Judgment : B.P. Dharmadhikari, J. 1. Basic challenge in all these Petitions is to raid on or stoppage of vehicles transporting liquor by police personal functioning under Bombay Police Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Police Act” for short), as it is the commodity regulated by Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as “the Prohibition Act” for short). According to petitioners, only Prohibition Officer or the staff of State Excise Department functioning under the Prohibition Act, in terms thereof, can undertake any such exercise. In view of this submission, prayer made in all the writ petitions is to quash and set aside the F.I.R. registered by police authorities. Home Department of State of Maharashtra, Superintendent of Police, concerned Police Station are joined as respondents. Similarly, Commissioner of State Excise is also impleaded as party respondent. 2. As a question of law is placed for consideration, individual facts are not very material and it will be apt to deal with the respective contentions of the learned counsel appearing in the matter. 3. Shri Anil Mardikar, learned Senior Advocate with Shri S. Joshi, learned Counsel for petitioner in Writ Petition No.452/2012 states that the police authorities on 26.08.2012 laid a trap and searched motor vehicle bearing registration No.MH 32/A-2595, because of secret intelligence received by it. During search, police authorities claimed that total 525 bottles of country liquor packed in 11 boxes were found by them and accordingly a seizure panchnama was prepared. Three persons found in the motor vehicle came to be arrested by the local crime branch, Wardha, on the charge that they smuggled the liquor illegally upto Hinganghat for its sale. It is not in dispute that since 1975, entire Wardha District with its Tahsil Hinganghat are declared “Dry Area”. After trap and in view of the seizure, an offence under Sections 65[a][e], 77[a] of the Prohibition Act, has been registered against the accused persons vide Crime No.7314/2012. Prosecution claimed that these persons were not having the transport permit, for carrying country liquor bottles. Prosecution claimed that the investigation reveals bringing of bottles from a liquor shop of petitioner Jaiswal. It was also found that said Jaiswal used to transport liquor bottles to Wardha District, with the help of arrested accused persons. Investigation further revealed that country liquor bottles were illegally smuggled/transported by said Jaiswal and arrested accused persons into the area of Wardha District. It was also found that said Jaiswal used to transport liquor bottles to Wardha District, with the help of arrested accused persons. Investigation further revealed that country liquor bottles were illegally smuggled/transported by said Jaiswal and arrested accused persons into the area of Wardha District. Police Authorities claimed that after getting this information, police went in search of Jaiswal who runs a liquor bar at Butibori, but he managed to abscond. 4. Shri Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel submits that these allegations do not make out any offence under Prohibition Act against the present petitioner/applicant. He also invites attention to the provisions of Section 83 of the Prohibition Act to demonstrate that no case to attract that section has been made out. Our attention has been also invited to Section 2[16], as also 2[20] and Section 2[36] of the Prohibition Act, which defines phrases like “Export”, “Import” and “State”. Section 147 of the Prohibition Act is also read out to urge that it is not applicable. 5. Argument is, transporting liquor from Nagpur to Wardha does not meet ingradients of Section 65[a] and petitioner is having licenced shop in neighbouring district i.e. Nagpur District, therefore, when he sales the liquor to a third person, there is no offence made out. Such purchaser may carry liquor any where and no criminal liability can be fastened upon the petitioner for his acts. 6. Shri Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel submits that at the instance of police authorities, FIR No.7314/2012 under Sections 65[a] [e], 77[a] of Prohibition Act and Section 3/1[1], 51, 181,11, 177 and 184 of Motor Vehicles Act came to be registered against the persons who were found transporting the liquor. It is submitted that FIR under Section 65[1] [x] read with Section 77[a] of the Prohibition Act, Sections 26 and 41 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 4 and 25 of the Arms Act, has been registered vide FIR No.6343/2012 against the petitioner and other persons in relation to the trap in the night of 02.12.2012. In it, again it is shown that Maruti Swift vehicle was checked and 384 country liquor bottles, 1 teak wood log, 1 iron knife, 48 plastic bottles, 1 Samsung, 1 Nokia and 1 L.G. mobile phone came to be seized from Maruti Swift vehicle having registration No.MH31/CP 0864. In relation to this detection and procurement, arguments of Shri Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel are on same lines. In relation to this detection and procurement, arguments of Shri Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel are on same lines. 7. Learned Senior Counsel points out that all this is nothing but a harassment of petitioner. Petitioner on 02.12.2012 lodged report with the police inspector at Butibori Police Station complaining that on that day at about 4.30 p.m. two customers visited shop of the petitioner in red car. Those customers took their seat in the bar, Wardha Police came and entered petitioner's shop. These two customers were beaten severely. Employee of Petitioner by name Raju Giri was on duty and police also beat him. 4 containers of Goa brand country liquor in the shop were put in that red car and about Rs.40,000/- to Rs.50,000/-in cash was also taken from the cash counter. Police carried away those two customers and staff of the shop. Petitioner could not object. Petitioner gives names of said police officers in the complaint dated 02.12.2012. He pointed out that such incident had taken place earlier at the hands of Wardha Police on 06.03.2012. In reply, filed before this Court, the respondent no.8 Police Station Officer at Butibori has stated that complaint of present petitioner was an effort to counter the FIR No.6343/2012, and is a false one. 8. Our attention has been invited to circular dated 19.01.2012 issued by the Additional Commissioner, State Excise to state that as per the earlier circular dated 04.05.1974 and circular dated 20.04.1982 issued by the Home Department and letter dated 27.10.1988, police authorities have been directed not to register office against licence holders under Prohibition Act. The police authorities have been advised to work to find out illicit liquor distillation and its smuggling so as to stop sale of illegal liquor to augment the revenue of the State Government. Shri Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel submits that thus only in a very limited sphere, the police working under the Police Act is authoritied to take action. To explain how the scope of these concepts like "illicit liquor" or "smuggling" has been understood by this Court, he draws support from judgment reported at 2012 All M.R. (Cri) 2370 (Ratanlal Pralhad Gindodiya vrs. State of Maharashtra) (paragraph no.12, 14 and 15) and unreported judgment in Criminal Writ Petition No.32/2011. To explain how the scope of these concepts like "illicit liquor" or "smuggling" has been understood by this Court, he draws support from judgment reported at 2012 All M.R. (Cri) 2370 (Ratanlal Pralhad Gindodiya vrs. State of Maharashtra) (paragraph no.12, 14 and 15) and unreported judgment in Criminal Writ Petition No.32/2011. Attention has also been drawn to orders passed by this Court on 12.02.2013 in Writ Petition No.56/2013 and Government Resolution dated 18.07.2013, received by the petitioner. Dictionary meaning of word 'Smuggling” has also been relied upon, with contention that transport of liquor from adjacent district to Wardha District is not covered therein. Shri Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel urges that even if it is found that the detained Motor Vehicle was carrying country liquor and there was no valid transport permit, the police authorities are not empowered to act and to investigate. Order dated 24.07.2013 in Criminal Writ Petition No.100/2013 and judgment of learned Single Judge in Criminal Writ Petition No.68/2011 (Mukesh vrs. State), is being relied upon. He also contends that statement of co-accused cannot be read against the petitioner, and therefore, it is of no consequence. Judgment delivered in Writ Petition No. 4561/2004 on 15.12.2005, is also pressed into service by him. 9. Shri Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel submits that against the judgment and order dated 30.04.2002 in Criminal Writ Petition No.278/1996, delivered by Aurangabad Bench of this Court in case of Ratanlal Pralhad Gindodiya vrs. State of Maharashtra (supra), Special Leave Petition has been dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court on 30.09.2002. 10. Coming to the facts of Criminal Application No.223/2013, he submits that there FIR No.6021/2013 has been registered on 24.01.2013 in similar facts for transporting liquor in Wardha District in Maruti Van No. MH 31/C-8190. Offence is registered under Sections 65[a] [e], 77[a], 82 and 83 of the Prohibition Act, read with Sections 26 and 41 of the Indian Forest Act. The report dated 24.01.2013 is also read out to show that it does not make out any offence. Judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge of this court in Criminal Application No.424/2009 on 24.08.2009, concludes the controversy in favour of the present petitioner. Said Criminal Application was filed by the applicant no.1 only. 11. Taking up Criminal Writ Petition No.328/2013, Shri Anil Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel submits that the petitioners in Criminal Application No. 223/2013 and Writ Petition No.328/2013 are same. Said Criminal Application was filed by the applicant no.1 only. 11. Taking up Criminal Writ Petition No.328/2013, Shri Anil Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel submits that the petitioners in Criminal Application No. 223/2013 and Writ Petition No.328/2013 are same. Another FIR came to be registered against them by the police authorities vide FIR No.6113/2013 dated 22.04.2013, under Sections 65[a][e], 77[a] and Section 83 of the Prohibition Act and Section 26 and 41 of the Indian Forest Act. He submits that the complaint as filed shows a claim by one Sachin Nanaji Raut as staff of petitioner, but, Naukarnama in favour of that person was already canceled on 01.11.2012. 12. In Criminal Writ Petition No.148/2013, Shri Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel points out that the petitioner Shankar is shown as accused in FIR which is challenged in Criminal Application/Writ Petition No.223/2013. He also invites attention to the FIR No.3042 dated 24.12.2012 registered at Police Station, Wadner, to urge that it is under Prevention of Gambling Act. The accused therein was produced before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Hinganghat on 25.12.2012, where he pointed out ill-treatment and beating. Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class found swelling on his left cheek and some marks of muffle injury on his back. The accused was given Magisterial Custody Remand till 05.01.2013. Injury certificate issued by Rahate Surgical Hospital and ICU. dated 28.12.2012 is also relied upon by him. In this background our attention is invited to order passed by this Court in this Writ Petition on 02.05.2013. It is submitted that FIR under Prohibition Act and Gambling Act has been therefore, questioned independently by the petitioner, who points out his persecution and therefore, claims compensation also. He invites attention to few facts that respondent nos.3 to 6 (police officers) also during search of his house took away Rs.41,500/-. 13. Shri Firdos Mirza, learned Counsel arguing for petitioners in Criminal Writ Petition No.56/2013 adopts the line of argument advanced by Shri Mardikar. He points out that as per the FIR No.7100/2012 dated 30.11.2012 offence under provisions of Sections 65[a][e], 77[a], 82 and 83 of the Prohibition Act and Sections 3[c], 181, 130/177 of Motor Vehicles Act are registered against the petitioners Shailesh and Anil. He points out that when police trapped Jeep MH-12C-129, 47 country liquor bottles were found in a Bandi (type of vest) worn by Rakesh Jambhulkar and Akash Gedam. He points out that when police trapped Jeep MH-12C-129, 47 country liquor bottles were found in a Bandi (type of vest) worn by Rakesh Jambhulkar and Akash Gedam. One Dinesh Narayanrao Mata, owner of Satyam Bar at Amravati, has been disclosed to be the owner of bottles by persons caught and still police has proceeded as if said stock is belonging to petitioner Shailesh Ravikumar Jaiswal. Police have recorded that bottles were brought to Wardha District for retail sale from said Satyam Bar. Accused no.5 Anil Lamgire, a Bar servant is alleged to have handed over the bottles. Accused persons were not having any transport permit, vehicle was also without necessary papers and driver was alleged to be without licence. Shri Mirza, learned Counsel submits that thus, there is no question of naming petitioner Shailesh as an accused in the said FIR. For the same reason, petitioner no.2 servant also could not have been shown as accused no.2. 14. As petitioners were illegally arrested, they are claiming compensation of Rs.1 Crore. He further states that as per Section 119 of the Prohibition Act, offence is non-bailable, but, then arrest of petitioners ought to have been shown at 10 a.m. on 30.12.2012 when they were taken in custody, and they ought have been produced before the competent Court so as to enable them to obtain bail. Police authorities did not deliberately record this arrest in the morning, but, detained them illegally till 6.45 p.m. in the evening and mischievously they were shown as absconding in FIR. He contends that these allegations are not specifically dealt with in reply affidavit filed by the respondent no.6 before this Court. He has also invited our attention to provisions of Prohibition Manual (Vol-IV) to urge that sanction of Collector ought to have been obtained in such matter by the Police. Our attention is also drawn to Section 104 of the Prohibition Act to demonstrate that offence could have been compounded by the Prohibition Officer/Authorities. Petitioner no.1 being a licencee and petitioner no.2 being registered servant, no offence was made out against them. He contends that petitioners have specifically asserted in their petition that they sought bail, but, it was not granted. This assertion is not denied by the respondents in their reply. He draws support from judgment reported at 2002 All M.R. (Cri) 1373 (Baban Khandu Rajpur vrs. He contends that petitioners have specifically asserted in their petition that they sought bail, but, it was not granted. This assertion is not denied by the respondents in their reply. He draws support from judgment reported at 2002 All M.R. (Cri) 1373 (Baban Khandu Rajpur vrs. State of Maharashtra and others), to buttress his prayer for compensation. 15. Addressing this court in Criminal Writ Petition No.568/2012, Shri Mirza, learned Counsel submits that said petitioner has got grievance against respondents, as respondent nos.1 to 5 are responsible to ensure that the policy of the State Government and its various orders, directions and circulars are implemented and followed by the Prohibition Officers as also Police Officers. They have failed in their duty to safeguard the petitioner against illegal acts of their subordinates like respondent nos.6 and 7. He submits that said petitioner, a whole-seller in Chandrapur District has also got partnership in CL-III shop located at village Tarsa in Tahsil Gondpipri, District Chandrapur. Petitioner also happened to be President of Congress Political Party and was also President of the Municipal Council, Chandrapur. Because of his social and political position, petitioner came to be victimized by the police. 16. Shri Mirza, learned Counsel submits that vehicle was stopped in Chandrapur District only and it had not entered the adjacent dry district Gadchiroli. Offence under Section 65[c] of the Prohibition Act has been shown as registered, while there exists no such section or provision in Prohibition Act. In report, there is no name of petitioner. Person shown at sr.no.7 namely Mukesh Purankar is employee of whom naukarnama is duly registered and CL-III bottles found were also completely sealed. In this situation, registration of FIR against the petitioner is itself unwarranted. 17. Petitioner on 09.10.2012 sought bail, but, PCR was obtained by mentioning offence under Section 65 [kh], Section [d], 72, 82[1], 83[2] of Prohibition Act. PCR of 5 days was asked for only to harass him. Trial Court granted it on 10.l10.2012, and thereafter again three days PCR was sought. Trial Court granted MCR till 19.10.2012 on 12.10.2012. Shri Mirza, learned Counsel argued that because of this arrest and episode, political party–Congress removed him from their organization. He also points out that the superior officers like Commissioner of State Excise and Collector have not come forward to file any reply. Trial Court granted MCR till 19.10.2012 on 12.10.2012. Shri Mirza, learned Counsel argued that because of this arrest and episode, political party–Congress removed him from their organization. He also points out that the superior officers like Commissioner of State Excise and Collector have not come forward to file any reply. By placing reliance upon judgment reported at AIR 1993 SC 2592 (Smt. Naseem Bano vrs. State of U.P. And others) (paragraph no.11), he submits that as these allegations are not denied, the same must be deemed to have been admitted. 18. Our attention is invited to orders dated 13.12.2011 in Criminal Application No.656/2011 decided on 19.06.2012, to urge that there High Court had called for an affidavit from Government and in said affidavit filed in that matter, a decision taken by the Government giving primacy to the Prohibition department in such matters has been pointed out. Copy of the said communication dated 13.01.2012 as also affidavit dated 17.02.2012 filed in that writ petition are also relied upon by him to buttress his contention, that the police authorities lack jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence as alleged in FIR. He contends that before this Court, State Government has taken a stand contrary to above letter. Even the investigating officer's stand in reply affidavit militates with the said communication and stand of superiors. He has invited attention to provisions of Section 6 and 16 of the Police Act read with Section 23F thereof, to urge that the distribution of duties or business is the job of superiors and investigating officer cannot refuse to obey such circulars or letters. He therefore, seeks compensation in terms of prayer made in petition. He has also pointed out how image of petitioner is sought to be tarnished by the police authorities in present matter. Learned Single Judge's judgment reported at 2005 All MR (Cri) 3100 (Santosh Laxman Nayak and others vrs. State of Maharashtra and others), is relied upon by him. He invites attention to an application No.185/2013 filed in Criminal Writ Petition No.56/2013 to urge that there directions have been sought to the respondents to clarify the meaning of terms “ill-legal liquor and smuggling of liquor” used in government resolution dated 18.07.2013. 19. Shri S.K. Tambde, learned counsel appearing for petitioner in Criminal Writ Petition No.139/2013 has adopted the arguments of Senior Counsel Shri Mardikar and Advocate Mirza. 19. Shri S.K. Tambde, learned counsel appearing for petitioner in Criminal Writ Petition No.139/2013 has adopted the arguments of Senior Counsel Shri Mardikar and Advocate Mirza. He submits that names of petitioners do not figure in FIR, recorded by the police authorities under section 65[a][e] of the Prohibition Act and Sections 130[1]. 3/181, 5/140 and 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Though FIR is dated 27.11.2012, while seeking MCR on 01.12.2012, name of petitioner no.2 came to be added. While obtaining PCR on 13.11.2012, the liquor was reported to be loaded in vehicle at country liquor bhatti and not in the shop of petitioner no.1. Petitioner had immediately lodged a complaint about his harassment to superiors on 30.11.2012 itself. Shri Tambde, learned counsel states that vehicle was intercepted in area of Yavatmal district only and had not entered Wardha district. 20. Shri N.S. Warulkar, learned counsel appearing for petitioner in Writ Petition No. 60/2013, states that FIR is dated 05.12.2012 and it is under same provision as in Criminal Writ Petition No.139/2013. It does not contain name of petitioner who has got his licenced shop at village Wadki in Tahsil Ralegaon. In FIR it is mentioned that vehicle bearing no. MH 31/H3314 and bottles found therein belong to accused no.2 Ashish Patil. As servant of petitioner came to be arrested, petitioner was required to obtain anticipatory bail. He has invited attention to a complaint made by the petitioner on 20.12.2012 to the Excise Authorities, complaining of high handedness in the matter. 21. Shri P.B. Bibekar, learned counsel appearing in Criminal Writ Petition No. 324/2013 has submitted that the petitioner Jagdish therein has got a licence for place Morshi in Amravati District. FIR has been registered vide no. 6042/2013 on 02.04.2013 under Sections 65[a], 82 and 83 of the Prohibition Act against one Avdhoot Kathane and petitioner. Petitioner has no concern with said Avdhoot or the stock seized. 22. All the petitioners in this background challenge the action initiated against them through respective FIRs only on the ground that the police authorities are not competent to take cognizance of alleged irregularities or violations. Some of the petitioners claim that they have sold the liquor bottles and as such thereafter had no control over its movement. 23. Mrs. 22. All the petitioners in this background challenge the action initiated against them through respective FIRs only on the ground that the police authorities are not competent to take cognizance of alleged irregularities or violations. Some of the petitioners claim that they have sold the liquor bottles and as such thereafter had no control over its movement. 23. Mrs. B.H. Dangre, learned P.P. appearing for the State Government has submitted that almost in all cases charge sheet has been filed and in Criminal Writ Petition No.452/2011 there is no challenge to charge sheet. She also points out that if charge sheet is challenged, matters need to be placed before the learned Single Judge and only when FIR is challenged, matter needs to be looked into by the Division Bench. In Criminal Writ Petition No.56/2013, there is a prayer to set aside the charge sheet; in Criminal Writ Petition No.60/2013 though charge sheet is filed, there is no prayer either to quash the charge sheet or FIR; in Criminal Writ Application No. 223/2013 and Criminal Writ Petition No. 328/2013, only FIR has been questioned and there is no challenge to charge-sheet. She further points out that there is no challenge to any legal provisions in any of these matters. 24. Government Resolution dated 18.07.2013 is read out to this Court to explain the history. It is pointed out that in this government resolution the categories of crimes in relation to prohibition in which police can act are only illustrative and not exhaustive. She submits that Prohibition Act enables a citizen to trade in liquor and the trading activity is permitted only to the extent allowed by the said legislation or licence issued thereunder. The word “illicit liquor” or “smuggling” used in this government resolution needs to be understood liberally so as to suppress the mischief and advance the cause or general public interest. Our attention is invited to Sections 118, 119, 122, 123, 125, 129, 129-A and 129-B of the Prohibition Act to show that the legislature has accepted the authority or power with police to Act in these offences, while officer of the State Excise Department cannot initiate any action unless and until he is specifically empowered in that respect. Our attention is invited to Sections 118, 119, 122, 123, 125, 129, 129-A and 129-B of the Prohibition Act to show that the legislature has accepted the authority or power with police to Act in these offences, while officer of the State Excise Department cannot initiate any action unless and until he is specifically empowered in that respect. The power given to police to investigate and to take cognizance by the Criminal Procedure Code as maintained by State Legislature in Police Act and Prohibition Act, can not be withdrawn or set at naught by any administrative authority like the State Government or any of its officers. She submits that government resolution dated 18.07.2013 has superseded earlier communications/decisions taken at administrative level and hence, the entire challenge in the writ petition is rendered infructuous or meaningless. Judgment delivered in Criminal Writ Petition No. 35/2011 is relied upon to substantiate the contention. 25. Attention is invited to earlier Division Bench judgment in case of Ratanlal Pralhad Gindodiya vrs. State of Maharashtra (supra), to urge that the resolution in paragraph nos. 14 and 15 therein show that it does not law down any law of general application and exposition therein must be restricted to facts in it. Judgment in case of SantoshLaxman Nayak and others vrs. State of Maharashtra (supra), is also distinguished by stating the Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court there has dealt with only a case where terms and conditions of licence were violated. Section 2 [41] defining "Sale", Section 2[49] defining "Transport" along with Sections 11 and 13 are pressed into service to urge that spirit thereof needs to be kept in mind and these provisions are enabling provisions. She also points out that in exercise of powers under Section 139 of the Prohibition Act, since 25.04.1975, Wardha has been made a dry district. Our attention is also invited to Sections 116, 117, 118 and 129 to buttress the arguments. AIR 1964 SC 828 (Raja Ram Jaiswal vrs. State of Bihar) ,is relied upon to submit that there is nothing wrong with the cognizance taken by the police authorities and even if the two different wings are competent to investigate, investigation and cognizance will be one only. 26. To demonstrate that there is no fundamental right to trade or deal in liquor, judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported at AIR 1954 SC 220 (Cooverjee B. Bharucha vrs. 26. To demonstrate that there is no fundamental right to trade or deal in liquor, judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported at AIR 1954 SC 220 (Cooverjee B. Bharucha vrs. Excise Commissioner and others.), (paragraph no.7) and (2013) 2 SCC 565 (State of Bihar and others vrs. Nirmal Kumar Gupta), (paragraph no.19) are relied upon. 27. Shri S.S. Doifode, learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the State in Criminal Writ Petition No. 148/2013 submitted that, in that petition challenge is to FIR taking cognizance of an offence under Prohibition Act and also under Section 12-A of Prevention of Gambling Act. There is also a Forest Office and demand for compensation. High Court order dated 02.05.2013 and report of the Magistrate received upon it, are relied upon to submit that the prayer for compensation at this stage is premature. Spot panchnama conducted immediately after raid is relied upon to point out absence of any merit in the challenge. 28. Shri Shukul, learned counsel appearing for respondent police officers in Writ Petition No.148/2013. in reply submits that the challenge to FIR under Gambling Act does not survive before this Court because of para 6 in writ petition. Subsequent orders dated 14.10.2013 and 29.10.2013 are also relied upon to urge that only after due enquiry the liability of the respondents and entitlement of petitioner to compensation may be examined. 29. Shri F.T. Mirza, learned Counsel in his reply arguments, submits that the State Government is not disputing that the alleged transport is nothing but, in breach of licence conditions and is also accepting that there cannot be investigation in same offence by two different agencies. He submits that Section 108 of the Prohibition Act does not allow transport without payment of duty and as such, such an irregularity or violation can be compounded under Section 104 thereof looking to its spirit. Power under section 104 becomes available, if the violation is reported to Collector and in none of the matters before this Court, police authorities have approached either the Excise Department or any Prohibition Officer including the Collector. He also submits that the words “illicit liquor” or “smuggling” used in Government Resolution dated 18.07.2013, or in earlier communications must be construed so as to exclude therefrom the breaches of licence or other irregularities. In support he invites attention to paragraph no.25B and 25 D in Criminal Writ Petition No. 568/2012. 30. He also submits that the words “illicit liquor” or “smuggling” used in Government Resolution dated 18.07.2013, or in earlier communications must be construed so as to exclude therefrom the breaches of licence or other irregularities. In support he invites attention to paragraph no.25B and 25 D in Criminal Writ Petition No. 568/2012. 30. Senior Counsel Shri Mardikar, relies upon judgments reported at AIR 1967 SC 1368 (Krishan Kumar Narula vrs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others), (paragraph nos. 12 and 13) and AIR 1996 SC 1627 (State of Andhra Pradesh vrs. McDowell and Co. and others), (paragraph nos. 41 to 43) to demonstrate that Trade in liquor is a fundamental right. 31. Learned A.P.P. with the permission of the Court invited attention to Section 64[b][d] of the Police Act and submitted that in Criminal Writ Petition No. 568/2012 officers are not joined as parties in personal capacity. 32. Perusal of the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 is essential. Section 2 of Criminal Procedure Code contains some definitions important for resolving the controversy. It begins with usual opening words which permit deviation from the defined meaning if the context in Cr.P.C. otherwise requires. Clause (n) defines that “offence” means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. Clause (a) defines “bailable offence” to mean an offence which is shown as bailable in the First Schedule, or which is made bailable by any other law for the time being in force; and “non-bailable offence” means any other offence; Section 119 of the Prohibition Act makes Offences under sections 65, 67, 67A and 68 thereof non-bailable. Clause (c) explains “cognizable offence” to mean an offence for which, and “cognizable case” to mean a case in which, a police officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant; Section 118 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, hereinafter referred to as Prohibition Act, lays down that in the absence or any provision to the contrary in said Act, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 with respect to cognizable offences apply to offences under it. Section 82 of the Prohibition Act makes any breach by the holder of any license, permit, pass or authorization granted under it or by his servants or by any person acting with his express or implied permission on his behalf of any of the terms or conditions of such license, permit, pass or authorization such holder, an offence providing imprisonment there-for in addition to its cancellation or suspension. Thus read with Clause (n) Cr.P.C., by virtue of this Section 82, it constitutes an offence for the purposes of Cr.P.C. Section 2(o) of Cr.P.C. points out that an “officer in charge of a police station” includes, when the officer in charge of the police station is absent from the stationhouse or unable from illness or other cause to perform his duties, the police officer present at the stationhouse who is next in rank to such officer and is above the rank of constable or, when the State Government so directs, any other police officer so present; while clause (h) stipulates that “investigation” includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorized by a Magistrate in this behalf. Section 4 of Cr.P.C. is on trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws. Subsection (1) states that all offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. Subsection 2 is offences under other enactments and it reads (2) all offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. Section 5 is about procedure in any special or local law. It reads :5. Saving.— “Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force.” 33. Other provision of importance contained in Cr.P.C. are Sections 156 and 157. Other provision of importance contained in Cr.P.C. are Sections 156 and 157. S.156 gives police officer-in-charge of a police station to investigate. Under subsection (1) any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. Subsection (2) lays down that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. Subsection (3) empowers any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned. S.157 is about the procedure for investigation. Its subsection (1) stipulates that if, from information received or otherwise, an officer in charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, to proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and, if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender. Prohibition Act vide Section 2 (29) explains phrase "Officer in charge of a Police Station" as including (a) in the Greater Bombay the Officer in charge of a police station as provided under the provisions of the 2[Bombay Police Act, 1951 (Bom. XXII of 1951); and] (b) elsewhere the officer in charge of a police station as defined in the 3 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898). Similarly it defines police station in clause (33) ) "police station" to mean in the Greater Bombay a police section as provided under the provisions of the 3 [Bombay Police Act, 1951 Bom XXII of 1951)]; and elsewhere any place declared to be a police station for the purposes of the 4[Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898); 34. Similarly it defines police station in clause (33) ) "police station" to mean in the Greater Bombay a police section as provided under the provisions of the 3 [Bombay Police Act, 1951 Bom XXII of 1951)]; and elsewhere any place declared to be a police station for the purposes of the 4[Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898); 34. In the light of these provisions, specially Sections 4 and 5 of Cr.P.C., we have to first consider the extent to which the Bombay Prohibition Act amends existing provisions in Cr.P.C. Section 115 of the Prohibition Act confers upon the Magistrate power to impose enhanced penalties. It reads- “Notwithstanding, anything contained in section 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 2 (V of 1898), it shall be lawful for any Presidency Magistrate or any Magistrate of the First Class to pass any sentence authorized by this Act in excess of his powers under Section 32 of the said code', provided that the fine shall not exceed three thousand rupees.” Procedure to be followed by such Magistrate is in Section 116, which is as under- “In all trials for offences under this Act, the Magistrate shall follow the procedure prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure,, 1898 3(V of 1898), for the trial of summary cases in which an appeal lies.” Procedure for Investigations Arrests, Searches, etc. is in Section 117 which reads:- “Save as otherwise expressly-provided in this Act, all investigations, arrests, detentions in custody and searches shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Provided that no search shall be deemed to be illegal by reason only of the fact that witnesses for the search were not inhabitants of the locality in which the place searched is situated.” Special provision made for compounding and conspiracy also need to be noted. Section 104 is as under:- “Section 104: Compounding Of Offences. Provided that no search shall be deemed to be illegal by reason only of the fact that witnesses for the search were not inhabitants of the locality in which the place searched is situated.” Special provision made for compounding and conspiracy also need to be noted. Section 104 is as under:- “Section 104: Compounding Of Offences. “(1) The [State] Government may sanction the acceptance from any person whose license permit, pass or authorization is liable to be canceled or, suspended under the provisions of this Act or who is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence under section 10[69, 70, 77, 82 or] 108, of a sum of money in lieu of such cancellation or suspension or by way of composition for the offence which may have been committed, as the case may be; and in all cases inn which any property other than the intoxicant, hemp, mhowa flowers or molasses has been seized as liable to confiscation under this Act may release the same on payment of the value thereof as estimated by the '[State] Government or such officer as the 2[State] Government may authorize in this behalf.” Section 83: Penalty For Conspiracy When two or more persons agree- (a) to commit or cause to be committed any offence under this Act, or (b) [***] to commit a breach of a condition of a license, permit, pass or authorization, each of such persons shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a period which may extend to two years or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. 35. Sections 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 129 and 129-A of Prohibition Act recognize the powers available to a police officer in Cr.P.C. and preserve the same. Prohibition Officers on whom those powers inherent in any police officer are conferred by the State Government, can only exercise the same. 35. Sections 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 129 and 129-A of Prohibition Act recognize the powers available to a police officer in Cr.P.C. and preserve the same. Prohibition Officers on whom those powers inherent in any police officer are conferred by the State Government, can only exercise the same. Relevant portions of various provisions which stipulate such special empowerment or authorization are briefly stated below :- Section 120: Power Of Entry And Inspection:- The [Commissioner], Collector on or any Prohibition Officer duly empowered in this behalf by the State Government, or any Police Officer may Section 121: Power To Open Packages Etc (1) Any Prohibition Officer duly empowered in this behalf by the '[State] Government or any Police Officer may open any package and examine any goods and may [stop and search] for any intoxicant, hemp, mhowra flowers, or molasses any vessel, vehicle or other means of conveyance 3[and may seize any intoxicant, hemp, mhowra flowers, molasses or any other thing liable to confiscation or forfeiture under this Act or any other law for the time being in force relating to excise revenue found while making such search.] Section 122: 1[Power To Require Production Of Licenses (1) The [Commissioner] or Collector or any Prohibition Officer duly empowered in this behalf by the State Government or any Police Officer may Section 123: Arrest of offenders And Seizure of Contraband Articles (1) Any Prohibition Officer authorized by the [State] Government in this behalf or any Police Officer may (a) arrest without warrant any person whom he has reason to believe to be guilty of an offence under this Act: (b) seize, and detain any intoxicant hemp, mhowra flowers or molasses or other articles which he has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation or forfeiture under this Act [and seize any document or other article which he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the commission of any offence under this Act. (2) Any Prohibition Officer authorized by the [State] Government under this section who arrests any person under clause (a), or seizes and detains any article under clause (b), of subsection (1) shall forward such person or article, as the case may be, without unnecessary delay to the officer-in-charge of the nearest Police Station. (2) Any Prohibition Officer authorized by the [State] Government under this section who arrests any person under clause (a), or seizes and detains any article under clause (b), of subsection (1) shall forward such person or article, as the case may be, without unnecessary delay to the officer-in-charge of the nearest Police Station. Section 124: Power To Obtain Information (1)The [Commissioner] or Collector or any Prohibition Officer specially empowered in this behalf by the [State] Government or a Police Officer may, by order require any person to furnish Section 125: Power To Seize Intoxicants, Etc The [Commissioner], Collector or am Prohibition Officer duly empowered in this behalf or any Police Officer may (a) seize in any open place, or in transit any intoxicant, hemp, mohwra flowers or molasses or any other thing which he has reason to believe to be liable to [confiscation or forfeiture] under this Act or any other law for the time being in force relating to excise revenue [and any document or other article which he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the commission of an offence under this Act;] (b) detain and search any person whom he has reason to believe to be guilty of any offence against this Act or any other law for the time being in force relating to excise revenue and if such person has any intoxicant, hemp, mhowra flowers, molasses or [other thing] in his possession, arrest him. Section 126: Arrest Without Warrant The [Commissioner], Collector or any Prohibition Officer duly empowered in this behalf by the [State Government or any Police Officer may arrest without an order from a Magistrate and without warrant any person who obstructs him in the execution of his duties under this Act or who has escaped or attempts to, escape from custody in which he has been or is lawfully detained under this Act. Section 129: Prohibition Officers May Be Empowered To Investigate Offences (1) The [State Government may empower any Prohibition Officer to investigate offences under this Act. (2) An officer empowered under subsection (1) shall in the conduct of such investigation exercise the powers conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, upon an officer-in-charge of a police station for the investigation of cognizable offences. (2) An officer empowered under subsection (1) shall in the conduct of such investigation exercise the powers conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, upon an officer-in-charge of a police station for the investigation of cognizable offences. Section 129a: [Power To Require Persons To Submit To Medical Examination, Etc (1) Where in the investigation of any offence under this Act, any Prohibition Officer duly empowered in this behalf by the State Government or any Police Officer has reasonable ground for believing that a person has consumed an intoxicant and that for the purpose of establishing that .. .... . Section 131: Bail By Prohibition Officer (1) Any Prohibition Officer empowered to investigate An offence under this Act shall have power to grant bail in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 to any person arrested without a warrant for an offence under this Act. (2) When any person has been arrested under Section 126, a Prohibition Officer empowered to investigate offence under this Act shall have power to grant bail in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. 36. The scheme of Cr.P.C. and Prohibition Act looked into by us above show that State Legislature has in consonance with spirit of Cr.P.C., the primacy in the matter of “offence” to police officers is maintained by it while formulating Prohibition Act. This can be seen also in following provisions of Prohibition Act. Section 130: Arrested Persons And Things Seized To Be Sent To Officer-In-Charge Of Police Station Every person arrested and thing seized by a Prohibition Officer under this Act, shall be sent to the officer-in-charge of the nearest Police Station '[or to any other officer duly empowered under Section 129 if the 2[Commissioner] in any particular case has directed such officer to conduct the investigation of the offence]. Section 132: Articles Seized 3[When anything has been seized under the provisions of this Act by a Prohibition Officer exercising powers under Section 129 or by an officer-in-charge of a police station], or has been sent to him in accordance with the provisions of this Act, such officer, after such inquiry as may be, deemed necessary, 37. In this background, we have now to consider the provisions creating or relating to offences in the Prohibition Act and Police Act. Relevant Sections in Prohibition Act are :- Section 65: Penalty For Illegal Import, Etc. In this background, we have now to consider the provisions creating or relating to offences in the Prohibition Act and Police Act. Relevant Sections in Prohibition Act are :- Section 65: Penalty For Illegal Import, Etc. Of Intoxicant Or Hemp Whoever, in contravention of the provisions of this Act, or of any rule, regulation or order made or of any license, pass, permit or authorization granted there-under- (a) imports or exports or transport any intoxicant 6[(other than opium)] or hemp, (b) manufactures any intoxicant (other than opium)] (c) constructs or works any distillery or brewery, (d) bottles liquor, (e) sells or buys any intoxicant [(other than opium)] or hemp, or uses, keeps or has in his possession any materials, still utensils, implements or apparatus for the purpose of manufacturing any intoxicant [(other than opium)] [(g) cultivates or collects hemp.] [shall, on conviction, be punished for each such offence with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to five years or with fine which shall not be less than twenty-five thousand rupees but which may extend to fifty thousand rupees or with both; Section 82: Breach Of License, Permit, Etc. to Be An Offence (1) In the event of any breach by the holder of any license, permit, pass or authorization granted under this Act or by his servants or by any person acting with his express or implied permission on his behalf of any of the terms or conditions of such license, permit, pass or authorization such holder shall; in addition to the cancellation or suspension of the license, permit, pass or authorization granted to him be punished, on conviction, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees or with both, unless it is proved that all due and reasonable precautions were exercised by him to prevent any such breach. (2) Any person who commits any such breach shall, whether he acts with or without the permission of the holder of the license, permit, pass or authorization, be liable to the same punishment. (2) Any person who commits any such breach shall, whether he acts with or without the permission of the holder of the license, permit, pass or authorization, be liable to the same punishment. Section 83: Penalty For Conspiracy When two or more persons agree- (a) to commit or cause to be committed any offence under this Act, or (b) [***] to commit a breach of a condition of a license, permit, pass or authorization, each of such persons shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a period which may extend to two years or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. The Bombay Police Act, 1951 also needs to be perused here. Section 2 (11) defines "Police officer" to means any member of the Police Force appointed or deemed to be appointed under this Act, and includes a special or an additional Police officer appointed under Sections 21 or 22; Section 28 states that Police officers to be deemed to be always on duty and to be liable to employment in any part of the State. Its subsection (1) reads“ Every Police officer not on leave or under suspension shall for all purposes of this Act be deemed to be always on duty, and any Police officer or any number or body of Police officers allocated for duty in one part of the State may, if the State Government or the Inspector General so directs, at any time, be employed on Police duty in any other part of the State for so long as the services of the same may be there required.” Another important provision is Section 64 on duties of a Police officer, which reads;- “S. 64 :-It shall be the duty of every Police officer- (a) promptly to serve every summons and obey and execute every warrant or other order lawfully issued to him by competent authority, and to endeavor by all lawful means to give effect to the lawful commands of his superior; (b) to the best of his ability to obtain intelligence concerning the commission of cognizable offences or designs to commit such offences, and to lay such information and to take such other steps, consistent with law and with the orders of his superiors as shall be best calculated to bring offenders to justice or to prevent the commission of cognizable offences and within his view of non-cognizable offences ; (c) to prevent to the best of his ability the commission of public nuisances; (d) to apprehend without unreasonable delay all persons whom he is legally authorized to apprehend and for whose apprehension there is sufficient reason ; (e) to aid another Police officer when called on by him or in case of need in the discharge of his duty, in such ways as would be lawful and reasonable on the part of the officer aided; (f) to discharge such duties as are imposed upon him by any law for the time being in force.” Harassment of suspect or accused is also dealt with in Section 148. Said section stipulates penalty for vexatious delay in forwarding a person arrested. “. Any Police officer who vexatiously and unnecessarily delays forwarding any person arrested to a Magistrate or to any other authority to whom he is legally bound to forward such person, shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees or with both.” 38. Any Police officer who vexatiously and unnecessarily delays forwarding any person arrested to a Magistrate or to any other authority to whom he is legally bound to forward such person, shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees or with both.” 38. Similar controversy about lack of competency by the police force under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act in view of special procedure in Wild Life Act has been looked into by Hon'ble Apex Court in MotiLal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2002) 4 SCC 713 . Contention before the Hon'ble Apex Court was that Wild Life Act being special law containing comprehensive provisions for investigation, inquiry, search, seizure, compounding of offences, trial, punishment and complete code as envisaged under Section 5 of Cr.P.C.; the police force under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act was not empowered to investigate the case. At page 720, Hon'ble Apex Court after noticing the provisions of the Wild Life (Protection) Act and Cr.P.C. has observed :- “12. As provided under subsection (1) of Section 50 “police officers” are not excluded for the purpose of investigation including inspection, search and seizure of the offending articles. No doubt, special powers are conferred to other officers but that is in consonance with subsection (2) of Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 4 of the Code reads thus: “Note :Section 4 Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws :Subsection (1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. Sub-section (2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. The aforesaid section inter alia specifically provides that all offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the Code of Criminal Procedure but it shall be subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigation, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. In view of the specific provision under the Wild Life Act, apart from any police officer not below the rank of Sub Inspector, the Director or any other officer authorized by him in this behalf or the Chief Wild Life Warden or authorized officer or any forest officer can inspect, conduct search or inquire, seize article mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (1). To this extent, there is contrary provision under the Wild Life Act and would prevail as provided under subsection (2) of Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to the decision in the case of State of Rajasthan wherein this Court dealt with the question—whether CBI can investigate the offences for violation of the Foreign Exchange (Regulation) Act, 1973 (“FERA” for short), more so, when the offence is alleged to have been committed outside the Indian territory. After referring to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of FERA, the Court held that the Act enacts that for implementing and enforcement of provisions of FERA, different classes of officers of the Enforcement Directorate have been constituted in Section 3. The Court observed that from a combined reading of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of FERA, it was clear that primarily officers of the Enforcement Directorate as mentioned in Sections 3 and 4 have been empowered to exercise the powers and discharge the duties conferred or imposed on such officers of the Enforcement Directorate under FERA. And, in such cases, the Central Government under Section 5 can authorize any officer of the Customs or Central Excise Officer or police officer or any officer of the Central Government or State Government to exercise such of the powers and discharge such of the duties of the Director of Enforcement or any other officer of the Enforcement Directorate under FERA, as may be specified, subject to such conditions and limitations as deemed fit by the Central Government. The Court also held that as it was nobody’s case that any notification has been issued under FERA authorizing the member of Delhi Special Police Establishment to discharge the duties and functions of an officer of the Enforcement Directorate and in absence of such notification under FERA, a member of Delhi Special Police Establishment cannot be held to be an officer under FERA and, therefore, is not competent to investigate into the offences under FERA. The Court further observed that FERA being a special law containing provisions for investigation, inquiry, search, seizure, trial and imposition of punishment for offences under FERA, Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable in respect of offences under FERA. 14. In our view, the aforesaid judgment has no bearing in the present case. As stated above, the Central Government has issued a notification dated 21.3.2000 under Section 5 read with Section 6 of the Act empowering CBI for investigation of the case against the appellants under the Wild Life Act and the Indian Penal Code. The scheme of Section 50 of the Wild Life Act makes it abundantly clear that a police officer is also empowered to investigate the offences and search and seize the offending articles. For trial of offences, the Code of Criminal Procedure is required to be followed and for that there is no other specific provision to the contrary. The special procedure prescribed is limited for taking cognizance of the offence as well as powers are given to other officers mentioned in Section 50 for inspection, arrest, search and seizure as well as of recording statement. The power to compound offences is also conferred under Section 54. Section 51 provides for penalties which would indicate that certain offences are cognizable offences meaning thereby a police officer can arrest without warrant. Subsection (5) of Section 51 provides that nothing contained in Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 shall apply to a person convicted of an offence with respect to hunting in a sanctuary or a national park or of an offence against any provision of Chapter 5A unless such person is under 18 years of age. The aforesaid specific provisions are contrary to the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure and that would prevail during the trial. However, from this, it cannot be said that operation of rest of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are excluded.” 39. In the light of this precedent and provisions mentioned supra, it will be proper to appreciate two Division Bench judgments and one judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court. At times, Petitioners also faintly suggested the need to place the matter before larger bench, which is to be born in mind while undertaking this exercise. 40. In the light of this precedent and provisions mentioned supra, it will be proper to appreciate two Division Bench judgments and one judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court. At times, Petitioners also faintly suggested the need to place the matter before larger bench, which is to be born in mind while undertaking this exercise. 40. First such judgment in case of Ratanlal Pralhad Gindodiya Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. ( supra) is by the Division Bench judgment of this Court dated 3042002 which had no occasion to consider MotiLal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (supra). Petitioner there had opened liquor shop on dry day came with case that half shutter of the shop was opened to remove the idol from inside the shop. High Court found that whether he was effecting sales is disputed question and it cannot enter into such a disputed question while dealing with the writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India. It noted the Circular issued by Inspector General of Police informing all police officers that the Prohibition and Excise Department alone was required to deal with breaches committed by licensees and Police officers learning of any breach by licensee must report the case to the nearest Prohibition and Excise Officer for taking necessary action. It held that Petitioner holding a valid license for possession and sale of the liquor cannot be charged for illegally possessing foreign and country liquor under Section 66(1) (b) of Bombay Prohibition Act. High Court also found arrest of petitioner and detaining him in contravention of specific orders issued by the Inspector General of Police. Provision of Section 50 of Criminal Procedure Code being mandatory, needed to be strictly complied with. Noticing its violation, considering his right to life and liberty and his illegal arrest and detention for a period of about 3 and half hours, petitioner was held entitled for to compensation for tortuous acts committed by State employees in the course of their employment. State was directed to pay compensation of Rs. 25,000/with liberty to recover it from erring police officers. In paragraph 15, this Division Bench has observed:- “Rule 30(1) of Chapter I of the Bombay Police Manual speaks that the Inspector General of Police is the Head of all the Police Force in the State. State was directed to pay compensation of Rs. 25,000/with liberty to recover it from erring police officers. In paragraph 15, this Division Bench has observed:- “Rule 30(1) of Chapter I of the Bombay Police Manual speaks that the Inspector General of Police is the Head of all the Police Force in the State. He is the Head of the Police Department and the Adviser to Government on all questions of Police Administration. He is responsible for the internal discipline of Police Force and for its efficient organization as a means of preventing and checking crime and preserving law and order. Clause (2) of this Rule states that all orders of Government in this connection, as a general rule, be issued through the Inspector General of Police. Despite of the specific directions issued by the Inspector General of Police as well as by the Government of Maharashtra the respondent no.1, the respondent nos. 3 to 5 have not obeyed those directions and instead of obeying the said directions, they themselves took the action which was not desirable at all. Taking into consideration, both the Circulars, referred to above, issued by the Competent Authorities, read with the provisions of law, apparently, the action taken by the respondent nos.3 to 5 for arrest of the petitioner appears illegal." This Division Bench decided the controversy as presented and in the light of assistance received. It considered D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal AIR 1997 SC 610 (Para 22), State of Maharashtra vs. Ravikant Patil (1991) 2 AIR SCW 373 (Para 26) and Bhim Singh vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir AIR 1986 SC 494 (Para 23). Various provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and recognition of power already reposed in police officers in the scheme of Bombay Prohibition Act are issues not argued before it for appreciation. Hence, question whether subordinate legislation like Rule 30(1) of Chapter I of the Bombay Police Manual can countermand the scheme to the contrary of Parent legislation or other main enactment like Prohibition Act or then needed interpretation in harmony with such State Legislation was also not examined there. 41. Santosh Laxman Nayak and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.2006 (1) LJSOFT 130 = 2005 All MR (CRI) 130 is the judgment dated 4.4.2005 delivered by the learned Single Judge. 41. Santosh Laxman Nayak and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.2006 (1) LJSOFT 130 = 2005 All MR (CRI) 130 is the judgment dated 4.4.2005 delivered by the learned Single Judge. This judgment banks upon Ratanlal Gindodiya vs. State (supra) to note that the offence under Prohibition Act alleging breach of license is liable to be dealt under the provisions of the Prohibition Act, Rules and the prosecution is not liable to be lodged nor by virtue of the declared policy of the State, the Police Officers are entitled to enter the licensed premises on account of a grievance of violation of terms of license. The matters relating to violation of terms of license are to be handled by the Officer under the Bombay Prohibition Act for which the Police Officer concerned should report the matter to the nearest prohibition officer for suitable action according to law and departmental action and procedure as per rules. Paras 13 to 15 of Ratanlal Gindodiya vs. State (Supra) have been cited. In paragraph 17, the Learned Single Judge observes :- “17. It is thus seen that very cognizance of the non-cognizable offence by police under Bombay Prohibition Act and under Bombay Police Act was wholly impermissible and hence liable to be quashed. As regards the offences under Indian Penal Code and Arms Act are concerned, on facts, this Court has found that the contents of the charge-sheet and evidence recorded by the police which is brought in support thereto, is grossly inadequate to bring home the imputations of any of the charges for which the trial is sought by the police by filing the charge-sheet in question.” Our observations supra while distinguishing the Division Bench judgment also hold good here. 42. Rajesh Narayan Jaiswal Vs. State Of Maharashtra and Ors. 2012 (4) LJSOFT 27=2012 (2) Bom.C.R. (CRI) 15, is the later Division Bench ruling dated 132012 which takes a different view but then Ratanlal Gindodiya vs. State (supra) or Santosh Laxman Nayak and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra) were not pointed out to it. This Division Bench was considering a prayer to quash F.I.R. about illegal transportation of liquor bottles in rickshaw and the charge sheet filed by police against the petitioner for offence punishable under section 65(a) and (e) of the Prohibition Act. Police intercepted an auto-rickshaw and its driver could not produce transport pass. (supra) were not pointed out to it. This Division Bench was considering a prayer to quash F.I.R. about illegal transportation of liquor bottles in rickshaw and the charge sheet filed by police against the petitioner for offence punishable under section 65(a) and (e) of the Prohibition Act. Police intercepted an auto-rickshaw and its driver could not produce transport pass. Xerox copy of the transport pass was shown but the auto-rickshaw number mentioned in the pass was different. Court finds that the general powers of police are not restricted by Prohibition Act and as the offences are cognizable and there is specific mention of police officers in the said Act, the police officers have the power to investigate such offences when committed within their jurisdiction. The Division Bench also finds that administrative circulars cannot take place of provisions of the law and the provisions of Cr.P.C. It observes that it is desirable that police informs such incidents to nearest Prohibition Officer, Excise Department, as there is always possibility of detecting more irregularities and more offences in such a case. But it also sates that the police can go on with the investigation in such matters and it is not desirable to use extraordinary jurisdiction or inherent powers to quash the proceedings. 43. This Division Bench judgment considers judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court in G. Sagar Suri and Anr. Vs. State of U.P. and ors. AIR 2000 SC 754 (1) and Dhariwal Tobacco Products Limited and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. 2009 (3) LJSOFT (SC) 38 = (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 806. It was not invited to consider judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in MotiLal v. Central Bureau of Investigation,(supra). To ascertain whether police can take impugned action, this judgment examines the provisions of the Prohibition Act and the Rules framed there-under in para 7. The legal provisions are found grouped into separate chapters as per their object by this Division Bench. Definitions in Chapter I, scheme for carrying out generally the provisions of the enactment in Chapter No.-II are perused. Section 6 in this Chapter enabling the State to empower the officers of other departments including police department with the powers to perform the functions under the enactment are taken note of. Chapter-III prohibiting manufacture, sale, consumption, possession etc. Definitions in Chapter I, scheme for carrying out generally the provisions of the enactment in Chapter No.-II are perused. Section 6 in this Chapter enabling the State to empower the officers of other departments including police department with the powers to perform the functions under the enactment are taken note of. Chapter-III prohibiting manufacture, sale, consumption, possession etc. of intoxicant and other substances containing alcohol, otherwise than the provisions made in the Act and the Rules, Chapter IV exempting from said prohibition some substances and containing provisions to regulate and control the use of such exempted substances, Chapter IV-A regulating the manufacture etc. of articles exempted under Chapter IV, Chapter IV-B, V, VI contain provisions for control and regulation of use of some other substances like mhowra flowers, spirit preparation, molasses and Chapter VIII in respect of excise duty and the powers of the officers of Excise Department in connection with levying excise duties are also seen. The Division Bench observes that the provisions of Chapter II, III, IV, IV-A, IV-B, V and VI do not refer to the powers of police officers but refer to the officers of Excise Department. Unless powers are specifically conferred on police officers under section 6 of the Act, police officers cannot become members of this establishment for the purpose of these provisions. 44. This judgment in Rajesh Narayan Jaiswal Vs. State Of Maharashtra and Ors (supra) then goes to Chapter VII which provide for penalties when there is a breach of the provisions made in Chapter II to VIA and procedure to be followed when the breach of such provisions is detected or suspected prescribed in Chapter IX. Section 117, Section 118, Section 119 are taken note of. The provisions of Sections 41, 149 to 151, 154 and 156 of Cr.P.C. providing that whenever a cognizable offence is committed within the local jurisdiction, the police officer may use the powers given to him under these sections of Cr.P.C. are also appreciated to conclude that “Thus, even if, provisions of section 120 and of subsequent sections of the Act are ignored, it can be said that the police officers can act in view of the aforesaid provisions of the Act and Cr.P.C., when offence is committed under the Act.” This Division Bench records important findings in para 11 and 12. Those findings are: “Thus, under the provisions of the Act and under the provisions of Cr.P.C. already mentioned, police officers have power to detect and investigate the offences committed under the Act.” and “ Thus, the general powers of police are not restricted by the Act. As the offences are cognizable and further there is specific mention of police officers in aforesaid provisions, the police officers have the power to investigate such offences when the offence are committed within their jurisdiction.” 45. In VishalAgrawal v. Chhattisgarh SEB ( 2014) 3 SCC 696, Hon'ble Apex Court has rejected similar arguments while evaluating impact of Section 155 of the Electricity Act on Section 4 of Cr.P.C. Hon'ble Court observes:- “19. As far as the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) is concerned, it is essential to point out that it demarcates the offences into two categories, namely, cognizable and non-cognizable offences. As per Part II of Schedule I to the Code, any offence punishable with three years or more of imprisonment is a cognizable offence. Section 154 of the Code prescribes that in respect of every offence which is a cognizable one, information thereof is to be given to an officer in charge of a police station, who shall reduce the same into writing. Thus, it is the duty and responsibility of the police authorities to register a first information report. Subsection (3) of Section 154 further obligates the police authorities to investigate the same as per the manner prescribed in subsequent sections and thereafter submit its report to the Magistrate, who is empowered to take cognizance of the offence on police report, under Section 173 of the Code, on completion of investigation.” “21. It is apparent from the reading of Section 4 that provisions of the Code would be applicable where an offence under IPC or under any other law is being investigated, inquired into, tried or otherwise dealt with. These offences under any other law could also be investigated, inquired into or tried with according to the provisions of the Code except in case of an offence where the procedure prescribed there-under is different than the procedure prescribed under the Code. It is so specifically provided under Section 155 of the Electricity Act also. Thus, it is not a case where any special or different procedure is prescribed. It is so specifically provided under Section 155 of the Electricity Act also. Thus, it is not a case where any special or different procedure is prescribed. Rather, the procedure contained in the Code is made applicable for the offences to be tried under the Electricity Act as well.” “23. Thus, the clear principle which emerges from the aforesaid discussion is that even when a Magistrate is to take cognizance when a complaint is filed before it, that would not mean that no other avenue is open and the complaint/FIR cannot be lodged with the police. It is stated at the cost of repetition that the offences under the Electricity Act are also to be tried by applying the procedure contained in the Code. Thus, it cannot be said that a complete machinery is provided under the Electricity Act as to how such offences are to be dealt with. In view thereof, we are of the opinion that the respondent’s counsel is right in his submission that if the offence under the Code is cognizable, provisions of Chapter XII containing Section 154 Cr.P.C and onward would become applicable and it would be the duty of the police to register the FIR and investigate into the same. Sections 135 and 138 only prescribe that certain acts relating to theft of electricity, etc. would also be offences. It also enables certain persons/parties, as mentioned in Section 151, to become complainant in such cases and file complaint before a court in writing. When such a complaint is filed, the court would be competent to take cognizance straightway. However, that would not mean that other avenues for investigation into the offence which are available would be excluded. It is more so when no such special procedure for trying the offences under the Electricity Act is formulated and the cases under this Act are also to be governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 46. Thus, considering the portion high lightened supra, we find that even in absence of advantage of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in MotiLal v. Central Bureau of Investigation,(supra), the judgment of this Court in Rajesh Narayan Jaiswal Vs. State Of Maharashtra and Ors (supra) properly touches all relevant aspects and arrives at correct conclusion. We have to only add that S, 6 (2) of the Prohibition Act enables the State Government to confer the powers, functions, duties etc. State Of Maharashtra and Ors (supra) properly touches all relevant aspects and arrives at correct conclusion. We have to only add that S, 6 (2) of the Prohibition Act enables the State Government to confer the powers, functions, duties etc. under said Act upon “any person” also. This section must be read in consonance with the other provisions where the State Legislature itself has empowered the police to act. Those provisions can not be rendered nugatory and it can not be presumed that S.6 enables State Government to supersede the mandate of the Legislature in recognition of the existing power with police under Cr.P.C. to take cognizance of and to investigate the certain offences. The extent to which the provisions and procedure in Cr.P.C. undergoes change is already pointed out in this judgment. Earlier judgments of this Court i.e. Ratanlal Gindodiya vs. State and SantoshLaxman Nayak and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors (supra) were not called upon to consider all these legal provisions or judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court. Rule 30(1) of Chapter I of the Bombay Police Manual and fact of the Inspector General of Police being the Head of the Police Force in the State, is relied upon by Petitioners to urge that police can not violate the directions issued by him. But then Sections of Prohibition Act which attract the provisions and procedure of Cr.P.C. or the mandate of State Legislature recognizing the primacy already with police in the matter of investigation of cognizable offences were not presented to this Court when it decided RatanlalGindodiya vs. State and SantoshLaxman Nayak and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors (supra). Hence, these judgments can not be said to have laid down any law on the subject. Moreover as the principles settled and reiterated in the judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court in MotiLal v. Central Bureau of Investigation and VishalAgrawal v. Chhattisgarh SEBB,(supra) as also the law on the point are not considered, the exposition by earlier Division Bench or learned Single Judge of this Court can not be accepted as binding. It sufficiently rules out any need of reference to the Larger Bench. 47. It sufficiently rules out any need of reference to the Larger Bench. 47. A copy of circular dated 4.5.1974 issued by Inspector General of Police shows that the police officers were advised not to visit the shops to find out as to whether there is breach of conditions of Abkari license Circular dated 20.4.1982 issued by Home Department shows that even when there is definite information to police that in such a shop, the sale of liquor not covered by the license is made, the police officers are not to visit the shop and they should report about such information to nearest Prohibition and Excise Officer. In Cri. W.P.568/2012 and 56 of 2013, on 12.2.2013, this Court by an interlocutory order directed the State Government to consider the situation again. In pursuance of said order, a meeting was presided over by the Chief Secretary, Government of Maharashtra. Additional Chief Secretary (home), Chief Secretary (state excise) and Additional Secretary (state excise) attended that meeting. Home department of State has thereafter issued a government resolution on 18.7.2013. This GR notices the earlier law as laid down in Ratanlal Gindodiya vs. State and Santosh Laxman Nayak and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors (supra). Government Resolution states that as Prohibition and Excise department is the license-issuing authority, that department is competent to look into complaints of breaches or violations of such license. Hence, police should inform instances of such violations to the excise department for action as per law. It also expects the Police to mainly care and look for offences relating to illicit liquor as also smuggling of liquor and take suitable action. Police as also Prohibition machinery are directed to strictly adhere to these directions. Collector has been asked to take a review of the situation every three months in a meeting with Commissioner of Police or his representative, Superintendent of Police and District Superintendent of State Excise. However, the learned GP has argued that by such a GR statutory power with police has not been and can not be denied. Later Division Bench judgment in Rajesh Narayan Jaiswal Vs. State Of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra) is not looked into by the State Government while arriving at this decision. However, the learned GP has argued that by such a GR statutory power with police has not been and can not be denied. Later Division Bench judgment in Rajesh Narayan Jaiswal Vs. State Of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra) is not looked into by the State Government while arriving at this decision. We have also noted that the State Prohibition and Excise Department has not come up with a plea that it has taken cognizance of the alleged illegal transportation or of violations of terms/conditions of license. None of the Petitioners have pointed out double persecution or prosecution. State Government itself is not supporting the GR. The violation or offense is of carrying the liquor in large quantities i.e. transporting it by public road without requisite authorization i.e. transport permit. The ultimate goal may be to supply it in the dry district or elsewhere. Hence, whether it tantamount to smuggling or not is not very material before this Court. Similarly whether such liquor becomes “illegal” or “licit” liquor is not relevant. 48. Considering the fact that impact of such illegal transport either to a dry district or elsewhere is on society at large and basically, it is for police force to care for public peace, law and order, the Police force is more concerned with the social evil. In State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co. , (1996) 3 SCC 709 , at page 736 : “40. For the sake of completeness, and without prejudice to the above holding, we may examine the alternate line of thought. In Cooverjee Bharucha, a Constitution Bench of this Court expressed its wholehearted concurrence with the opinion of Field, J. in Crowley v. Christensen to the effect that: “There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail; it is not a privilege of a citizen of the State or of a citizen of the United States. As it is a business attended with danger to the community, it may, as already said, be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils. The manner and extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority.” While laying down the said proposition, Mahajan, C.J., speaking for the Court, referred generally to the position obtaining under Article 19(1)(g) and clause (6) of the article. The manner and extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority.” While laying down the said proposition, Mahajan, C.J., speaking for the Court, referred generally to the position obtaining under Article 19(1)(g) and clause (6) of the article. The learned Chief Justice said that the reasonableness of the restriction has to be determined having regard to the nature of the business and the conditions prevailing in that trade. The learned Chief Justice said: “The nature of business is, therefore, an important element in deciding the reasonableness of the restrictions.” These observations, it may be noted, were not made with particular reference to trade in intoxicating liquors but are general in nature. Indeed, it is after making these general observations that the Bench proceeded to refer to and express its concurrence with the observations of Field, J. referred to above. he said observations cannot be read as recognizing a fundamental right to trade in intoxicating liquors. Any such proposition would run counter to the main holding in the decision referred to above. It is true that in Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of J&K, Subba Rao, C.J., speaking for the Constitution Bench, adopted a slightly different approach, viz., every trade is a trade; even the trade in intoxicating liquor is a trade; however, the nature and character of the business is relevant for determining the extent of restrictions that can be placed on such trade or business; inasmuch as intoxicating liquors are inherently harmful to the individuals consuming them and to the society as a whole, it can even be prohibited but it cannot be said that trade or business in intoxicating liquors is not a trade or business within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g). Even adopting this approach, it would be evident—and the decision in Krishna Kumar Narula recognizes it—that the trade and business in intoxicating liquors can be restricted, severely curtailed or even prohibited. The fact that Article 47 of the Constitution expressly speaks of the obligation of the State to endeavor to bring about prohibition of the consumption of intoxicating drinks is itself a clear and definite pointer in this direction. Imposing prohibition is to achieve the directive principle adumbrated in Article 47. The fact that Article 47 of the Constitution expressly speaks of the obligation of the State to endeavor to bring about prohibition of the consumption of intoxicating drinks is itself a clear and definite pointer in this direction. Imposing prohibition is to achieve the directive principle adumbrated in Article 47. Such a course merits to be treated as a reasonable restriction within the meaning of clause (6) of Article 19.” These observations also support need of authority or primacy to be given to the police force in such matters. 49. In continuation of observations supra, a Full Bench judgment of this Court Full Bench of this Court in 2011 (5) Mah.L.J. 412–Jitendra S/o Manindranath Bose Vs. State of Maharashtra and anr.( one of us viz. B.P. Dharmadhikari J. is party to it), has while considering the question of entitlement to claim refund of license fee for the period during which the licensee could not use privilege due to Court's restraining orders has observed :- “5.It is now well settled that no citizen has a fundamental right to trade or do business in intoxicants. The State under its regulatory powers has a right to prohibit every form of activity in relation to manufacture, storage, import, export, sale and possession of intoxicants. Neither can anyone claim against the State, the right to trade or do business in liquor nor can the State be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege. It is observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Har Shankar and others etc. etc. Versus The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner and others etc. ( AIR 1975 SC 1121 ), that since the right in regard to the intoxicants belongs to the State, it is open to the State to part with its right for a consideration and the amount charged to the licensee is not a fee properly so called nor indeed a tax but, is in the nature of the price of a privilege, which the purchaser has to pay in any trading or business transaction. The view expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Har Shankar and others etc. etc. Versus The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner and others etc. ( AIR 1975 SC 1121 ) is consistently followed by the Supreme Court in the decisions reported in AIR 1975 SC 2008 (Panna Lal and others etc., etc. The view expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Har Shankar and others etc. etc. Versus The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner and others etc. ( AIR 1975 SC 1121 ) is consistently followed by the Supreme Court in the decisions reported in AIR 1975 SC 2008 (Panna Lal and others etc., etc. Versus State of Rajasthan and others), 1994 Supp (1) SCC 8 (State of U.P. and others Versus Sheopat Rai and others), (2004) 11 SCC 26 (State of Punjab and another Versus Devans Modern Breweries Ltd. and another) and (2008) 10 SCC 607 (State of Madhya Pradesh and others Versus Lalit Jaggi)”. It, therefore, follows that the licensee carrying on the business in liquor has to conform to the terms and conditions of the grant i.e. license. He can not justify his action on the premise that it is not prohibited by the terms and conditions of the license. Such licensees must strictly restrict their operations to and conduct it only to the extent permitted by the license expressly. Privilege allowed to them can not be enlarged by them in any manner. As there is no challenge to any license condition or a legal provision, we need not delve into the controversy more and reference to various judgments by rival parties, to demonstrate the nature of right to trade in intoxicants is uncalled for. 50. The judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court in MotiLal v. Central Bureau of Investigation and VishalAgrawal v. Chhattisgarh SEBB, and the later Division Bench of this Court (supra) were not looked into by the State Government when it issued GR on 18.7.2013. We find that such circulars cannot over ride the provisions of the Prohibition Act and the provisions of Cr.P.C. So, these circulars or later decision of State Government cannot help the petitioner to oppose initiation of the proceedings like present one. Statutory scheme in provisions made by the Prohibition Act, the Police Act and of Cr.P.C.,1973 can not be defeated or diluted by such subordinate instrument or administrative instruction. None of the statutory provisions give power to State Government to deny to the police its statutory powers. Statutory scheme in provisions made by the Prohibition Act, the Police Act and of Cr.P.C.,1973 can not be defeated or diluted by such subordinate instrument or administrative instruction. None of the statutory provisions give power to State Government to deny to the police its statutory powers. As we find the circulars or the last GR dated 18.7.2013 not sufficient to deny to the police officer, the right to take cognizance and to investigate offences under Prohibition Act according to said enactment, we need not consider the contentions based upon the use of words “illegal / illicit liquor” or “smuggling” in said circulars or GR or dictionary meaning of said words. We also do not find it necessary to judgment dated 24.8.2009 delivered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Cri.W.P. 424 of 2009 adhering to old views. 51. Scope of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be conveniently seen in following judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court. In UmeshKumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591 , at page 605 Hon'ble Apex Court observes: “20. The scope of Section 482 ...... ex debito justitiae. However, in exercise of such powers, it is not permissible for the High Court to appreciate the evidence as it can only evaluate material documents on record to the extent of its prima facie satisfaction about the existence of sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused and the Court cannot look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. Any document filed along with the petition labeled as evidence without being tested and proved, cannot be examined. The law does not ….. undergoing the agony of a criminal trial. (Vide Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate, Ashok Chaturvedi v. Shitul H. Chanchani, G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. and Padal Venkata Rama Reddy v. Kovvuri Satyanarayana Reddy.)”. In State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222, at page 251 : “29. The findings of the High Court that no offence is made out against the respondents under the Essential Commodities Act is also based on the appreciation of ‘the annexures’ and other disputed facts on the record and as such is untenable for the reasons already indicted above.” In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, at page 368, Hon'ble Court observes : “69. As pointed out ....... As pointed out ....... them in this connection. The impugned judgment spells out that the learned Judges of the High Court had felt that the nonfiling of a written statement by a competent authority of the State Government by way of reply to the averments made in the writ petition is a serious flaw on the part of appellants and as such the averments of Shri Bhajan Lal should be held as having disproved the entire crimination alleged in the FIR. The above view of the High Court in our opinion, is neither conceivable nor comprehensible. Further no adverse inference could be drawn on the mere non-filing of a written statement by the State of Haryana in cases of this nature especially when the matter relates to serious disputed facts, yet to be investigated. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Rajinder Sachar the stage is premature and as such the government could not be expected to have in its possession all the details in support of the allegations made in the complaint before any enquiry or investigation is launched and completed. Similarly, the appellants 2 and 3 who are only police officials also cannot be expected to give a detailed reply to the averments made in the writ petition when the investigation has not at all been proceeded with. It will be appropriate to refer to a decision of this Court in State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha (at SCC p. 574) wherein this Court has disapproved the exercise of the extraordinary power of the High Court in issuing a prerogative writ quashing the prosecution solely on the basis of the averments made in the affidavit in the following words: (SCC p. 574, para 28) “The High Court in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction committed a grave error by making observations on seriously disputed questions of facts taking its cue from affidavits which in such a situation would hardly provide any reliable material. In our opinion the High Court was clearly in error in giving the direction virtually amounting to a mandamus to close the case before the investigation is complete. We say no more.” 52. Perusal of Criminal Writ Petition No. 452/2012, shows a prayer for direction to respondent no.3 Police Station Officer not to harass the petitioner in Crime No. 7413/2012. There is a further prayer to stay the proceedings in that Crime number. We say no more.” 52. Perusal of Criminal Writ Petition No. 452/2012, shows a prayer for direction to respondent no.3 Police Station Officer not to harass the petitioner in Crime No. 7413/2012. There is a further prayer to stay the proceedings in that Crime number. As per documents supplied, the said FIR is registered by one Mukesh Jaiswal against the Police Officers of Wardha Police Station. However, in prayer clause after this Crime Number, offence under Sections 65(a)(e) and 77 (a) of the Prohibition Act are mentioned. These offences are registered against Aakash Gawali, Mukesh Jaiswal and others vide FIR No. 6343 dated 10.10.2012. Facts mentioned in this FIR show that upon information received that country liquor is being imported in Wardha District for sale, Police stopped the vehicle and seized 8 boxes containing 384 glass bottles of country liquor and 48 plastic bottles. When they enquired with accused nos.1 to 3 about the owner of said bottles, other accused persons disclosed that the bottles were handed over to them by owner of Village Bar, Mukesh Jaiswal for its delivery to Sonu, Bhendre Bai and Dadu, who illegally sold liquor at Hinganghat. They were asked to show the bar from where they got the liquor and they lead police to a bar at the boundary of the village Sawangi Asola. There they found servant of Mukesh Jaiswal namely Raju Shankargiri, a person who delivered liquor to accused found in vehicle. This servant accepted that he delivered liquor to accused persons and it was to be taken to Hinganghat. 53. Prayers in Criminal Writ Petition No. 568/2012 show prayer to quash FIR No. 6065/2012 under Section 65 (ka) of Prohibition Act. This FIR is registered at Gondpipri police station of District Chandrapur on 08.10.2012. There the police authorities have mentioned that they got information about illegal transport of liquor by road to Gadchiroli. They stopped one Bollero Vehicle and found 75 country liquor bottles and arrested persons named therein. There are total 7 accused in the matter. Petitioner Deepak came to be arrested in that offence later on. He has stated that he is a licence holder staying at Chandrapur and on 08.10.2012, he was at Nagpur. 54. They stopped one Bollero Vehicle and found 75 country liquor bottles and arrested persons named therein. There are total 7 accused in the matter. Petitioner Deepak came to be arrested in that offence later on. He has stated that he is a licence holder staying at Chandrapur and on 08.10.2012, he was at Nagpur. 54. In Criminal Writ Petition No.56/2013, challenge is to FIR No.7100/2012 dated 30.12.2012 under Sections 65 [e][a], 77 [a], 82 and 83 of the Prohibition Act read with Sections 3[1], 181, 130 and 177 of Motor Vehicles Act. It appears that charge sheet has been filed later on, vide charge sheet no. 58/2013 dated 25.01.2013. Perusal of FIR shows that accused no.1 Ganesh and accused no.2 Akash were found carrying 47 bottles of country liquor on a motor cycle. These accused persons have disclosed that it belonged to one Dinesh Narayanrao Mada and it was handed over to them by petitioner no.2 who happens to be servant of petitioner no.1. Petitioner nos. 1 and 2 are alleging to be managing a Bar by name Satyam Bar at Amravati. 55. In Criminal Writ Petition No.60/2013, prayer is to quash and set aside Crime No. 6368/2012 under Sections 65[e][a], 77[a] and 83 of the Prohibition Act. Perusal of this FIR shows that it is registered at police station Wadner, District Wardha on 05.12.2012 under Sections 65[e][a], 77 [a] and 83 of the Prohibition Act, read with Sections 130, 177, 3[1], 181 [5], [1] and 180 of Motor Vehicles Act. The police authorities have mentioned that upon getting information that in a Maruti 800 vehicle, country liquor is being illegally transported; check was arranged and in it, one Sk. Imram Abdul Kadir resident of Hinganghat was caught while driving Maruti 800. He was not possessing any documents. In the said vehicle, 96 bottles of country liquor were found. Vehicle belongs to one Asihish Walmik Patil. Petitioner has stated that police station officer Shri Chaudhari of Wadner Police came to his shop and arrested his servant in Crime No. 6368/2012. 56. In Criminal Writ Petition No.139/2013, petitioners question cognizance taken vide FIR Nos. 6222/2012 and 6223/2012 both dated 27.11.2012 under Section 65 [e][a] of Prohibition Act read with Sections 130[1], 3/181, 5/180 and 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It shows that when information was received and jeep was stopped, it was carrying 1056 country liquor bottles. 56. In Criminal Writ Petition No.139/2013, petitioners question cognizance taken vide FIR Nos. 6222/2012 and 6223/2012 both dated 27.11.2012 under Section 65 [e][a] of Prohibition Act read with Sections 130[1], 3/181, 5/180 and 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It shows that when information was received and jeep was stopped, it was carrying 1056 country liquor bottles. The driver was not possessing any documents. Petitioner no.2 Vijay is shown as accused before the Judicial Magistrate First Class at Kalamb in this offence. Another FIR No.6223/2012 is registered on 27.11.2012. Its perusal reveals that stoppage of jeep and finding of 240 bottles in 5 boxes. Jeep driver was not possessing any documents. Petitioner no.2 Vijay is shown as accused on 30.11.2012 in this matter. Both the petitioners are shown as accused persons on 04.12.2012. 57. In Criminal Writ Petition No. 148/2013, prayer is to quash and set aside FIR No.3042/2012 dated 24.12.2012 under Section 12(a) of the Gambling Act and another FIR No. 6021/2013 dated 24.01.2014 under Sections 65[a][e], 77[a], 82 and 83 of the Prohibition Act, read with Sections 26 and 41 of the Indian Forest Act. In First FIR petitioner is shown as accused no.1 with assertion that it is petitioner no.1 and one Gulab Mahajab were caught red handed at a place while accepting amounts for Gambling. In Crime No. 6021/2013, petitioner figures as accused no.4, prosecution has mentioned that petitioner, in collusion with one Munnaseth managing CLIII shop at Lakhni, was bringing country liquor in Wardha District for selling it illegally at higher cost. Accordingly Maruti Omni vehicle was stopped and in it total 2342 country liquor bottles were found. Persons in the said vehicle informed that goods belonged to petitioner. Respondent nos. 3 to 6 (police officers in person) have urged that charge under Gambling Act is not being seriously assailed by the petitioner before this Cpurt in view of para 6 of the petition. We do not find substance in this submission. Moreover, orders of this Court dated 14.10.2013 and 29.10.2013 show dispute whether bleeding was due to beating or “haitus hernia”. Two inconsistent certificates issued by the same medical officer are produced on record. The question needs determination after suitable evidence during trial. In this situation, the demand for compensation is prematuer. 58. We do not find substance in this submission. Moreover, orders of this Court dated 14.10.2013 and 29.10.2013 show dispute whether bleeding was due to beating or “haitus hernia”. Two inconsistent certificates issued by the same medical officer are produced on record. The question needs determination after suitable evidence during trial. In this situation, the demand for compensation is prematuer. 58. In Criminal Writ Petition No.324/2013, prayer is to quash FIR No. 6042/2013 under Sections 65[a], 82 and 83 of the Prohibition Act. Perusal of FIR reveals that it is registered on 02.04.2013. A motor cycle was stopped and it was found that in a gunny bag on its carrier total 48 country liquor bottles were being carried by one Awdhoot Kathane. He disclosed that he bought the material from the shop of petitioner Jagdish. 59. In Criminal Writ Petition No.328/2013, prayer is to quash FIR No.6113/2013 dated 22.04.2013, under Sections 65[a][e], 77[a] and 83 of the Prohibition Act and Sections 26 and 41 of the Indian Forest Act. Perusal of this FIR shows that after receipt of an intelligence, a 4 wheeler was stopped. Two persons traveling in it tried to flee, but they were apprehended. Enquiry was made with the driver as also other person, who disclosed that Maruti Omni was containing country liquor. The material therein belonged to Munnaseth Lalani, resident of Wadhona Bazar, Yavatmal. Total 364 bottles were seized by the police. 60. In Criminal Application No. 223/2013 prayer is to quash FIR No.6021/2013 for offence punishable under Sections 65[a][e], 77[a], 82 and 83 of the Prohibition Act read with Sections 26 and 41 of the Indian Forest Act. In this case in vehicle Maruti Omni, total 2352 country liquor bottles were found and driver disclosed that the same were belonging to one Shankar Jaiswal, who supplied it to illegal sellers in Wardha district. They have also mentioned that they got paid for transporting the liquor. 61. Thus, in almost in all the matters police after getting information stopped the concerned motor vehicle on public road and found large quantity of country liquor being transported or attempted to be sent either in “dry district” like Wardha or Gadchiroli or elsewhere, without any transport permit. It is in this background that respective FIRs have been registered by the police authorities. The defence of respective accused [petitioners before this court] is of total denial. It is in this background that respective FIRs have been registered by the police authorities. The defence of respective accused [petitioners before this court] is of total denial. Some of the petitioners have claimed that even if case of prosecution is accepted to be correct, persons detained with vehicle have purchased the bottles from the licenced shops of petitioners. Sale by petitioners is in accordance with law and after sale petitioners have no control over the purchasers. 62. At this juncture, it will be worthwhile to see what the Division Bench of this Court in Rajesh Narayan Jaiswal Vs. State Of Maharashtra and Ors. 2012 (4) LJSOFT 27=2012(2) Bom.C.R. (CRI) 15, has observed in paragraphs 14 and 15. Those paragraphs read as under :- “14. It was submitted for the State that the charge sheet is already filed by police. Only few papers of the investigation are produced in the present proceeding. It was submitted for the petitioner that even when charge sheet is filed, the High Court can exercise the jurisdiction under section 482 of Cr.P.C. On this point, two reported cases were cited. (i) AIR 2000 SC 754 (1) (G. Sagar Suri and Anr. Vs. State of U.P. and ors.) (ii) 2009 (3) LJSOFT (SC) 38 = (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 806 ( Dhariwal Tobacco Products Limited and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. The facts of these two cases are altogether different. There cannot be dispute over the proposition that this Court has the power to quash the F.I.R., if, on the basis of material available, it can be said that there is abuse of process of law or no case, at all, can be made out against the petitioner. In view of discussion already made, it cannot be said that there is no power with police to take action in such a case. In view of the facts of the case already discussed, this Court holds that it is not desirable to use extraordinary jurisdiction or inherent powers. It needs to be observed that in such cases, it is desirable for police to inform about such incidents to nearest Prohibition Officer, Excise Department, as there is always possibility of detecting more irregularities and more offences in such a case. However, police can go on with the investigation in such a case. 15. It needs to be observed that in such cases, it is desirable for police to inform about such incidents to nearest Prohibition Officer, Excise Department, as there is always possibility of detecting more irregularities and more offences in such a case. However, police can go on with the investigation in such a case. 15. The aforesaid discussion shows that the rayer made by the petitioner for giving compensation also cannot be considered at this stage. So the petition stands rejected”. 63. When we evaluate the defences of Petitioners like out right sale to the person caught transporting the liquor without transport permit or police authorities acting highhandedly to falsely implicate the licensee or his authorized servant and indulging in criminal activities, we find that several disputed questions arise. Whether their respective licences enabled the Petitioners to sell in bulk to such third persons, whether petitioners can themselves transport their legal stock to any other place without proper transport permit are few of them. When on a day declared to be dry or closed for sale of intoxicants, if the licencee keeps the shop open, it is breach of license terms or a possible threat to law and order situation warranting quick response by the Police is also one of the moot questions. Considering the nature of business and possible impact of any violation, it will have to be left to civil administration but then preventive step by Police can not be said to be unwarranted and without cause of action. In any case, police intervention in such sensitive matters can not be said to be without justification and jurisdiction. The facts either relating to alleged violations or misconduct by or on part of the Petitioners or Licencees, their servants or then with the help of their alleged associates, involvement of any of them, alleged transgression by the Police either in the matter of detection or detention; all are seriously disputed issues. As in most of the cases, the investigation or enquiry is still on and facts or liability etc. are yet to crystallize, no relief can be bestowed upon any Petitioner in this jurisdiction. Though, the Police have yet not reported any offence to the concerned Collector or Superintendent of State Excise, the Excise and Prohibition Department of State Government has not made any grievance. are yet to crystallize, no relief can be bestowed upon any Petitioner in this jurisdiction. Though, the Police have yet not reported any offence to the concerned Collector or Superintendent of State Excise, the Excise and Prohibition Department of State Government has not made any grievance. As we have answered the basic issue against the Petitioners and found no fault with the role of Police machinery, no relief can be given to them in this jurisdiction. The disputed facts warrant appropriate answer either to exonerate them of the charges or to grant them any compensation for alleged persecution. 64. In paragraph no.50 above we have already answered the main issue against the petitioners and upheld the power with police to investigate a cognizable offence in terms of Prohibition Act read with Criminal Procedure Code. In this situation, as individual challenges raise disputed questions of fact and even otherwise looking to the nature of alleged violations or misconducts, we are not inclined to interfere under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. We dispose of all these petitions only with direction to respective Police to communicate the alleged offences and FIRs to the officers of State Excise concerned within two weeks from today. Defences raised and reliefs claimed by the Petitioners, not adjudicated upon above and contingent upon the crystallization of facts are kept open along with stand of respondents in relation thereto. Parties are at liberty to raise it before the Trial Court as per law. 65. All Criminal Writ Petitions are accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs. 66. At this stage, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants seek continuation of interim orders for a period of eight weeks. The request is being opposed by learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the State. We do not find any merit in the request. The same is, therefore, rejected.