JUDGMENT 1. - Matter comes up on second stay petition but with the consent of both the parties, appeal itself is heard finally at this stage and disposed of by this judgment. 2. Appalled by the order dt. 4.3.2013, the appellants have laid this appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, 'Act of 1996) By the order impugned, learned Additional District Judge No. 3, Udaipur has rejected the application of the appellants under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 by declining to interfere with the arbitral award dt. 21.4.2010. 3. Succinctly stated, the facts of the case are that State Government sanctioned the work for construction of flow portion of RD 235 to 3501 M of Chiklawas Irrigation Project by its order dt. 7.3.1994 for a sum of Rs. 3,32,15,276/- in favour of appellant-Corporation and in this respect Work Order was issued and requisite agreement was also executed. Pursuant to the Work Order, appellants issued a Notice Inviting Tender (for short, 'NIT') in which respondent also participated and after acceptance of its tender. Work Order No. 10/97 dt. 2.5.1994 was issued for a sum of Rs. 1,79,52,393.09. The aforesaid work was allotted to the respondent on the same terms and conditions, which were agreed between the appellants and the Irrigation Department. In the Work Order, the date of commencement of the work was mentioned as 15.5.1994 and deadline for its completion was shown as 14.11.1995. However, in fact, the work was completed on 18.6.1997. After completion of the work, a dispute cropped up between the parties and eventually by judicial intervention, at the behest of respondent, this Court, while exercising powers under Section 18 of the Act of 1996, appointed Arbitrator vide order dt. 5.5.2005 while deciding S.B. Civil Arbitration Application No. 42/2004. The respondent contractor submitted its claim before the sole Arbitrator worth Rs. 1,53,29,794.18, while dividing it in 13 parts. The details about 13 claims of the respondent are as under:-- Claim No-1 Refund of Security Deposit (SD) for Rs. 5,30,000.00 (Rupees five lacs thirty thousand). Claim No. 2 Payment of Final Bill for Rs. 10,14,711.00 (Rupees ten lacs fourteen thousand seven hundred eleven). Claim No. 3 Escalation charges for labour and material for Rs. 11,91,776.18 (Rupees eleven lacs ninety one thousand seven hundred seventy six & paise eighteen) as per Agreement Clause 45. 5,30,000.00 (Rupees five lacs thirty thousand). Claim No. 2 Payment of Final Bill for Rs. 10,14,711.00 (Rupees ten lacs fourteen thousand seven hundred eleven). Claim No. 3 Escalation charges for labour and material for Rs. 11,91,776.18 (Rupees eleven lacs ninety one thousand seven hundred seventy six & paise eighteen) as per Agreement Clause 45. Claim No. 4 Overhead expenditure and reduced profitability for Rs. 14,07,000.00 (Rupees fourteen lacs seven thousand). Claim No. 5 Idling of labour and machinery for Rs. 66,50,000.00 (Rupees sixty six lacs fifty thousand). Claim No. 6 Reduced profitability - Claim for Rs. 16,10,991.00 (Rupees sixteen lacs ten thousand nine hundred ninety one). Claim No. 7 Increase in minimum wages claim for Rs. 3,95,366.00 (Rupees three lacs ninety five thousand three hundred sixty six). Claim No. 8 Payment for land acquisition for haul road Rs. 1,57,000.00 (Rupees one lac fifty seven thousand). Claim No. 9 Payment for cleaning of blocks Rs. 38,000.00 (Rupees thirty eight thousand). Claim No. 10 Construction of temporary access on block No. 14 Rs. 40,000.00 (Rupees forty thousand) Claim No. 11 Wrong recovery of Rs. 35,000.00 (Rupees thirty five thousand) for electric connection. Claim No. 12 Illegal and wrongful deduction of Rs. 7,60,000.00 (Rupees seven lacs sixty thousand) from running bills. Claim No. 13 Damage for illegal & wrongful deductions, non payments etc. - Rs. 15,00,000.00 (Rupees fifteen lacs) 4. For substantiating the aforementioned claims, the respondent pleaded requisite facts in the claim petition and also produced documentary evidence. 5. Responding to the claim petition submitted by the respondent-contractor, appellants filed a reply. In the return, respondent has raised a preliminary objection that entire work relates to the Irrigation Department, and therefore, without impleadment of Irrigation Department, claim cannot be processed. In the reply, it was also pleaded that delay in completion of work is directly attributable to the Irrigation Department and time was extended by Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department for completion of work, therefore, detailed reply in this behalf can be by filed by the Irrigation Department. The sole Arbitrator framed in all 18 points for determination between the rival parties and after completion of evidence passed; Award on 21.4.2010 favouring the respondent-contractor. The sole Arbitrator passed the award following terms:-- In accordance with the decision of the various issues, an Award in favour of the claimants and against the respondents is passed as under: 1. The Principal amount of Rs. The sole Arbitrator passed the award following terms:-- In accordance with the decision of the various issues, an Award in favour of the claimants and against the respondents is passed as under: 1. The Principal amount of Rs. 74,36,130/- (Rupees seventy four lacs thirty six thousand one hundred thirty). 1(a) An amount of Rs. 45,67,413/- (Rupees forty five lacs sixty seven thousand four hundred thirteen) as interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the above amount from 3.8.1999 upto 31.5.2006. Total amount Rs. 1,20,03,543/- (Rupees one crore twenty lacs three thousand five hundred forty three). 2. Interest at the rate 9% per annum on the principal amount of the Award i.e. the amount of Rs. 74,36,130/- (Rupees seventy four lacs thirty six thousand one hundred thirty) pendent lite and future till realisation of the total amount of the Award. 6. Being aggrieved by the arbitral award, appellants submitted an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside the arbitral award before the learned District Judge, Udaipur and subsequently it was transferred to the learned Additional District Judge No. 3, Udaipur. In the application, appellants assailed the arbitral award by urging that sole Arbitrator has not scanned the materials on record and without recording cogent finding awarded claim worth Rs. 74,36,130/- in favour of respondent-contractor and interest @ 9% from 31.8.1999 to 31.5.2006 for a sum of Rs. 45,67,413/-. It is also averred in the application that while adjudicating the claims of the respondent-contractor, the sole Arbitrator has not examined the agreement (Ex. 6) and the relevant clause governing the province of interest and as such award is bereft of requisite reasons. While referring to Clause 2.20 of Ex. 6 under Chapter II "Special Conditions", the appellants have pleaded in the application that while awarding interest worth Rs. 70,00,000/- to the respondent-contractor, the sole Arbitrator has completely overlooked the aforesaid clause, and therefore, decision on Issue No. 15 cannot be sustained being dehors clause 2.20. Adverting to Issue No. 6, which relates to damages on account of idling of labour and machinery, appellants have seriously disputed finding of the sole Arbitrator and alleged in the application that Arbitrator has quantified the amount of damages worth Rs. 50,00,000/- without there being any evidence and cogent material on record. That apart, many other objections were also raised regarding arbitral award. 7. 50,00,000/- without there being any evidence and cogent material on record. That apart, many other objections were also raised regarding arbitral award. 7. Application under Section 34 submitted by the appellants was contested by respondent and a reply to the same is submitted. Countering all the allegations, in the return, respondent-contractor has pleaded that the Arbitrator has examined the matter threadbare and thereafter adjudicated its claim, which cannot be upset on the strength of grounds set out in the application. The respondent has also submitted in the reply that the sole Arbitrator has examined the individual claims in the light of evidence and other materials and thereafter decided all the issues and it is clearly evident from the arbitral award that some of the issues have been decided in favour of respondent and some have been decided against it. Therefore, resisting the application of the appellants with full vigor, respondent prayed for its rejection. 8. The learned Additional District Judge examined the application of the appellants within the parameters and yardsticks set out under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for interference with the arbitral award. In the order impugned, it is found by the learned Court that there is no semblance of proof that award is vitiated within the four comers of any of the reasons set out under sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The findings of the sole arbitrator on Issue Nos. 6 & 15 were also examined by the learned Court below with bird's eye view and it was found that there is no infirmity much less legal infirmity in the findings so as to interfere with the findings in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. Learned Court below has also taken note of the fact that the powers under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 are to be exercised with great care and circumspection and such powers are not akin to the appellate Court, and consequently by the impugned order rejected the same. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the arbitral award on Issue No. 6 relating to claim of respondent on account of idling of labour and machinery is not founded on any cogent material or reliable and authentic evidence, yet the learned Court below has not examined this finding objectively while rejecting the objection of the appellants. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the arbitral award on Issue No. 6 relating to claim of respondent on account of idling of labour and machinery is not founded on any cogent material or reliable and authentic evidence, yet the learned Court below has not examined this finding objectively while rejecting the objection of the appellants. Elaborating his submissions, in this behalf, learned counsel has argued that findings and conclusions of the arbitral Tribunal on Issue No. 6 are based on mere ipse dixit, which ought to have been examined by the learned Court below, and therefore, by not exercising its powers under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the learned Court below has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. Assailing the findings and conclusions of the Arbitrator on Issue No. 15, learned counsel for the appellants contends that interest has been awarded to the respondent-contractor by the Arbitrator dehors the terms of agreement and the learned Court below while examining finding on Issue No. 15, has also not cared to properly construe the terms of the agreement. Learned counsel for the appellants, while referring to Clause 2, 20 of the agreement, submits that in view of clear and unambiguous embargo that respondent is not entitled for any interest, the Arbitrator has completely ignored the said clause while deciding Issue No. 15 against the appellants, and the learned Court below has also misconstrued the said clause to appellant's disadvantage while rejecting its objections under section 34 of the Act of 1996. Learned counsel has urged that as a matter of fact, the Arbitrator and the leaned Court below both have completely eschewed the relevant clause of the agreement governing the province of interest and as such the arbitral award as well as the impugned award is not sustainable. Lastly, learned counsel submits that arbitral award is against the public policy which ought to have been examined by the learned Court below. Learned counsel for the appellants, in support of his contentions, has placed reliance on following legal precedents; Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 , (2) O.N.G.C. Ltd. v. Garware Shipping Corporation Ltd., AIR 2008 SC 456 , M/s. Som Datt Builders v. State of Kerala ; M/s. MB. Patel & Co. Learned counsel for the appellants, in support of his contentions, has placed reliance on following legal precedents; Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 , (2) O.N.G.C. Ltd. v. Garware Shipping Corporation Ltd., AIR 2008 SC 456 , M/s. Som Datt Builders v. State of Kerala ; M/s. MB. Patel & Co. v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission, AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 290 , Union of India v. Saraswat Trading Agency & Anr., AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 839 , M/s. MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., AIR 2011 SC 2979 , and M/s. Sree Kamatchi Amman Construction v. Divisional Railway Manager (Works), Palghat & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 3337 . 10. E. converse, learned counsel for the respondent contractor submits that the Arbitrator has thrashed out the matter in its entirety' and on appreciation of evidence and other materials on record has decided Issue Nos. 6 & 15 in favour of respondent-contractor, which are rightly not interfered by learned Court below under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. Learned counsel for the respondent has urged that against the arbitral award scope of interference under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is very much limited and interference is called for only within the four corners of the grounds set out under sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and as the appellants have miserably failed to make out a case under sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, learned Court below has rightly rejected the objections by the impugned order. Learned counsel for the respondent has also urged that findings on Issue No. 6 are based on cogent material and the same have been discussed by the Arbitrator in the award, which has been rightly not interfered with by the learned Court below. Countering the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants regarding finding on issue No. 15, learned counsel for the respondent submits that both the Arbitrator as well as learned Court below have properly construed Clause 2.20 of the agreement, which warrants no interference in the limited scope of judicial review under Section 37 of the Act of 1996. Countering the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants regarding finding on issue No. 15, learned counsel for the respondent submits that both the Arbitrator as well as learned Court below have properly construed Clause 2.20 of the agreement, which warrants no interference in the limited scope of judicial review under Section 37 of the Act of 1996. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on following judgments : Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 411 , K.V. Mohd. Zakir v. Regional Sports Centre, (2009) 9 SCC 357 , Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd., (2009) 10 SCC 63 , State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. M/s. Ferro Concrete Construction, (2009) 12 SCC 1 , M/s. Ravindra Kumar Gupta & Co. v. Union of India, (2010) 1 SCC 409 , and Union of India v. Ajmer Construction Company, AIR 1997 Raj 65 . 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order as well as the arbitral award. 12. The issue, with which the Court is concerned in the present appeal, lies in a narrow compass inasmuch as there remains no quarrel that agreement between the parties envisages a clause for referral of dispute to the arbitrator. 13. Admittedly, in the instant case, dispute cropped between the parties in execution of the contract and considering the genuineness of the dispute for its resolution, the same was referred to a sole Arbitrator by judicial intervention. 14. Arbitration in the recent past has developed as an effective Alternate Dispute Resolution Forum for adjudication of contentious issues between the parties. 15. In the instant case, the sole Arbitrator, after examining the evidence and available material, concurred with some of the grievances of the respondent, awarded principal amount of Rs. 74,36,130/- and amount of interest of Rs. 45,67,413/- by calculating interest @ 9% per annum. That apart, on principal amount interest @ 9% per annum is also awarded pendente lite and future till realisation of the amount of the award. 16. Appellants, in the instant appeal, have accordingly addressed on finding of the arbitral award on Issue Nos. 6 and 15 against which their effort under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 proved abortive before the learned Court below in the form of rejection of their objections. 17. 16. Appellants, in the instant appeal, have accordingly addressed on finding of the arbitral award on Issue Nos. 6 and 15 against which their effort under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 proved abortive before the learned Court below in the form of rejection of their objections. 17. The issue relating to idling of labour and machinery, i.e. Issue No. 6, is examined by the sole Arbitrator with bird's eye view in the light of available material and the arbitral Tribunal has found that the respondent-contractor is not responsible in delayed execution of the work. As a matter of fact, it is noticed by the Arbitrator that there was some sense of discord or lack of coordination between the appellants and the Irrigation Department, which slowed down the progress of the work with eventual delay in its completion. The sole Arbitrator has also referred to letter (Ex. 86) by the Resident Engineer of the appellants addressed to the Executive Engineer, Irrigation Division, Kankroli attributing no fault to the respondent-contractor. The sole Arbitrator has also examined the letters Exhibits-46 to 50, 63, 71 and 73, which were written by the respondent-contractor, elaborating the cause of idling of labour and machinery causing financial loss to it. The sole Arbitrator has also taken cognizance of letters written by the appellant-Corporation to the Irrigation Department complaining against it for hindrance in the work at the site. Recitals contained in these letters clearly indicate that the appellant-Corporation has admitted that labour employed and machinery developed at the site were lying idle causing huge loss every day. The sole Arbitrator has also taken note of the evidence of the witnesses, who have appeared on behalf of the appellants. Therefore, in totality, the Arbitrator has found that the respondent-contractor has suffered loss due to idling of labour and machinery, and awarded damages to the respondent-contractor to the tune of Rs. 50,00,000/- against its claim of Rs. 66,50,000/-. 18. As regards Issue No. 15, which relates to awarding of interest, the sole Arbitrator has recorded cogent reasons for awarding the interest. Taking cognizance of serious lapses on the part of the appellant in retaining security deposits of the respondent-contractor worth Rs. 1,30,000/-, the arbitral Tribunal has awarded interest on the said amount. The parties are in agreement that entire work was scheduled to be completed by 14.11.1995, however, the same was actually completed on 18.6.1997. Taking cognizance of serious lapses on the part of the appellant in retaining security deposits of the respondent-contractor worth Rs. 1,30,000/-, the arbitral Tribunal has awarded interest on the said amount. The parties are in agreement that entire work was scheduled to be completed by 14.11.1995, however, the same was actually completed on 18.6.1997. Despite completion of work, appellant-Corporation's action of not refunding the security deposits to the respondent-contractor clearly indicates a total callousness on its part. Therefore, the entitlement of the contractor for the aforementioned amount with interest is unquestionable. 19. The arbitral Tribunal has also taken cognizance of the fact that final bill of the respondent contractor could not be settled in time, and therefore, awarded interest on the amount found due. The arbitral Tribunal has also taken very benevolent stand in awarding interest from the date of notice, i.e. 3.8.1999, and not anterior to it, i.e. from the date of completion of the work. 20. The issue relating to awarding of interest by the Arbitrator is no more res-integra because as per scheme of the Act of 1996, an Arbitrator is competent to award interest for four stages; viz. (1) from the stage of accrual of cause of action till filing of the arbitration proceedings, (2) during pendency of the proceedings before the Arbitrator, (3) further interest arising between date of award and date of the decree, and (4) interest arising from date of decree till realisation of award. Sub-section (7) of Section 31 of the Act of 1996 is clear and unequivocal in this behalf, which reads as under:-- 31(7)(a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where and in so far as an arbitral award is for the payment of money, the arbitral Tribunal may include in the sum for which the award is made interest, at such rate it deems reasonable, on the whole or any part of the money, for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made. 31(7)(b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate of eighteen per centum per annum from the date of the award to the date of payment. 21. 31(7)(b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate of eighteen per centum per annum from the date of the award to the date of payment. 21. Therefore, once the Arbitrator records its finding favouring cause of the claimant by way of passing arbitral award for payment of money, its power to award interest at such rate as it deems reasonable is within its sole discretion. Appellants have romped in Clause 2.20(ii) of the agreement to thwart the claim of interest by the respondent-contractor and assailed arbitral award as well as impugned order by taking shelter of it. Clause 2.20(ii) reads as under:- 2.20 (ii) All materials and work for which payment is made in part or full shall become the sole property of the Government but this provision shall not relieve the contractor of his responsibility for the care and protection of the materials and works at his own cost nor his liability to make good the damages if any unless and until the whole work has been deemed to have been completed and handed over to the Government. The contractor shall not be entitled to claim any interest upon any such payment, any arrears or upon any balance which may be found due to him at any time. 22. The clause referred to supra by the appellants as an impediment for grant of interest is having no application in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. A bare reading of the clause makes it abundantly clear that it refers to all materials and works for which payment is made in part or full to the contractor. It cannot be construed of wide connotation as suggested by the appellants to cover the issue relating to interest on damages for idling of labour and machinery, or denial and delayed payment of legitimate dues of the contractor. Therefore, considering it superfluous, it is rightly brushed aside by the arbitral Tribunal as well as the learned Court below. 23. Both these issues adjudicated by the sole Arbitrator were re-examined by the learned Court below in its limited scope of judicial review. It is trite that scope of judicial review under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is very much limited and such a jurisdiction is not akin to appellate Court. 24. 23. Both these issues adjudicated by the sole Arbitrator were re-examined by the learned Court below in its limited scope of judicial review. It is trite that scope of judicial review under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is very much limited and such a jurisdiction is not akin to appellate Court. 24. An arbitral award can be set aside if the, aggrieved party has been able to make out a case within the four comers of sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. As a matter of fact, the learned Court below was not obliged to re-assess the evidence on record while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, but it has taken utmost care to examine the arbitral award threadbare. The learned Court below after examining the award has fully concurred with the findings and conclusions of the Arbitrator by declining to interfere with the arbitral award. 25. Learned counsel appearing for the rival parties have cited many legal precedents for supporting their cause, but I am not inclined to discuss the legal precedents cited at bar, as the law on the subject is clear and unequivocal. 26. In the present scenario, phenomena of commercial world are fast emerging. In the commercial world, time is of essence and much amount is involved, the parties prefer to go for arbitration rather than for civil labyrinth of procedures and, at times, climbs the judicial pyramid, has persuaded to parties to place an arbitration clause in the contract. The scope and ambit of judicial review over an award passed by an Arbitrator are now well settled. The Arbitrator is a Judge appointed by both the parties after reaching a consensus, or a Court appoints him under the provisions of the Act. The Arbitrator is a Judge appointed by the parties; the parties are bound by his decision even if the award is wrong either on law, or on facts. Thus, the decision of the Arbitrator is final unless the reasons given by him are totally perverse or the award is based on wrong proposition of law. A mere error of law on the face of award is not sufficient to nullify the award. Thus, the decision of the Arbitrator is final unless the reasons given by him are totally perverse or the award is based on wrong proposition of law. A mere error of law on the face of award is not sufficient to nullify the award. If on examining the arbitral award the Court comes to the conclusion that view of the Arbitrator is a plausible one in its award, the same is not liable to be interfered with. It goes without saying that if the interpretation of a contract is a matter solely within the domain of the Arbitrator; the Courts are expected to be weary in interpreting the contractor. 27. My view on scope of judicial review for setting aside arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 finds support from a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Allied Constructions, (2003) 7 SCC 396 ] wherein Court held as under:-- 4. Any award made by an arbitrator can be set aside only if one or the other term specified in Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is attracted. It is not a case where it can be said that the arbitrator has misconduct the proceedings. It was within his jurisdiction to interpret Clause 47 of the Agreement having regard to the fact-situation obtaining therein. It is submitted that an award made by an arbitrator may be wrong either on law or on fact and error of law on the face of it could not nullify an award. The award is a speaking one. The arbitrator has assigned sufficient and cogent reasons in support thereof. Interpretation of a contract, it is trite, is a matter for arbitrator to determine (See Sudarsan Trading Co. v. Govt. of Kerala) . Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 providing for setting aside an award is restrictive in its operation. Unless one or the other condition contained in Section 30 is satisfied, an award cannot be set aside. The arbitrator is a Judge chosen by the parties and his decision is final. The Court is precluded from reappraising the evidence. Even in a case where the award contains reasons, the interference therewith would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the Court unless, of course, the reasons are totally perverse or the judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law. The Court is precluded from reappraising the evidence. Even in a case where the award contains reasons, the interference therewith would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the Court unless, of course, the reasons are totally perverse or the judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law. An error apparent on the face of the records would not imply closer scrutiny of the merits of documents and materials on record. Once it is found that the view of the arbitrator is a plausible one, the Court will refrain itself from interfering (See U.P. SEB v. Sear sole chemicals Ltd. and Ispat Engg. & Foundry Works v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.) . 28. The same view has also been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a subsequent decision in case of D.D. Sharma v. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 325 . 29. Reliance, in this behalf, can be profitably made to a decision of hon'ble Apex Court in case of Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd., (2010) 11 SC 296 , wherein the Court has held as under:-- 41. The view canvassed on behalf of the respondent was that Clause 17.3 ought to be read narrowly like an indemnity clause or given a literal interpretation as in the case of an insurance policy. The umpire on the other hand has observed that this clause is couched in wide terms and it was commercially understandable and sensible, since it was designed to cover a wide and potentially unforeseeable spectrum viz. the likely impact of a possible change in Indian law in future. In the circumstances the approach adopted by the umpire being a plausible interpretation, is not open to interference. The Division Bench was clearly in error when it observed that the view of the umpire on Clause 17.3 is by no stretch of imagination a plausible or a possible view. Perhaps, it can be said to be a situation where two views are possible, out of which the umpire has legitimately taken one. As recently reiterated by this Court in SAIL v. Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd. if the conclusion of the arbitrator is based on a possible view of the matter the Court is not expected to interfere with the award. The High Court has erred in so interfering. 42. As recently reiterated by this Court in SAIL v. Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd. if the conclusion of the arbitrator is based on a possible view of the matter the Court is not expected to interfere with the award. The High Court has erred in so interfering. 42. Can the findings and the award in the present case be described as perverse? This Court has already laid down as to which finding would be called perverse. It is a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but altogether against the evidence. This Court has held in Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE that a perverse finding is one which is based on no evidence or one that no reasonable person would have arrived at. Unless it is found that some relevant evidence has not been considered or that certain inadmissible material has been taken into consideration the finding cannot be said to be perverse. The legal position in this behalf has been recently reiterated in Arulvelu v. State. 43. In the present case, the findings and award of the umpire are rendered after considering the material on record and giving due weightage to all the terms of the contract. Calling the same to be perverse is highly unfair to the umpire. The umpire has considered the fact situation and placed a construction on the clauses of the agreement which according to him was the correct one. One may at the highest say that one would have preferred another construction of Clause 17.3 but that cannot make the award in any way perverse. Nor can one substitute one's own view in such a situation, in place of the one taken by the umpire, which would amount to sitting in appeal. As held by this Court in Kwality Mfg. Corpn. v. Central Warehousing Corpn. , the Court while considering challenge to arbitral award does not sit in appeal over the findings and decision of the arbitrator, which is what the High Court has practically done in this matter. The umpire is legitimately entitled to take the view which he holds to be the correct one after considering the material before him and after interpreting the provisions of the agreement. If he does so, the decision of the umpire has to be accepted as final and binding. 44. The umpire is legitimately entitled to take the view which he holds to be the correct one after considering the material before him and after interpreting the provisions of the agreement. If he does so, the decision of the umpire has to be accepted as final and binding. 44. It is an obligation of the parties to a contract that they must perform their respective promises, and if a party does not so perform, the arbitrator or the umpire has to give the necessary direction if sought. In that process, they have to give a meaningful interpretation to all the relevant clauses of the contract to make them effective and not redundant. The intention of the parties in providing a clause like Clause 17.3 could not be ignored. It had to be given a due weightage. This is what the umpire has done and has given the direction to the respondent to compensate the appellant for the amount of the necessary and reasonable extra cost caused by change in law. We have no hesitation in holding that the award of the umpire is a well-reasoned award and one within his jurisdiction, and which gives a meaningful interpretation to all the clauses of the contract including Clause 17.3. In the circumstances in our view the High Court has clearly erred in interfering with the award rendered by the umpire. 30. Hon'ble Apex Court, while dilating on scope of judicial review of arbitral award, reiterated the same view in case of P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd., (2012) 1 SCC 594 , wherein the Court has held as under:-- 21. A Court does not sit in appeal over the award of an Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or re-appreciating the evidence. An award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal has examined the facts and held that both the second respondent and the appellant are liable. The case as put forward by the first respondent has been accepted. Even the minority view was that the second respondent was liable as claimed by the first respondent, but the appellant was not liable only on the ground that the arbitrators appointed by the Stock Exchange under Bye-law 248, in a claim against a non-member, had no jurisdiction to decide a claim against another member. Even the minority view was that the second respondent was liable as claimed by the first respondent, but the appellant was not liable only on the ground that the arbitrators appointed by the Stock Exchange under Bye-law 248, in a claim against a non-member, had no jurisdiction to decide a claim against another member. The finding of the majority is that the appellant did the transaction in the name of the second respondent and is therefore, liable along with the second respondent. Therefore, in the absence of any ground under Section 34(2) of the Act, it is not possible to re-examine the facts to find out whether a different decision can be arrived at. 31. Thus, viewed from any angle, the learned Court below has not committed any error in rejecting the application of the appellants as the reasons given by the arbitrator are neither preserve, nor based on wrong proposition of law. 32. Resultantly, in my opinion, no interference with the impugned order as well as the arbitral award is warranted and appeal lacks in merit, which is, hereby, dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******