Judgment 1. The petitioner is a Sweeper in the second respondent College, which is an aided minority institution. She belongs to Scheduled Caste. She was placed under suspension by the order dated 28.10.2013, with immediate effect, pending enquiry into grave and serious charges. The petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking to declare the suspension as null and void, illegal and abuse of its power. 2. Serious allegations are made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. It is stated that the petitioner was subjected to sexual harassment at the work place, by the Principal and Superintendent of the second respondent college. It is alleged that no internal complaint committee was constituted as per “Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. In those circumstances, the petitioner made a complaint to the Commissioner of Police, on 06.09.2013, and the Commissioner, in turn, forwarded it to the Assistant Commissioner, St.Thomas Mount, for investigation. It is also stated that the Principal and the Superintendent committed offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. While so, the petitioner was placed under suspension by the impugned order dated 28.10.2013 pending enquiry into grave and serious charges. 3. The second respondent filed a counter affidavit refuting the allegations and has stated that the petitioner was placed under suspension by the impugned order and alleged that she committed grave charges. Thereafter, a charge memo dated 26.12.2013 was issued to her making various allegations. The petitioner was directed to submit her explanation to the charge memo. The petitioner sought for the documents, based on which, the charge memo was issued. Subsequently, on 11.03.2014, copies of the documents were furnished to the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner gave her reply on 06.05.2014 denying the charges. Further, it is stated that a domestic enquiry is now under process. The second respondent College denied the allegations made by the petitioner relating to sexual harassment and also disputed the caste status of the petitioner. It is also stated that the petitioner is entitled to subsistence allowance at the rate of half the rate of pay, which she was drawing at the time of suspension, as per Rule 13(1) of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Rules, 1976. It is also stated that the petitioner is entitled to subsistence allowance at the rate of half the rate of pay, which she was drawing at the time of suspension, as per Rule 13(1) of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Rules, 1976. It is also pleaded that though the second respondent college is governed by the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act and the Rules framed thereunder, some of the provisions of the Act and the Rules are not applicable to the second respondent, since the second respondent is a minority college. The second respondent college sought for dismissal of the writ petition. 4. Heard the submissions made on either side. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that though the second respondent, being a minority institution, is exempted from the provisions of Sections 18(2) and 19 to 22 of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976, in view of Section 24(3) of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 (Shortly “the Act”), the First Bench of this Court has held in the judgment in ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY TEACHERS VS. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [ 1991 (2) LLJ 31 ] that Section 19(3) of the Act is applicable to the minority colleges, while upholding the exemptions in respect of other provisions as made in Section 24(3) of the Act. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that as per Section 19(3) of the Act, the second respondent College could place the petitioner under suspension, only for a period of two months and the same could be extended for a further period of two months only after getting an order from the competent authority in this regard. Therefore, the petitioner shall be paid full wages for the period of suspension beyond two months, since there is no order from the competent authority permitting the college to extend the suspension for two more months. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the following judgments in support of his submission: i) Judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in P.DEVADASS VS. THE DISTRICT ELEMENTARY EDUCATIONAL OFFICER, THENI DISTRICT AND ANOTHER [W.A.No.286 of 2005 decided on 08.08.2005] iii) Judgment of this Court in DR.R.PETER PERINBARAJA AND ANOTHER VS. JOINT DIRECTOR, COLLEGIATE EDUCATION, TIRUNELVELI REGION AND ANOTHER [2014 (1) CWC 740] 8. THE DISTRICT ELEMENTARY EDUCATIONAL OFFICER, THENI DISTRICT AND ANOTHER [W.A.No.286 of 2005 decided on 08.08.2005] iii) Judgment of this Court in DR.R.PETER PERINBARAJA AND ANOTHER VS. JOINT DIRECTOR, COLLEGIATE EDUCATION, TIRUNELVELI REGION AND ANOTHER [2014 (1) CWC 740] 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that though the petitioner has sought to declare the suspension as null and void, and illegal, she would be satisfied, if a direction is issued to the respondents to pay full wages for the period of suspension, beyond two months and to pay half of the wages for the period of two months, as per the aforesaid judgments. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent college sought to argue that Section 19 of the Act is not applicable to minority institution in view of Section 24(3) of the Act, though no such pleading was made in the counter affidavit. However, he submitted that the college is bound to pay subsistence allowance at the rate of 50% of wages per month as per Rule 13(1) of the Rules as pleaded in their counter affidavit. He relied on Rule 53 of Fundamental Rules and submitted that unless the petitioner furnishes certificate that she was not engaged in any other employment, the subsistence allowance would not be paid. 10. I have considered the submissions made on either side and perused the materials available on record. 11. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the exemption under Section 24(3) of the Act was the subject matter of challenge in the decision in ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY TEACHERS VS. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [ 1991 (2) LLJ 31 ] and the First Bench of this Court held that all other exemptions granted under Section 24(3) of the Act is perfectly valid, except Section 19(3) of the Act. In this regard, para 46 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder: “46. Secs. 19(3) (a) and (b) read as follows :- (3) (a) : No teacher or other person employed in any private college shall be placed under suspension, except when an inquiry into the gross misconduct, within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed under sub-section (1) of Section 18, of such teacher or other person is contemplated. Secs. 19(3) (a) and (b) read as follows :- (3) (a) : No teacher or other person employed in any private college shall be placed under suspension, except when an inquiry into the gross misconduct, within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed under sub-section (1) of Section 18, of such teacher or other person is contemplated. (b) No such suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of two months from the date of suspension and if such inquiry is not completed within that period, such teacher or other person shall, without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as teacher or other employee." In the view that I take, I am fortified by the judgments reported in All Saints College v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (supra) and Frank Anthony Employees' Association v. Union of India (supra). Secs. 19(3)(a) and (b) mandates that no teacher or any other person employed in any private college shall be placed under suspension, except where an enquiry into gross misconduct is pending against such a teacher or other person and prescribes the maximum period during which the order of suspension can remain in force. In other words, it contemplates that the departmental enquiry should be completed expeditiously and as far as possible within two months. The right conferred on the religious and linguistic minorities to administer an educational institution established by them is not an absolute right in abstract. Providing regulatory measures, which do not make inroads into the administration of such institutions and are necessary for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound administration, are permissible. The provisions of Section 19(3)(a) and (b) in terms do not affect the right of the management of the institutions in any way to administer its institution and, on the other hand, they ensure fair deal to the teachers and other employees of the private colleges. Neither by providing the circumstances under which an order of suspension can be made nor by providing the maximum period during which the order of suspension can remain in force, can it be said that the right of the minority to administer its institution has been interfered with. As a matter of fact, it is a healthy provision and ensures to the teachers and other persons employed by such institution fairness in action which, in the long run, is conductive to efficient functioning of the colleges. As a matter of fact, it is a healthy provision and ensures to the teachers and other persons employed by such institution fairness in action which, in the long run, is conductive to efficient functioning of the colleges. Unmistakably, there is no right vested in the institution administering a religious or minority educational institution to give a go-bye to the basic rules of fair play while dealing with their employees or otherwise harass them. I am at a loss to understand any logic or reason by which the provisions of Section 19(3)(a) and (b) can be said to make any inroads into the fundamental rights of the minority institution under Article 30(1) of the Constitution, so as to justify their exclusion to them. The provisions of Section 19(3)(a) and (b) do not make any invasion at all into the right to administer an institution unlike the provisions of Section 19(1) and (2) of the Act which require prior permission from an outside body. There is no justification for excluding the application of Section 19(3)(a) and (b) of the Act in so far as the minority institutions are concerned. Consequently, the exclusion of Section 19(3)(a) and (b) of the Act by means of Section 24(3) of the Act in their application to the minority institutions, is unreasonable, unjustified, arbitrary and thus, void. Accordingly, the provisions of Section 24(3) of the Act in so far as they exclude the application of the provisions of Section 19(3)(a) and (b) of the Act to a minority college, are held to be ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution and void and are struck down to that extent.” 12. Therefore, I am not able to agree with the submission made by the learned counsel for the second respondent that Section 19(3) of the Act is not applicable to the second respondent college. In fact, there is no such specific pleading made in the counter affidavit. It is stated in the counter affidavit that some of the provisions of the Act and the Rules are not applicable to the minority institutions. In fact, such an argument would be against the second respondent, since, in the absence of any power to place the petitioner under suspension, the college is bound to pay full wages for the entire period of suspension. In fact, such an argument would be against the second respondent, since, in the absence of any power to place the petitioner under suspension, the college is bound to pay full wages for the entire period of suspension. In view of Section 19(3) of the Act read with Rule 13(1) of the Rules, the subsistence allowance payable to the petitioner is only at the rate of half of the pay for a period of two months and also for a period of further two months, if the same was extended with the permission of the competent authority and full salary could be payable to the petitioner, only if she is placed under suspension beyond the period of four months, as fixed in the statute. 13. In this case, the suspension order does not specify the period of suspension. At the most, as per Section 19(3) of the Act, the same could be for four months, if there is permission from the competent authority. If there is no permission, the suspension could be confined only to two months. It is not the case of the second respondent that the second respondent obtained permission from the competent authority, for extension of suspension for a further period of two months. However, the second respondent could keep the petitioner out of employment, during the pendency of the enquiry, even beyond the period of two months, but the second respondent shall pay full salary as held in the judgments of this Court that are relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 14. In the Division Bench judgment of this Court in P.DEVADASS's case (cited supra), the appellant therein was a Teacher, in the second respondent school therein. He was placed under suspension, pending a criminal case, by the second respondent school. The appellant therein questioned the order of suspension. Section 22(3) of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act and Section 19(3) of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976, are in similar terms. The grievance of the appellant therein was that he should not be kept under suspension beyond four months under Section 22(3) of the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools (Regulation) Act and if he is kept under suspension beyond four months, he should be paid full wages, for the period beyond four months. The grievance of the appellant therein was that he should not be kept under suspension beyond four months under Section 22(3) of the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools (Regulation) Act and if he is kept under suspension beyond four months, he should be paid full wages, for the period beyond four months. The said contention was rejected by a learned single Judge of this Court holding that Section 22(3) cannot be applied, if a Teacher is placed under suspension on the ground of pendency of a criminal case and dismissed the writ petition. The matter was taken on appeal. A Division Bench of this Court has categorically laid down the law that the power to suspend an employee shall be available, in the conditions of service, such as the rules and regulations applicable to the particular employee, or any Standing Order or bye-laws applicable to the services of the employee. Unless and otherwise such power is vested in the authority, to place the employee under suspension and specifically provided therefor under the Rules, there is no scope for placing any employee under suspension. In any event, the employer can still keep out an employee from work place, by placing him under suspension, though they do not have power. But the employee shall be paid full salary for the period in which he was kept out of service by way of suspension. After holding so, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the appellant therein could be placed under suspension at the most for a period of four months and the school could also keep out the appellant therein from the school beyond the period of four months, but the school shall pay full salary for the period beyond four months, towards subsistence allowance. In this regard, para 14 of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in P.DEVADASS's case (cited supra) is extracted hereunder: “14. With the result, we are inclined to hold that suspension of the appellant beyond the period fixed under Section 22(3) of the Tamilnadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act cannot be sustained. It is true that it may be open to the employer to keep the appellant/teacher under suspension if the Management does not want to avail the services of the appellant. It is true that it may be open to the employer to keep the appellant/teacher under suspension if the Management does not want to avail the services of the appellant. In that case, though the Management can prevent the employee from attending to his duties, it will be obliged to pay full salary for the period beyond four months.” 15. In the judgment in DR.R.PETER PERINBARAJA's case (cited supra) this Court held that if an employee of a private college is kept under suspension beyond the statutory period that is permitted under the statute, such an employee is entitled to full salary for the period, beyond the stipulated period in the statute. In this regard, paras 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the said judgment are extracted hereunder: “18. The issue as to whether the petitioners are entitled to reinstatement automatically after the expiry of two months as prescribed under the Proviso to Section 19(3)(b), has already been considered by a learned Single Judge of this Court while dealing with an identical provision under Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulations) Act 1973, reported in G.Anbarasan V. District Educational Officer, Cuddalore, 2001 (1) CTC 292 , (as stated supra). A similar provision under the above said Act is Section 22(3)(a)&(b). The learned Single Judge observed that merely because restriction is imposed, it cannot be held that beyond the said period the teacher cannot be placed under suspension. It is further held therein that the school has to pay full salary for any period beyond the period stipulated by the statutory provision. The relevant paragraph No.29 of the above said decision is extracted hereunder: “29. One other incidental question that has been raised is whether the suspension could be continued beyond two months or the extend the period as provided in Section 20(3) of the Act. The statutory provision provides the period of suspension to be confined to two months at the first instance and an extension for identical period shall be by appropriate Authority. The object of the statutory provision being that there shall not be any delay in the Disciplinary proceedings against a teacher working in a private school. Merely because a restriction is imposed, it cannot be held that beyond the said period the teacher cannot be placed under suspension. The object of the statutory provision being that there shall not be any delay in the Disciplinary proceedings against a teacher working in a private school. Merely because a restriction is imposed, it cannot be held that beyond the said period the teacher cannot be placed under suspension. However, if a teacher is kept under suspension beyond the period stipulated in Section 20(3), the Employer namely the School Management has to pay full salary for any period beyond the period stipulated by the statutory provisions or extended under the Proviso to Section 20(3) from its funds.” 19. The said view was further followed by another learned Single Judge in W.P.No.7092 of 2001 dated 08.10.2003 wherein at Paragraphs 6, 7 & 8 of the above said decision, it has been held as follows: “6. Considering the aforesaid provisions, it has been observed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of G.Anbarasan V. District Educational Officer, Cuddalore, 2001 (1) CTC 292 , wherein the Paragraphs 27 & 29 are to the following effect: Though the statutory provisions of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act and the Rules framed thereunder do not make a provision for placing a teacher or other person employed in a school under suspension pending investigation or the Crime or a Complaint or pending of a Criminal case, the Employer of such a teacher could very well place him under suspension even when the statutory provision do not provide for such a contingency, by exercise of its powers of suspension, but the Employer has to pay the salary. 29. One other incidental question that has been raised is whether the suspension could be continued beyond two months or the extend the period as provided in Section 20(3) of the Act. The statutory provision provides the period of suspension to be confined to two months at the first instance and an extension for identical period shall be by appropriate Authority. The object of the statutory provision being that there shall not be any delay in the Disciplinary proceedings against a teacher working in a private school. Merely because a restriction is imposed, it cannot be held that beyond the said period the teacher cannot be placed under suspension. The object of the statutory provision being that there shall not be any delay in the Disciplinary proceedings against a teacher working in a private school. Merely because a restriction is imposed, it cannot be held that beyond the said period the teacher cannot be placed under suspension. However if a teacher is kept under suspension beyond the period stipulated in Section 20(3), the Employer namely the School Management has to pay full salary for any period beyond the period stipulated by the statutory provisions or extended under the Proviso to Section 20(3), from its funds. 7. The aforesaid observation of the learned single Judge is obviously on the footing that apart from any provision relating to suspension, an Employer has got the inherent right to place an Employee under suspension. However, in such an event, the Employer is to pay full salary to the concerned Employee. 8. Following the aforesaid decision, while refusing to recall the order of suspension, I make it clear that the petitioner is entitled to get the salary for the entire period except the initial period of four months, suspension. Such amount should be paid by the Fourth Respondent from its own funds. It would be open to the Fourth petitioner to recall the order of suspension or to continue with the order of suspension. In case the Suspension Order is to continue, the Fourth Respondent would be liable to pay the full salary except for the period stipulated under Section 22(3). This payment should be made within a period of four months from the date of communication of this Order. Subject to the aforesaid observation, the Writ Petition is allowed to such extent. No costs.” 20. The similar view was also taken by another learned Single Judge in W.P.(MD) No.11817 of 2012 dated 8.10.2012. 21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in RT.REV.B.P.Sugandhar Bishop in Medak V. Dorothy Dayasheela Ebeneser, 1996 (4) SCC 406 (stated supra) while considering the similar provision in Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982, has held Paragraph 6 as follows: “6. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of the two decisions of the same High Court in M.Chandrasekhara Rao V. Secy. & Correspondent, Sri Sarvodaya College and Y.Philomena (Dr.) V. Govt. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of the two decisions of the same High Court in M.Chandrasekhara Rao V. Secy. & Correspondent, Sri Sarvodaya College and Y.Philomena (Dr.) V. Govt. of A.P. the Division Bench should not have directed the Appellant, by issuing a Writ of Mandamus, “to arrange for the Petitioner to assume charge as Principal”, in view of the serious irregularities found to have been committed by her. In M.Chandrasekhara Rao case, the High Court after considering the effect of Section 79(3) of the A.P. Education Act, 1982 (1 of 1982) has held that in a case where there are grave charges of misconduct, whatever may be the reason for not completing the enquiry within the prescribed time, the interest of the institution and the Employee would be best served if a direction is given to the Management to continue to pay to the Employee the salary and allowances of the post held by him instead of directing reinstatement / restoration of the Employee into the service. The said view was reiterated by a Division Bench of the High Court in Dr.Philomena case and it has been observed therein that though Section 79(3), is mandatory and on the expiry of the specified period the Employee would be entitled to be restored to the same position and status as he or she occupied as on the date of the order of suspension, but such restoration cannot be automatic in all circumstances of the case, instead of directing restoration or reinstatement, strike an equibalance between the right of the Employee vis-a-vis the right of the institution / society and the discipline among the co-employees. Unfortunately, the High Court did not consider this aspect and has ordered restoration of Respondent 1 on the post of the Principal. From the material on record we find that the charges levelled against Respondent 1 are quite serious. They pertain not only to administrative irregularities but also to financial irregularities and disobedience. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case we think it just and proper to set aside the direction for restoration of Respondent 1 on the post of Principal and instead direct the Appellant to go on paying full salary and allowances to her till the enquiry is over. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case we think it just and proper to set aside the direction for restoration of Respondent 1 on the post of Principal and instead direct the Appellant to go on paying full salary and allowances to her till the enquiry is over. We also direct the Appellant to conclude the enquiry within four months from today. Respondent 1 shall also cooperate with the enquiry in order to see that it is completed within the time fixed by us. This Appeal is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs.” 16. Therefore, following the aforesaid decisions, I am of the view that the second respondent shall pay full salary to the petitioner, beyond the two months period of suspension. 17. The next issue is as to whether the second respondent could insist non-employment certificate, as contemplated under Rule 53(2) of the Fundamental Rules. 18. Rule 53(2) of the Fundamental Rules is extracted hereunder: “53. (2) No payment under sub-rule (1) shall be made unless the Government servant furnishes a certificate that he is not engaged in any other employment, business, profession or vocation: 19. Rule 53 of the Fundamental Rules relates to payment of subsistence allowance payable to Government employees during the period of suspension. 20. In my view, the argument of the learned counsel for the second respondent placing reliance on Fundamental Rules has no merit. Fundamental Rules are applicable to Government employees only and the same cannot be applied to the employees in private colleges. In fact, when the private school sought to rely on Rule 17(e)(2) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, a Division Bench of this Court in P.DEVADASS's case (cited supra) has held that the school was not correct in placing reliance on the rule, which is applicable to Government employees alone. In this regard, para 13 of said judgment is extracted hereunder: “13. Therefore, we are inclined to hold that when the power to suspend is governed specifically under Section 22(3) of the Tamilnadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act and any agreement which could have been executed between the appellant and the school, the power to suspend has to be dealt with only under those provisions and only in terms of those provisions. There can be no implied power of suspension beyond the specific regulations applicable to the appellant. There can be no implied power of suspension beyond the specific regulations applicable to the appellant. Though no specific reference is made to Rule 17(e)(2) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, the respondent school attempts to import the very same principle in order to sustain the order of suspension. Apart from the fact that the said Rules are not applicable to the appellant, there is no question of importing any principle formulated in some other rule not applicable to the petitioner in the context of the power of the employer to keep the employee under suspension, more so in the light of the specific observations of the Supreme Court as above.” 21. Therefore, the second respondent college shall pay subsistence allowance to the petitioner, at the rate of half of the pay, for a period of two months, and thereafter, pay full salary to the petitioner, without insisting non employment certificate within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and continue to pay subsistence allowance till the enquiry is completed and final order is passed in the disciplinary proceedings. 22. With the above observation and direction, the writ petition is disposed of. No cots. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.