Judgment M. Venugopal, J. 1. The Appellants have preferred the present Original Side Appeals as against the order passed by the Learned Single Judge, on the basis of the memo, dated 03.04.2014, in A.Nos.2021 & 2022 of 2013, in C.S.No.242 of 1986. 2. According to the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants, the Learned Single Judge ought not to have been entertained the filing of memo, dated 03.04.2014, in Open Court, by the Applicants therein (some of the Trustees/Respondents in Appeals) and in fact, the relief sought for in the said memo was beyond the purview of A.Nos.2021 & 2022 of 2013 in C.S.No.242 of 1986 pending on the file of this Court. 3. The prime submission of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants is that the Learned Single Judge had committed an error in entertaining a memo filed by some of the Trustees/Respondents whose continuance in office is a subject matter of Application pending before this Court. 4. Added further, the contention of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants is that the Learned Single Judge ought not to have considered the subject without a proper Application by the Respondents/Trustees and without affording due opportunity of the Appellants. 5. Advancing her arguments, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants forcefully projects an argument that a memo normally would be filed in a Court of Law to record certain facts and not to pass an order in the Application. 6. Expatiating her submission, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants strenuously contends that a memo dated 03.04.2014 was filed by the Learned Counsel for the Respondents 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 and the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants/Respondents 1, 2 and 11 prayed time before the Learned Single Judge to file a detail reply and made an endorsement to that effect on the memo. However, no opportunity was given to the Appellants Counsel to raise objections and the memo was ordered in violation of principles of natural justice. 7. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants brings it to the notice of this Court that one Teacher filed W.P.No.22286 of 2012 and the same was dismissed on 27.02.2013. However, no opportunity was given to the Appellants Counsel to raise objections and the memo was ordered in violation of principles of natural justice. 7. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants brings it to the notice of this Court that one Teacher filed W.P.No.22286 of 2012 and the same was dismissed on 27.02.2013. Thereupon, a Writ Appeal was preferred by him in W.A.No.762 of 2013 and the same was also dismissed on 19.03.2014 observing that he was not a regular teacher and he was only a temporary teacher and as such, he could not claim reinstatement. Significantly, these vital facts were not taken into consideration by the Learned Single Judge, while passing orders, on the memo, on 03.04.2014, in A.Nos.2021 & 2022 of 2013. 8. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants submits that the Chairman and Trustee are bound to follow the Scheme Decree and the Bye Law approved by this Court and indeed, the Bye Law gives enough power to the Chairman of the Trust to check the agenda and approve the same. 9. The main grievance of the Appellants is that the Learned Single Judge, while passing orders (on the memo), on 03.04.2014, had failed to appreciate that the Trust Board considering the plight of the students etc., had made it to pass a resolution to close some groups in +2 self financing courses in Resolution No.126, dated 10.12.2008, and in Group I in Resolution No.263, dated 10.06.2011 and the said Resolution No.263 was implemented by the new Trust Board in Resolution No.350 on 13.07.2012. Furthermore, an unanimous resolution was passed by the Trust Board which was not challenged by any one and in the absence of any challenge to the said unanimous decision of the Trust Board, it is not open to the Respondents 1 to 4/Applicants to seek reinstatement of teachers without there being any vacancy. Also that, the closure of Group I in +2 courses was communicated to the concerned educational authorities on 14.09.2012 and as such, there is no question of further conducting classes. 10. On behalf of the Appellants, it is represented before this Court that even assuming that the interested Trustees passed a resolution by majority for reinstatement of teachers, there is no course to accommodate them as on date. 11. 10. On behalf of the Appellants, it is represented before this Court that even assuming that the interested Trustees passed a resolution by majority for reinstatement of teachers, there is no course to accommodate them as on date. 11. Finally, it is the contention of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants that when A.Nos.2021 & 2022 of 2013 in C.S.No.242 of 1986 are ripe for enquiry/arguments, by completion of all pleadings, the Learned Judge should have disposed of the said Applications on merits instead of passing any interim direction on the basis of memo. 12. Per contra, it is the submission of the Learned Counsel for the Respondents 1 to 4 that the Respondents 1 to 4/Applicants filed A.Nos.2021 & 2022 of 2013 praying for passing of an order by this Court for appointing a committee to investigate and to conduct an enquiry about all violations committed by the Respondents and to file a report; and for passing an order to direct the Respondents to reinstate the Applicants in their respective services with backwages and service benefits and when the two Applications are pending before the Learned Single Judge, a memo was filed on behalf of the Respondents 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10, inter alia, stating that the five Trustees submitted a letter dated 02.04.2014 to the Chairman and the Secretary of the Trust requesting them to ratify the resolution to reinstate the teaching staff members with backwages by withdrawing the earlier Resolution No.350 dated 13.07.2012 and Resolution No.263, dated 10.06.2011 by placing this issue as an agenda in the Board Meeting to be convened during the 2nd week of April 2014 and the memo was ordered on 03.04.2014, by the Learned Single Judge, in directing the Secretary of the Appellants Trust, the 11th Respondent (in the Applications) to place the subject in the agenda as per the written request of the five Trustees before the next Trust Board meeting of the P.T. Lee Chengalvaraya Naicker Trust and to file his report for passing appropriate orders. Further, A.Nos.2021 & 2022 of 2013 were directed to be posted on 23.04.2014. 13. Further, A.Nos.2021 & 2022 of 2013 were directed to be posted on 23.04.2014. 13. The contention of the Learned Counsel for the Respondents 1 to 4 is that no prejudice would be caused to the Trust, by placing the issue relating to reinstatement of teaching staff members as an agenda in the Board meeting, which was to be convened during the 2nd week of April 2014 and as per Bye Law, the request of the five Trustees to place the subject matter in issue as an agenda cannot be stifled by any one. 14. The Learned Counsel for the Respondents 1 to 4 submits that the Bye Law enables the Trustees to bring him any subject for consideration as an agenda in the Board Meeting to be held by the Board and in fact, the Bye Law was approved by this Court and that apart, the Chairman and the Secretary of the Trust are bound to follow the Bye Law approved by this Court. 15. The Learned Counsel for the Respondents 7, 8, 10 to 12 projected similar submissions made by the Learned Counsel for the Respondents 1 to 4. However, on behalf of the Respondents 1 to 4, 7, 8, 10 to 12, it is repudiated that on behalf of Respondents 2, 11 and 12, time was sought for to file a detail reply for the memo dated 03.04.2014 filed on behalf of Respondents 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10. 16. According to the Learned Counsel for the Respondents 1 to 4, 7, 8 and 10 to 12, it is contended that the Original Side Appeals filed by the Appellants are not maintainable before this Court, since the rights of parties having not been decided conclusively and finally. In short, the plea taken on behalf of the Respondents 1 to 4, 7, 8, 10 to 12 is that by ordering the memo, the rights of parties have not come to an end. 17. By way of reply, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants submits that the Original Side Appeals filed by the Appellants are maintainable and in this connection, referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank Limited and others V. Chunilal Nanda and others, (2006) 5 Supreme Court Case 399 at special page 411 & 412, in paragraph No.12, wherein, it is held as follows: “12. We will next consider as to whether an intra-court appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent was available against the interlocutory order dated 20.11.1998 containing the directions on merits of the dispute. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for an appeal from a 'judgment' of a single Judge in exercise of original jurisdiction, to a Division Bench. In Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania & Anr. [ AIR 1981 SC 1786 ], the scope of clause 15 of the Letters Patent was considered. This Court held : "The concept of a judgment as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure seems to be rather narrow and the limitations engrafted by sub-section (2) of section 2 cannot be physically imported into the definition of the word 'judgment' as used in Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent because the Letters Patent has advisedly not used the term 'order' or 'decree' anywhere. The intention, therefore, of the givers of the Letters Patent was that the word 'judgment' should receive a much wider and more liberal interpretation than the word 'judgment' used in the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time, it cannot be said that any order passed by a trial Judge would amount to a judgment; otherwise there will be no end to the number of orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent. It seems to us that the word 'judgment' has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense. In other words, a judgment can be of three kinds: (1) A final Judgment .. (2) A preliminary Judgment .. (3) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment - Most of the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and have already been held by us to be judgments within the meaning of the Letters Patent and, therefore, appealable. There may also be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43, Rule 1 but which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality in that, the orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceedings. Before such an order can be a judgment the adverse effect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote. Before such an order can be a judgment the adverse effect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote. (SCC pp.55-56, para 113) * * * ... in other words every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. (SCC p.57, para 115) * * * ...any discretion exercised or routine orders passed by the trial Judge in the course of the suit which may cause some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice one party or the other cannot be treated as a judgment, otherwise the appellate court (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all kinds of orders passed by the trial Judge. ... .. the interlocutory order in order to be a judgment must contain the traits and trappings of finality either when the order decides the questions in controversy in an ancillary proceeding or in the suit itself or in a part of the proceedings. (SCC p.58, para 119)" 18. Also, in the aforesaid Judgment, at page 413, on behalf of the Appellants, a reference was made before this Court, to paragraph No.14, wherein it is observed as follows: “14. The above principle was reiterated in Mithailal Dalsangar Singh vs. Annabai Devram Kini [ 2003 (10) SCC 691 ] and Subal Paul vs. Malina Paul [ 2003 (10) SCC 361 ]. In the latter case, this Court held : (SCC pp. 370-71, paras 32 & 35) "32. While determining the question as regards clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the court is required to see as to whether the order sought to be appealed against is a judgment within the meaning thereof or not. Once it is held that irrespective of the nature of the order, meaning thereby whether interlocutory or final, a judgment has been rendered, clause 15 of the Letters Patent would be attracted. * * * 35. ... Clause 15 of the Letters Patent confers a right of appeal on a litigant against any judgment passed under any Act unless the same is expressly excluded. * * * 35. ... Clause 15 of the Letters Patent confers a right of appeal on a litigant against any judgment passed under any Act unless the same is expressly excluded. Clause 15 may be subject to an Act but when it is not so subject to the special provision the power and jurisdiction of the High Court under clause 15 to entertain any appeal from a judgment would be effective." 19. Apart from the above, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants cites the Judgment of this Court dated 10.01.2013, in L.P.A.No.3 to 6 of 2012, (between K.Vijayalakshmi V. B.Prakasham), wherein, in paragraph No.9, it is observed as follows: “9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.” 20. Continuing further, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants referred to the Judgment of this Court, dated 26.11.2013, in W.A.No.2705 of 2010 and the Judgment dated 22.09.2014 in O.S.A.No.181 of 2013 and O.S.A.No.110 of 2004 to show that unless and otherwise, when interlocutory order decides the valuable right of parties, an Appeal under Clause 15 of Letters Patent is maintainable. 21. This Court has heard the Learned Counsels appearing for the parties and noticed their contentions. 22. It is not in dispute that A.Nos.2021 & 2022 of 2013 filed by the Applicants/Third parties are pending on the file of the Learned Single Judge. Ordinarily, when Applications are pending for consideration, before a Court of Law, filing of memo by the parties concerned seeking an appropriate order for issuance of necessary directions is not a desirable/prudent one, in the considered opinion of this Court. To put it succinctly, ordinarily, a memo would be filed to record certain facts in a given proceedings before a Court of Law. 23. It is to be borne in mind that Order II Rule 1 and 2 of Rules of the High Court, Madras, Original Side, 1956 run as follows: “1. To put it succinctly, ordinarily, a memo would be filed to record certain facts in a given proceedings before a Court of Law. 23. It is to be borne in mind that Order II Rule 1 and 2 of Rules of the High Court, Madras, Original Side, 1956 run as follows: “1. A suit shall be commenced by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as the Chief Justice appoints in this behalf; all other proceedings shall be commenced by petition unless otherwise provided for by these rules or by rules framed under any special Act. 2. All affidavits, interlocutory applications, and other proceedings presented to the Court shall be written, typewritten or printed fairly and legibly etc.” 24. Further, Order XIV of the Original Rules provides for Interlocutory Applications. Order XIV Rule 5(a) and (b) of the said Rules of High Court are extracted as under: “5. (a) A Judge's summons, or Master's summons shall state the provision of law under which it is made and shall not contain more than one prayer unless the prayers are consequential. It shall state only the substance of the order prayed for without any statement of facts or argument. Unless otherwise ordered, any facts required to be proved shall be proved by affidavit. (b) If a party prays for several reliefs on the basis of a common affidavit it is sufficient to sign the original affidavit as required by law which shall accompany one of the Judge's summons. Each other Judge's summons shall be accompanied by a copy of the common affidavit certified by the counsel or the party, if he appears in person, to be a true copy.” 25. As per Rule 7 of Order XIV, the Judge, in case of urgency, may hear any application with respect of any matter. Rule 8 of Order XIV provides that all applications other than those mentioned under Rule 10 of Order XIV, shall be disposed of by the Judge. As per Rule 7 of Order XIV, the Judge, in case of urgency, may hear any application with respect of any matter. Rule 8 of Order XIV provides that all applications other than those mentioned under Rule 10 of Order XIV, shall be disposed of by the Judge. Order XIV Rule 13 of Original Side Rules provides that all applications except appeals filed under R.12 of Order XIV, shall be posted before the Master in the first instance and if the application is one which, either by the Rules or by a direction of the Judge is required to be dealt with by a Judge, the Master shall adjourn the matter to the Judge as soon as the matter is ready for hearing. 26. At this juncture, this Court relevantly points out that in the decision D.Gopalan V. Raghava Naicker & others, 1990-1-L.W.15 (DB), it is observed that non-compliance of Order I of the Rules of High Court, Madras, Original Side, 1956 would not render the proceedings void unless directed by the court. Further, it is held that the proceedings cannot be declared void merely because the application had been moved before the Judge instead of the Master as required by the Rules particularly in the absence of any serious prejudice caused. 27. In the instant case on hand, since an order dated 03.04.2014 was passed by the Learned Single Judge (on the memo filed by Respondents 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10), without providing an opportunity to the Appellants to project their version of the case and consequently, had affected their valuable rights, in law. As such, this Court is of the considered view that the Original Side Appeals filed by the Appellants are perfectly maintainable in law. 28. As such, this Court is of the considered view that the Original Side Appeals filed by the Appellants are perfectly maintainable in law. 28. On a careful of consideration of respective contentions and in view of the fact that the Appellants were not provided with an opportunity to file a reply to the memo dated 03.04.2014, then, this Court, without going into the merits and demerits of the matter and also not delving deep into the subject matter in issues, comes to an inevitable conclusion that the Appellants have been deprived of an opportunity to project their version of the case/stand and on this simple ground alone, this Court is left with no option but to interfere with the order dated 03.04.2014 passed in the memo in A.Nos.2021 & 2022 of 2013, in C.S.No.242 of 1986 by the Learned Single Judge. Consequently, the Original Side Appeals succeed. 29. In the result, the Original Side Appeals are allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The order passed by the Learned Single Judge, on the basis of the memo, dated 03.04.2014, in A.Nos.2021 & 2022 of 2013 in C.S.No.242 of 1986, is hereby set aside by this Court. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.