JUDGMENT Dharam Chand Chaudhary, J. (Oral) This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree passed by learned District Judge, Mandi, in Civil Appeal No.15 of 1998, on 19.7.2001. It has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: “ 1) Whether the impugned judgment passed by learned first appellate Court is the result of total misreading and mis-appreciation of the evidence adduced on record and the resultant findings and conclusions are wrong and incorrect? 2) Whether the learned Court below has failed to apply correctly the settled law regarding the presumption of truthfulness attached to the record of rights to the facts of the present case and thereby whether material prejudice was caused to the plaintiffs? 3) Whether in order to claim partition over the abadi deh, the plaintiffs were required under the law to plead and prove that they were estate right holders in the village? 2.The bone of contention in the present lis is half share of the land entered in Khewat No.380 min, Khatauni No.507, Khasra No.381/1, measuring 1-3-12 bighas, situated in Mohal Garoroo/339, Tehsil Jogindernagar, District Mandi. The Jamabandi for the year 1988-89 with respect to the suit land is Ext.PA. Pradhan Singh, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, hereinafter to be referred as ‘the plaintiffs’, had filed the suit for partition of the suit land to get his half share separated from the entire chunk. 3. The defendants, however, contested the suit on the grounds that the deceased plaintiff was neither owner nor in possession of the suit land. The entries in the revenue record to this effect are wrong, illegal and contrary to the factual position on the spot. It was claimed that the entire suit land belongs to them and it is they who are owners in possession thereof. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court has framed the following issues: 1. Whether the suit property is joint inter se the parties as alleged under para 1 of the plaint, as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession and entitled to 1/2 share of the suit property and remaining 1/2 share belongs to defendants as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest over the suit property as alleged? OPD. 4. Whether the plaintiff has got no locus-standi to file the suit as alleged? OPD. 5. 2. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession and entitled to 1/2 share of the suit property and remaining 1/2 share belongs to defendants as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest over the suit property as alleged? OPD. 4. Whether the plaintiff has got no locus-standi to file the suit as alleged? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit as alleged? OPD.6. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped to file the present suit by their act and conduct as alleged? OPD. 7.Relief. 5. After holding the trial and hearing the parties on both sides issues No.1 and 2 were answered in favour of the plaintiffs, whereas issues No.3 to 6 against the defendants and the suit, therefore, was decreed for the relief of partition of the suit land and declaration to the effect that the plaintiffs are entitled for separate possession of 1/2 share in the suit land. 6.The defendants assailed the judgment and decree in an appeal. Learned District Judge, Mandi, has reversed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree impugned before this Court in the present appeal. 7.Challenge to the impugned judgment and decree is on the grounds, inter alia, that the decree for partition of the suit land was rightly passed by learned trial Court because the plaintiffs were in joint possession thereof alongwith the defendants and the land being Abadi over which, as per the evidence produced by the defendants themselves, the plaintiffs had laid foundation for construction of a house about 15 years ago, lower appellate Court has erred in holding that they failed to plead and prove that they were proprietors or estate right holders in the village where the land in dispute is situated. 8.Shri Ashwani Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs while taking this Court to the pleadings of the parties and also the evidence on record, has strenuously contended that the plaintiffs being co-owners in possession of the suit land, are entitled to the decree of partition of the suit land and to get their half share separated. 8.Shri Ashwani Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs while taking this Court to the pleadings of the parties and also the evidence on record, has strenuously contended that the plaintiffs being co-owners in possession of the suit land, are entitled to the decree of partition of the suit land and to get their half share separated. 9.Shri Praneet Gupta, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, while repelling the contentions raised on behalf of the plaintiffs, has urged that as per own admission of plaintiff No.1 while in the witness-box as PW-1 that she alongwith her family is residing at a distance of 12 kilometers from the place where the suit land is situated, the plaintiffs cannot be treated to be the proprietors or right holders in the area where the suit land is situated. Mr. Gupta has further urged that ‘Abadi Deh’ no doubt can be partitioned, however, only amongst the co-sharers/right holders having their houses in the village where the same is situated and not outsiders like the plaintiffs. It has further been submitted that merely a stray entry in the record of rights that too without there being any evidence as to on what basis the same was entered, the plaintiffs cannot claim any benefit. It has, therefore, been submitted that the impugned judgment and decree being legally and factually sustainable, calls for no interference and deserves to be upheld. 10.From the substantial questions of law enumerated in para supra, it is seen that the legality and validity of the impugned judgment and decree has been assailed on the sole ground that the lower appellate Court has failed to appreciate the pleadings and evidence available on record in its right perspective and also that is there any necessity to plead and prove that the plaintiffs were estate right holders. Also that learned lower appellate Court has not appreciated law regarding the presumption of truth attached to the entries in the record of rights. 11.Before coming to the adjudication of the substantial questions of law so raised, it is deemed appropriate as to what expression “Abadi-Deh” in legal parlance means. Term “Abadi-Deh” is defined by this Court in Kewal Ram v. The Gram Pancha yat, Bhutti and others, 1988 PLJ 11. 11.Before coming to the adjudication of the substantial questions of law so raised, it is deemed appropriate as to what expression “Abadi-Deh” in legal parlance means. Term “Abadi-Deh” is defined by this Court in Kewal Ram v. The Gram Pancha yat, Bhutti and others, 1988 PLJ 11. In this judgment while defining as to what the term “Abadi-Deh” means in legal parlance and that the same can be partitioned amongst the co­sharers/right holders, it further held as under: “9. Gleaning through the aforesaid relevant material contained in the Settlement and Land Administration Manuals which continue to apply in Himachal Pradesh, and the judicial dicta, the position which emerges is that Abadi Deh, that is, the inhabited site of the village, consists of sites on which the houses of the members of the brotherhood or proprietary body are usually built close together, small plots attached or annexed thereto which are used for penning the cattle, storing manure or stacking straw, empty or vacant sites unoccupied by any individual, common plots set apart for public us e such as the chaupal or hujra for dharamshalas, mosques, graveyards, burningghats, tanks, wells, etc. and public paths or ways. The village site is measured in one number for the purposes of the revenue record and the entry in the column of ownership and occupancy will be “Abadi Deh”. The Abadi is almost always excluded from the operation of the Land Revenue Act, except so far as may be necessary for the record, recovery and administration of village cesses. The proprietary body or brotherhood holds Abadi Deh in joint ownership and it is treated as the common property of the community. Still, however, generally speaking, the greater part of Abadi Deh is in most cases indivisible and members of the community cannot call for a redistribution of the area or for a partition according to the Khewat or ancestral shares. The members of the community, who have built their houses or ghers in the portion of the village site for long with the assent or acquiescence of their co-sharers, cannot be ousted from the sites on which they have built, in the guise or partition. So also the portions of the land set apart by common consent for public use cannot be brought into any scheme or redistribution or partition at the instance of any member of the community. So also the portions of the land set apart by common consent for public use cannot be brought into any scheme or redistribution or partition at the instance of any member of the community. If the village site in which such portions are comprised is assessed to land revenue, which would be in a very rare case, the revenue authorities may determine the extent and manner to and in which the co-sharers may make use thereof and the proportion in which expenditure if any, incurred thereon and the profits if any, derived therefrom are to be borne by and divided by those persons or any of them. However, so far as empty or open sites in or about the village, unoccupied by the members of the community and not used by them for any public purpose, are concerned, whether they are enclosed by shrubs, bushes etc. or not any member(s) of the proprietary body can call for the partition of such vacant or open sites according to the rule applicable in a particular case which more often than not determines the share of each proprietor therein according to the land revenue paid by him.” 12.It is, therefore, seen that “Abadi-Deh” is the inhabited site of the village on which the houses of the members of the brotherhood or proprietary body are usually built close to smaller plots meant for penning the cattle, storing manure or stacking straw, empty or vacant sites unoccupied by an individual attached thereto. It is the proprietary body or brotherhood holds “Abadi-Deh” in joint ownership and the same even is treated as common property of the community. It has further been held in this judgment that any member(s) of the proprietary body can call for the partition of the Abadi-Deh according to the rules applicable in a particular case. Therefore, as per the ratio of this judgment, the Abadi-Deh can be partitioned between the members of the brotherhood or proprietary body who have built their houses or having possession over the vacant land adjoining to their houses. 13.In Ganga Devi and another v. Ashok Kumar and others, Latest HLJ 2011 (HP) 721, also it has been held that partition of Abadi-Deh is permissible when a person having built house at Abadi-Deh dies leaving behind two or more legal heirs. 13.In Ganga Devi and another v. Ashok Kumar and others, Latest HLJ 2011 (HP) 721, also it has been held that partition of Abadi-Deh is permissible when a person having built house at Abadi-Deh dies leaving behind two or more legal heirs. One of his legal heirs can file suit for partition of the structure as well as the land adjoining thereto. However, there being no quarrel to such settled legal proposition is hardly of any help to the plaintiffs’ case unless and until it is pleaded and proved that they are members of the village community having constructed house in the village and residing there, hence right holders. 14. Whether the plaintiffs have successfully pleaded and proved that they are the members of the village community and estate right holders takes this Court to the pleadings of the parties and also the evidence available on record alleged to have not been appreciated by learned lower appellate Court in its right perspective. 15. The suit land, as per Jamabandi for the year 1988-89 (Ext.PA) is situated in village Garoroo, Tehsil Jogindernagar, District Mandi. The plaintiffs, however, seem to be not the resident of village Garoroo, where the suit land is situated because as per the address given in the plaint, they are residents of village Drahal. Not only this as per own version of plaintiff No.1, who stepped into witness box as PW-1, her house is 12 kilometers away from village Garoroo. Even defendant No.1 while in the witness box as DW-1 has also stated so in his examination-in-chief, meaning thereby that the plaintiffs who are residing at village Drahal, at a distance of 10-12 kilometers from village Garoroo where the suit land is situated, cannot be treated either members of community of village Garoroo or right holders of that village. How they came to be recorded as owners in possession of the suit land to an extent of half share, nothing in this behalf has come in the plaint. No doubt, PW-1 has stated that the suit land was purchased in the year 1962 by her husband, however, from whom is not known. Even the sale deed or mutation attested in the name of the deceased plaintiff Pradhan Singh has also not been produced in evidence. No doubt, PW-1 has stated that the suit land was purchased in the year 1962 by her husband, however, from whom is not known. Even the sale deed or mutation attested in the name of the deceased plaintiff Pradhan Singh has also not been produced in evidence. Otherwise also, learned Counsel representing the plaintiffs has failed to satisfy this Court that Abadi-Deh can be sold by the right holders to any one including a right holder of the other village like the plaintiffs. 16.Admittedly, the plaintiffs have no house in village Garoroo. No doubt, as per the versions of DW-1, the plaintiffs had laid foundations of house about 15 years ago over a portion of the suit land. Defendant No.1 also admitted that such foundation have been laid, however, he has blown hot and cold because at one stage it is stated by him that the foundation was laid by the plaintiffs whereas in the same breath expressed his ignorance in this behalf. He also admits that the plaintiffs have unloaded one truck of bricks on the spot, however, according to him, he never came in his presence. According to DW-2, though foundation for construction of two rooms’ house has been laid over a portion of the suit land and bricks are also lying there, however, who has dug the foundation is not known. DW­3 has expressed his ignorance about one truck load of bricks lying there. Such evidence is also not cogent and clinching to suggest that the plaintiffs had laid foundations for the construction of their house over a portion of the suit land. Otherwise also, foundation which was laid down 15 years ago, it can reasonably be believed that even trace thereof also will not be visible on the spot with the passage of such a long time. However, DW-1, DW-2 and DW-3 are categoric in stating that the suit land is in the ownership and possession of the defendants. 17. Learned lower appellate Court, therefore, has rightly concluded that the plaintiffs cannot be held entitled to half share of the suit land merely on the basis of a stray entry in the Jamabandi for the year 1988-89 Ext.PA. There is also no misreading or mis-appreciation of the pleadings and also the evidence available on record, hence no perversity or illegality can be attached to the judgment and decree under challenge on this score. 18. There is also no misreading or mis-appreciation of the pleadings and also the evidence available on record, hence no perversity or illegality can be attached to the judgment and decree under challenge on this score. 18. No doubt, presumption of truth is attached to the entries in the right of records, however, the same is rebuttable and in this case there is no evidence which shows that the deceased plaintiff Pradhan Singh is one of the owners in possession of the suit land, hence such entries being without any basis are erroneous. In the case in hand, stray entry in the Jamabandi for the year 1988-89 Ext.PA showing the deceased plaintiff Pradhan Singh owner in possession of the suit land to an extent of half share has been pressed into service on behalf of the plaintiffs. Even if it is presumed that the suit land was purchased by him in the year 1962 it is not understandable as to why the record prior to Jamabandi for the year 1988-89 (Ext.PA) is not available and not produced in evidence. It lies ill that the defendants should have produced the evidence to prove that the deceased plaintiff Pradhan Singh was not recorded owner in possession of the suit land prior to 1988-89 for the reason that the onus to prove this fact was on the plaintiffs and not on the defendants. No presumption of truth can be said to be attached to such record of right. 19. In view of the law laid down in the judgments cited supra, a person seeking partition of the land is required to plead and prove that he is a member of the village community/right holder having his house constructed on the Abadi-Deh and residing there. 20.In view of the discussion hereinabove, there is no question of law muchless substantial questions of law arises for determination in the present appeal. The same rather being devoid of any merit, deserves dismissal and the impugned judgment and decree affirmed. Substantialquestions are accordingly answered. 21.For all the reasons recorded hereinabove, the present appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.