JUDGMENT : Dhiraj Singh Thakur, J. 1. The present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order Dt. 24.4.2015, passed by the writ court in SWP No. 3042/2014, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant (writ petitioner), challenging his pre-mature order of transfer has been dismissed. It was urged that the impugned order of transfer Dt. 21.10.2014, had been issued prematurely within three months from the earlier order of transfer and, thus, was violative of the transfer policy framed by the Government vide Government Order N0.861-GAD of 2010 Dt. 28.7.2010, which prescribed a minimum tenure of two years of an employee at a particular place of posting. 2. Besides this, it was also urged that the order of transfer had been issued for mala fide reasons as the respondent No. 2, in his capacity as the Minister Incharge, had expected the appellant to execute a work which was not permissible under rules, which led to relieving out of the appellant from his present place of posting at Sidhra Bajalta, Jammu, and resulted in transfer of the respondent No. 3, in place of the appellant, who is said to be a close relative of respondent No. 2 i.e. the Minister Incharge. 3. It was further urged that the writ court had failed to notice that the allegations leveled against the Minister Incharge in the writ petition had remained unrebutted, which constituted a sufficient ground for the petition to be allowed on the ground of mala fides. 4. A perusal of the judgment and order impugned shows that the writ court has held that an employee has no enforceable right to be posted at a particular place of posting. It is the employer concerned who has to see as to for which place an employee is best suited. 5. The argument that the appellant had been placed under suspension only to make way for transfer of the respondent No. 3, in place of the appellant despite interim order passed by the writ court, also had been rejected by the writ court by holding on a question of fact that whereas the interim order had been passed by the writ court on 28.10.2014, the appellant had been placed under suspension on 1.1.2015, and that the respondent No. 3 had already joined at Bajalta on 24.10.2014, and was getting his salary. 6. 6. The allegations of mala fide have been rebutted by the Commissioner/Secretary to Government, Revenue Department in his affidavit, who claimed that the transfer order, impugned in the writ petition had been passed purely on merit after the approval of the competent authority i.e. the Minister Incharge. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 8. Now it is well settled that transfer is an exigency of service. An employee does not have any indefeasible right to remain posted at a particular place ad-infinitum or seek a posting of his choice. It is also no longer res integra that an order of transfer can only be interfered with by courts if the same is questioned on the ground of mala fide or lack of jurisdiction or if it is otherwise contrary to the statutory rule governing such transfers. 9. In Shanti Kumari v. Regional Deputy Director, Health Services, Patna Division, Patna & ors, (1981) 2 SCC 72 , the Apex Court has held as under:-- "2. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High Court rightly declined to interfere with the impugned order. Transfer of a Government servant may be due to exigencies of service or due to administrative reasons. The courts cannot interfere in such matters. Shri Grover, learned counsel for the appellant, however, contends that the impugned order was in breach of the Government instructions with regard to transfers in the Health Department. If that be so, the authorities will look into the matter and redress the grievance of the appellant.". 10. In the case of Union of India and others v. S.L. Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357 , the Apex Court while dealing with the guidelines framed by the Government of India regarding couple transfers held that the guidelines/administrative instructions do not create any enforceable right in the employees. The said guidelines are in the nature of instructions and do not have any statutory force. 11. In State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh Dhatt, AIR 1993 SC 2486 , the Apex Court held that ordinarily the courts should not interfere with the order of transfer of an employee as it is for the employer to decide as to when, where and what point of time, a public servant has to be transferred. 11. In State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh Dhatt, AIR 1993 SC 2486 , the Apex Court held that ordinarily the courts should not interfere with the order of transfer of an employee as it is for the employer to decide as to when, where and what point of time, a public servant has to be transferred. What was observed in this regard in paragraph 3 of the judgment supra is being reproduced below:-- "We have heard learned counsel for the parties. This court has time and again expressed its disapproval of the courts below interfering with the order of transfer of public servant from one place to another. It is entirely for the employer to decide when, where and at what point of time a public servant is transferred from his present posting. Ordinarily the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of transfer. The High Court grossly erred in quashing the order of transfer of the respondent from Hoshiarpur to Sangruz. The High Court was not justified in extending its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a matter where, on the face of it, no injustice was caused". 12. Similar view was taken by the Apex Court in the case of Abani Kanta Ray v. State of Orissa, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 169. 13. In State of U.P. and another v. Siya Ram and another, (2004) 7 SCC 405 , the Apex Court has held as under:-- "........No government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place or place of his choice since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the courts or the tribunals normally cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they were appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the employer/management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. This position was highlighted by this court in National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. This position was highlighted by this court in National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan, (2001) 8 SCC 574 ." 14. In Rajendra Singh & ors v. State of U.P. & ors, (2009) 15 SCC 178 , the Apex Court, yet again, reiterated the aforementioned principles and in paragraph 9 of the judgment, held as under:-- "9. The courts are always reluctant in interfering with the transfer of an employee unless such transfer is vitiated by violation of some statutory provisions or suffers from mala fides. In Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar, this court held: "4. In our opinion, the courts should not interfere with a transfer order which is made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of malafide. A government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the department. If the courts continue to interfere with day-to-day transfer orders issued by the government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the administration which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court overlooked these aspects in interfering with the transfer orders." 15. Again in the case reported as Registrar General, High Court of Judicature of Madras v. R. Perachi and Others, (2011) 12 SCC 137 , the Apex Court held that transfer is an incident of service and one cannot make any grievance if the same is made on administrative grounds and without attaching any stigma. It was further held that in the matter of transfers, the scope of judicial review is limited and the High Court cannot interfere with the order of transfer lightly since the courts cannot substitute their own decision in such matters. What was observed in this regard in paragraphs 21 and 24 of the judgment supra, is being reproduced below: "21. We have considered the submissions of both the counsel. What was observed in this regard in paragraphs 21 and 24 of the judgment supra, is being reproduced below: "21. We have considered the submissions of both the counsel. As far as the action of transfer against the first respondent is concerned, the same was on the basis of the report of the Registrar (Vigilance). Besides, the District Judge had also opined that retention of the appellant in his district was undesirable from the point of view of administration. Thus, it involved inter-district transfer. Respondent 1 had not disputed the power of the High Court to transfer him outside the district, nor did the Division Bench interfere therein on that ground. This is apart from the fact that transfer is an incident of service, and one cannot make a grievance if a transfer is made on the administrative grounds, and without attaching any stigma which was so done in the present case. 24. We may mention that this Court has reiterated the legal position recently in Airports Authority of India v. Rajeev Ratan Pandey, (2009) 8 SCC 337 that: 10........ In a matter of transfer of a government employee, the scope of judicial review is limited and the High Court would not interfere with an order of transfer lightly, be it at interim stage or final hearing. This is so because the courts do not substitute their own decision in the matter of transfer." 16. The issue regarding the order of transfer being contrary to the transfer policy of the Govt. notified vide its Order N0.861-GAD of 2010 Dt. 28.7.2010 also is no longer res integra. This court in SWP No. 489/2013, Jagdeep Singh v. State of J&K & ors, 2014 (1) JKJ 626 [HC] decided on 8.8.2013 has already held that the said order is in the nature of executive instructions without any statutory force or flavor and thus, would not create any enforceable right in favour of the appellant. In case, there is any violation of the policy framed by the Government, the appellant would be at liberty to approach the authority concerned for its implementation but breach of any of the conditions' of the said policy, by itself, would create no vested or enforceable right in favour of the appellant. 17. In case, there is any violation of the policy framed by the Government, the appellant would be at liberty to approach the authority concerned for its implementation but breach of any of the conditions' of the said policy, by itself, would create no vested or enforceable right in favour of the appellant. 17. In so far as the issue of mala fide is concerned, no doubt, the Minister Incharge against whom the said allegations had been leveled, had not responded specifically to the allegations made in the writ petition, yet, on a perusal of the allegations made by the appellant in the writ petition, one can safely say that they were quite vague and general in character. While setting up a case on the ground of mala fide and bias, there should be enough material on record in support of the averments made in the petition which would generate confidence in the court that what has been pleaded is supported and buttressed by some evidence on record, which would support the plea of bias and mala fide. 18. In the writ petition, however, simple assertions that the respondent No. 3 was related to the Minister Incharge or that the appellant had failed to dance to the tune of the Minister Incharge, by itself would not be sufficient to accept the argument that the order impugned in the writ petition in fact, was a colourable exercise of power by the official respondents or that the same had been actuated by mala fides. 19. Even otherwise, it cannot be said that every transfer order made at the instance of a Minister Incharge, MP or MLA would be vitiated. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. What was observed in this regard by the Apex Court in the case reported as Mohd. Masood Ahmad v. State of U.P. and Others, (2007) 8 SCC 150 , be noticed: "Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned transfer order of the appellant from Muzaffarnagar to Mawana, District Meerut was made at the instance of an MLA. On the other hand, it has been stated in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of Respondents 1 and 2 that the appellant has been transferred due to complaints against him. On the other hand, it has been stated in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of Respondents 1 and 2 that the appellant has been transferred due to complaints against him. In our opinion, even if the allegation of the appellant is correct that he was transferred on the recommendation of an MLA, that by itself would not vitiate the transfer order. After all, it is the duty of the representatives of the people in the legislature to express the grievances of the people and if there is any complaint against an official the State Government is certainly within its jurisdiction to transfer such an employee. There can be no hard and fast rule that every transfer at the instance of an MP or MLA would be vitiated. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of an individual case. In the present case, we see no infirmity in the impugned transfer order." 20. Having heard the counsel for the parties and having gone through the records, we are unable to persuade ourselves to take a view different from the one taken by the writ court. This appeal is, accordingly, found to be without merit and is dismissed. Caveat discharged.