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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 1816 (HP)

State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sh. Inder Singh

2014-12-05

SURESHWAR THAKUR

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JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. The respondent in the writ petition was engaged as a daily waged workman by the petitioners herein. He claimed that though, he had rendered “continuous service” under the petitioners herein for not less than one year, yet he was retrenched in blatant transgression of the mandate of Section 25-F(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 envisaging therein an enshrined mandatory obligation upon the employer to, preceding retrenchment of the workman, as also, to render it valid, serve one month’s notice in writing upon him indicating therein the reasons for retrenchment or the employer defraying to him in lieu of notice, wages for the period of notice, besides in case one month’s notice in writing has come to be served upon the workman, a valid retrenchment/disengagement would occur only when the period of notice has expired. Therefore, he contends that his retrenchment/disengagement at the instance of the petitioners is non est and is liable to be quashed and set aside. The grievance aforesaid of the respondent constrained the “appropriate government” to formulate a reference for adjudication by the Labour Court-com-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala. The reference which was to be adjudicated upon by the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala was couched in the hereinafter extracted phraseology:- “Whether termination of the services of Sh. Inder Singh s/o Shri Jagat Ram by the Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division No.-II, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P. w.e.f. 30.10.19099 without following the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as alleged by the workman is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits including seniority and compensation the above workman is entitled to?” 2. The learned Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, on a consideration of the material as it was seized with comprised in the mandays chart divulging the period of service rendered by the workman/respondent herein with the petitioners herein/his employers, inasmuch as its displaying that he had in the year preceding to his retrenchment rendered 240 days of service under the petitioners/his employers, was constrained to conclude that despite his having rendered the requisite period of “continuous service” within the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act, his retrenchment having not been preceded by compliance by the petitioners/his employers with the mandatory obligation envisaged under Section 25-F(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, rendered his disengagement/retrenchment to be liable to be quashed and set aside. The relevant provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act read as under: “S.25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen- No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until- (a) the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice: (b)………………………………………………. (c)………………………………………………” 3. The import of the phraseology “continuous service” existing in Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act has to be fathomed as well as grasped, as comprehension of its signification would facilitate this Court to render a determination qua the factum of the respondent having or having not rendered “continuous service” within the ambit of the phrase “continuous service” existing in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act so as to then concomitantly make it incumbent upon the employers/the petitioners herein, to further for rendering his disengagement to be valid, comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 4. The definition of the phrase “continuous service” exists in Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act which provisions are extracted hereinbelow:- “25-B. Definition of continuous service:- For the purpose of this chapter,- (1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman; (2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer- (a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than- (i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case; …………………………………………………………………….” 5. The learned Deputy Advocate General contends on the strength of the definition of “continuous service” existing in Section 25-B(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, that when the provisions thereof define “continuous service” to be a period of continuous service uncircumscribed qua its duration/time, rather with sub section (1) of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, treating and construing “continuous service” to be only a period of uninterrupted service and interruptions in “continuous service” of a workman under his employers sequeled by sickness, authorized leave or an accident or a strike or a lock out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, not constituting any break or cessation in the continuity in service of a workman under his employer, the mandate therein is to be imported into the definition of “continuous service” existing in sub section 213(2) of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, besides he contends that both sub sections (1) and (2) of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act have to be read in harmony or conjunctively. In the above manner in which he reads the provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, he contends that though it is displayed by the mandays chart of the respondent herein comprised in Annexure P-2, that he in the year preceding his retrenchment had rendered 240 days of service, nonetheless, when as also disclosed therein of his in the months of October, 1998 and July, 1999, having omitted to perform duty under the petitioners/his employers and when such interruption in his “continuous service” under the respondents is not sequeled by proof of existence of the prescribed statutory reasons engrafted in sub section (1) of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, such breaks in his continuity of service or such interruptions in his continuity of service under the petitioners herein being, hence, statutorily uncondonable, do not render his service under his employers to be constituting “continuous service”, within the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial disputes Act, even if, otherwise the respondent herein has rendered 240 days of service under the petitioners herein/his employers. In fathoming the vigour of the contention of the learned Deputy Advocate General, it is necessary initially to dwell upon the factum whether sub section (1) and sub section (2) of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act ought to be read in harmony or in conjunction or the provisions aforesaid stand in mutual exclusion to each other and as such they are to be construed disconjunctively. Only on this Court construing that both sub sections (1) and (2) of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act stand in mutual exclusion to each other or are to be read disconjunctively, that the contention of the learned Deputy Advocate General would stand dispelled. The fact that both sub sections (1) and (2) of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act stand in mutual exclusivity to each other, is apparent on a plain reading of the two provisions which exist in contra-distinct sub sections. On a plain literal construction of sub section (1) of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is apparent that it is mandatorily enjoined therein that “continuous service” as envisaged therein is for a period un-fettered in duration, yet it prescribes conditions or valid statutory grounds which when proved, do not, even if, they occur during the period of service of a workman/employee, sequel a break in the “continuous service” of a workman under his employer. However, when sub section 2 commences with the phraseology that where a workman is not in “continuous service” within the meaning of sub section (1), yet by a statutory fiction shall be deemed to be in “continuous service” under his employer in case during the 12 calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, he has rendered 190 days in case of a workman employed below ground in a mine and 240 days in any other case, as is the case of the petitioner, his not being employed below the ground in a mine, as such it procreates a provisions direly contra-distinct to the provision existing in the preceding sub section or hence it constitutes exception to the definition of “continuous service” existing in the prior sub section. When on a plain reading of sub section (1) and sub section (2) of Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act defining “continuous service” it is neither apparent nor clear that the provisions therein either envisage or contemplate a harmonious reading of sub section (1) and sub section (2), so as to accept the submission of the learned Deputy Advocate General, rather when qua a workman not falling in the category of a workman qua whom 'continuous” service is to be reckoned in a distinct manner as enshrined in sub section (1), rather the reckoning of rendition of “continuous service” qua such workman is to be made in a starkly distinct manner and fashion exclusively defined in sub section (2). Cumulatively, besides when workmen falling in the category qua whom computation of “continuous service” is to be made in the specific manner enshrined in sub section (1) of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, comprise a category distinct from the category of workmen falling in the category qua whom reckoning of “continuous service” is to be made in a distinct fashion, as enunciated in sub section (2) of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, in sequel, both sub sections (1) and (2) of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act stand in exclusion to each other, especially when they mandate the reckoning of “continuous service” qua distinctly spelt categories of workmen in a distinctly enunciated manner. Consequently, for reiteration when, hence, sub section (2) is in exclusion to sub section (1), the provisions of sub section (2) are to be read independently to the provisions of sub section (1). As a concomitant then for the reckoning of the period of “continuous service” qua the respondent herein, inasmuch as qua the factum of computation of his having rendered 240 days of 'continuous service” under his employer for his, hence, being entitled to the protection as envisaged under the provisions of Section 25-F(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, there is no necessity of any interruptions or cessations, if any, in his service of 240 days under his employer in the year preceding his retrenchment being enjoined to be proven to be validated by the statutory prescriptions enunciated in Section 25-B(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Rather, when it is suffice that in case his mandays chart reflect his having rendered 240 days of service under his employers, even if, with or without interruptions or with or without breaks, it constitutes completion of 240 days of service under his employers, so as to then entail upon the obligation to comply with the mandate of Section 25-F(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Consequently, the submission made by the learned Deputy Advocate General that when the interruptions in his service under his employer is not on account of proven/existence of statutory prescriptions occurring in sub section (1) of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, hence, even if, he rendered 240 days of service under his employers before his retrenchment, it does not constitute “continuous service” under his employers for the purpose of giving him the protection of Section 25-F(a) of the Industrial Dispute Act is rendered rudderless. At this stage, it is apt to cite a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in Surendranagar District Panchayat versus Dahyabhai Amarsinh (2005)8 SCC 750 , the relevant paragraph No.8 of which is extracted hereinafter, which sustains and gives succor to the interpretation rendered by this Court on sub sections (1) and (2) of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act defining “continuous service”, as also, gives fillip to the conclusion formed by this Court that the import of “continuous service” as existing in sub Section 2 of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act qua workmen of the category to which the respondent herein belongs, is of his having rendered at least 240 days period of work under his employers, irrespective of whether he has not worked throughout the year under his employer and irrespective of the fact that his breaks or interruptions in service are proven to be validly authorized by the statutory prescriptions enshrined in sub section (1) of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. Relevant paragraph No.8 of the judgment reads as under:- “8. To attract the provisions of Section 25F, one of the condition required is that the workman is employed in any industry for a continuous period which would not be not less than one year. Section 25B of the Act defines continuous service for the purposes of Chapter VA "Lay-off and Retrenchment". To attract the provisions of Section 25F, one of the condition required is that the workman is employed in any industry for a continuous period which would not be not less than one year. Section 25B of the Act defines continuous service for the purposes of Chapter VA "Lay-off and Retrenchment". The purport of this Section is that if a workman has put in an uninterrupted service of the establishment, including the service which may be interrupted on account of sickness, authorized leave, an accident, a strike which is not illegal, a lock-out or cessation of work, that is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, shall be said to be a continuous service, for that period. Thus the workmen shall be said to be in continuous service for one year i.e., 12 months irrespective of the number of days he has actually worked with interrupted service, permissible under Section 25B. However, the workmen must have been in service during the period, i.e., not only on the date when he actually worked but also on the days he could not work under the circumstances set out in Sub-Section (1). The workmen must be in the employment of the employer concerned on the days he has actually worked but also on the days on which he has not worked. The import of Sub Section(1) of Section 25B is that the workmen should be in the employment of the employer for the continuous, uninterrupted period for one year except the period the absence is permissible as mentioned hereinabove. Sub-section (2) of Section 25B introduces the fiction to the effect that even if the workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of Clause (i) of Section 25-B for the period of one year or six months he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for that period under an employer if he has actually worked for the days specified in clause (a) and (b) of Sub-s(2). By the legal fiction of Sub-s2(a) (i), the workmen shall be deemed to be in continuous service for one year if he is employed underground in a mine for 190 days or 240 days in any other case. By the legal fiction of Sub-s2(a) (i), the workmen shall be deemed to be in continuous service for one year if he is employed underground in a mine for 190 days or 240 days in any other case. Provisions of the Section postulate that if the workmen has put in at least 240 days with his employer, immediately prior to the date of retrenchment, he shall be deemed to have served with the employer for a period of one year to get the benefit of Section 25F.” 6. Further fortification to the view aforesaid is lent by the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court enshrined in General Manager, Harayana Roadways Vs. Rudhan Singh (2005)5 SCC 591 , the relevant paragraph No.5 is extracted hereinbelow:- “5. Learned counsel for the appellant has next submitted that according to the own case of the respondent he was appointed on 16.3.1988 and his services were terminated on 28.2.1989 and thus he had not worked for one year and consequently Section 25-F of the Act would not apply to his case. In support of this submission reliance has been placed on Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. vs. The Workmen [ AIR 1963 SC 1914 ], wherein it was held that under Section 25-F of the Act only a workman, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer, is entitled to its benefit. Before a workman can be considered to have completed one year of continuous service in an industry it must be shown first that he was employed for a period of not less than 12 calendar months and next that during those 12 calendar months he had worked for not less than 240 days. It was further held that a workman, who has not at all been employed for a period of 12 months, would not satisfy the requirements of Section 25-B of the Act and would not be entitled to the benefit under Section 25-F of the Act. It was further held that a workman, who has not at all been employed for a period of 12 months, would not satisfy the requirements of Section 25-B of the Act and would not be entitled to the benefit under Section 25-F of the Act. It is important to note that Section 25-B of the Act, which contains the definition of 'continuous service' was amended by Act No. 36 of 1964 and the relevant part thereof reads as under: - "25-B. Definition of continuous service.- For the purpose of this Chapter, - (1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman; (2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer- (a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than- (i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case; (b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than- (i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case. Explanation. - (omitted as not relevant for the present case)" This amended provision has been considered in Surendra Kumar Verma vs. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court [ AIR 1981 SC 422 ], where after noticing the ratio of Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. vs. The Workmen ( AIR 1963 SC 1914 ), it was held as under: - "Act 36 of 1964 has drastically changed the position. S. 2(eee) has been repealed and S. 25-B(2) now begins with the clause "where a workman is not in continuous service ...... for a period of one year". These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a workman who has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months; it is not necessary that he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year. ........." In view of this authoritative pronouncement the requirements of Section 25-F of the Act would be satisfied if a workman has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months and it is not necessary that he should have been in the service of employer for complete one year. The Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has recorded a finding that the respondent has worked for 264 days and this finding has not been challenged before the High Court. In this view of the matter the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are clearly applicable and as neither any notice or wages in lieu of the period of notice nor any retrenchment compensation was paid to the respondent, his termination of service has to be held to be invalid.” 7. In aftermath it is invincibly concluded that the findings and conclusions arrived at by the learned Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharmshala qua the factum of the respondent herein having rendered 240 days of continuous service under the petitioner herein/his employers is sustainable, also as a corollary the submission of the learned Deputy Advocate General stands discountenanced. 8. The learned Deputy Advocate General has concerted to also contend that given the factum that the respondent stood retrenched from service in the year 1999, his having raised an industrial dispute qua his illegal retrenchment in the year 2010, consequently, the reference was stale and ought to have entailed dismissal. 8. The learned Deputy Advocate General has concerted to also contend that given the factum that the respondent stood retrenched from service in the year 1999, his having raised an industrial dispute qua his illegal retrenchment in the year 2010, consequently, the reference was stale and ought to have entailed dismissal. The above submission does not warrant acceptance in the face of the fact that the “appropriate government” had while formulating the reference couched/framed in the hereinabefore extracted phraseology had transmitted it to the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala for adjudication thereon by the latter. It was for the “appropriate government” before making the reference to consider the fact whether the dispute raised by the workman/respondent herein constituted a stale claim or the claim was barred by delay and laches, hence, was un-referable. However, though the “appropriate government” applied its mind to the dispute as raised by the respondent herein, but it appears to have overlooked the factum of the purported staleness of the claim as raised by the workman. As a natural corollary, when it then, hence, overlooked the fact of the purported staleness of the claim as raised by the workman, as such, it is to be construed to have, hence, abandoned the factum of the purported staleness of the claim raised by the workman and its having vitiated the impugned award. As a corollary when the petitioners herein constitute a part of the “appropriate government” are estopped from concerting or agitating before this Court that the claim raised by the workman is stale and necessitates dismissal. Besides, the petitioners herein are estopped from forestalling an adjudication by the learned Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala on the reference formulated in the phraseology extracted hereinabove. The natural inference which ensues is that dehors the factum of the purported staleness of the claim as raised by the workman, it having been omitted to be gone into rather having been overlooked as well as abandoned, the mere factum of delay, if any, does not constitute a valid ground for this Court to interfere with the adjudication by the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal on the reference made to it by the “appropriate government” especially when given the reference of the dispute to it by the “appropriate government, it was vested with the jurisdiction to decide it. Even if, the petitioners herein were aggrieved by the factum of the formulation of the reference comprising the industrial dispute formulated by the “appropriate government” carrying the stench of vitiation, inasmuch as its having omitted to apply its mind to the factum of the demand as raised by the workman being stale, hence, the demand or claim raised by the workman being un-referable for adjudication, the appropriate remedy was then available with the petitioners herein to approach the Writ Court for setting aside the reference. The petitioners having omitted to approach the writ Court for quashing of the reference on the ground of its comprising a stale claim, are now estopped from seeking relief from this Court that the award of the learned Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal is permeated with a vice, inasmuch as it has adjudicated upon a reference which was unreferable being barred by time. In coming to the above conclusion, I am supported by the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in Karan Singh versus Executive Engineer, Haryana State Marketing Board, (2007)14 SCC 291 , the relevant paragraphs No.13 to 15 of which are extracted hereinbelow:- “13. In the present case, the Industrial Tribunal has held that the employer has violated Section 25F. If so, the order of termination is bad in law. It has to be struck down. In the present case, it has been struck down. However, the Tribunal had refused to grant any relief on the ground of delay. The Tribunal has no authority to invalidate the reference, particularly when it has found that the order of termination violates Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 14. In Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Ors., { (2001) 6 SCC 222 }, it has been held, vide para 15, as follows: (SCC p.228) "There are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval, it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanized by the workmen or the Union on account of other justified reasons, it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanized by the workmen or the Union on account of other justified reasons, it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. In this case, when the Government have chosen to refer the dispute for adjudication under Section 4-K of the U.P. Act the High Court should not have quashed the reference merely on the ground of delay. Of course, the long delay for making the adjudication could be considered by the adjudicating authorities while moulding its reliefs. That is a different matter altogether. The High Court has obviously gone wrong in axing down the order of reference made by the Government for adjudication. Let the adjudicatory process reach its legal culmination." 15. “10. So far as delay in seeking the reference is concerned, no formula of universal application can be laid down. It would depend on facts of each individual case. 11. However, certain observations made by this Court need to be noted. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and Ors. { 2000 (2) SCC 455 } it was noted at para 6 as follows: (SCC pp.459-60) "6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex-facie bad and incompetent." 12. In S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka ( 2003 (4) SCC 27 ) the position was reiterated as follows: (SCC pp.39-40, para 17) "17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree. It is true, as held in M/s. Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen (supra) ( AIR 1959 SC 1217 ), that merely because the Industrial Disputes Act does not provide for a limitation for raising the dispute it does not mean that the dispute can be raised at any time and without regard to the delay and reasons therefor. There is no limitation prescribed for reference of disputes to an industrial tribunal, even so it is only reasonable that the disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed particularly so when disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale. A delay of 4 years in raising the dispute after even reemployment of the most of the old workmen was held to be fatal in M/s. Shalimar Works Limited v. Their Workmen (supra) ( AIR 1959 SC 1217 ), In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and others (supra) AIR 2000 SC 839 , a delay of 7 years was held to be fatal and disentitled to workmen to any relief. In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and others v. Union of India and others (supra) (1993 Supp (4) SCC 67), it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and others v. Union of India and others (supra) (1993 Supp (4) SCC 67), it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief. Although the High Court has opined that there was a delay of 7 to 9 years in raising the dispute before the Tribunal but we find the High Court factually not correct. The employment of the appellants was terminated sometime in 1985-86 or 1986-87. Pursuant to the judgment in Daily Rated Casual Employees Under P&T Department v. Union of India (supra) ( AIR 1987 SC 2342 ), the department was formulating a scheme to accommodate casual labourers and the appellants were justified in awaiting the outcome thereof. On 16-1-1990 they were refused to be accommodated in the scheme. On 28-12-1990 they initiated the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act followed by conciliation proceedings and then the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal cum-Labour Court. We do not think that the appellants deserve to be non suited on the ground of delay." The above position was highlighted recently in Sudamdih Colliery of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Workmen, { (2006)2 SCC 329 }, SCC pp.334-36, paras 10-12 and Chief Engineer, Ranjit Sagar Dam v. Sham Lal, { (2006)9 SCC 124 }” 9. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed and the impugned award of the learned Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala is affirmed and maintained. No costs. 10. The pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.