JUDGMENT : SANJAY KAROL, J. 1. Appellant-convict Karamjit Singh alias Amarjit Singh (hereinafter referred to as accused-convict Amarjit Singh) has assailed judgment dated 29.3.2008/ 31.3.2008, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Solan, Himachal Pradesh, in Sessions Trial No.4-NL/7 of 2007, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh v. Karamjit Singh and others, whereby he stands convicted of having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs.20,000/- and in default thereof, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. 2. It is the case of prosecution that in the night intervening 12th-13th August, 2006, convict Amarjit Singh alongwith his two other brothers, namely Paramjit Singh alias Pamma and Guljit Singh, murdered their father Shri Balwant Singh with a Barchha (spear) (Ex.P-2) and danda. Separately, they also strangulated their mother Smt. Ravinder Kaur in the fields. Thereafter, they together burnt their dead bodies by setting their hutment (Chaan/ Chhappar) on fire in village Jhida. On 13.8.2006 at about 5.30 a.m., accused Amarjit Singh went to the house of Kamal Kumar (PW-1), resident of another village, i.e. village Manjauli, Tehsil Nalagarh, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, and confessed that “he” had burnt his parents by setting the hutment on fire, for the reason that they were not giving him his share in the land for construction of a house. Kamal Kumar (PW-1) telephonically informed the police about the incident, when Som Dutt (PW-19), SHO of Police Station, Nalagarh, proceeded to the spot. On the way, he met Kamal Kumar (PW-1) in village Maganpura and recorded his statement (Ex. PA), on the basis of which Ruka (Ex.PW-19/A) was sent to Police Station, Nalagarh, which led to registration of FIR No.204 dated 13.8.2006 (Ex. PX-VIII), under the provisions of Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. Superior officers of the Police Department were also informed of the incident. On the request of Som Dutt, Officers of the Forensic Department reached the spot and conducted necessary investigation. Inquest reports (Ex. PK, PK-1, Ex. PL and Ex. PL-1) were prepared; spot of crime was got photographed and videographed. Photographs (Ex. PW-16/A to PW-16/O and PW-17/C to PW- 17/L), and CD (video) (Ex.PW-16/A-19) of the spot were prepared. Incriminating articles in the shape of knife (Barchha) (Ex. P-2), ashes (Ex. Inquest reports (Ex. PK, PK-1, Ex. PL and Ex. PL-1) were prepared; spot of crime was got photographed and videographed. Photographs (Ex. PW-16/A to PW-16/O and PW-17/C to PW- 17/L), and CD (video) (Ex.PW-16/A-19) of the spot were prepared. Incriminating articles in the shape of knife (Barchha) (Ex. P-2), ashes (Ex. P-4), soil (Ex.P-6), piece of cloth, metal Kara (Ex.P-12), copper ring (Ex. P-13), allegedly worn by the deceased, were recovered. Dr. Sukhwinder Singh (PW-10) also collected samples of tissues and bones. Smt. Narmal Kaur (PW-2), daughter and Shri Yadvinder Singh (PW-6), another son of the deceased were associated during investigation. 3. On 13.8.2006 itself, accused Amarjit Singh was arrested. On 16.8.2006, accused Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh also confessed and confided their guilt with Kamal Kumar, of having murdered their parents alongwith accused Amarjit Singh. Confessional statement (Ex. PW-19/J) was recorded by the police. Also, Amarjit Singh, in custody, made statement dated 16.8.2006 (Ex.PX-II) to the effect that his brothers Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh were also involved in the incident. As such, they were arrested. All three accused persons made disclosure statements, which led to recovery of button (Ex. P-7) and gold ear ring (Ex. P-16) of Smt. Ravinder Kaur from the fields. They also led the police to the place where they had murdered their parents. Incriminating articles so recovered from the spot were sent for chemical analysis and reports (Ex. PW-9/A, 10/B, 10/C and 17/A) from the Director, State Forensic Science Laboratory, Junga, pertaining to weapon of offence (Ex. P-2), ashes (Ex. P-4) and soil (Ex. P-6), pieces of flesh and bones, were obtained by the police. Also, report (Ex. PW-18/A) from the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh, was obtained by the police, which prima facie revealed that the accused, after murdering their parents, had burnt their bodies. 4. With the completion of investigation, which prima facie revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 5. Accused were charged for having committed offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 302 & 201, both read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, to which they did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 6. 5. Accused were charged for having committed offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 302 & 201, both read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, to which they did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 6. In order to establish its case, prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses and statements of the accused under the provisions of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were also recorded, in which they took defence of false implication. No evidence in defence was led. 7. Based on the testimonies of witnesses and the material on record, trial Court convicted accused Amarjit Singh of having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him as aforesaid, but acquitted him of offence punishable under Sections 201 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Co-accused Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh stand acquitted on all counts. Hence, the present appeal by accused Amarjit Singh. 8. Trial Court found the prosecution case, based on the following circumstances, to have been duly proved on record: (i) motive – disinheritance from property, (ii) extra judicial confession, (iii) disclosure statements, which led to recovery of incriminating articles, and (iv) recovery of remnants of bodies of the deceased. Significantly, Court found that even though Kamal Kumar (PW-1) did not support the prosecution qua guilt of co-accused Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh, but however, his testimony, qua accused Amarjit Singh, proving extra judicial confession, was beyond doubt, fully inspiring in confidence and stood corroborated by Jaspal Singh (PW-4). 9. Trial Court found the alleged extra judicial confession (Ex. PW- 19/J) made by accused Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh not to have been proved, in fact belied by Kamal Kumar and Nirmal Kaur (PW-2). However, extra judicial confession (Ex.PA) made by accused Amarjit Singh was found to have been duly proved, through the otherwise inspiring testimony of Kamal Kumar (PW-1), duly corroborated by Jaspal (PW-4). Also trial Court found the prosecution to have proved the remnants recovered from the spot to be that of bodies of deceased Balwant Singh and Ravinder Kaur, parents of the accused. Through the testimony of Dr. Sukhwinder Singh (PW-10) and Dr. Also trial Court found the prosecution to have proved the remnants recovered from the spot to be that of bodies of deceased Balwant Singh and Ravinder Kaur, parents of the accused. Through the testimony of Dr. Sukhwinder Singh (PW-10) and Dr. J.R. Gaur (PW- 17), prosecution story of the accused having strangulated deceased Ravinder Kaur (mother) in the fields was not found to have been established on record, beyond reasonable doubt, for the reason that articles (ear-ring and button) shown to have been recovered on 16.8.2006, stood deposited in the Malkhana on 13.8.2006 itself. The fact that copy of FIR was sent to Halqua Magistrate on 14.8.2006 was found not to be fatal. Even though disclosure statement made by co-accused Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh was found to be shrouded with suspicious circumstances, but however such statement with respect to accused Amarjit Singh was found to have been proved on record. 10. Since trial Court observed that “from the evaluation of the prosecution material discussed above, it is crystallized that the circumstantial evidence brought on record contains in it positive proof, credible sequence of events and factual truth linking the accused Amarjit Singh alias Karamjit Singh with the commission of the offence by means of doing to death his own parents. It is he who is found to have caused their death by murdering them and consigning them to flames in the chhaan (thatched hutment). Though, the possibility of other two accused cannot be ruled out, but for want of evidence, as the recoveries effected on 16.8.2006 have been found to be wanting, the benefit of doubt has been given to them. It is all probability, this sinister and diabolical plan could not be executed single handedly but due to the discrepant investigation and evidence produced on record by the prosecution the two other accused have been given benefit”, on 9.7.2014, we directed the State to obtain appropriate instructions from the relevant authority. On 25.11.2014, learned Additional Advocate General, under instructions, made a statement that no appeal against the judgment of acquittal of co-accused Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh stands filed or was sought to be filed by the State. 11. On 25.11.2014, learned Additional Advocate General, under instructions, made a statement that no appeal against the judgment of acquittal of co-accused Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh stands filed or was sought to be filed by the State. 11. It is a settled principle of law that when allegedly several persons commit an offence in furtherance of common intention and all except one are acquitted, it is open to the appellate court to find out, on reappraisal of evidence whether some of the accused persons stood wrongly acquitted, although it would not interfere with such acquittal in the absence of any appeal by the State Government. The effect of such finding is not to reverse the order of acquittal into one of conviction or visit the acquitted person with criminal liability. The finding is relevant only in invoking against the convicted person his constructive criminality. (See: Brathi alias Sukhdev Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) 1 SCC 519 ). 12. That skeletal parts and ashes recovered from the spot belonged to Shri Balwant Singh and Smt. Ravinder Kaur is not an issue before us. From the remnants of dead bodies so recovered from the spot, such fact stands established on record. Testimonies of Vijay Singh Jamwal (PW-9), Gian Thakur (PW-11), Dr. J.R. Gaur (PW-17) and Dr. Sanjeev (PW-18), who have proved reports (Ex. PW-9/A, Ex. PW-11/A, Ex.PW-17/A and Ex. PW-18/A) as also Kishore Kumar (PW-8) and Dr. Sukhwinder Singh (PW-10), who have proved death certificates (Ex.PX-X & PX-XI), evidently establish such fact. Even the accused has not assailed the findings returned by the Court below on this count. 13. We are faced with a situation where trial Court disbelieved version of Kamal Kumar (PW-1) of co-accused Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh having made any confessional statement and accepted such version with respect to appellant Amarjit Singh. In our considered view, prosecution case primarily rests upon appreciation of testimony of this witness. 14. In the instant case, there is no eye witness to the crime. Since the prosecution case primarily rests upon the alleged confessional statement and circumstantial evidence, we shall first deal with the law on the issue. 15. Law with regard to confessional statement is now well settled. The apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 , has held thus: “18. Confessions may be divided into two classes, i.e. judicial and extrajudicial. 15. Law with regard to confessional statement is now well settled. The apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 , has held thus: “18. Confessions may be divided into two classes, i.e. judicial and extrajudicial. Judicial confessions are those which are made before Magistrate or Court in the course of judicial proceedings. Extra-judicial confessions are those which are made by the party elsewhere than before a Magistrate or Court. Extra-judicial confessions are generally those made by a party to or before a private individual which includes even a judicial officer in his private capacity. It also includes a Magistrate who is not especially empowered to record confessions under Section 164 of the Code or a Magistrate so empowered but receiving the confession at a stage when Section 164 does not apply. As to extra-judicial confession, two questions arise : (i) were they made voluntarily ? And (ii) are they true? As the section enacts, a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceedings, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise, (1) having reference to the charge against the accused person, (2) proceeding from a person in authority, and (3) sufficient, in the opinion of the Court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. It follows that a confession would be voluntary if it is made by the accused in a fit state of mind, and if it is not caused by any inducement, threat or promise which has reference to the charge against him, proceeding from a person in authority. It would not be involuntary, if the inducement, (a) does not have reference to the charge against the accused person, or (b) it does not proceed from a person in authority; or (c) it is not sufficient, in the opinion of the Court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that, by making it, he could gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. Whether or not the confession was voluntary would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, judged in the light of Section 24. The law is clear that a confession cannot be used against an accused person unless the Court is satisfied that it was voluntary and at that stage the question whether it is true or false does not arise. If facts and circumstances surrounding the making of a confession appear to cast a doubt on the veracity or voluntariness of the confession, the Court may refuse to act upon the confession, even if it is admissible in evidence. One important question, in regard to which the Court has to be satisfied with is, whether when the accused made confession, he was a free man or his movements were controlled by the police either by themselves or through some other agency employed by them for the purpose of securing such a confession. The question whether a confession is voluntary or not is always a question of fact. All the factors and all the circumstances of the case, including the important factors of the time given for reflection, scope of the accused getting a feeling of threat, inducement or promise, must be considered before deciding whether the Court is satisfied that (in) its opinion the impression caused by the inducement, threat or promise, if any, has been fully removed. A free and voluntary confession is deserving of highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the highest sense of guilt. [See R. v. Warwickshall; (1783) Lesh 263)]. It is not to be conceived that a man would be induced to make a free and voluntary confession of guilt, so contrary to the feelings and principles of human nature, if the facts confessed were not true. Deliberate and voluntary confessions of guilt, if clearly proved, are among the most effectual proofs in law. An involuntary confession is one which is not the result of the free will of the maker of it. So where the statement is made as a result of the harassment and continuous interrogation for several hours after the person is treated as an offender and accused, such statement must be regarded as involuntary. An involuntary confession is one which is not the result of the free will of the maker of it. So where the statement is made as a result of the harassment and continuous interrogation for several hours after the person is treated as an offender and accused, such statement must be regarded as involuntary. The inducement may take the form of a promise or of threat, and often the inducement involves both promise and threat, a promise of forgiveness if disclosure is made and threat of prosecution if it is not. (See Woodroffe Evidence, 9th Edn. Page 284). A promise is always attached to the confession, alternative while a threat is always attached to the silencealternative; thus, in the one case the prisoner is measuring the net advantage of the promise, minus the general undesirability of a false confession, as against the present unsatisfactory situation; while in the other case he is measuring the net advantages of the present satisfactory situation, minus the general undesirability of the confession against the threatened harm. It must be borne in mind that every inducement, threat or promise does not vitiate a confession. Since the object of the rule is to exclude only those confessions which are testimonially untrustworthy, the inducement, threat or promise must be such as is calculated to lead to an untrue confession. On the aforesaid analysis the Court is to determine the absence or presence of inducment, promise etc. or its sufficiency and how or in what measure it worked on the mind of the accused. If the inducement, promise or threat is sufficient in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil, it is enough to exclude the confession. The words `appear to him' in the last part of the section refer to the mentality of the accused. 19. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made. 19. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made. The value of the evidence as to the confession depends on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. It is not open to any Court to start with a presumption that extra-judicial confession is a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession was made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction can be founded thereon if the evidence about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused, the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it. After subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. In Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 11 SCC 768 , the apex Court has held as under: “29. The issue that emanates for appreciation is whether such confessional statement should be given any credence or thrown overboard. In Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 11 SCC 768 , the apex Court has held as under: “29. The issue that emanates for appreciation is whether such confessional statement should be given any credence or thrown overboard. In this context, we may refer with profit to the authority in Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205 , wherein, after referring to the decisions in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 322 , Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 234 , Narayan Singh V. State of M.P., (1985) 4 SCC 26 , Kishore Chand v. State of H.P., (1991) 1 SCC 286 and Baldev Raj v. State of Haryana, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 14, it has been opined that it is the settled position of law that extra judicial confession, if true and voluntary, can be relied upon by the court to convict the accused for the commission of the crime alleged. Despite inherent weakness of extra-judicial confession as an item of evidence, it cannot be ignored when shown that such confession was made before a person who has no reason to state falsely and his evidence is credible. The evidence in the form of extra-judicial confession made by the accused before the witness cannot be always termed to be a tainted evidence. Corroboration of such evidence is required only by way of abundant caution. If the court believes the witness before whom the confession is made and is satisfied that it was true and voluntarily made, then the conviction can be founded on such evidence alone. The aspects which have to be taken care of are the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak for such a confession. That apart, before relying on the confession, the court has to be satisfied that it is voluntary and it is not the result of inducement, threat or promise as envisaged under Section 24 of the Act or brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections 25 and 26. 30. Recently, in Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 6 SCC 403 , after referring to the rulings in Sk. 30. Recently, in Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 6 SCC 403 , after referring to the rulings in Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B., (2011) 11 SCC 754 and Pancho v. State of Haryana, (2011) 10 SCC 165 , a two-Judge Bench has laid down that the extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself and it has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution; that it should be made voluntarily and should be truthful; that it should inspire confidence; that an extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence; that for an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities; and that such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law. The Court cautioned that confession would have to be proved like any other fact, which would depend upon veracity of the witness. Also, such confession can be relied upon and conviction based thereupon, if evidence comes from the mouth of the witness, who appears to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused and in respect of whom nothing is brought, which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the accused. The Court has to satisfy with regard to voluntariness of the confession, truthfulness thereof and corroboration, if so required. The Court further held that:- “15.6. Accepting the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession, the Court in the case of Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan [ (2010) 10 SCC 604 ] held that: “29. There is no absolute rule that an extra-judicial confession can never be the basis of a conviction, although ordinarily an extra-judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material. [Vide Thimma and Thimma Raju v. State of Mysore, Mulk Raj v. State of U.P., Sivakumar v. State (SCC paras 40 and 41 : AIR paras 41 & 42), Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewari v. State of Maharashtra and Mohd. Azad v. State of W.B.] 30. In the present case, the extra-judicial confession by Balwan has been referred to in the judgments of the learned Magistrate and the Special Judge, and it has been corroborated by the other material on record. Azad v. State of W.B.] 30. In the present case, the extra-judicial confession by Balwan has been referred to in the judgments of the learned Magistrate and the Special Judge, and it has been corroborated by the other material on record. We are satisfied that the confession was voluntary and was not the result of inducement, threat or promise as contemplated by Section 24 of the Evidence Act, 1872.” 15.7. Dealing with the situation of retraction from the extrajudicial confession made by an accused, the Court in the case of Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod v. State of Gujarat [ (2009) 5 SCC 740 ], held as under: “It appears therefore, that the appellant has retracted his confession. When an extra-judicial confession is retracted by an accused, there is no inflexible rule that the court must invariably accept the retraction. But at the same time it is unsafe for the court to rely on the retracted confession, unless, the court on a consideration of the entire evidence comes to a definite conclusion that the retracted confession is true.” 15.8. Extra-judicial confession must be established to be true and made voluntarily and in a fit state of mind. The words of the witnesses must be clear, unambiguous and should clearly convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of conviction, if it passes the test of credibility. The extra-judicial confession should inspire confidence and the court should find out whether there are other cogent circumstances on record to support it. [Ref. Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B. [ (2011) 11 SCC 754 ] and Pancho v. State of Haryana [ (2011) 10 SCC 165 ].” [Emphasis supplied] 17. Law with regard to circumstantial evidence is now well settled. It is a settled proposition of law that when there is no direct evidence of crime, the guilt of the accused can be proved by circumstantial evidence, but then the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn, should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature, to fully connect the accused with the crime. All the links in the chain of circumstances must be established beyond reasonable doubt, and the proved circumstances should be consistent, only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused, being totally inconsistent with his innocence. All the links in the chain of circumstances must be established beyond reasonable doubt, and the proved circumstances should be consistent, only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused, being totally inconsistent with his innocence. While appreciating the circumstantial evidence, the Court must adopt a very cautious approach and great caution must be taken to evaluate the circumstantial evidence. [See: Pudhu Raja and another Versus State Represented by Inspector of Police, (2012) 11 SCC 196 ; Madhu Versus State of Kerala, (2012) 2 SCC 399 ; Dilip Singh Moti Singh versus State of Gujarat, (2010) 15 SCC 622 , Mulakh Raj and others Versus Satish Kumar and others, (1992) 3 SCC 43 ; and Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Versus State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 .]. 18. Also, apex Court in Padala Veera Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706, Court held that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, following tests must be satisfied: “(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.” (Also see: Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 172 ; Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 259; and Harishchandra Ladaku Thange v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 11 SCC 436 ) 19. Each case has to be considered on its own merit. Court cannot presume suspicion to be a legal proof. In the absence of an important link in the chain, or the chain of circumstances getting snapped, guilt of the accused cannot be assumed, based on mere conjectures. 20. Each case has to be considered on its own merit. Court cannot presume suspicion to be a legal proof. In the absence of an important link in the chain, or the chain of circumstances getting snapped, guilt of the accused cannot be assumed, based on mere conjectures. 20. The apex Court in State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992) 2 SCC 286, while cautioning the Courts in evaluating circumstantial evidence, held that if the evidence adduced by the prosecution is reasonable, capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. This of course must precede the factum of prosecution having proved its case, leading to the guilty of the accused. 21. Applying the aforesaid principles, we are of the considered view that testimony of Kamal Kumar (PW-1) with whom accused amarjit Singh confessed his guilt, does not inspire confidence at all. He cannot be said to be a truthful witness. His testimony is not free from blemish and contradictions, which are material, bordering falsehood. 22. Accused Amarjit Singh undisputedly was issueless and used to reside in his own house at Dera Bassi (Punjab), where he was gainfully employed and doing well in life. He was well settled. This is an admitted fact. Even as per testimony of Kamal Kumar (PW-1), Smt. Nirmal Kaur (PW-2) and Yadvinder Singh (PW-6), he would seldom visit his native place, i.e. place of occurrence of the incident. According to Nirmal Kaur (PW-2) and Yadvinder Singh (PW-6), issue of inheritance of property, the alleged motive for the accused to have murdered his parents, stood settled eight years prior to the occurrence of the incident. Thus motive stands ruled out. Version of Yadvinder Singh (PW- 6) that on 12.8.2006 accused demanded his share, to say the least, is uninspiring in confidence. Why did he leave for Haridwar, remains unexplained. Also, except for uninspiring testimony of Kamal Kumar (PW-1) and Yadvinder Singh (PW-6) presence of accused in the village, on the fateful day, cannot be found to have been sufficiently explained or proved by the prosecution. Another brother, who undisputedly was in the village has not been examined. Be that as it may, both these witnesses admit that one Fateh Singh, from Bihar, employed by their father, used to look after their parents. Presence of Fateh Singh on 12.8.2006 at 7 p.m., undisputedly stands proved by Yadvinder Singh (PW-6). Another brother, who undisputedly was in the village has not been examined. Be that as it may, both these witnesses admit that one Fateh Singh, from Bihar, employed by their father, used to look after their parents. Presence of Fateh Singh on 12.8.2006 at 7 p.m., undisputedly stands proved by Yadvinder Singh (PW-6). In fact, Smt. Nirmal Kaur also states that when she arrived on the spot, after occurrence of incident, he was present in the house. Now, surprisingly, Fateh Singh has not been examined in Court at all. Also, police did not bother to associate him during investigation and cite him as a witness. Why so? has not been explained. Police has not tried to rule out either involvement of Fateh Singh or ascertain from him what transpired after Yadvinder Singh allegedly left the house on 12.8.2006. After all he was personal attendant of the deceased and in best position to disclose events leading to the incident in question. 23. Coming back to original issue of confessional statement, we find even Kamal Kumar (PW-1) to have materially contradicted himself on the same. As per version (Ex. PA), so disclosed by him to the police, on 13.8.2006 at 5.30 a.m., accused Amarjit Singh came to his house, fell on his feet and sought help. His brothers wanted to kill him. Accused Amarjit Singh confessed of having burnt his parents, by setting the hutment on fire, as he was deprived of his share in the property. Soon thereafter both Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh came, to whom he informed that Amarjit Singh had met him. Thereafter, he left his house by taking Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh to the village, where he saw only ashes. Accordingly, he informed the police. But significantly, in Court he has deposed that: “accused Amarjeet Singh disclosed that he had come from outside only yesterday and he had sought land from his parents to construct a house. The accused told me that his mother was willing to give land for the construction of the house but the father did not want to give the same to the accused. (him). on this account there was some altercation between the parents of the accused Amarjeet Singh. He further disclosed that he went to sleep after having food in his own house. At about mid night he saw the 'Chhaan? (thatched hutment) on fire. (him). on this account there was some altercation between the parents of the accused Amarjeet Singh. He further disclosed that he went to sleep after having food in his own house. At about mid night he saw the 'Chhaan? (thatched hutment) on fire. He further disclosed that when I reached near the hutment on fire I saw my father standing besides the hutment. My mother was inside the hutment. She was in flames. The accused Amarjeet Singh had further disclosed that on his asking his father pushed him aside and said that I will take care of you also. The accused Amarjeet further stated that on this an altercation ensued between them and I (accused) threw my father into the burning hutment (Chaan). Because of the noisy altercation my brothers got up, because of their fear I have come to you. I asked the accused Amarjeet Singh to sit down and assured him to look into the matter”. When confronted with his previous statement (Ex. PA) so recorded by the police, we find such fact not to have been recorded therein. We find the witness to have clarified that “Amarjeet accused had only stated that he had thrown his father into the burning hutment (Chhaan)”. 24. We do not find testimony of this witness qua the present accused to be inspiring in confidence at all. Witness admits that he was not on visiting terms with the accused. He would seldom meet him. He was also not his neighbour, an influential person or a man of confidence. His house is situated at a distance of 2 kms from the spot of crime. There was no reason for accused Amarjit Singh to have confessed his guilt with him. Significantly, witness admits that Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh met him during the course of investigation. Even then they did not say anything. He has retracted from his statement (Ex. PW-19/G) to the effect that the said co-accused persons also confessed their guilt of having murdered their parents alongwith accused Amarjit Singh. Thus, the witness cannot be said to be truthful and his testimony reliable. His version cannot be said to be inspiring in confidence at all. On the question of disclosure statement (Ex.PW-19/J), he was declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution. In the circumstances, his testimony ought to have been believed or disbelieved in toto. Thus, the witness cannot be said to be truthful and his testimony reliable. His version cannot be said to be inspiring in confidence at all. On the question of disclosure statement (Ex.PW-19/J), he was declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution. In the circumstances, his testimony ought to have been believed or disbelieved in toto. He had informed the police that co-accused were looking for the convict, yet police did not associate this witness during investigation. Testimony of Jaspal Singh (PW-4) is in the nature of hearsay evidence and thus cannot be relied upon. 25. Court is conscious of the fact that evidence of a hostile witness need not be rejected in its entirety. Evidence, which is credible, even of a hostile witness, can form basis for conviction. It is the quality and not the quantity of witnesses, which would matter (See: Mrinal Das and others v. State of Tripura, (2011) 9 SCC 479 ). But then, in the instant case, we find the witness not to be worthy of credence. 26. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the testimony of sole witness. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Test is whether evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy. If the quality of evidence is not satisfactory, Court, in discharge of its duties, would come forward to acquit the accused. (See: Prithpal Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another, (2012) 1 SCC 10 ). 27. Testimony of Yadvinder Singh to the effect that accused made disclosure statement is hearsay in nature and is thus not of much help to the prosecution. Version of this witness that there used to be quarrel and bickering in the family, does not inspire confidence, for the matter was never reported by anyone to the police or local panchayat. 28. There is yet another reason of disbelieving Kamal Kumar. It is the prosecution case that initially on 13.8.2006 and then on 15.8.2006, coaccused Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh confessed of having murdered their parents. But we find this version to be belied by Jaspal (PW-4), an independent witness, according to whom, all the accused persons stood arrested by the police on 13.8.2006 itself. It is the prosecution case that initially on 13.8.2006 and then on 15.8.2006, coaccused Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh confessed of having murdered their parents. But we find this version to be belied by Jaspal (PW-4), an independent witness, according to whom, all the accused persons stood arrested by the police on 13.8.2006 itself. Now, if this were so, then obviously police record appears to have been fabricated, testimony of police officials of having conducted a fair investigation to be false and version of Kamal Kumar to be false. 29. There is yet another mitigating circumstance on record in favour of the accused-convict. In our considered view, prosecution has taken a contradictory stand. Through the testimony of Kamal Kumar, prosecution wants us to believe that after killing his wife, Balwant Singh set the hutment on fire whereafter Amarjit Singh pushed his father into the fire, but through the testimony of Jaspal (PW-4), Hukkamdin (PW-5) and Yadvinder Singh (PW-6), prosecution wants us to believe that accused murdered their parents in the fields; brought their bodies to the spot and then set the hut on fire. Recovery of button and earring so effected on 16.8.2006, allegedly belonging to the deceased, is the link evidence, produced to establish such circumstance. This version of the prosecution, though contradictory in nature, in fact stands belied by police official MHC Vishesh Kumar (PW-7), according to whom button and earring stood deposited with him in the Malkhana on 13.8.2006. Noticeably, there is no dispute about the correctness of date. Thus, this totally knocks down the prosecution case of accused Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh of having made confessional statements (Ex. PW-19/J) as also disclosure statement(s) leading to recovery of these articles. Thus, prosecution case even on the question of disclosure statements made by all the accused in police custody, stands falsified. 30. When we examine the testimony of Nirmal Kaur (PW-2), we find that she has contradicted herself, rendering her version in Court to be absolutely doubtful, if not false. In her examination-in-chief, she does state that upon receiving telephonic information about death of her parents, on 13.8.2006 itself she reached the spot and got identified articles, i.e. Kara (P-2) and ring (P- 13) from the ashes, which she had given to them. However, in her crossexamination, she unequivocally admits of having written letter dated 10.8.2007 (Ex. In her examination-in-chief, she does state that upon receiving telephonic information about death of her parents, on 13.8.2006 itself she reached the spot and got identified articles, i.e. Kara (P-2) and ring (P- 13) from the ashes, which she had given to them. However, in her crossexamination, she unequivocally admits of having written letter dated 10.8.2007 (Ex. DC) to the concerned Court, admitting that in fact she had reached the spot of occurrence the following day, next day, i.e. 14th and not 13th of August, 2006. This obviously renders the prosecution case of having associated her, in carrying out search and seizure operations of incriminating articles, such as Kara (P-12), ring (P-13), spear (sketches Ex. PB & PC), vide recovery memo (Ex.PF) to be false. Importantly, this witness also admits that the alleged incident of crime was witnessed by Fateh Singh, who also disclosed that deceased were strangulated by the accused. Now, if this were so, then why is it that she did not disclose such fact to the police or that police endeavoured to search for Fateh Singh and examine him in Court, for after all he was an eye witness to the occurrence of incident. 31. We find role of Investigating Officer Som Dutt (PW-19) to be intriguing and not fair. His version of having arrested co-accused Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh on 16.8.2006 stands belied by Nirmal Kaur (PW-2) and Jaspal (PW-4). Witness admits that village Manjholi is a big village. He feigns ignorance with regard to criminal antecedents of witness Kamal Kumar (PW-1). He admits that accused-convict Amarjit Singh is gainfully employed at Dera Bassi (Punjab), where he resides permanently and that the other two accused persons reside separately. Surprisingly, he furnishes no explanation for not sending the information of murder to the concerned Magistrate, housed just at a distance of 200 metres from the Police Station. After all accused stood arrested on 13.8.2006 itself. His version of disclosure statements made by the accused, which led to recovery of incriminating articles, is absolutely uninspiring in confidence, for the reason that he did not associate any independent witness present on the spot. He also admits that on documents (Ex. PL and PK-1) name of accused was written after using fluid. In fact, he admits that till certain point of time, even he was not sure who had set the hutment on fire. He also admits that on documents (Ex. PL and PK-1) name of accused was written after using fluid. In fact, he admits that till certain point of time, even he was not sure who had set the hutment on fire. Thus, not only there is interpolation in record, but also version of Kamal Kumar (PW-1) of confessional statement stands belied and the prosecution case falsified. 32. Trial Court disbelieved the prosecution case qua co-accused Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh, finding (i) testimonies of Kamal Kumar and Nirmal Kaur to be uninspiring in confidence, and (ii) disclosure statements made by them, leading to recovery of incriminating articles, to be hit by provisions of Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act. We do not find the reasoning to be logical or legal. Testimonies of prosecution witnesses, in the given facts and the circumstances, had to be believed or rejected in toto, for afterall, all the accused had confessed their guilt. Also, Section 27 is an exception to Section 26. Prosecution case of recovery of incriminating articles was to be disbelieved in toto. 33. In our considered view, Court below has rendered contradictory findings. While convicting accused Amarjit Singh, it believed the testimony of Kamal Kumar, holding that there was neither any threat, inducement or promise nor did he have any motive of false implication. Very same logic and reasoning would also apply qua accused Paramjit Singh and Guljit Singh. 34. Without appreciating that accused had neither any intimacy nor any justifiable reason to confess his guilt, Court got swayed with the fact that Kamal Kumar had no reason to falsely implicate Amarjit Singh. The logic is illegal irrational and against the settled principles of law. Accused Amarjit Singh had no reason to kill his parents. He had no intimacy with the witness whom he seldom met. He was not even on visiting terms. The witness was neither influential nor powerful to have protected him. In fact, trial Court doubted the prosecution story of having recovered the incriminating articles on 19.8.2006. Under these circumstances, it seriously erred in convicting accused Amarjit Singh, causing serious prejudice to him, rendering the findings to be illegal and perverse, not borne out from the record. Finding of guilt cannot be said to be logical/legal, based on correct and complete appreciation of evidence on record. 35. Under these circumstances, it seriously erred in convicting accused Amarjit Singh, causing serious prejudice to him, rendering the findings to be illegal and perverse, not borne out from the record. Finding of guilt cannot be said to be logical/legal, based on correct and complete appreciation of evidence on record. 35. Thus, in our considered view, trial Court erred in convicting Amarjit Singh of the charged offence. In the instant case, there is no motive for the accused to have committed the offence. His extra-judicial confession allegedly made to Kamal Kumar is absolutely uninspiring in confidence. Disclosure statements and recoveries pursuant thereto cannot be said to be based on cogent, clear and convincing piece of evidence. In the instant case, circumstances leading to the irresistible conclusion of guilt of the accused and to no other hypothesis, cannot be said to have been proved on record, by leading cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence. It is clear that the Court below erred in appreciating the testimonies of the witnesses and returning findings of guilt of accused Amarjit Singh. Material contradictions, embellishments, improvements and inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses, namely Kamal Kumar, Nirmal Kaur, Jaspal, Yadvinder Singh and Investigating Officer Som Dutt, are apparent and glaring. 36. Thus, findings of conviction and sentence, returned by the Court below against accused Amarjit Singh, cannot be said to be on the basis of any clear, cogent, convincing, legal and material piece of evidence, leading to an irresistible conclusion of guilt of the accused. 37. Hence, for all the aforesaid reasons, appeal is allowed and the judgment of conviction and sentence, dated 29.3.2008/31.3.2008, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Solan, Himachal Pradesh, in Sessions Trial No.4- NL/7 of 2007, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh v. Karamjit Singh and others, is set aside and accused Amarjit Singh is acquitted of the charged offences. He be released from jail, if not required in any other case. Amount of fine, if deposited by the accused, be refunded to him accordingly. Release warrants be immediately prepared. Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any.