JUDGMENT 1. Invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'the CPC'), the appellant/plaintiff has preferred this second appeal against the impugned judgment and decree dated 17/11/2005 passed by 10th Additional District Judge (F.T.C.), Raipur in Civil Appeal No.9-A/2005, affirming the judgment and decree dated 30/11/2000 passed by 5th Civil Judge Class-II, Raipur in Civil Suit No. 74-A/1991. [For sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status shown in the suit before the trial Court] 2. Sans unnecessary details, the facts which are essential to be stated for the purpose of disposal of the present second appeal are as under:- 2.1 The appellant/plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction stating inter alia that he is owner of the scheduled suit land, which was shown in the Schedule annexed with the plaint, situated at village-Aarang, Patwari Halka No.60, Revenue Nirikshak Mandal, Aarang, Tahsil and District Raipur. 2.2 It is the case of the plaintiff that on 12/09/1991, the defendant-Municipal Council has taken a decision to construct public urinal on suit land and thereafter issued a notice for commencing the construction work of public urinal, and started construction work, declaring him encroacher leading to filing of the instant suit. 2.3 The defendant filed his written statement contesting the suit pleading inter alia that plaintiff's possession was unauthorized on suit land and on oral request of the some persons and businessmen, public urinal was proposed to be constructed as per decision taken by Council on 07/09/1991, the urinal was constructed over the said land. It is the further case of defendant that the suit is barred for want of imperative statutory notice under Section 319 of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961 (henceforth 'the Act of 1961 ). It is the further case of defendant that the suit is barred for want of imperative statutory notice under Section 319 of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961 (henceforth 'the Act of 1961 ). 2.4 The trial Court on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, framed six issues and answered them as under:- okn&iz’u fu"d”kZ 1- D;k uxjikfyd ifj”kn~ vkjax e-iz- uxj ikfydk vf/kfu;e] 1961 dh /kkjk 18 ds vuqlkj xfBr fudk; gS] vr% nkok xfBr fudk; ds uke ij is’k fd;k tkuk pkfg;s Fkk] ;fn gka rks izHkko\ gka vizpyu ;ksX; ugh gS 2- D;k fookfnr Hkwfe oknh dh iSr`d laifr gS\ vFkok D;k oknh fookfnr Hkwfe dk izfrdwy dCts ds fl)kar vuqlkj Lokeh gS\ Izkekf.kr ugh Izkekf.kr ugh 3- D;k oknh us nkok is’k djus ds iwoZ vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 319 ds varxZr oS/kkfud lwpuk ugh nh gS] vr% nkok fujLr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS \ izekf.kr ugh 4- lgk;rk ,oa O;;\ Okknh dk nkok lO;; fujLr fd;k x;k 5- D;k oknh Hkwfe e-iz- ‘kklu }kjk uxj ikfyd dks iznRr ugh dh x;h gS\ izekf.kr ugh 6- D;k oknh yxkrkj 60 o”kksZ ls nkfo;k Hkwfe ds fojks/kh vkf/kiR; es gksus ls nkfo;k Hkwfe dk Lokeh cu x;k gS\ 2.5 The trial Court, by its judgment and decree dated 30/11/2000 dismissed the suit of the appellant/plaintiff holding that the plaintiff has failed to establish his title over the scheduled suit land and the suit is expressly barred under Section 319 (1) of the Act of 1961 in absence of statutory notice. 2.6 On appeal preferred by the plaintiff under Section 96 of the CPC, the First Appellate Court by its impugned judgment and decree dated 17/11/2005, affirmed the finding of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal of the plaintiffs. 3. Mr. Sanjay Patel, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that both the Courts below have concurrently erred in holding that the suit was not maintainable in absence of statutory notice under Section 319 of the Act of 1961, as such, the suit was for the permanent injunction, therefore, provision of Section 319(1) of the Act of 1961 would not be applicable and such as this second appeal involves substantial question of law for determination. 4. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff and perused the judgment and decree of both the Courts below with utmost circumspection. 5. 4. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff and perused the judgment and decree of both the Courts below with utmost circumspection. 5. In order to have proper comprehension of the attack made to the decree passed by the Trial Court, it will be profitable to have a look of Section 319 of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961, which creates a bar of suit in absence of notice. It provides as under ; "319. Bar of suit in absence of notice.-(1) No suit shall be instituted against any Councilor any Councillor, officer or servant thereof or any person acting under the direction of any such Council, Councillor, officer or servant for anything done or purporting to be done under this Act, until the expiration of two months next after a notice, in writing, stating the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims has been, in the case of a Council delivered or left at its office and in the case of any such member, officer, servant or person as aforesaid, delivered to him or usual place of abode; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. (2) Every such suit shall be dismissed unless it is instituted within eight months from the date of the accrual of the alleged cause of action. (3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any suit instituted under Section 54 of the Specified Relief Act, 1877 (1 of 1877)." 6. From a careful and close reading of Section 319(1) of the Act, it would appear that the suit against the Council shall not be instituted for anything done or purporting to be done under this Act, until the expiration of two months notice, in writing, stating the cause of action is served to the Council and such a suit is barred in absence of notice contemplated under Section 319(1) of the Act of 1961, as such service of such statutory notice is imperative before instituting the suit against Municipality. 7. Very recently, the Supreme Court in case of Nagar Palika Parishad, Mihona and another Vs. 7. Very recently, the Supreme Court in case of Nagar Palika Parishad, Mihona and another Vs. Ramnath and another, 2014 (4) Scale page 704, dealing the identical fact situation has held that suit for declaration against Municipality is not maintainable in absence of notice under Section 319 of the Act of 1961. Para 08 of report states as under: "8. Respondent No.1-plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction. In view of bar of suit for declaration of title in absence of notice under Section 319 the suit was not maintainable. The Courts below wrongly held that the suit was perpetual injunction though the respondent No. 1-plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title and for permanent injunction." 8. Submission of Mr. Patel, learned counsel for appellant/plaintiff that suit was instituted under Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, equivalent to Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and therefore by virtue of subsection (3) of Section 319, the bar en-crafted under Section 319(1), would not be applicable. Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 reads as under: 38. Perpetual injunction when granted-(1) Subject to the other provisions contained in or referred to by this Chapter, a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour, whether expressly or by implication. (2) When any such obligation arises from contract, the court shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter 11. (3) When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff's right to, or enjoyment of, property, the court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, namely: (a) where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff; (b) where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused, or likely to be caused, by the invasion; (c) where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief; (d) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings. 9. Admittedly, the plaintiff filed suit claiming decree for declaration of title and permanent injunction and therefore, it is absolutely incorrect to submit that suit is for permanent injunction only and statutory bar in absence of notice would not be applicable. 9. Admittedly, the plaintiff filed suit claiming decree for declaration of title and permanent injunction and therefore, it is absolutely incorrect to submit that suit is for permanent injunction only and statutory bar in absence of notice would not be applicable. In the considered opinion of this Court, Section 319(1) of the Act of 1961, is squarely attracted to the instant suit filed for declaration of title and permanent injunction. In case of Nagar Palika Parishad (supra), their Lordships' further held as under:- "The benefit aforesaid cannot derive by respondent No.1-plaintiff as the suit was filed for declaration of title coupled with permanent injunction. Respondent No. 1 having claimed title, the suit cannot be termed to be suit for perpetual injunction alone." 10. Thus, the instant suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction is hit by Section 319(1) of the Act of 1961 and Section 319(3) of the Act of 1961 would not save the suit from dismissal being non-maintainable in Law. 11. Both the Courts have concurrently recorded a finding that the plaintiff has not served statutory notice under Section 319(1) of the Act of 1961 before instituting instant suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction, therefore, such a suit is not maintainable in law. The said finding is based on evidence available on record and both the Courts below have rightly dismissed the suit for want of notice under Section 319 of the Act of 1961. There is no perversity, no substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal. 12. Resultantly, the second appeal deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed at the admission stage itself without notice to other side. No order as to costs. Appeal Dismissed.