JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. This Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the plaintiffs-appellants against the judgment and decree dated 02.08.2001 passed by learned District Judge, Una, in Civil Appeal No.71 of 1997, whereby, he has affirmed the judgment and decree dated 04.04.1997 passed by the learned Sub Judge Ist Class, Court No.II, Amb, District Una, in Case No. 144/1992. 2. Succinctly, the facts of the case as pleaded in the suit are that the plaintiffs were owners-in-possessionof the suit land comprised in Khasra No.746, as entered in the copy of jamabandi for the year 1987-88, situated in village Marwari, Tehsil Amb, District Una. Its area was 0-01-84 hectares, out of which the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs-appellants sold land along with the super-structure vide sale deed dated 03.05.1988 to the defendants/respondents. The super-structure comprised of shops and rooms measuring 62’.3" x 21’.6". The remaining portion of such khasra number was shown by letters ABCD in the site plan and was not sold by the predecessor-in­interest of the plaintiffs-appellants. It is pleaded that the defendants- respondents were clever persons and they procured an agreement dated 11.07.1989 alleged to have been executed by the predecessor­in-interest of the plaintiffs-appellants i.e. Gian Chand. This agreement was the result of fraud and misrepresentation. It is averred that the suit land was still in the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs- appellants, but the defendants-respondents were threatening to take over forcible possession of the same and raise construction thereupon. Therefore, the suit was filed for permanent prohibitory injunction to restrain the defendants-respondents from raising any construction over the suit land in Khasra No.746 and, in the alternate, a decree for possession by way of demolition of the construction or super-structure, if raised during the pendency of the suit or after the institution of the suit, was prayed for. 3. The defendants-respondents filed written statement and raised preliminary objection to the effect that the suit was not maintainable in the present form and objections regarding estoppel, cause of action and no enforceable right qua the suit land, were also raised. On merits, it is averred that Shri Gian Chand, predecessor-in­interest, of the plaintiffs-appellants had agreed vide agreement dated 11.07.1989 to sell the suit land measuring 2 marlas to the defendants- respondents for a consideration of ‘500/-. The consideration was paid and accordingly, they were put in possession on the same date. On merits, it is averred that Shri Gian Chand, predecessor-in­interest, of the plaintiffs-appellants had agreed vide agreement dated 11.07.1989 to sell the suit land measuring 2 marlas to the defendants- respondents for a consideration of ‘500/-. The consideration was paid and accordingly, they were put in possession on the same date. It is further averred that the defendants-respondents have raised construction of latrine etc. on the suit land and that the plaintiffs- appellants are not in possession of the suit land. It was further pleaded that the defendants-respondents had requested the plaintiffs-appellants to accompany them for registration of the sale deed, but they had been postponing the same on one pretext or the other. 4.The plaintiffs-appellants filed replication and denied the allegations of the defendants-respondents made in the written statement and reasserted the claim already taken in the plaint. 5.The learned trial Court on 29.09.1994 framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are owners in possession of the portion of land marked as ABCD as alleged? OPP 2.Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of injunction as prayed for? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the possession of suit land by way of alternative relief, as alleged? OPP. 4.Whether portion of land marked ABCD has been sold by the predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs to defendants vide agreement dated 11.7.89, as alleged, if so, to what effect? OPD 5.Whether the agreement dated 11.7.89 is the result of fraud and misrepresentation, as alleged? OPP 6.Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD 7.Whether the plaintiffs are estopped to file the suit by their acts and conduct? OPD 8.Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action? OPD 9. Relief 6. The learned trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 4th April, 1997, dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, plaintiffs-appellants preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, Una, who vide its judgment and decree dated 02.08.2001 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. It is against this judgment and decree that the plaintiffs-appellants have preferred the present appeal. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, plaintiffs-appellants preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, Una, who vide its judgment and decree dated 02.08.2001 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. It is against this judgment and decree that the plaintiffs-appellants have preferred the present appeal. This Court on 29.11.2001 was pleased to admit the appeal on the following substantial questions of law:- 1.Whether a person having legal right of ownership and possession on the basis of Revenue Record, and whose rights have been threatened can obtain and maintain an injunction in the suit for permanent injunction? 2. Whether under the Transfer of Property Act a contract for sale creates any interest in or charge on the property and passes any title to the prospective vendee so as to defeat the rights of the actual owner? 3.Whether a sale of property above the value of Rs.100/- can be made on the basis of an unregistered instrument or by a contract for sale on the basis of delivery of property? 7.Since all the questions are inter-connected, I proceed to answer the same by common reasonings. 8. Before I proceed further, it is relevant to note that the suit filed by the plaintiffs-appellants is based on the alleged plea of fraud and misrepresentation and the pleadings to this effect are contained in paragraph-3 of the plaint which reads as follows:- “That the portion marked A.B.C.D. which is open land and is in possession of the plaintiff and other co- sharers has never been sold by predecessor-in­interest of the plaintiff as shown red in the site plan prepared by the draughtsman and produced by the plaintiff. The said portion is in the ownership and possession of the plaintiff and other co-sharers. The defendants are very clever and shrewd persons and they have procured a wrong agreement in their favour alleged to have been executed by the predecessor-in­interest of the plaintiffs. The predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs never executed the said agreement to sell and the said agreement is forged and fabricated document and it has no binding effect on the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are in possession of portion marked A.B.C.D. The said agreement is the result of fraud and misrepresentation and is not admitted to be correct. The plaintiffs are in possession of portion marked A.B.C.D. The said agreement is the result of fraud and misrepresentation and is not admitted to be correct. The predecessor-in­interest of the plaintiffs was illiterate person and he has been duped. However, suit land marked by letters A.B. C.D. is in possession of the plaintiffs and the defendants have no concern with the same nor they ever shown the said agreement to sell prior to the filing of the written statement.” 9. The term ‘fraud’ has been defined in Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, to mean :- “17. ‘Fraud’ defined.- ‘Fraud’ means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract:- (1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (3) a promise made without any intention of performing it’; (4) any other act fitted to deceive; (5) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.” Similarly, misrepresentation has been defined in Section 18 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, to mean:- “18. “Misrepresentation’ defined.- “Misrepresentation” means and includes- (1) the positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that which is not true, though he believes it to be true; (2) any breach of duty which, without an intent to deceive, gains an advantage of the person committing it, or any one claiming under him, by misleading another to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of any one claiming under him; (3) causing, however innocently, a party to an agreement, to make a mistake as to the substance of the thing which is the subject of the agreement.” 10.In terms of the Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to give necessary particulars as are exemplified in the forms provided in the Code of Civil Procedure with particulars (with dates and items if necessary) as would be clear from the bare perusal of this provision which reads as follows:- “Order 6 Rule 4. Particulars to be given where necessary.- In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars ( with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading.” 11.A perusal of the plaint would clearly go to show that the pleadings of the fraud and misrepresentation are totally deficient and do not meet the requirement of the Code ibid. Rule 4 of Order 6 of the Code requires particulars with dates, items to be stated in the pleadings, inter alia, in cases of misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default or undue influence. The object of insisting of such particulars is two folds : “(i) It enable the opposite party to know the case he has to meet with; and (ii) It prevents the issue being enlarged and enables the Court to determine the controversy at the earliest.” 12.Under this rule, where fraud and misrepresentation are alleged, necessary particulars have to be stated in the pleading. The allegations must be clear, definite, express and specific. It is not enough to allege fraud or misrepresentation without stating particulars with dates and items as to such fraud or misrepresentation. General allegations, however strong, if unaccompanied by sufficient particulars are not enough and the Court will not take notice. It has also been held that a plaint seeking relief on the allegation of fraud, but omitting to give particulars does not disclose the cause of action. 13.Keeping in view the aforesaid well settled principles of law, I proceed to scrutinize the evidence of the parties. In order to prove their ownership over the suit land, the plaintiffs-appellants examined PW-1 Balram Singh, Draughtsman, who has prepared the site plan Ex.PW1/A and thereafter examined Shri R.S.Bhatti as PW-2, who was an Advocate and appointed as Local Commissioner during the pendency of the suit. His report Ex.PW2/A is on the record. The plaintiff has not stepped into the witness box and has chosen to examine one Shri Balwant Singh (PW-3) his attorney appointed vide Ex.PW3/A. This witness has stated that the suit land belongs to the plaintiffs-appellants and that the defendants-respondents have been threatening to encroach upon the same. His report Ex.PW2/A is on the record. The plaintiff has not stepped into the witness box and has chosen to examine one Shri Balwant Singh (PW-3) his attorney appointed vide Ex.PW3/A. This witness has stated that the suit land belongs to the plaintiffs-appellants and that the defendants-respondents have been threatening to encroach upon the same. He has further stated that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs-appellants never executed any agreement qua the suit land in favour of the defendants- respondents. In cross-examination, he has denied that the defendants-respondents have raised construction of a latrine and bathroom on the suit land. He has also stated that the agreement is fraud. 14.The plaintiffs-appellants placed on record copy of the jamabandi Ex.P-1 which shows ownership and possession of Gian Chand, predecessor-in-interest, of the plaintiffs-appellants over the suit land measuring 0-01-84 hectares comprised in Khasra No.746, out of which 6 marlas have already been sold on 03.05.1988 while remaining 2 marlas is the suit land therein. 15.In rebuttal, the defendants-respondents have examined one of the defendants i.e. Mohan Lal, who stepped into the witness box as DW-1 and stated that earlier the suit land measuring 6 marlas was purchased by them from Gian Chand on 03.05.1988 and the suit land measuring 2 marlas was subsequently purchased vide agreement Ex.DW1/A on 11.07.1989 from Gian Chand for ‘500/-. In cross-examination, he has stated that Gian Chand put his thumb- impression on the agreement which was witnessed by the witnesses so present as also in the presence of the parties. He further stated that the agreement in question had been written at Marwari village. 16.The scribe of the agreement Ex.DW1/A Shri Ami Chand appeared as DW-2, who stated that he had scribed the agreement at the instance of the parties thereto whereafter it was read over and explained to Gian Chand, who put his thumb impression on the same. He also stated that the factum of such agreement having been entered into between the parties was entered at Serial No.319 on 11.07.1989 in his register maintained for such purpose. In cross- examination, this witness denied the suggestion that this document had not been entered in the register of deed writer. He also stated that the factum of such agreement having been entered into between the parties was entered at Serial No.319 on 11.07.1989 in his register maintained for such purpose. In cross- examination, this witness denied the suggestion that this document had not been entered in the register of deed writer. 17.The Pradhan of Gram Panchayat, Marwari, Krishan Rana, has appeared as DW-3 and stated that he verified from the parties including Gian Chand regarding the agreement and the sale consideration and had thereafter put his signatures and stamp on the agreement Ex.DW1/A. In cross-examination, he has stated that he had enquired from Gian Chand at about 4/4.30 p.m. on 11th July, 1989 about the agreement and on determination of the same by Shri Gian Chand, he had thereafter attested it. 18.The defendants-respondents placed on record copy of jamabandi for the year 1973-74 Ex.D-1, copy of missal haqiyat bandobast for the year 1987-88 Ex.D-2 which showed the ownership and possession of Gian Chand over the suit land. The agreement Ex.DW-1/A is of later date as the same has been executed on 11.07.1989. 19.The plaintiffs-appellants, in rebuttal, examined one Kuldeep Chand (PW-4), who was one of the attesting witnesses to the agreement Ex.DW1/A. He stated that no such agreement was prepared in his presence, however, in his cross-examination, this witness admits that he is a graduate and that he knows Hi ndi and English, but he signed Ex.DW1/A without reading it. 20.The learned Courts below have correctly held that the plea of fraud and misrepresentation has not been established on record as there is a solitary and self-serving statement of Balwant Singh, the power of attorney, of the plaintiffs-appellants, apart from, the statement of Kuldeep Chand (PW-4). In case the statement of Balwant Singh is perused, then it is established on record that this witness is not even aware as to whether the agreement was executed by Gian Chand or not. Therefore, in this background, his statement is of no significance because he was appointed attorney by the plaintiffs-appellants in the year 1992, whereas, the agreement Ex.DW1/A is dated 11th July, 1989. Therefore, in this background, his statement is of no significance because he was appointed attorney by the plaintiffs-appellants in the year 1992, whereas, the agreement Ex.DW1/A is dated 11th July, 1989. Likewise, the statement of Kuldeep Chand (PW-4) does not inspire any confidence and, in fact, his statement appears to be a total lie when he claims that no agreement had been executed in his presence by Gian Chand because it is scribed in Hindi script and this witness is not only a graduate, but admittedly, knows both English and Hindi scripts. It is unimaginable and unbelievable at all that this witness signed the document Ex.DW1/A without going through it. 21.There is yet another reason for dismissing the appeal. The plaintiffs-appellants, admittedly, have not stepped into the witness box and only Balwant Singh, attorney, made himself available for examination on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants. As has already been noticed hereinabove, the agreement Ex.DW1/A was alleged to have been executed on 11.07.1989 while Shri Balwant Singh has been appointed attorney by the plaintiffs-appellants vide Ex.PW3/A in the year 1992. There is no relationship established on record between the plaintiffs-appellants and Shri Balwant Singh. Admittedly, Balwant Singh has no knowledge regarding the agreement executed by Gian Chand. Therefore, in this fact situation, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs-appellants to have stepped into the witness box and having failed to do so, I have no other option but to draw an adverse inference against the plaintiffs-appellants under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act for with-holding evidence. Section 114(g) reads as follows:- “Clause (g): Non-examination of witness.- Merely because number of witnesses cited by the investigating agency have not been examined by the prosecution, presumption cannot be drawn against the prosecution when the evidence adduced are sufficient to prove the charge against the accused. Section 114(g) reads as follows:- “Clause (g): Non-examination of witness.- Merely because number of witnesses cited by the investigating agency have not been examined by the prosecution, presumption cannot be drawn against the prosecution when the evidence adduced are sufficient to prove the charge against the accused. However, in specified circumstances, adverse presumption may be drawn under clause (g) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act.” 22.It is settled law that where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness box and state his own case on oath and further does not offer himself for cross-examination by other side, a presumption under Section 114(g) would arise that the case set up by him was not correct as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ishwar Bhai C.Patel alias Bachu Bhai Patel versus Harihar Behera and another (1999) 3 SCC 457 wherein it has been held as under:- “17. Admittedly respondent No. 1 had an account in the Central Bank of India Limited, Sambalpur Branch which his father, namely, respondent No. 2, was authorised to operate. It is also an admitted fact that it was from this account that the amount was advanced to the appellant by respondent No. 2. It has been given out in the statement of respondent No. 2 that when the appellant had approached him for a loan of Rs. 7,000/-, he had explicitly told him that he had no money to lend whereupon the appellant had himself suggested to advance the loan from the account of respondent No. 1 and it was on his suggestion that the respondent No. 2 issued the cheque to the appellant which the appellant, admittedly, encashed. This fact has not been controverted by the appellant who did not enter the witness box to make a statement on oath denying the statement of defendant (respondent) No. 2 that it was at his instance that respondent No. 2 had advanced the amount of Rs. 7,000/- to the appellant by issuing a cheque on the account of defendant (respondent) No. 1. Having not entered into the witness box and having not presented himself for cross-examination, an adverse presumption has to be drawn against him on the basis of principles contained in illustration (g) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. 18. 7,000/- to the appellant by issuing a cheque on the account of defendant (respondent) No. 1. Having not entered into the witness box and having not presented himself for cross-examination, an adverse presumption has to be drawn against him on the basis of principles contained in illustration (g) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. 18. As early as in 1927, the Privy Council in Sardar Gurbaksha Singh v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1927 PC 230, took note of a practice prevalent in those days of not examining the parties as a witness in the case and leaving it to the other party to call that party so that the other party may be treated as the witness of the first party. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as under :- “Notice has frequently been taken by this Board of this style of procedure. It sometimes takes the form of a manoeuvre under which counsel does not call his own client, who is an essential witness, but endeavours to force the other party to call him, and so suffer the discomfiture of having him treated as his, the other party’s, own witness. This is thought to be clever, but it is a bad and degrading practice. Lord Atkinson dealt with the subject in Lal Kunwar v. Chiranji Lal (1910) ILR 32 All 104), calling it “a vicious practice, unwo rthy of a high-toned or reputable system of advocacy.” 19. They further observed as under :- “But in any view her non-appearance as a witness, she being present in Court, would be the strongest possible circumstance going to discredit the truth of her case.” 20. Their Lordships also took note of the High Court finding which was to the following effect :- “It is true that she has not gone into the witness box, but she made a full statement before Chaudhri Kesar Ram, and it does not seem likely that her evidence before the Subordinate Judge would have added materially to what she had said in the statement. 21. They observed :- “Their Lordships disapprove of such reasoning. The true object to be achieved by a Court of justice can only be furthered with propriety by the testimony of the party who personally knowing the whole circumstances of the case can dispel the suspicions attaching to it. 21. They observed :- “Their Lordships disapprove of such reasoning. The true object to be achieved by a Court of justice can only be furthered with propriety by the testimony of the party who personally knowing the whole circumstances of the case can dispel the suspicions attaching to it. The story can then be subjected in all its particulars to cross- examination.” 22. This decision has since been relied upon practically by all the High Courts. The Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh, AIR 1930 Lahore 1, observed as under :- “It is significant that while the plaintiffs put the defendant in the witness-box they themselves had not the courage to go into the witness-box. Plaintiffs were the best persons to give evidence as to the “interest” possessed by them in the institution and their failure to go into the witness-box must in the circumstances go strongly against them.” 23. This decision was also relied upon by the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh, AIR 1931 Bombay 97, which observed as under :- “It is the bounden duty of a party personally knowing the facts and circumstances, to give evidence on his own behalf and to submit to cross-examination and his non­appearance as a witness would be the strongest possible circumstance which will go to discredit the truth of his case.” 24. The Lahore High Court in two other cases in 1934, namely, Bishan Das v. Gurbakhsh Singh, AIR 1934 Lahore 63 (2) and Puran Das Chela v. Kartar Singh, AIR 1934 Lahore 398 took the same view. 25. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Devji Shivji v. Karsandas Ramji, AIR 1954 Patna 280, relying upon the decision of the Privy Council in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh v. Gurdial Singh (AIR 1927 PC 230) (supra) and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat, AIR 1970 MP 225 have also taken the same view. The Madhya Pradesh High Court also relied upon the following observation of the Calcutta High Court in Pranballav Saha v. Sm. Tulsibala Dassi, AIR 1958 Cal 713 :- “The very fact that the defendant neither came to the box herself nor called any witness to contradict evidence given on oath against her shows that these facts cannot be denied. The Madhya Pradesh High Court also relied upon the following observation of the Calcutta High Court in Pranballav Saha v. Sm. Tulsibala Dassi, AIR 1958 Cal 713 :- “The very fact that the defendant neither came to the box herself nor called any witness to contradict evidence given on oath against her shows that these facts cannot be denied. What was prima facie against her became conclusive proof by her failure to deny.” 26. The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virender Nath, AIR 1971 All 29 , held that :- “the explanation of any admission or conduct on the part of a party must, if the party is alive and capable of giving evidence, come from him and the Court would not imagine an explanation which a party himself has not chosen to give.” 27. It was further observed that :- “If such a party abstains from entering the witness box it must give rise to an inference adverse against him. 28. A Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court also in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand, AIR 1974 P & H 7, drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that if a party does not enter into the witness box, an adverse presumption has to be drawn against that party. 29. Applying the principles stated above to the instant case, it would be found that in the instant case also the appellant had abstained from the witness box and had not made any statement on oath in support of his pleading set out in the written statement. An adverse inference has, therefore, to be drawn against him. Since it was specifically stated by respondent No. 2 in his statement on oath that it was at the instance of the appellant that he had issued the cheque on the account of respondent No. 1 in the Central Bank of India Ltd., Sambalpur Branch, and the appellant, admittedly, had encashed that cheque, an inference has to be drawn against the appellant that what he stated in the written statement was not correct. In these circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in decreeing the suit of respondent No. 1 in its entirety and passing a decree against the appellant also. In these circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in decreeing the suit of respondent No. 1 in its entirety and passing a decree against the appellant also. 23.Similar observations have been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vidhyadhar versus Manikrao and another (1999) 3 SCC 573 which reads as follows:- “1 7.Where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness-box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct as has been held in a series of decisions passed by various High Courts and the Privy Council beginning from the decision in Sardar Gurbaksh Singh v. Gurdial Singh AIR 1927 PC 230. This was followed by the Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh AIR 1930 Lah 1 and the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh AIR 1931 Bom 97. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat AIR 1970 MP 225 also followed the Privy Council decision in Sardar Gurbaksh Singh case. The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virendra Nath AIR 1971 All 29 held that if a party abstains from entering the witness box, it would give rise to an adverse inference against him. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand AIR 1974 P&H 7 drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872 against a party who did not enter the witness box.” 24.Apart from, the pleadings not being in conformity with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code, there is otherwise total lack of evidence to prove the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation. On the other hand, the defendants-respondents have successfully proved the execution of agreement Ex.DW1/A by examining not only the defendant, but also, the scribe and witnesses of such document. The plaintiffs-appellants do not have prima facie case. In the agreement Ex.DW1/A a clear recital is found whereby the possession of the suit land has been delivered by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs-appellants to the defendants-respondents on 11.07.1989 after Gian Chand having received full sale consideration of ‘500/-. The plaintiffs-appellants do not have prima facie case. In the agreement Ex.DW1/A a clear recital is found whereby the possession of the suit land has been delivered by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs-appellants to the defendants-respondents on 11.07.1989 after Gian Chand having received full sale consideration of ‘500/-. Lastly, I may observe that since the plaintiffs-appellants were out of possession and did not deny the execution of document, but only denied the contents, insofar as the area depicted in such agreement is concerned, the suit for injunction was not maintainable. The plaintiffs- appellants were required to seek a declaration for having any instrument i.e. agreement of sale Ex.DW1/A and in absence thereof, the suit simpliciter for injunction at their instance was not maintainable. Moreover, the plaintiff has not stepped in the witness box to state her case on oath and further has not offered herself for cross-examination calling for adverse inference against her. 25.In view of the detailed discussion hereinabove, I do not find any merit in the present appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. The judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below are upheld leaving the parties to bear their own costs.