JUDGMENT Mr. Rajiv Narain Raina, J.:- The petitioning bank was the defendant in a suit filed by the respondent, an employee of the Bank, for declaration and mandatory injunction for setting aside an administrative order inflicting penalty on the plaintiff-respondent under Section 6 (E) of the Bipartite Agreement as a result of a domestic inquiry held against the respondent for misconduct. The respondent was brought down by the penalty order to a lower stage in the scale of pay up to a maximum of two stages i.e. from Rs. 13210/- to Rs. 11,680/-. It was, however, ordered that the employee would continue to get stagnation increment, FPA and PQA in the reduced basic pay. It was further ordered that he would not be entitled to salary and wages for the days he remained on unauthorized leave. The respondent was advised that in case he felt aggrieved by the order, he could prefer an appeal within 45 days to the competent authority. The order was passed on 16th September, 2007. 2. On receiving notice of the suit the defendant bank filed an application under order 7 rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint on the ground that bank staff are governed by the provisions of the Bipartite Agreement signed between the management and the workman and the disputes, if any, can be dealt with only under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was prayed that the plaint be rejected for want of maintainability before the civil court. 3. The respondent workman resisted the application and contended that the suit was maintainable since the inquiry conducted against him which led to the penalty order was neither fair nor proper and he was not given a chance to cross examine witnesses produced against him nor was he provided with any person to defend himself. Therefore, the penalty order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The trial court rejected the application vide order dated 21st September, 2013. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. It is well settled that a workman can elect remedy either under the Industrial Disputes Act or before the civil court against an order passed adverse to his interest. The trial court rejected the application vide order dated 21st September, 2013. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. It is well settled that a workman can elect remedy either under the Industrial Disputes Act or before the civil court against an order passed adverse to his interest. If the remedy is elected before the labour court or industrial tribunal, and industrial rights alone are pressed in aid, viz noncompliance of Section 25 F, protections afforded by Section 25 G and 25 H etc. then the labour court would have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the dispute and the civil court would not have. However, if no industrial right is claimed to obtain relief, a civil suit can well lie and be maintainable before the civil court. In the present case, no industrial rights statutorily conferred by the Act have been pressed in the civil suit. The Bipartite Settlement may justify penalty but would not oust the jurisdiction of the civil court to examine the correctness of the punishment imposed on civil law and common law principles. 6. The Civil Judge (Junior Division), Amritsar in her impugned order has well understood the principle and rightly declined the application under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC filed by the petitioner. She has correctly applied the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamalakar Shantaram Wadke; AIR 1975 SC 2238 to reach the conclusion. The impugned order is a perfectly crisp and good. 7. In view of the above, the impugned order is upheld and the revision petition fails and is dismissed in limine. The suit to proceed. ----------------