while the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act was in operation it was uncalled for to have yet another legislation for the recovery of the mounting dues. Considering the totality of circumstances the financial climate world over, if it was thought as a matter of policy, to have yet speedier legal method to recover the dues, such a policy decision cannot be faulted with nor it is a matter to be gone into by the Courts to test the legitimacy of such a measure relating to financial policy." "80. ……. ……… ………. 2. As already discussed earlier, on measures having been taken under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 and before the date of sale/auction of the property it would be open for the borrower to file an appeal (petition) under Section 17 of the Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. 3. That the Tribunal in exercise of its ancillary powers shall have jurisdiction to pass any stay/interim order subject to the condition at it may deem fit and proper to impose. 4. In view of the discussion already held on this behalf, we find that the requirement of deposit of 75% of amount claimed before entertaining an appeal (petition) under Section17 of the Act is an oppressive, onerous and arbitrary condition against all the canons of reasonableness. Such a condition is invalid and it is liable to be struck down. 5. As discussed earlier in this judgment, we find that it will be open to maintain a civil suit in Civil Court, within the narrow scope and on the limited grounds on which they are permissible, in the matters relating to an English mortgage enforceable without intervention of the Court." 14. Thus, a close reading of the above provisions of the Act quoted hereinabove and the observations made by the Supreme Court in case of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. And others (supra), it is transparently clear that jurisdiction of the Civil Court has expressly been taken away and interest of the aggrieved/effected person like plaintiff in this case has been protected by providing a Right to appeal, under Section 17(1) of the Act by way of approaching Debts Recovery Tribunal. 15. 15. The Supreme Court in case of United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and Ors. : AIR 2010 SC 3413 has held that tangible grievance of the party against the notice issued under Section 13(4) of the Act, such aggrieved party has remedy of filing application under Section 17(1) of the Act. Para. 17 of the report states as under:- "17. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If respondent No. 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed the remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression 'any person' used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Section 17 and 18and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective." 16. The Supreme Court in case of Jagdish Singh vs. Heeralal and others, : (2014) 1 SCC 479 has also held that the expression "any person" used in Section 17 is of wide import and takes within its fold not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by action taken under Section 13(4)of the Securitisation and held as under:- "(18) Any person aggrieved by any order made by the DRT under Section 17 may also prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the Act. (19) The expression "any person" used in Section 17 is of wide import and takes within its fold not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by action taken under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act. Reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in Satyawati Tondon case, : (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260. (20) Therefore, the expression "any person" referred to in Section 17 would take in the plaintiffs in the suit as well. Reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in Satyawati Tondon case, : (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260. (20) Therefore, the expression "any person" referred to in Section 17 would take in the plaintiffs in the suit as well. Therefore, irrespective of the question whether the civil suit is maintainable or not, under the Securitisation Act itself, a remedy is provided to such persons so that they can invoke the provisions of Section 17 of the Securitisation Act, in case the Bank (secured creditor) adopt any measure including the sale of the secured assets, on which the plaintiffs claim interest." 17. Not only this, the Debts Recovery Tribunal is entitled to examine the correctness of the action taken by the Bank/Secured Creditor under Section 13(4) of the Act and is entitled to set aside the sale and to restore possession to the borrower in appropriate case. 18. The Supreme Court in case of Authorised Officer, Indian Overseas Bank and Anr. V. M/s. Ashok Saw Mill,: AIR 2009 SC 2420 has held that Debts Recovery Tribunal is entitled is entitled to question the action taken by the secured creditor and the transaction entered into by virtue of Section 13(4) of the Act. Para. 23 of the report states as under:- "23. The intention of the legislature is, therefore, clear that while the Banks and Financial Institutions have been vested with stringent powers for recovery of their dues, safeguards have also been provided for rectifying any error or wrongful use of such powers by vesting the DRT with authority after conducting an adjudication into the matter to declare any such action invalid and also to restore possession even though possession may have been made over the transferee. The consequences of the authority vested in DRT under Sub-Section (3) of Section 17 necessarily implies that the DRT is entitled to question the action taken by the secured creditor and the transactions entered into by virtue of section 13(4) of the Act. The Legislature by including Sub-Section (3) in Section17 has gone to the extent of vesting the DRT with authority to even set aside a transaction including sale and to restore possession to the borrower in appropriate cases. 19. The Legislature by including Sub-Section (3) in Section17 has gone to the extent of vesting the DRT with authority to even set aside a transaction including sale and to restore possession to the borrower in appropriate cases. 19. Very recently, the Supreme Court in case of Jagdish Singh (supra) considering the jurisdiction of Civil Court qua the measures taken under Section 13(4) of the Act and noticing the decision of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. And others (supra) has held in respect of measures taken by secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly barred. Paras. 24 & 25 of the report state as under:- "24. Statutory interest is being created in favour of the secured creditor on the secured assets and when the secured creditor proposes to proceed against the secured assets, sub-section (4) of Section 13 envisages various measures to secure the borrower's debt. One of the measures provided by the statute is to take possession of secured assets of the borrowers, including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or realizing the secured assets. Any person aggrieved by any of the "measures" referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 has got a statutory right of appeal to the DRT under Section 17. The opening portion of Section 34 clearly states that on civil court shall have the jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding "in respect of any matter" which a DRT or any Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under the Securitisation Act to determine. The expression "in respect of any matter" referred to in section 34 would take in the "measure" provided under sub-Section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act. Consequently, if any aggrieved person has got any grievance against any "measures" taken by the Borrower under sub-section (4) of Section 13, the remedy open to him is to approach the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal and not the civil court. The civil court in such circumstances has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of those matters which fall under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act because those matters fell within the jurisdiction of the DRT and the Appellate Tribunal. The civil court in such circumstances has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of those matters which fall under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act because those matters fell within the jurisdiction of the DRT and the Appellate Tribunal. Further, Section 35 says, the Securitisation Act overrides other laws, if they are inconsistent with the provisions of that Act, which takes in Section 9 CPC as well. 25. We are of the view that the civil court jurisdiction is completely barred, so far as the "measures" taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act, against which an aggrieved person has a right of appeal before the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal to determine as to whether there has been any illegality in the "measures" taken. The Bank, in the instant case, has proceeded only against secured assets of the borrowers on which no rights of Respondents 6 to 8 (sic Respondents 1 to 5) have been crystallized, before creating security interest in respect of the secured assets." 20. From a conjoint reading of the provisions of the Act of 2002, as extracted above and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in mardia Chemicals' case (supra) and Jagdish Singh (supra) noticed hereinabove, it is luminously clear that legislature has taken away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by safeguarding interest and aggrieved person such as plaintiff in this case to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal under Section 17(1) of the act, in which event, the Tribunal is empowered with a duty under sub Section 3 of Section 17 of the Act is authorized to pass any interim orders as deemed it fit proper. 21. Having ascertained the legal position, turning back to facts of the case, it would appear; admittedly, the scheduled suit property bearing Khasra No. 39/4. Area 10,500 Sq.ft. situated at village Lalpur, Bagbahra, District Mahasamund was mortgaged with the applicant-Bank by the defendant No. 2(which was recorded in his name) and same is secured asset as defined in the Act of 2002. Area 10,500 Sq.ft. situated at village Lalpur, Bagbahra, District Mahasamund was mortgaged with the applicant-Bank by the defendant No. 2(which was recorded in his name) and same is secured asset as defined in the Act of 2002. There was no dispute between the parties till possession notice was issued on 20.1.2011 and, thereafter, sale notice was issued on 23/24.06.2012 for sale of scheduled suit property inviting tenders and fixing the date for opening the tender on 25.07.2012 then only the suit for declaration and permanent injunction came to be filed on 23.07.2012 by son and daughter of guarantor/defendant No. 2, claiming the following reliefs:- ¼v½ ;g fd oknxzLr Hkwfe ij oknhx.k dk 2@3 fgLlk ?kksf”kr fd;k tkdj oknhx.k ds fgLls dks fodz; djus ds LFkk;h fu”ks/kkKk )kjk izfroknh dzekad ,d dks jksdk tkosA 22. (A) Thus, instant suit was filed on 23.07.2012 for following two reliefs:- (i) For declaring their share in the suit property with respect to schedule suit property which is 'secured asset' under the Act of 2002. And (ii) For permanent injunction restraining the applicant-Bank from alienating the 'secured asset'. (B) Thus, in sum & substance, instant suit filed on 23.07.2012 for partition is only to frustrate the measures taken by the applicant-Bank after publication of the sale notice on 23/24.6.2012 and fixing the date for opening the offers on 25.7.2012, thus the instant suit was filed only to frustrate the Endeavour of the applicant-Bank to sell the 'secured asset' under Section 13(4) of the act of 2002 and to realise, it dues Likewise, the suit for permanent injunction restraining the applicant-Bank from alienating the scheduled suit property in respect of measures taken, which is expressly barred under Section 34 of the Act of 2002. 23. 23. Thus, in the light of the provisions contained in Section 13(4) and 17(1) of the Act of 2002 and following principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases including Jagdish Sing (supra) and in the light of factual backdrop of the instant case, it is held that jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of measures taken under Section 13(4) is expressly barred and remedy of the plaintiffs were to file application under Section 17(1) of the Act of 2002 before Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Civil Court, in such circumstances, has no jurisdiction to entertain such suit restraining the applicant-Bank from alienating the suit property from making recovery under Section 13(4)of the Act of 2002. 24. Consequently, the civil revision is allowed. Order impugned dated 19.03.2013 passed by the trial court holding that the Civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by plaintiffs is set aside and the civil Suit No. 2-A/2011 (Rishika & another Vs. Neerendra Kumar and others) pending in the court of 2nd Civil Judge, Class-II, Mahasamund filed by the respondents No. 1 & 2/plaintiffs for declaration and permanent injunction stands dismissed being expressly barred by the provisions of Section 34 of the Act of 2002. No order as to costs.