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2014 DIGILAW 1804 (ALL)

P. v. Jaganmohan VS Union of India

2014-05-30

RAKESH SRIVASTAVA, SATYENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN

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JUDGMENT S.S. Chauhan, J. Since common question of law and fact are involved in these writ petitions, therefore, the same are being decided by a common order. Writ Petition No.31 (SB) of 2011 has been filed challenging the order dated 18.10.2010 passed in CCP no.56/2008 and OA No.52/2008. The present case arises out of the proceedings initiated for contempt under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act (for short 'the Act'), wherein a direction was issued in OA No.52/2008 to the Railway to take an early decision regarding wages for the period from 25.7.2000 to 9.2.2006 and regularization etc. in the light of the Tribunal's earlier order dated 22.3.2004 and letters dated 26.4.2007 and 8.7.2007 in accordance with the rules within a period of three months from the date, a certified copy of the order is produced before the competent authority. It is stated that the copy of the order was received by opposite party no.2 on 20.5.2008, but since the compliance of the said order was not made, therefore, the contempt petition was filed. 2. The facts relating to Writ Petition No.31 (SB) of 2011 are that vide order dated 21.7.2000, the Assistant Divisional Engineer, Headquarters, Northern Railway, Lucknow declared the petitioner as surplus, who was working at the relevant time on work charged post as Casual Carpenter Grade-III on ELA basis under ADEN/HQ/LKO. Subsequently, he was redeployed as Gangman, but the petitioner did not join as Gangman and remained absent from duty from 25.7.2000 to 9.2.2006. Meanwhile, he filed OA No.458/2000. The OA was finally disposed of vide order dated 22.3.2004 in favour of the petitioner, by making an observation that the order dated 21.7.2000 was not justified and is quashed and the opposite parties were further directed to allow the petitioner to continue on the post, which he had been holding prior to his relieving on 25.7.2000. As a consequence thereof, the petitioner was permitted to join on that post. the petitioner is still in service on the said post. The petitioner filed another OA 110.52/2008 seeking direction to the opposite parties to pay him back wages from 25.7.2000 to 9.2.2006 and also to regularize him on the post with effect from the date Sri Lal Verma, junior to him was regularized. the petitioner is still in service on the said post. The petitioner filed another OA 110.52/2008 seeking direction to the opposite parties to pay him back wages from 25.7.2000 to 9.2.2006 and also to regularize him on the post with effect from the date Sri Lal Verma, junior to him was regularized. This OA was also allowed and a direction was issued to opposite parties to take an early decision as regards the wages for the aforesaid period and also for regularization in the light of the Tribunal's order dated 22.3.2004 within a period of three months. 3. The matter proceeded and two compliance reports were filed by the opposite parties. In the first compliance report, it was stated that as the period of absence was more than five years, it was only the Railway Board who was competent to take decision under the relevant rules. A letter dated 29.1.2009 was forwarded to the Railway Board for considering the case of the petitioner for regularization through proper channel. Thus, it was averred that compliance of the order of the Tribunal has been made by the Divisional Railway Manager, Northern Railway, Hazratganj, Lucknow at his end. Alongwith this compliance report, a delay condonation application was also moved in February, 2009. 4. In the second compliance report, Sri Jogesh Singh Sondhi, DRM, Northern Railway, Lucknow passed an order on 4.5.2010, directing therein that the matter of the petitioner be decided in the light of the Supreme Court's judgment in the case of Somesh Tiwari vs. UOI and others (2009) 2 SCC 592 . The opposite parties considered the case of the petitioner and his absence was regularized as leave due by means of letter dated 30.4.2010. It was further stated that the delay in deciding the petitioner's period of absence and the matter of regularization was neither intentional nor deliberate, but was beyond the control of the opposite parties and deeply regretted. 5. On the aforesaid given facts, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the order passed by the Tribunal has been complied with and it was found that the petitioner was not willing to work on the post of Gangman, on which, he was redeployed in routine course after he was found surplus on the post of work charged casual Carpenter. The order of redeployment was passed bonafidely and there is no allegation of malice or any such thing. The order of redeployment was passed bonafidely and there is no allegation of malice or any such thing. The Tribunal also found that the petitioner was merely a casual worker and he should have joined the duties of Gangman and subsequently he could have represented before the department of before the court of law and as such the opposite parties have rightly adhered to normal rule of no work no pay in this case. The direction of the Tribunal was only to pass appropriate orders regarding wages and regularization and it was accordingly passed. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the Tribunal was not required to go Into the merit or demerit of the order. The order passed by the Tribunal in OA no.52/08 does not make out; any case that there was an order for making payment of wages necessarily. The Tribunal found that there was delay of two years in complying the order of the Tribunal, therefore, awarded cost of Rs.25000/- to the petitioner. 6. The aforesaid order has been challenged on the ground that discharge is improper and opposite parties ought to have been punished as there was no substantial compliance of the order in the eyes of law. At the time of hearing, a preliminary objection was raised by Sri K.C. Kaushik, learned counsel for Union of India by submitting that the petition was not maintainable against the discharge proceedings. The Tribunal has discharged the contemner and condoned the delay and, therefore, the writ petition was not maintainable against the discharge proceedings and the petitioner should approach the apex court. He relies upon the judgment of the apex court in the cases of T. Sudhakar Prasad vs. Govt. of A.P. And others (2001) 1 SCC 516 and R.Mohajan and others vs. Shefali Sengupta and others (Civil Appeal no.3297 of 2012) decided on 30.3.2012. He has also placed reliance upon the Division Bench judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of Smt. R.S. Sujatha vs. State of Karnataka and others (Writ Petition No.47288 of 2002), decided on 2.9.2003. 7. He has also placed reliance upon the Division Bench judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of Smt. R.S. Sujatha vs. State of Karnataka and others (Writ Petition No.47288 of 2002), decided on 2.9.2003. 7. More or less, same facts arc involved in Writ Petition No. 1793 (SB) of 2013 as the writ petition was filed against the discharge order passed by the Tribunal, wherein the Bench proceeded to stay the operation of the impugned Memorandum/Article of Charges dated 28.11.20) 1 and by way of abundant caution, the Bench also stated that it is for the opposite parties to take follow up action as a consequence of stay of operation of Memorandum dated 28.11.2011 and the scope of operation of the stay, and the consequences to follow was also specified by the Bench on that day, in the order itself by putting in the brackets "(opening sealed cover)" and it was found that the opposite parties have fully complied with the order as it was found that the seal cover has been opened. 8. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that this Court in some cases has interfered in the matter and has directed the Tribunal to take a decision in the matter, where there was discharge on technical grounds. He has heavily relied upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar vs. Union of India and others 146 (2008) DLT 588, decided on 7.12.2007 and has contended that similar controversy arose before the Delhi High Court and the writ petition was found to be maintainable and the judgment in the case of T. Sudhakar Prasad (supra) was distinguished by the Delhi High Court. The Delhi High Court found the petition to be maintainable against the order of discharge. 9. Apart from it, learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of J.S. Parihar vs. Ganpat Duggar and others (1996) 6 SCC 291 , to support his contention that the appeal would be maintainable against an order dropping the contempt proceedings by the Tribunal. 10. 9. Apart from it, learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of J.S. Parihar vs. Ganpat Duggar and others (1996) 6 SCC 291 , to support his contention that the appeal would be maintainable against an order dropping the contempt proceedings by the Tribunal. 10. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India appearing for the Union of India has submitted that the law in regard to maintainability of appeal has been settled by the apex court in the case of T. Sudhakar Prasad (supra), which has been subsequently followed in the case of R.Mohajan (supra) and a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court has also laid down the same law after following T. Sudhakar Prasad case (supra), lie further submits that against the order dropping contempt proceedings, the matter came to be considered in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and another, 1996 SCC (4) 411, wherein the apex court has extensively considered the effect of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act and held that against the discharge of contempt proceedings, the appeal would lie before the Supreme Court. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12. The controversy before this court in the above two writ petitions is as to whether against the order dropping contempt proceedings, writ petition would be maintainable before the High Court under Article 226 /227 of the Constitution of India or a person has to approach the Supreme Court as contemplated under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 13. The facts have already been stated hereinabove, therefore, that need not require to be repeated, but for the sake of appreciation, it. is to be noted that in both the case, contempt proceedings have been dropped and against the said orders, present writ petitions have been filed. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the ease of Mahaveer Prasad Verma vs. Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow and others 2013 (31) LCD 351 . 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the ease of Mahaveer Prasad Verma vs. Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow and others 2013 (31) LCD 351 . In the said case, during pendency of the contempt proceedings, the officer concerned was transferred and in those very circumstances, the Court came to the conclusion that he shall not be deemed to be discharged by virtue of his transfer and in case his successor officer is not brought on record, then the contempt proceedings shall not become infructuous. Placing reliance upon the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for the petitioner has emphasized that more or less, identical position has arisen in the present case and, therefore, the writ petition would be maintainable. 15. We could have entertained the writ petitions, but we find that the controversy in the said case was altogether on a different footing in comparison to the controversy involved in the present case as indicated hereinabove. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar (supra). The Delhi High Court has considered the case of T. Sudhakar Prasad (supra) and has come to the conclusion that the writ petition would be maintainable against an order of the Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act (for short 'the Act) only in a case where the order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt has been passed, which has been held to be appealable only before the Supreme Court under Section 19 of the Act. The Court further found that otherwise all orders passed by the Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction under Section 17 of the Act have to be challenged before the concerned High Court alone. 17. With profound respect to the Division Bench of Delhi High Court, we are unable to subscribe to the view taken, as if no remedy is provided against the discharge order, then the remedy available to a party is only under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in respect of discharge proceedings. 18. 17. With profound respect to the Division Bench of Delhi High Court, we are unable to subscribe to the view taken, as if no remedy is provided against the discharge order, then the remedy available to a party is only under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in respect of discharge proceedings. 18. In T. Sudhakur Prasad case (supra), the facts were that a contempt application was moved invoking the contempt jurisdiction of Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act seeking initiation of proceedings against the Principal Secretary, Irrigation and CAD Department, alleging therein that there was willful disobedience by the contemner of an order passed by the Tribunal in favour of the applicant. The Tribunal initiated the proceedings. The State of Andhra Pradesh and the Principal Secretary filed a writ petition (CWP No. 34841 of 1997) in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh laying challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to take cognizance of the contempt case. In another matter, an application was also moved invoking contempt jurisdiction of the High Court, without approaching the Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act, and complaining of willful disobedience of an order passed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. In both the matters, question arose as to whether such proceedings were appropriately maintainable before the High Court or the Administrative Tribunal. The issue has been disposed of by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court holding therein that in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [ (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577], Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 does not survive and consequently, the Administrative Tribunals set up under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 cannot exercise the contempt jurisdiction under Section 17 of the said Act, as the same had become non est under law. The contempt proceedings before the Administrative Tribunal are set aside as being devoid of jurisdiction and the applicants were at liberty to initiate contempt proceedings by following the procedure as applicable to the contempt of subordinate courts provided under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the rules framed thereunder by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In other contempt application, same view was taken. In other contempt application, same view was taken. The said order of the High Court was put to challenge before the apex court and the apex court in Para-16 of the said judgment held as under: "16. It is thus clear that the Constitution Bench has not declared the provisions of Article 323-A(2)(b) or Article 323-B(3)(d) or Section 17 of the Act ultra vires the Constitution. The High Court has, in its judgment under appeal, noted with emphasis the Tribunal having been compared to like "courts of first instance" and then proceeded to hold that the status of Administrative Tribunals having been held to be equivalent to courts or Tribunals subordinate to the High Court the jurisdiction to hear their own contempt was lost by the Administrative Tribunals and the only course available to them was either to make a reference to the High Court or to file a complaint under Sections 193, 219 and 228 IPC as provided by Section 30 of the Act. The High Court has proceeded on the. reasoning that the Tribunal having been held to be subordinate to the High Court for the, purpose of Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and its decisions having been subjected to judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, the right to file an appeal to the Supreme Court against an order passed by the. Tribunal punishing for contempt under Section 17 of the Act was defeated and on these, twin grounds Section 17 of the Act became unworkable and unconstitutional. We do not find any basis for such conclusion or inference being drawn from the judgments of this Court in the cases of Supreme Court Bar Association (supra) or L. Chandra Kumar (supra) or any other decision of this Court. We do not find any basis for such conclusion or inference being drawn from the judgments of this Court in the cases of Supreme Court Bar Association (supra) or L. Chandra Kumar (supra) or any other decision of this Court. The Constitution Bench has in so many words said that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Articles 226/227 could not be taken away by conferring the same on any court or Tribunal and jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the High Court now legislatively conferred on Tribunals to the exclusion of the High Court on specified matters, did not amount to assigning Tribunals a status of substitute for the High Court but such jurisdiction was capable of being conferred additionally or supplementally on any court or Tribunal which is not a concept strange to the scheme of the Constitution more so in view of Articles 323-A and 323-B. Clause (2)(b) of Article 323-A specifically empowers Parliament to enact a law specifying the jurisdiction and powers, including the. power to punish for contempt, being .conferred on the Administrative Tribunals constituted under Article 323-A. Section 17 of the Act derives its legislative sanctity there from. The power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself under Article 215 of the Constitution remains intact but the jurisdiction, power and authority to hear and decide the matters covered by sub-section (I) of Section 14 of the Act having been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals the jurisdiction of the High Court to that extent has been taken away and hence the same jurisdiction which vested in the High Court to punish for contempt of itself in the matters now falling within the jurisdiction of tribunals if those matters would have continued to be heard by the High Court has now been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals under Section 17 of the Act. The jurisdiction is the same as vesting in the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution read with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The need for enacting Section 17 arose, firstly, to avoid doubts, and secondly, because the Tribunals are not "courts of record". The jurisdiction is the same as vesting in the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution read with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The need for enacting Section 17 arose, firstly, to avoid doubts, and secondly, because the Tribunals are not "courts of record". While holding the proceedings under Section 17 of the Act the Tribunal remains a Tribunal and so would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution subject to the well-established rules of self-restraint governing the discretion of the High Court to Interfere with the pending proceedings and upset the interim or interlocutory orders of the Tribunals. However any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt shall be appealable only to the Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of the order appealed against in view of the specific, provision contained in Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act is a piece of legislation by reference. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act are not as if lifted and incorporated in the text of the Administrative Tribunals Act (as is in the case of legislation by incorporation): they remain there where they are, yet while reading the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act in the context of Tribunals, the same will he so read as to read the word "Tribunal" in place of the word "High Court" wherever it occurs, subject to the modifications set out in Section 17 of the Administrative 'tribunals Act. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for appeals. In its text also by virtue of Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 the word "High Court" shall be read as "Tribunal". Here, by way of abundant caution, we make it clear that the concept of intra-Tribunal appeals i.e. appeal from an order or decision of a Member of a Tribunal sitting singly to a Bench of not less than two Members of the Tribunal is alien to the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Here, by way of abundant caution, we make it clear that the concept of intra-Tribunal appeals i.e. appeal from an order or decision of a Member of a Tribunal sitting singly to a Bench of not less than two Members of the Tribunal is alien to the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The question of any order made under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by a Member of the Tribunal sitting singly, if the rules of business framed by the Tribunal or the appropriate Government permit such hearing, being subjected to an appeal before a Bench of two or more Members of the Tribunal therefore does not arise. Any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt Is appealable under Section 19 of the Act to the Supreme Court only. The Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar has nowhere said that orders of the Tribunal holding the contemner guilty and punishing for contempt shall also be subject to judicial scrutiny of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution in spite of remedy of statutory appeal provided by Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act being available. The distinction between orders passed by the Administrative Tribunal on matters covered by Section 14(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act and orders punishing for contempt under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, is this: as against the former there is no remedy of appeal statutorily provided, but as against the latter statutory remedy of appeal is provided by Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act itself. " 19. The apex court ultimately came to the conclusion that the distinction between the orders passed by the Administrative Tribunal on matters covered by Section 14(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act and orders punishing for contempt under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, is this: as against the former there is no remedy of appeal statutorily provided, but as against the latter statutory remedy of appeal is provided by Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act itself The judgment of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal to proceed ahead with the proceedings pending before it as per law. 20. 20. In the aforesaid case, the apex court found that where the remedy of statutory appeal is provided, the appeal shall lie before the Supreme Court only and a categorical finding has been recorded to the effect that any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt is appealable under Section 19 of the Act to the Supreme Court only. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner upon T. Sudhakar Prasad case (supra) is only in respect of the words "while holding the proceedings under Section 17 of the Act the Tribunal remains a Tribunal and so would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution subject to the well-established rules of self-restraint governing the discretion of the High Court to interfere with the pending proceedings and upset the interim or interlocutory orders of the Tribunals." 21. The twin conditions have been taken into consideration and a particular portion of the judgment being relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner is wholly misconceived. Judgment has to be read as a whole and if the judgment is read as a whole, then the only outcome would be that, for punishing for contempt, appeal would be maintainable before the Supreme Court 22. In a later case of R.Mohajan (supra), the appellants were not fully implementing the orders, therefore, the Tribunal, vide order dated 23-3-2010, directed for issuance of Rule 8 notice to the contemnorsppellants returnable within two months and directed to list the matter for orders on 3-5-2010. On 30-3-2010, counsel for the contemnorsppellants appeared before the Tribunal and placed on record various documents to show that the orders have been complied with. Not satisfied with the report filed by the Department, the Tribunal passed the order dated 11-6-2010 directing the contemnorsppellants to present before it to receive charges of contempt and adjourned the matter for 30-7-2010. Against the said order, the contenmors preferred an appeal. The apex court taking into consideration L. Chandra Kumar case (supra) and T. Sudhakur Prasad case (supra), came to the conclusion that the appeal was very much maintainable before the Supreme Court and in Para-9 of the said judgment, it was held as under: "9. Against the said order, the contenmors preferred an appeal. The apex court taking into consideration L. Chandra Kumar case (supra) and T. Sudhakur Prasad case (supra), came to the conclusion that the appeal was very much maintainable before the Supreme Court and in Para-9 of the said judgment, it was held as under: "9. In view of the clarification by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in T. Sudhakar Prasad (supra), we reject the objection as to the maintainability of the present appeal and hold the same as maintainable." 23. So it is clear from the above finding that not only in respect of punishment under the Contempt of Courts Act, but also in respect of interlocutory orders, the appeal has been found to be maintainable by the apex court. 24. More or less similar question arose before the Supreme Court as to what will be position where a contemner has been discharged from contempt proceedings by the High Court. If the proceedings have been dropped under the Contempt of Courts Act, then whether the appeal-would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court as provided under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act or the Special Leave Petition would be maintainable under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 25. In the case of Mahboob S. Allibhoy (supra), the facts were that contempt notice was issued and ultimately the proceedings for contempt were dropped against the contemners. In connection with the said dispute, a notice was issued to the contemners as to why a complaint be not filed against them under Sections 191, 192, 209 and 210 of the Indian Penal Code. The said order was subjected to challenge before the apex court. The apex court found that no appeal would be maintainable against the order dropping proceeding for contempt or refusing to initiate the proceeding for contempt, which is apparent not only from subsection (1) of Section 19 but also from sub-section (2) of Section 19 which provides that pending any appeal the appellate court may order that if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail and the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. While considering the maintainability of the appeal, it was held in the following form: "4.....This Court in the case of Baradakanta Mishra v. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, C.J. of the Orissa H.C., AIR 1974 SC 2255 : (1975) 1 SCR 524 , said: ... Where the court rejects a motion or a reference and declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Such a decision would not, therefore, fall within the opening words of Section 19 , sub-section (1) and no appeal would lie against it as of right under that provision. Again in the case of D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal [ (1988) 3 SCC 26 , it was said: "The right of appeal will be available under sub-section (1) of Section 19 only against any decision or order of a High Court passed in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In this connection, it is pertinent to refer to the provision of Article 215 of the Constitution which provides that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 215 confers on the High Court the power to punish for contempt of itself. In other words, the High Court derives its jurisdiction to punish for contempt from Article 215 of the Constitution. As has been noticed earlier, an appeal will lie under Section 19 (1) of the Act only when the High Court makes an order or decision in exercise, of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent and, in our opinion rightly, that the High Court exercises its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution when it imposes a punishment for contempt. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemnor; the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to say (hat the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to say (hat the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution. " 26. No appeal is maintainable against an order dropping proceeding for contempt or refusing to initiate a proceeding for contempt is apparent not only from sub¬section (1) of Section 19 but also from sub-section (2) of Section 19 which provides that pending any appeal the appellate court may order that- (a) the execution of the punishment or the order appealed against be suspended: (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail: and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 indicates that the reliefs provided under clauses (a) to (c) can be claimed at the instance of the person who has been proceeded against for contempt of court. 5. But even if no appeal is maintainable on behalf of the person at whose instance a proceeding for contempt had been initiated and later dropped or whose petition for initiating contempt proceedings has been dismissed, he is not without any remedy. In appropriate cases he can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and this Court on being satisfied that it was a fit case where proceeding for contempt should have been initiated, can set aside the order passed by the High Court. In suitable cases, this Court has to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution in the larger interest of the administration of justice. " 27. So the question regarding the maintainability of the writ petition against the discharge of contempt proceedings as held in the above case, the apex court has ruled that the appeal would be maintainable against an order discharging the contemner from contempt proceedings. 28. " 27. So the question regarding the maintainability of the writ petition against the discharge of contempt proceedings as held in the above case, the apex court has ruled that the appeal would be maintainable against an order discharging the contemner from contempt proceedings. 28. In the case of Smt. R.S. Sujatha (supra), the Tribunal issued contempt notice and ultimately convicted the contemner upto the rising of the Court alonwith a fine of Rs.2000/-, The said order was challenged before the Division Bench of Krnataka High Court and the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court placing reliance upon the case of T. Sudhakar Prasad (supra), came to the conclusion that the appeal would be maintainable before the Supreme Court in such circumstances. In Paragraphs-7 and 8 of the said judgment, the Court held as under: "7......The first portion extracted above is relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the second portion is relied on by the respondents. A careful reading of the decision of the Supreme Court makes it clear that once an order is passed by an Administrative Tribunal punishing a party for contempt, the remedy is only by way of appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and not by seeking judicial review under Article 226 /227 of the constitution. The observation that Tribunal would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 /227 of the constitution cannot be read in isolation. In fact similar observations are made in CHANDRA KUMAR also. The said observations should be read with the subsequent statement of law. The mere fact that the order imposing punishment for contempt is passed in violation of principles of natural justice or by not following the procedure contemplated under Section 17 of the AT Act read with the CC [CAT] Rules, would not, by itself, mean that instead of filing an appeal, the party aggrieved can challenge the order in a proceedings under Article 226 /227 of the Constitution. 8. Though the order dated 19.12.2002 which is under challenge is passed in a proceedings initiated and pending under Section 19 of the AT Act, it is a final order in so Jar as the proceedings initiated for contempt are concerned. 8. Though the order dated 19.12.2002 which is under challenge is passed in a proceedings initiated and pending under Section 19 of the AT Act, it is a final order in so Jar as the proceedings initiated for contempt are concerned. Therefore, it has to be held that an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act and not a writ petition under Article 226 /227 of the Constitution of India is the remedy of the petitioner. " 29. The legal position, which crystallizes from the case laws referred to hereinabove, is that against an order dropping/discharging contempt proceedings, the appeal would be maintainable before the apex court as it cannot be inferred that where no remedy of statutory appeal is provided, then jurisdiction can be created under Article 226 /227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court. The conviction under Section 19 has to be considered in reference to the discharge proceedings and when the discharge order is without a remedy, then there is no provision for intra court appeal before the Tribunal or the rules framed therein. 30. The reasoning given in Mahboob S. Allibhoy case (supra) applies with full force in the present case, therefore, we hold that the writ petition against the discharge proceedings would not be maintainable and the appropriate remedy to the petitioner is to approach the apex court by way of appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. We, accordingly, do not find any merit in these writ petitions. They arc accordingly dismissed.