JUDGMENT Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The substantial question of law formulated and to be answered by this Court in defendants' second appeal is as under:-- "Whether the possession of respondent No. 2/plaintiff over a part of the suit land can, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, be said to be adverse so as to permit him to acquire title?" [For sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status shown in the suit before the trial Court.] Sans unnecessary details, the facts which are essential to be stated for the purpose of disposal of the present second appeal are as under: 1.1 The scheduled suit property bearing Khasra No. 1065/1, area 0.35 decimal situated at village Narayanpur, District Narayanpur was originally held by Medu-defendant No. 1 (died during the pendency of this appeal) and his name stood recorded in the revenue records. The defendant No. 1 - Medu sold and delivered possession of the 0.06 decimal land to the defendant No. 2 Aruna Rani Dutta by registered sale deed dated 17.12.1980 with due permission from the Collector Bastar, after having published notice inviting objections from the public in the local Newspaper and an enquiry been conducted by the Collector defendant No. 2 had mutated her name in the revenue records on the strength of the sale deed. 1.2 The defendant No. 2 had taken possession of the said property in November 1982 and finding 20x20 feet, which defendant No. 2 had purchased from defendant No. 1 was within the possession of the plaintiff, and therefore, defendant No. 2 preferred an application for seeking possession of the said land before the Tehsildar, Narayanpur. 1.3 Thereafter, plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration of title, permanent injunction and in alternative, decree for possession contending inter alia that the defendant No. 1 has lost his title over the suit land, as he had constructed a house, courtyard etc. on 0.12 decimal of the said scheduled land in the year 1964, and was in possession since then. The defendant No. 1 (late Medu) did not object to the possession of the plaintiff over the said land for the entire period, and therefore, the plaintiff was in possession of the said land since past 19 years without any objection. on 0.12 decimal of the said scheduled land in the year 1964, and was in possession since then. The defendant No. 1 (late Medu) did not object to the possession of the plaintiff over the said land for the entire period, and therefore, the plaintiff was in possession of the said land since past 19 years without any objection. 1.4 It was further pleaded that when defendant No. 1 vide registered sale deed dated 17.12.1980 had sold a portion of 0.06 decimal of the said scheduled property to defendant No. 2 for consideration amount of Rs. 2,100/-. 1.5 It was further pleaded that since the plaintiff was in possession of the said scheduled property since 1964, and therefore, defendant No. 1 could not have transferred any title to defendant No. 2 over the scheduled suit land sought of any authority and furthermore, since the plaintiff had already informed defendant No. 2 about his possession over the said land, the defendant No. 2 ought not to have purchased the same. 1.6 It was lastly pleaded that the plaintiff was in possession of the said land since 1964 without any objection adverse to the title of defendant No. 1. Therefore, the plaintiff had perfected his title as the owner of the said property by virtue of having been in continuous possession of the said land and whatever right defendant No. 1 had over the said property had extinguished. Moreover, since defendant No. 2 had purchased the property from defendant No. 1 over which, defendant No. 1 does not have any title, therefore, no title can be transferred to defendant No. 2. The cause of action had arisen in March 1983, when defendant No. 2 had sought to take possession of the scheduled suit property from the plaintiff and started quarrelling with the plaintiff leading to filing of the instant suit for declaration of title on the basis of adverse possession, permanent injunction on the strength of said possession, and alternatively decree for possession. 1.7 Defendant No. 1 - Medu filed his written statement stating inter alia that he is title and possession holder of the property and stated that in fact plaintiff was permitted by defendant No. 1 to reside over the said property, as a licensee. Since plaintiff was given nothing in his family partition and upon much request to defendant No. 1, he was permitted to stay. Since plaintiff was given nothing in his family partition and upon much request to defendant No. 1, he was permitted to stay. It is further case of defendant No. 1 that the plaintiff was never in adverse possession of the said land, as he was staying there with the permission of defendant No. 1. The permission to stay was over and therefore, the plaintiff was holding the said property as an encroacher. 1.8 Further, the defendant No. 2 had taken possession of the said property in November 1982, and requested plaintiff to vacate the scheduled suit land, to which, the plaintiff started objecting and therefore, defendant No. 2 proceeded to the revenue authorities for taking possession of the said land and lastly pleaded that suit is not maintainable under Section 257 of the Land Revenue Code. 1.9 The Trial Court, by its judgment and decree dated 17.04.1986 dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove his possession over the suit property since 1964, and the plaintiff was the licensee of the defendant No. 1. It was further held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he had constructed the house over the suit property and thus, title of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 has not been extinguished over the scheduled suit property. 1.10 Feeling dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, plaintiff filed first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (henceforth 'the CPC'). The First Appellate Court, by its judgment and decree dated 27.09.1991 reversed the finding of the Trial Court and allowed the appeal and decreed the suit of the plaintiff." 2. Questioning the legal acceptability and sustainability of the impugned judgment and decree dated 27.09.1991 passed by Additional District Judge, Bastar (Kanker) in Civil Appeal No. 9-A/1986, the instant second appeal has been filed by the defendants, in which, substantial question of law has been formulated, as it has been mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment. 3. Mr. Prafull N. Bharat and Mr. Amrito Das, learned counsel appearing for appellants/defendants would submit that the suit for declaration of title based on adverse possession was neither maintainable in law nor the plaintiffs has pleaded and established the necessary ingredients of adverse possession, in order to defeat the right, title of the plaintiff on the suit land. 3. Mr. Prafull N. Bharat and Mr. Amrito Das, learned counsel appearing for appellants/defendants would submit that the suit for declaration of title based on adverse possession was neither maintainable in law nor the plaintiffs has pleaded and established the necessary ingredients of adverse possession, in order to defeat the right, title of the plaintiff on the suit land. They, would further submit that the First Appellate Court has committed legal error in reversing the finding of the Trial Court and thus, judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court be set aside and that of the Trial Court be restored. 4. Per contra, Mr. Vishnu Koshta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/plaintiffs would submit that First Appellate Court has rightly reversed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and as such no substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 5. I have learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the records of both the Courts below with utmost circumspection. Answer to substantial question of law : 6. The twin question that falls for determination in this second appeal are as under:-- (i) Whether the plaintiff's suit for declaration of title based on adverse possession was maintainable in law? (ii) Whether plaintiff has pleaded and established adverse possession over the suit land over a period of 12 years and entitled for permanent injunction? 7. The question whether the plaintiff can maintain a suit for declaration of his title on the basis of adverse possession is no longer res Integra. 8. Very recently, it has been held by their Lordships of Supreme Court in Gurudwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat, village Sirthala and another : (2014)1 SCC 669 , that plaintiff cannot maintain suit for declaration of title based on adverse possession and it can use his adverse possession as a shield/defence. Para-8 of the report succinctly held as under:-- "8. There cannot be any quarrel to this extent that the judgments of the courts below are correct and without any blemish. Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. Only if proceedings are filed against the appellant and the appellant is arrayed as defendant that it can use this adverse possession as a shield/defence." 9. Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. Only if proceedings are filed against the appellant and the appellant is arrayed as defendant that it can use this adverse possession as a shield/defence." 9. Following the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in aforesaid case namely Gurudwara Sahib (supra) it is held that the plaintiff is not entitled to seek declaration that he has perfected his adverse possession into title. 10. The next question to be considered is whether plaintiff has pleaded and established his adverse possession by stating the ingredient required to prove the same. 11. In case of Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India : (2004) 10 SCC 779 , the Supreme Court has held that person pleading adverse possession has no equity in his favour. It runs as under:-- "11........... Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is "nec vi, nec clam, nec precario"', that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. .....Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession." 12. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession." 12. Coming back to the facts of the case, it is to be seen whether plaintiff had disclosed source of possession, nature of possession and the date on which he came into possession and whether factum of possession was known to other side, that his possession was open and peaceful, a brief survey of the plaint would be necessary. The plaintiff has pleaded that he had constructed a house, Courtyard on 0.12 decimal of the suit land in the year 1964 and was in possession since them. It is apt to mention that plaintiff neither disclosed his source of possession nor disclosed nature of possession and the date on which he came into possession of the suit land except the year 1964, which imperative requirement of the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Karnataka Board of Wakf (supra). It was also not pleaded that Medu was aware of the adverse/hostile possession of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had the intention to dispossess the original owner i.e. defendant No. 1-Medu. 13. Though, the plaintiff in his plaint pleaded that he is in possession of the suit land since 1964 by constructing the house and courtyard peacefully and without interruption and thereby, he has perfected his adverse possession into title. In order to prove the said possession right from 1964, the plaintiff has filed documents Exhibit P-1 to Exhibit P-7. 14. Exhibit P-1 is the copy of Khasra Panchsala for the year 1981-82 of suit land, in which, the defendant No. 1 is recorded as possession holder, whereas plaintiff is recorded as occupancy tenant. Exhibit P-2 is the copy of Khasra Panchsala for the year 1980-81 of suit land, in which, the defendant No. 1 is recorded as a Bhoomiswami, whereas the plaintiff's name is recorded in remarks column stating that he has constructed house on 0.12 decimal of suit land out of 0.35 decimal. Likewise Exhibit P-4 is Khasra Panchshala for the year 1982-83, and there is no other documentary evidence on record to establish his possession over the suit land. 15. Likewise Exhibit P-4 is Khasra Panchshala for the year 1982-83, and there is no other documentary evidence on record to establish his possession over the suit land. 15. The question is whether the entry made by the Patwari in the remarks column in Exhibits P-2 to P-4 showing that the plaintiff is in possession by making construction on the suit land can be relied upon and any presumption of continuity of possession in favour of plaintiff can be drawn. 16. It is well settled law that the provisions of Chapter IX of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 or even other provisions of the Code, including the Rules framed in respect of them, do not require a Patwari to make any other kind of entry in a Khasra or field book in respect of the matter relating to occupation of lands. He is not required to make any entry in the remarks column or any other column of a Khasra or field book with regard to any person other than recorded holder being in occupation of the land unauthorizedly or on the basis of any imperfect title. It is obvious that in case, he does make any such entry, the same cannot have any presumptive value as regards its correctness under Section 117 of the Code. 17. In case of Harisingh & others v. Dheerajsingh 1983 RN 57, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has categorically held that presumption under Section 117 of the Code arises with respect to entries which are required to be made under the law, and held as under:-- "8..........It will also be relevant to point out that the presumption with regard to the entries in the Khasra in the light of Section 117 of the Code arises only in respect of those entries which are required to be made under Chapter 9 of the Code and in respect of entries in other land record prepared under the Code. It applies only to those entries which are required to be made under the law. If any entry, existing in the land records is not required to be made either under Chapter 9 of the Code or under any other provision of the Code, no presumption of correctness can arise in respect of such entry. It applies only to those entries which are required to be made under the law. If any entry, existing in the land records is not required to be made either under Chapter 9 of the Code or under any other provision of the Code, no presumption of correctness can arise in respect of such entry. In the records of right and the Khasra, it is required that an entry should be made as to subtenant or occupancy tenant, cultivating the field and, therefore, had the defendants No. 1 been in occupation, having been inducted as a sub-tenant or an occupancy tenant, he would have been entered as such and the entry would not have been in column No. 12 which is only with regard to Remarks." 18. Thereafter, in case of Churamani v. Ramadhar 1991 MPLJ 311 , the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court noticing the Harisingh (supra) has held that the rules framed under the Code do not cast duty on the Patwari to make any entry in remarks column of Khasra in regard to any other person unauthorizedly in possession and held as under:-- "10. We find ourselves unable to accept the abovesaid contention of the learned counsel. In our opinion, no presumption of correctness can attach to an entry made by a Patwari in the remark column of a Khasra or field-book showing therein some third part/trespasser to be in possession of a land held by a Bhumiswami and recorded as such in his name in the said land record. 12. For our present purpose, the special provisions with regard to raising of presumption are contained in Section 117 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. According to the said section, all entries made under Chapter IX (containing sections 104 to 123) in the land records shall be presumed to be correct until contrary is proved. Taking even a broader view of the section, it has been held that the presumption under the section applies only to those entries which are required to be made under the law. Thus, even as per the broader view, the presumption arises only in respect of those entries which are required to be made under Chapter IX and in respect of entries in other land records prepared under the Code. 16. Thus, even as per the broader view, the presumption arises only in respect of those entries which are required to be made under Chapter IX and in respect of entries in other land records prepared under the Code. 16. Accordingly, in our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellate Court i.e. the Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Satna did not act improperly or with illegality in refusing to draw any presumption as regards continuity of possession' of the plaintiffs-petitioners over the suit land on the basis of their so called 'actual' possession having been recorded by the Patwari in the remark column of the Khasras for the period 1963-1964 to 1981-1982." 19. The aforesaid decision Churamani : 1991 MPLJ 311 (supra) has again in followed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Jageshwar Ramsahay Ahir v. Parmeshwar Ramprasad Yadav and others : AIR 2000 MP 223 and has held as under :-- "3............ In which it has been laid down that a presumption as regards continuity of possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land could not be drawn in favour of the plaintiffs on the basis of the remarks recorded in the remarks column. No presumption of correctness can attach to an entry made by the patwari in the remarks column of a Khasra or field book showing therein some third party/trespasser to be in possession the land held by a bhumiswami and recorded as such in his name in the said land records. Presumption under Section 117 of the Code applies to those entries which are required to be made under Chapter IX and in respect of entries in other land records prepared under the Code. The provisions of the Code or the Rules made thereunder do not require the patwari to make any entry in the remarks column and if such an entry is made, the same cannot have any presumptive value as regards its correctness under Section 117 of the Code. As there is no such duty cast on the patwari to make an entry in the remarks column there arises no question of drawing any presumption under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act regarding any act of the patwari having been regularly performed." 20. As there is no such duty cast on the patwari to make an entry in the remarks column there arises no question of drawing any presumption under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act regarding any act of the patwari having been regularly performed." 20. Not only this, the plaintiff has not brought any evidence to show that entry made in the Khasra Exhibits P-2 to P-4 was made in accordance with the rules. The plaintiff's pleading and filing documents placing reliance on Khasra entries was required to examine, and the Patwari who made the entry for the relevant years to prove the same. 21. In case of Sitaram v. Ram Charan and others : AIR 1995 MP 134 , the Madhya Pradesh High Court held as under:-- "8. After hearing counsel on both sides and on going through the record, I am of the opinion that this appeal has no merit. No doubt, under Section 117 of the Code, there is a presumption of correctness of all entries made in land records under Chapter IX of the Code unless the contrary is proved. But, this presumption is confined to land record's prepared in the manner prescribed. Under the Code, certain records are finalised after inviting objections, such as records of rights, Nistar Patrak, Wazib-ul-arz etc. and in such cases, there is a higher presumption of correctness while certain entries are made by the Patwari on the basis of his observation on the site or on information and for such entries, the presumption is weaker, notwithstanding it is there unless it is rebutted. In the second category of the cases, too, there should be an evidence that the copy issued by the Patwari is signed by him in his official capacity and the entry was made and the copy issued in the manner prescribed in the form provided by law. Therefore, the defendant was bound to lead evidence to prove that the entry in the Khasra was made according to the manner prescribed in the rules and also the copy so issued. Then only, under Section79 of the Evidence Act, the inference could have been drawn that the document is genuine and not spurious. Section 35 of the Evidence Act requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a document can be held to be admissible under this Section. Then only, under Section79 of the Evidence Act, the inference could have been drawn that the document is genuine and not spurious. Section 35 of the Evidence Act requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a document can be held to be admissible under this Section. (1) The document must be in the nature of an entry in any public or other official book, register or record, (2) it must state a fact in issue or a relevant fact and (3) the entry must be made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties or in performance of his duties especially enjoined by the law of the country in which the relevant entry is kept. (See State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, ( AIR 1983 SC 684 ) (supra). In the present case, there is no evidence that the entries were made by the Patwari in Khasras and Khatoni in the manner prescribed under the rules and he issued certified copies. In such circumstances, particularly when the evidence is of after the commencement of the lis, to eliminate the element of concoction, the Patwari ought to have been examined to prove the correctness of the entries made by him." 22. Having examined the legal position, reverting back to the facts of the case, it is apparent that Exhibits P-2 to P-4, in the remarks column (column-12), the possession of plaintiff has been recorded, which the concerned Patwari was not authorized to make entry as per rules, and therefore, no presumption of its correctness can be raised under Section 117 of the Code and the plaintiff has failed to bring appropriate legal evidence on record to establish the fact that entry were made in accordance with the rules. 23. Apart from this, there is no other evidence right from 1964 to 1981-82 to demonstrate his possession. Apart from the aforesaid documentary evidence, there is no reliable oral evidence on record to establish the fact of adverse possession except the self serving statement of plaintiff-Chhatranath Dewangan, thus, the plaintiff has failed to establish his adverse possession over the suit land and Trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit. 24. The First Appellate Court has evidently committed legal error in holding that the plaintiff has established his adverse possession over the scheduled suit land. 25. 24. The First Appellate Court has evidently committed legal error in holding that the plaintiff has established his adverse possession over the scheduled suit land. 25. Resultantly, the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court is set aside and judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court is restored. Consequently, the second appeal is allowed and the plaintiffs' suit stand dismissed with no order as to costs. A decree be drawn-up accordingly.