Judgment : Petitioners have invoked Articles 226/227 of Constitution of India assailing the orders dated 15.09.2003, 11.06.1998 and 22.01.1999 whereby mutation application, moved by the petitioners herein to mutate the name of the petitioners in the revenue record over the property in dispute pursuant to the oral family settlement and subsequent memorandum of family settlement dated 30th September, 1935, was rejected by the Tehsildar and appeal and revision arising therefrom were also came to be dismissed. 2. Brief facts of the present case, inter alia, are that name of Harkishan Lal Sah was recorded in the revenue record as the owner in possession of the property in question. Undisputedly, Shri Harkishan Lal Sah had three brothers, namely, Bhawani Dass Shah, Moti Ram Shah and Kundan Lal Shah. It is stated before me that name of Shri Harkishan Lal Shah was recorded in the revenue record in a representative capacity being elder brother / karta, since, in fact, property was joint Hindu family property of all the four brothers. It is further stated that after the death of Harkishan Lal Shah in the year 1926 sons of Harkishan Lal as well as Bhawani Dass Shah, Moti Ram Sah and Kundan Lal Shah all three brothers of Harkishan Lal Shah agreed to partition the property by way of mutual partition. Consequently, as per the oral settlement (partition) different lots were prepared and handed over to different co-owners and ultimately oral partition so effected was reduced in writing in the shape of memorandum of partition in the year 1935. 3. An application seeking mutation was moved about after 60 years, from the date of memorandum of partition which was initially rejected by the learned Tehsildar vide order dated 26.11.1996, however, appeal arising therefom was allowed by the Assistant Collector, Ranikhet vide order dated 10.09.1997 remanding the mutation case to decide it afresh in accordance with law. After the remand, learned Tehsildar once again dismissed the mutation application vide impugned order dated 11.06.1998, holding that petitioners could not prove themselves successors of Shri Harkishan Lal Shah. Appeal arising thereform was dismissed vide order dated 22.01.1999 and thereafter revision arising thereform was dismissed vide order dated 15.09.2003. Hence present petition. 4. I have heard Mr. B.C. Pandey, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Siddhartha Sah, Advocate for the petitioners and Mr. M.C. Pandey, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Appeal arising thereform was dismissed vide order dated 22.01.1999 and thereafter revision arising thereform was dismissed vide order dated 15.09.2003. Hence present petition. 4. I have heard Mr. B.C. Pandey, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Siddhartha Sah, Advocate for the petitioners and Mr. M.C. Pandey, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Devesh Upreti, Advocate for the respondents and have carefully perused the record. 5. Learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the respondents, raised preliminary objection that petition under Articles 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India, assailing the orders passed in mutation proceedings should not be entertained in view of the availability of efficacious alternate remedy for filing suit for declaration of title. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Virendra Singh Vs. Late Sri Ram Singh and others reported in 2009 (2) U.D. 627 . 6. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioners, vehemently argued that once report of succession or transfer is made to the Tehsildar under Section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, learned Tehsildar is duty bound to hold inquiry and to pass appropriate order on the mutation application so filed as provided under Section 35 of the Act. Further submits that in the present case petitioners were non suited only on the ground that name of the Harkishan Lal Shah was recorded in the revenue record and petitioners could not prove themselves to be legal heirs of Harkishan Lal Shah. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that family settlement shall be treated as a transfer as provided under Section 34 of the Act. Further submits in the present case, learned Tehsildar did not bother to see that mutation was being sought on the basis of transfer (family settlement) and not on the basis of succession. Therefore, order rejecting the mutation application is outcome of non application of judicial mind by the Tehsildar. 8. I have carefully perused the alleged family settlement, annexure No.1 to the writ petition. It is nowhere mentioned in the alleged memorandum of family settlement that name of Shri Harkishan Lal Shah was recorded in the revenue record in representative capacity being Karta of joint Hindu Family. 8. I have carefully perused the alleged family settlement, annexure No.1 to the writ petition. It is nowhere mentioned in the alleged memorandum of family settlement that name of Shri Harkishan Lal Shah was recorded in the revenue record in representative capacity being Karta of joint Hindu Family. I am unable to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that language of the memorandum of family settlement shall demonstrate that property was joint Hindu Family property in view of the fact that sons of Harkishan Lal Shah agreed to partitioned the same admitting the property as joint property. 9. Sections 34, 35 and 38 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 reads as under :- “34. Report of succession or transfer of possession.- (1) Every person obtaining possession of any land by succession or transfer (other than a succession or transfer which has already been recorded under Section 33-A), shall report such succession or transfer to the Tashildar of the Tashil in which the land is situate. (2) [* * * ] (3) [ * * *]. (4) If the person so succeeding, or otherwise obtaining possession, is a minor or otherwise disqualified, the guardian or other person who has charge of his property shall make the report required by this section. (5) No Revenue Court shall entertain a suit or application by the person so succeeding or otherwise obtaining possession until such person has made the report required by this section. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, the word "transfer" includes- (i) a family settlement by which the holding or part of the holding recorded in the record-of-rights in the name of one or more members of that family is declared to belong to another or other members ; or (ii) an exchange of holding or part thereof under Section 161 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. 35. Procedure on report. - On receiving a report of succession or transfer under Section 34, or upon facts otherwise coming to his knowledge, the Tahsildar shall make such inquiry as appears necessary, and if the succession or transfer appears to have taken place, he shall direct the annual registers to be amended accordingly. 35. Procedure on report. - On receiving a report of succession or transfer under Section 34, or upon facts otherwise coming to his knowledge, the Tahsildar shall make such inquiry as appears necessary, and if the succession or transfer appears to have taken place, he shall direct the annual registers to be amended accordingly. Section 38 - Fine for neglect to report - Any person neglecting to make the report required by Section 34 within three months from the date of obtaining possession under a lease, or from the date of the succession or other transfer, shall be liable to a fine not exceeding five times the amount of the fee which would otherwise have been payable under Section 37, or when no fee is leviable, then not exceeding such amount as the State Government may by rule prescribe.” 10. The joint reading of Sections 34, 35 and 38 of the Act would go to demonstrate that transferee or successor of the deceased owner shall report the succession or transfer within three months from the date of succession or transfer as the case may be. As per sub-section (5) of Section 34 of the Act, if succession or transfer is reported, then parties shall be at liberty to approach regular Court for getting their respective title decided. The plain language of Section 35 of the Act also suggests that learned Tehsildar having received the report on transfer or succession as the case may be shall make such inquiry as appears necessary. The words ‘‘shall make such enquiry as appears necessary” demonstrates that if Tehsildar finds that any inquiry is necessary, he shall proceed with the inquiry for the purpose of mutation. However, if Tehsildar is of the opinion that no inquiry is required in the case, in view of the fact that mutation application was moved with undue delay and complicated issues of fact and law are involved and parties may approach the regular Court for getting their title decided, he is not obliged to hold inquiry. Therefore, word ‘shall’ in Section 35 of the Act shall be read as ‘may’. 11. Allahabad High Court in the cases of State of U.P. Vs. Board of Revenue reported in 1993 (2) AWC 932 , Kunj Behari Vs. Board of Revenue reported in 2001 (1) AWC 613 and Ishu Vs. Therefore, word ‘shall’ in Section 35 of the Act shall be read as ‘may’. 11. Allahabad High Court in the cases of State of U.P. Vs. Board of Revenue reported in 1993 (2) AWC 932 , Kunj Behari Vs. Board of Revenue reported in 2001 (1) AWC 613 and Ishu Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2003 (1) AWC 774 has held that mutation proceedings does not decide the right of parties, therefore, parties are at liberty to approach the Court to decide the title, hence, writ jurisdiction arising of the mutation proceedings is barred by the alternative remedy. 12. Likewise, Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Mohammad Iqbal Vs. Government of India reported in 1999 (Supp) CCC 445 has held that mutation does not confer any title on a person, in whose favour it is so attested and parties are at liberty to approach Court to get their respective title decided. 13. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Smt. Sawarni Vs. Smt. Inder Kaur reported in 1996 (7) JT 580 , Balwant Singh Vs. Daulat Singh reported in 1997 (Supp.) CCC 262 (SC) and in the case of Suraj Bhan Vs. Financial Commissioner reported in 2007 (6) SCC 186 has held that mutation entries are relevant for fiscal purpose and substantive rights and title of ownership of contesting claimants can be decided only by competent Court in an appropriate proceedings. 14. This court in the case of Virendra Singh (Supra), having placed reliance on the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the cases of Summer Lal and others Vs. Board of Revenue, 1996 (87) R.D., 569 and Radhey Shyam and another Vs. Chhabi Nathh and others, 2009 (5) A.L.J., 244 also held that mutation proceedings is always summary in nature and complicated question of title cannot be decided in summary proceedings and any finding recorded in summary proceedings cannot be res judicate in subsequent regular title suit. 15. In my considered opinion writ or supervisory jurisdiction as available under Articles 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India may be exercised by this Court only when there seems to be apparent jurisdictional or illegal error in the impugned order taking away substantive right of the party. 16. 15. In my considered opinion writ or supervisory jurisdiction as available under Articles 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India may be exercised by this Court only when there seems to be apparent jurisdictional or illegal error in the impugned order taking away substantive right of the party. 16. Since order on mutation application does not disturb any substantive right of the parties and parties are always at liberty to approach the regular court to get their respective title decided, therefore, I am not inclined to disturb the orders impugned. 17. Consequently, writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. However, petitioners, if so advised, may file regular suit for getting their title decided pursuant to the alleged mutual partition and alleged memorandum of family settlement. 18. In the facts and circumstances of the case, no cost.