JUDGMENT SONIA GOKANI, J. 1. These are cross appeals arising from the decision of the learned Single Judge rendered in Special Civil Application No.1987 of 2012 and, therefore, both of them are decided by this common judgment, where the reference hereinafter to the original petitioner will be as “the appellant” and to the original respondent-Corporation as “the respondent”. 2. These appeals arise in the following factual background : 2.1 The appellant original petitioner joined the service with the respondent-Corporation as a Master Technician and he continued to serve on the said post since the year 1983 with the respondent-Corporation. 2.2 Two criminal complaints came to be lodged against the appellant being M-Case No.6 of 2006 dated July 07, 2006 as well as M-Case No.19 of 2006 dated July 08, 2006 for the alleged commission of offences punishable under sections 406, 467, 468 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code investigated by Anand Town Police Station and Vidyanagar Town Police Station respectively. The appellant came to be arrested in connection with the said offences on July 08, 2006. His regular bail application was allowed on January 08, 2008. Thus, nearly for about one year and five months, the appellant was incarcerated for want of discretionary relief granted in his favour. In both the criminal complaints, the charge sheet came to be laid against the appellant and the trial qua both the complaints are yet pending. 2.3 In the meantime, the respondent-Corporation deemed it proper to suspend the appellant from service on August 23, 2006 and directed to pay 25% of the subsistence allowance. However, no inquiry till date has been initiated against the appellant. After his release on a regular bail, the appellant approached the respondent-Corporation requesting to revoke the suspension order vide his application dated April 03, 2008 inter alia urging that a fraud was committed by the builder with the help of the bank officers and as he had already suffered enough, the order of suspension should be revoked. Yet another request also was made for revocation of the suspension to the respondent. Yet another request also was made for revocation of the suspension to the respondent. When no action was taken by the respondent, the appellant chose to approach this Court by preferring Special Civil Application No.1987 of 2012, wherein he sought for the relief of directing the respondents that the order of suspension dated August 23, 2006 to be held as invalid after completion of 90 days' period and he be treated on the duty. He also made a further request of reinstating him and to pay him full regular salary; so also sought direction that the subsistence allowance be paid quantifying the same at 75% of his revised basic wages plus dearness allowance for the period beyond three months from the date of order of his suspension. 2.4 After hearing both the sides, the learned Single Judge did not find any merit with regard to other reliefs, however, on the issue of subsistence allowance, it held the petitioner entitled to such allowance at the rate of 75% of his basic pay plus dearness allowance and directed the same to be paid for the entire period of suspension, subject to his filing the written declaration that he was not engaged in any other business, profession or employment. 2.5 Aggrieved by the same, the appellant herein has preferred present Letters Patent Appeal No.1013 of 2012, whereas the respondent has challenged the enhancement of subsistence allowance by way of Letters Patent Appeal No.1171 of 2012. 3. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shalin Mehta with the learned counsel Mr. G.B. Shah for the appellant and the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Manish Bhatt appearing with the learned counsel Mrs. Mauna Bhatt for the respondents in Letters Patent Appeal No.1013 of 2012 and the appellant of Letters Patent Appeal No.1171 of 2012, preferred by the respondent-Corporation. 3.1 Before us, the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mehta has contended that the Standing Order would permit the exercise of discretion of suspension during the pending inquiry, when the employer is of the opinion that it would be desirable that a person concerned should remain on duty. He also had further submitted that no charge sheet in the present case has been given in the departmental proceedings. The inquiry has not yet begun and, therefore, as per the settled legal position, the suspension as well as continuation of suspension would not be permissible. He also had further submitted that no charge sheet in the present case has been given in the departmental proceedings. The inquiry has not yet begun and, therefore, as per the settled legal position, the suspension as well as continuation of suspension would not be permissible. 3.2 Per contra, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Manish Bhatt has urged that not only the Standing Order of respondent-Corporation, but the law laid down by the Courts pronounced that employer's right is inbuilt in given circumstances. 3.3 Following are the broad issues raised before the learned Single Judge, which require our consideration in the present appeals : (i) Power of suspension. (ii) Procedure adopted while passing the order of suspension. (iii) Continuation of suspension. (iv) Subsistence allowance and the entitlement of the enhanced amount of subsistence allowance beyond the suspension period of 90 days. 3.4 With regard to the first three issues, the discussion requires to be made jointly where reference to the Standing Order of the respondent-Corporation would be made after some time. 3.5 In the instant case, as can be noted from the record, the order of suspension passed on August 23, 2006 clearly indicates that as the appellant had been arrested in the criminal matters, he was required to be suspended, which would be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the respondent-Corporation to take further action as per the Standing Orders and Rules of the respondent-Corporation as would be applicable to the appellant. Admittedly, the appellant's suspension from service has come due to the registration of the criminal complaints against the appellant, where he is alleged of having committed serious offences. Taking into account the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's being continued to be in the judicial custody, the respondent-Corporation chose to suspend him and such order of suspension has continued till date as admittedly no inquiry has been initiated. 3.6 The Apex Court in the case of R.P. Kapur v. Union of India and another, reported in AIR 1964 SC 787 , has held that the employer would have a right to suspend a public servant in one or two ways. It may suspend any public servant pending departmental enquiry or pending criminal proceedings or the Government may also proceed to hold departmental enquiry and after his being found guilty, order of suspension as a punishment can be passed if the rules so permit. It may suspend any public servant pending departmental enquiry or pending criminal proceedings or the Government may also proceed to hold departmental enquiry and after his being found guilty, order of suspension as a punishment can be passed if the rules so permit. In other words, the authority which appoints a public servant would be entitled to suspend him pending a departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal proceeding, which may eventually result in a departmental enquiry against him. Articles 311 and 314 of the Constitution of India have been enumerated to hold that the employer would have a right to suspend an employee in any of the two ways mentioned hereinabove. 3.7 The Apex Court in the case of Nasirkhan Nivaskhan Pathan v. District Development Officer, Bharuch and others, reported in AIR 2002 (Guj.) 143 , has examined dictionary meaning of 'suspension' and has held that the suspension is temporary deprivation of office and its privileges and by reasons of suspension, the person suspended does not lose his office nor his status or position. It has referred to Oxford Dictionary, which defines the word “suspension” as “action of debarring or state of being debarred, especially, for a time, from a function or privilege; temporary deprivation of one’s office or position, or again, state of being temporary kept from doing or deprived of something. 3.8 In the case of Bank of India v. Rattan Singh, reported in 2000 (10) SCC 396 , the respondent-Bank suspended the clerk-cum-cashier in view of an act of gross misconduct on his part. The departmental inquiry as well as criminal prosecution both were under contemplation. However, in view of the criminal prosecution, the departmental inquiry was not initiated. The Apex Court held that when a criminal prosecution on serious charges was pending, the bank was entitled to suspend him. 3.9 In the case of U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandli Parishad v. Sanjiv Ranjan, reported in 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 483, the respondent was employed at the relevant point of time as a cashier of the Agricultural Produce Market Committee and the allegations against the respondent was to the effect that during his tenure as a cashier, lakhs of rupees credited in the account of the Market Committee were not credited in its account. This misfeasance led the suspension of the respondent from service. This misfeasance led the suspension of the respondent from service. His challenge to the suspension on the ground that some other officers were allowed to join service, the Court quashed such order of suspension. When challenged before the Apex Court by the employer, the Apex Court held that “Ordinarily, when there is an accusation of defalcation of the monies, the delinquent employees have to be kept away from the establishment till the charges are finally disposed of. Whether the charges are baseless, malicious or vindictive and are framed only to keep the individual concerned out of the employment is a different matter. But even in such a case, no conclusion can be arrived at without examining the entire record in question and hence it is always advisable to allow the disciplinary proceedings to continue unhindered.” The Apex Court also held that the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the orders of suspension unless they are passed mala fide and without there being even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the employees with the misconduct in question. The Court also further held that prolongation of suspension due to delay in filing the charge sheet also would not justify revocation of suspension order. At the most the Court can direct the authorities to complete the inquiry within the stipulated period and can further direct the enhancement in subsistence adequately. 3.10 The Apex Court in the case of Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola, reported in 1997 (4) SCC 1 , was dealing with the case where the respondent was a bank employee. The Central Bureau of Investigation conducted an investigation and registered a case and the charge sheet reflected that the respondent participated in false issuance of cheque books and withdrawn money by depositing cheques issued from those cheque books. When the High Court had set aside the order of suspension, the Bank’s appeal was allowed by the Apex Court by holding that “What is an offence involving "moral turpitude" must depend upon the facts of each case. When the High Court had set aside the order of suspension, the Bank’s appeal was allowed by the Apex Court by holding that “What is an offence involving "moral turpitude" must depend upon the facts of each case. But whatever may be the meaning which may be given to the term "moral turpitude" it appears to us that one of the most serious offences involving "moral turpitude" would be where a person employed in a banking company dealing with money of the general public commits forgery and wrongfully withdraws money which he is not entitled to withdraw.” The Court held that the very fact that the investigation was conducted by the CBI, which resulted in the filing of a charge sheet, alleging various offences would be sufficient for the employer to conclude that pending prosecution the employee should be suspended. Such suspension pending the criminal trial in the case before the Apex Court continued for a long period of 10 years. The Court yet held that mere expiry of long period of 10 years would not be a proper ground for his reinstatement. 3.11 In the case of L.K. Verma v. H.M.T. Ltd. And another, reported in (2006) 2 SCC 269 , the Apex Court has dealt with different kinds of suspensions in this case as under : (i) An order of suspension may be passed by way of punishment in terms of the conduct rules. (ii) An order of suspension can also be passed by the employer in exercise of its inherent power in the sense that he may not take any work from the delinquent officer but in that event, the entire salary is required to be paid. (iii) An order of suspension can also be passed, if such a provision exist in the rule laying down that in place of the full salary, the delinquent officer would be paid only the subsistence allowance specified therein. 3.12 At this juncture, reproduction of Standing Order of respondent-Corporation would be profitable : “IV. SUSPENSION PENDING ENQUIRY : (a) Where an employee is charged with serious misconduct and it not considered desirable that he should remain on duty, he may be suspended from duty pending enquiry. (b) The order of suspension shall be given in writing and shall be followed within 7 days by a charge sheet setting out in precise terms the misconduct alleged against him. (b) The order of suspension shall be given in writing and shall be followed within 7 days by a charge sheet setting out in precise terms the misconduct alleged against him. During the period of suspension, an employee shall not enter the work premises except with the permission of the Management, nor shall he leave the station without the permission of the Management. (c) If during the enquiry it is found that the employee is guilty of a misconduct other than that stated in the order of suspension and or the chargesheet, the employee shall be liable to punishment for such misconduct but before any punishment is imposed on him he shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity of explaining and defending his action in respect of such misconduct. (d) An employee under suspension shall be entitled to subsistence allowance equal to half his basic wages plus dearness allowance for the period of his suspension. If, however, the period of his suspension exceeds 3 months for reasons to be recorded in writing, for which the employee is not responsible subsistence allowance will be at the rate of 3/4th of his basic wages plus dearness allowance for the period beyond 3 months. Where, however the employee is responsible for extension of the suspension period beyond 3 months, the amount of his subsistence allowance may be ¼ of his basic wages plus dearness allowance for the period beyond 3 months. The payment of subsistence allowance will be subject to a written declaration by the employee that he is not engaged in any other employment business, profession or vocation.” 3.13 Where an employee is charged with the serious misconduct, the Standing Order permits the respondent-Corporation to exercise the discretion to decide whether he should be continued on his duty or may be suspended from duty, pending enquiry. 3.14 As noted above, the Apex Court in the case of R.P. Kapur (supra) has held that the employer has a right to suspend the employee and any appointing authority would be entitled to suspend an employee pending the departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending the criminal proceedings. Even the Standing Order of the respondent-Corporation states that if an employee is charged with any serious misconduct and it is not desirable to continue him on duty, such powers can be exercised. Even the Standing Order of the respondent-Corporation states that if an employee is charged with any serious misconduct and it is not desirable to continue him on duty, such powers can be exercised. 3.15 We notice that the serious allegations have been levelled in the criminal complaints filed against the appellant by the Bank and, therefore, considering such grave nature of charges when the powers of suspension have been exercised by the respondent, it would not be possible to sustain the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the action of the respondent-Corporation was without any corresponding powers. Not only the respondent would have powers to suspend the appellant being the employer, but also under the said Standing Order, it would have the powers to suspend and continue such suspension pending the inquiry, taking the public interest in mind. And, when the trials of both the criminal matters are pending, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the respondent not only had power to suspend the public servant, but to continue such suspension and accordingly, both these aspects have been justifiably held in favour of the respondent. 3.16 In light of the discussion held hereinabove, what can be deduced is that the suspension is an inherent right of an employer. All the three kinds of suspensions, the Supreme Court has narrated in the case of L.K. Verma (supra). In the present case, not only as held in the case of R.P. Kapur (supra), the employer is entitled to suspend the employee pending departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending the criminal proceedings. The Standing Orders also provide for such suspension. When a person is suspended from the office, it is a direction by the employer that unless and until the departmental proceedings are concluded against him, so long as he holds the office, he shall not perform any function in discharge of his duties. With the serious nature of offences alleged against the present appellant, the respondent has rightly and appropriately exercised its discretion to suspend the appellant and mere delay in conducting the departmental proceedings also would not entitle the appellant to get his suspension revoked. With the serious nature of offences alleged against the present appellant, the respondent has rightly and appropriately exercised its discretion to suspend the appellant and mere delay in conducting the departmental proceedings also would not entitle the appellant to get his suspension revoked. 3.17 The Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that till date both the criminal trials are pending and, therefore, if the departmental proceedings have not been concluded so far, that ipso facto may not be a ground for either revocation of suspension or for full salary towards the subsistence allowance. 3.18 It would be apt to touch at this stage the aspect of non-following of the procedure while suspending the appellant as has been raised by the appellant herein. This has been rightly dilated and sufficiently elaborated in the decision under challenge. Record indicates that it was not possible for the respondent to follow such procedure considering the fact that the appellant continued to be in judicial custody for a period of about 1½ year. We notice that the order of suspension was passed on August 23, 2006 and the release of the appellant on regular bail was on January 08, 2008. As on today also, as is apparent from the record, as also from the submissions of the learned Counsel for the appellant, the criminal cases are yet pending and thus, when the trials are not completed, in such circumstances, the request on the part of the appellant to revoke the suspension, if has not been acceded to by the respondent-Corporation, no fault can be found either on the basis of the gross facts available on record and when compared such facts at the touchstone of the Standing Orders of the respondent-Corporation. 4. It has also been conveyed to the Court that during the pendency of these appeals, the appellant has reached the age of superannuation and, therefore, Civil Application No.11211 of 2014 came to be filed inter alia urging that the date of retirement of the appellant was September 30, 2012 and though he has already received 50% gratuity on the basis of the pay he was drawing earlier, no retiral dues like pension, leave encashment benefits, etc. have been made available to the appellant. And, therefore, direction is sought by way of an interim relief for the revised pay to be given to the appellant with all retiral benefits. have been made available to the appellant. And, therefore, direction is sought by way of an interim relief for the revised pay to be given to the appellant with all retiral benefits. Urging before us for such relief sought for in the Civil Application, reliance is also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Jharkhand v. Jitendrakumar Srivastava, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 210. It was also contended before us that all retiral benefits are needed to be given to the appellant as till date the departmental proceedings have not begun. This issue we have chosen not to entertain inasmuch as it would amount to enlarging the scope of the Letters Patent Appeals, which are preferred against the order of the learned Single Judge rendered in Special Civil Application No.1897 of 2012, when such circumstances did not exist, we are of the opinion that the respondent-Corporation should be availed the fullest opportunity to meet with all the contentions raised in the Civil Application. Such relief can be sought resorting to the substantive petition and only after respondent meets with all contentions on availing opportunity, the request made by the appellant of considering the grant of retiral benefits in the present appeals need not be entertained. 5. In view of the discussion, the fourth aspect of grant of 25% subsistence allowance at the time of order of suspension as also the enhanced order of 75% subsistence allowance of the pay and other allowances as permitted by the Court from the date of suspension, requires consideration. 5.1 Clause 23(IV) of the Standing Order (Annexure-E to the petition) referred to hereinabove, in sub-clause (d) enumerates that an employee under suspension shall be entitled to subsistence allowance equal to half of his basic wages plus dearness allowance for the period of his suspension. If such period of suspension exceeds three months, for reasons to be recorded in writing and for such delay if the employee is not responsible, subsistence allowance would be paid at the rate of 3/4th of his basic wages plus dearness allowance for the period beyond three months of suspension. And, if the employee is responsible for extension of such period of suspension beyond the period of three months of suspension, such amount to be reduced to 1/4th of his basic wages plus dearness allowance for the period beyond three months. And, if the employee is responsible for extension of such period of suspension beyond the period of three months of suspension, such amount to be reduced to 1/4th of his basic wages plus dearness allowance for the period beyond three months. 5.2 In the case of B.D. Shetty v. M/s. Ceat Ltd., reported in AIR 2001 SC 2953 , the Supreme Court was considering section 10A(1)(b) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act and held that the employer is required to pay subsistence allowance to a workman suspending pending inquiry at the rate of 50% of wages for first 90 days and at the rate of 75 for the remaining period of suspension. If the delay has occurred in completion of departmental proceedings, which is not directly attributable with the workman concerned, the workman cannot be denied subsistence allowance at the rate of 75%. The Apex Court has also given instance when the conduct can be said to be directly attributed to the delay in conducting the inquiry, as also the importance of subsistence allowance during the pendency of such proceedings. 5.3 The Supreme Court in the case of Principal J.D. Patil Sangludkar v. Ganesh, reported in (2003) 9 SCC 164 , dealt with the payment of subsistence allowance during the suspension pending criminal proceedings. The Court held that the provision to increase the rate of subsistence allowance pending suspension after a certain stipulated period is normally envisaged to ensure that the employer or the management concerned does not indefinitely keep an employee under the pretext of suspension out of his office without completing the inquiry and take advantage of its own lapse or delay in completing the disciplinary proceedings. 5.4 In the case of Union of India v. R.K. Chopra, reported in 2010 (2) SCC 763 , the Apex Court was dealing with a case where a suspended employee had demanded the revision of subsistence allowance based on the pay revision coming into effect during the suspension period. 5.4 In the case of Union of India v. R.K. Chopra, reported in 2010 (2) SCC 763 , the Apex Court was dealing with a case where a suspended employee had demanded the revision of subsistence allowance based on the pay revision coming into effect during the suspension period. The Apex Court denied such plea by holding that if the revision of pay takes effect from a date prior to the date of suspension of a Government servant then he would be entitled to benefit of increment in pay and in the subsistence allowance for the period of suspension, but if the revision scale of pay takes effect from a date falling within the period of suspension then the benefit of revision of pay and the subsistence allowances will accrue to him, only after reinstatement depending on the fact whether the period of suspension is treated as duty or not. 5.5 In the present case, admittedly the appellant was being paid the subsistence allowance at the rate of 25% of basic pay plus dearness allowance during the suspension period, which the respondent had continued even beyond the period of three months. Admittedly, the employee was not engaged in any employment or business or profession or vocation. However, on the ground that the criminal prosecution lodged against the appellant was pending and since he was released after about a period of one year and five months, the respondent-Corporation held the employee responsible for continuation of the suspension and, therefore, justified continuation of subsistence allowance at the rate of 1/4th of basic wages plus dearness allowance. 5.6 In the affidavit-in-reply filed in Special Civil Application, the respondent had contended that the appellant was allowed to draw subsistence allowance equal to 1/2 of his basic wages plus dearness allowance for a period of three months from the date of suspension as per the provisions of certified Standing Order of the respondent-Corporation. 5.7 Merely because the criminal trials have been pending in both the criminal cases, or because the appellant continued to be in judicial custody for a period of one year and five months, cannot be said to be the reasons attributable to the appellant for continuation of suspension. 5.8 We notice that no charge sheet has been given to the appellant as mentioned hereinabove in the departmental proceedings till the date and, therefore, the inquiry proceedings have not been initiated yet. 5.8 We notice that no charge sheet has been given to the appellant as mentioned hereinabove in the departmental proceedings till the date and, therefore, the inquiry proceedings have not been initiated yet. The respondent-Corporation, therefore, was not correct in interpreting that the order of suspension for a period beyond three months was extended on account of conduct of the appellant and, therefore, it was consequently not justified in denying the amount of subsistence allowance to be raised to 3/4th of his basic wages plus dearness allowance as provided under the Standing Order. Appellant's having faced the criminal proceedings is the very basis for his suspension and, therefore, for continuation of his suspension beyond the period of three months, the very ground cannot be put forth to suspend the continuation of such order of suspension. There is nothing on record to indicate that the appellant has in any manner contributed in the respondent not proceeding with its departmental inquiry or acted in the fashion whereby the suspension needed to be continued. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was, in our opinion, wholly justified in not upholding the version of the respondent in denying higher amount of subsistence allowance beyond the period of three months. However, while endorsing such views of the learned Single Judge, we notice that in the operative portion of the order, the learned Single Judge has granted subsistence allowance at the rate of 75% of basic wages plus dearness allowance for the entire period of suspension, subject to his fulfilling the condition of written declaration that the appellant was not engaged in any other employment or profession. As the Standing Order required grant of such period beyond the period of three months, when no cause could be attributed to the appellant for the period of suspension to exceed beyond three months, the grant of 75% of subsistence allowance shall have to be on completion of the period of three months and not from the date of suspension and to that limited extent, the prayer sought for by the respondent-Corporation in respect of enhanced subsistence allowance requires to be upheld. 6. In light of the discussion held hereinabove, we do not see any merit in the prayers sought for in Letters Patent Appeal No.1013 of 2012 and the same, therefore, deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. 6. In light of the discussion held hereinabove, we do not see any merit in the prayers sought for in Letters Patent Appeal No.1013 of 2012 and the same, therefore, deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. 6.1 As far as Letters Patent Appeal No.1171 of 2012 is concerned, the only change made in the order impugned is of grant of subsistence allowance to the appellant at the rate of 75% of basic pay plus dearness allowance beyond the period of three months of the date of suspension, subject to his filing the written declaration as has been provided in the impugned order. No other prayers deserve any further consideration. 6.2 Both the appeals stand disposed of accordingly in above terms, with no order as to costs. 7. In view of disposal of the main appeals, the connected Civil Application does not survive and the same stands disposed of accordingly. Appeals accordingly dismissed.