JUDGMENT 1. - This criminal misc. petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the petitioner while challenging the order dated 31.10.2013 passed by the Sessions Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Bikaner (for short the trial court' hereinafter) in Complaint No.55/2012 Ambuj v. Dr. A.K.Gehlot . 2. The respondent No.2 Ambuj Kumar Sharma filed a complaint before the trial court against the petitioner and some other persons, inter alia, alleging therein that the accused, under the garb of RPMT/PVT Counselling, 2010, organised a camp at J.L.N. Medical College, Ajmer for admission in Veterinary College, Jodhpur and selected 14 students, whereas the Indian Council of Veterinary Science did not grant any permission for such admission. It was alleged that despite having no permission for such admission, the accused have granted the admissions. It was further alleged that thereafter such students were granted admission in Veterinary College, Bikaner. It was also alleged that the accused Nos.1 to 3 also granted permission to change option for pension purposes to Dr. R.K. Tanwar and seven other persons, which was not permissible, thereby causing loss of lacs of rupees to the Government. It was also alleged that in the garb of improving the breed of cows in village Chandan, the accused persons spent a sum of Rs. 5 crore and 74 lacs, but only paper work was done and the accused persons misappropriated a sum of Rs. 5 crore. It was also alleged that the contractual employees were kept by the accused persons without any advertisement and if the employees would have been selected after due advertisement, the employees at lesser rate would have become available. It was also alleged that the accused persons sanctioned the extraordinary leave for six employees, who were working in foreign countries and granted undue benefit of pension, promotion and increments causing loss of about Rs. 1 crore. It was further alleged that in the marriage of daughter of Dr. G.S.Manohar, liquor was offered to the gurests on 18.1.2012 to 19.1.2012, whereas as per the Excise Policy, 2011-2012, the liquor cannot be served in any function organised in Government Educational Institutions. 3. The learned trial court, vide order dated 10.05.2012, forwarded the said complaint to the Anti Corruption Bureau, Bikaner with a direction that if a case is made out, then a regular FIR be registered. 4. 3. The learned trial court, vide order dated 10.05.2012, forwarded the said complaint to the Anti Corruption Bureau, Bikaner with a direction that if a case is made out, then a regular FIR be registered. 4. The Investigating Officer, after concluding the investigation, has submitted a report in the trial court with a finding that no offence is made out against the accused persons. 5. The learned trial court, after considering the said report filed by the Investigating Officer, vide order dated 31.10.2013, has rejected the same and sent the matter to the Additional Director General of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, Headquarters Jaipur with a direction that regular FIR be registered against the accused persons and after thorough investigation, report be submitted to the trial court on 21.12.2013. 6. Assailing the validity of the order dated 31.05.2013, the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the trial court has no jurisdiction to direct the Anti Corruption Bureau to register an FIR against the petitioner in the absence of prior sanction from the competent authority as required under section 19 of the Prevention of Anti Corruption Act, 1988 (for short the Act of 1988' hereinafter). It is contended that as the petitioner is the Vice Chancellor of the Rajasthan University of Veterinary and Animal Sciences, he cannot be prosecuted for the offences allegedly committed by him while discharging his official functions and duties in regard to the day to day affairs of the University. It is submitted that by the mandate of the provisions of section 19 of the Act of 1988, no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction by the competent authority. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court as well as of Karnataka High Court respectively in Anil Kumar & Ors. v. M.K.Aiyappa & Anr., 2013 (4) RLW 3604 (SC) , Manzoor Ali Khan v. Union of India & Ors., 2014 CRI.L.J.4257 , M.L.Sankhla & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 2014 CRI.L.J. 2458 and Babu Rao Chinchanasur v. State of Anr., 2014 CRI.L.J.3310 . 8. v. M.K.Aiyappa & Anr., 2013 (4) RLW 3604 (SC) , Manzoor Ali Khan v. Union of India & Ors., 2014 CRI.L.J.4257 , M.L.Sankhla & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 2014 CRI.L.J. 2458 and Babu Rao Chinchanasur v. State of Anr., 2014 CRI.L.J.3310 . 8. Per contra, in reply to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Public Prosecutor and counsel for the respondent No.2 have argued that the trial court has rightly directed the Additional Director General of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, Headquarters Jaipur to file FIR against the petitioner and other accused-persons. It is further submitted that when the trial court simply referred the complaint for investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C., it did not take the cognizance of the offence. It is a pre-cognizance stage and cannot be equated with the post cognizance stage and, therefore, in such circumstances, no previous sanction of the competent authority is required in terms of the provisions of section 19 of the Act of 1988 before ordering for registering FIR. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 has placed reliance on decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.R.Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 207 , Subramaniyan Swamy v. Manmohan Singh & Anr., (2012) 3 SCC 64 and Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Director Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., AIR 2014 SC 2140 . Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order. 10. It is not in dispute that on a written complaint filed by the respondent No.2, the trial court vide order dated 10.05.2012, has given a direction to the Anti Corruption Bureau, Bikaner to conduct preliminary investigation and if a case is made out, then register a regular FIR against the petitioner and other accused-persons. However, when the Anti Corruption Bureau, Bikaner has submitted its report before the trial court to the effect that no offence is made out against the persons named in the complaint, the trial court has rejected the said inquiry report and has given a direction to the Additional Director General of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, Headquarters Jaipur to register an FIR against the petitioner and other accused-persons and, thereafter to submit result before the trial court on 21.12.2013 after thorough investigation. 11. 11. The question of issuing directions to register FIR against a public servant for the offences punishable under the provisions of the Act of 1988 on a private complaint has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar & Ors. v. M.K.Aiyappa & Anr. (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court, after taking into consideration relevant provision of Cr.P.C. and the provisions of section 19 of the Act of 1988, has held as under: "9. We will now examine whether the order directing investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. would amount to taking cognizance of the offence, since a contention was raised that the expression "cognizance" appearing in Section 19(1) of the PC Act will have to be construed as post-cognizance stage, not pre-cognizance stage and, therefore, the requirement of sanction does not arise prior to taking cognizance of the offences punishable under the provisions of the PC Act. The expression "cognizance" which appears in Section 197 Cr.P.C. came up for consideration before a three Judge Bench of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh (2009) 6 SCC 372 , and this Court expressed the following view: "6. ..........And the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence is provided by Section 190 of the Code, either on receipt of a complaint, or upon a police report or upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his knowledge that such offence has been committed. So far as public servants are concerned, the cognizance of any offence, by any court, is barred by Section 197 of the Code unless sanction is obtained from the appropriate authority, if the offence, alleged to have been committed, was in discharge of the official duty. The section not only specifies the persons to whom the protection is afforded but it also specifies the conditions and circumstances in which it shall be available and the effect in law if the conditions are satisfied. The mandatory character of the protection afforded to a public servant is brought out by the expression, no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction. Use of the words no and shall makes it abundantly clear that the bar on the exercise of power of the court to take cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. The very cognizance is barred. Use of the words no and shall makes it abundantly clear that the bar on the exercise of power of the court to take cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. The very cognizance is barred. That is, the complaint cannot be taken notice of. According to Blacks Law Dictionary the word cognizance means jurisdiction or the exercise of jurisdiction or power to try and determine causes. In common parlance, it means taking notice of. A court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining a complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed during discharge of his official duty. In State of West Bengal and Another v. Mohd. Khalid and Others (1995) 1 SCC 684 , this Court has observed as follows: "It is necessary to mention here that taking cognizance of an offence is not the same thing as issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or upon information received from any other person that an offence has been committed. The issuance of process is at a subsequent stage when after considering the material placed before it the court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out." The meaning of the said expression was also considered by this Court in Subramanium Swamy case (supra). The judgments referred to herein above clearly indicate that the word "cognizance" has a wider connotation and not merely confined to the stage of taking cognizance of the offence. When a Special Judge refers a complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., obviously, he has not taken cognizance of the offence and, therefore, it is a pre-cognizance stage and cannot be equated with post cognizance stage. When a Special Judge takes cognizance of the offence on a complaint presented under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and the next step to be taken is to follow up under Section 202 Cr.P.C. Consequently, a Special Judge referring the case for investigation under Section 156(3) is at pre-cognizance stage.A Special Judge is deemed to be a Magistrate under Section 5(4) of the PC Act and, therefore, clothed with all the magisterial powers provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure. When a private complaint is filed before the Magistrate, he has two options. He may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 Cr.P.C. or proceed further in enquiry or trial. A Magistrate, who is otherwise competent to take cognizance, without taking cognizance under Section 190, may direct an investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The Magistrate, who is empowered under Section 190 to take cognizance, alone has the power to refer a private complaint for police investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 12. We may now examine whether, in the above mentioned legal situation, the requirement of sanction is a pre-condition for ordering investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., even at a pre-cognizance stage. Section 2(c) of the PC Act deals with the definition of the expression "public servant" and provides under Clauses (viii) and (xii) as under: "(viii) any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty. (xii) any person who is an office-bearer or an employee of an educational, scientific, social, cultural or other institution, in whatever manner established, receiving or having received any financial assistance from the Central Government or any State Government, or local or other public authority." The relevant provision for sanction is given in Section 19 (1) of the PC Act, which reads as under: "19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.-(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction- (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removeable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office." Section 19(3) of the PC Act also has some relevance; the operative portion of the same is extracted hereunder: "Section 19(3) - Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)- (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby; (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) xxx xxx xxx" 13. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants raised the contention that the requirement of sanction is only procedural in nature and hence, directory or else Section 19(3) would be rendered otiose. We find it difficult to accept that contention. Sub-section (3) of Section 19 has an object to achieve, which applies in circumstances where a Special Judge has already rendered a finding, sentence or order. In such an event, it shall not be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of absence of sanction. That does not mean that the requirement to obtain sanction is not a mandatory requirement. Once it is noticed that there was no previous sanction, as already indicated in various judgments referred to herein above, the Magistrate cannot order investigation against a public servant while invoking powers under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. The above legal position, as already indicated, has been clearly spelt out in Paras Nath Singh and Subramanium Swamy cases (supra). 14. Once it is noticed that there was no previous sanction, as already indicated in various judgments referred to herein above, the Magistrate cannot order investigation against a public servant while invoking powers under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. The above legal position, as already indicated, has been clearly spelt out in Paras Nath Singh and Subramanium Swamy cases (supra). 14. Further, this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 257 of 2011 in the case of General Officer, Commanding v. CBI and opined as follows: "Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue of sanction can be summarised to the effect that the question of sanction is of paramount importance for protecting a public servant who has acted in good faith while performing his duty. In order that the public servant may not be unnecessarily harassed on a complaint of an unscrupulous person, it is obligatory on the part of the executive authority to protect him.. If the law requires sanction, and the court proceeds against a public servant without sanction, the public servant has a right to raise the issue of jurisdiction as the entire action may be rendered void ab-initio." 15. We are of the view that the principles laid down by this Court in the above referred judgments squarely apply to the facts of the present case. We, therefore, find no error in the order passed by the High Court. The appeals lack merit and are accordingly dismissed." In the above judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme court has clearly laid down that in the absence of prior sanction, the learned Special Judge, who is having the powers of Magistrate, is not empowered to forward a private complaint to police for investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. against a public servant when the allegations are in relation to the offences alleged to have been committed by them during the course of discharge their official duties. 13. In the case in hand, the Sessions Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Bikaner, while ordering for registering of FIR against the petitioner and other accused-persons, has failed to consider that prior sanction of the competent authority was not available to prosecute the public servants against which the complaint was filed. 14. 13. In the case in hand, the Sessions Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Bikaner, while ordering for registering of FIR against the petitioner and other accused-persons, has failed to consider that prior sanction of the competent authority was not available to prosecute the public servants against which the complaint was filed. 14. From reading of the complaint, it is clear that all the allegations of the complaint are in relation to the acts committed by the petitioner and other persons related to the discharge of their official duties while working as Vice Chancellor of the University or on other posts. 15. The principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar & Ors. v. M..Aiyappa & Anr. (supra) clearly applies in this case and in the absence of prior sanction from the competent authority, as required under section 19 of the Act of 1988, the direction issued by the Sessions Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Bikaner for registering an FIR against the petitioner is not tenable. 16. Resultantly, this criminal misc. petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 31.10.2013 passed by Sessions Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Bikaner directing the Additional Director General of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau to register an FIR against the petitioner and other accused-persons is quashed and set aside.Petition allowed. *******