Hon'ble RAFIQ, J.— Instant application has been filed for execution and enforcement of the judgement of this Court dated 5.7.1991 rendered in a complaint under Section 454(5) of the Companies Act, 1956 by the Official Liquidator of M/s. Jaipur Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. by which his Director Ganesh Narayan Poddar was held guilty for breach of statutory requirement of Section 454(3) for not filing the statement of affairs and convicted and sentenced to pay fine @ Rs. 25 per day till such default continued. Ganesh Narayan Poddar assailed that order before the division bench of this Court. He however died during pendency of such appeal. Now in the present application, prayer has been made that the amount of fine/penalty be ordered to be recovered from his legal heirs. 2. Factual matrix of the case, bereft of unnecessary details, is that M/s. Swadeshi Poly-text Ltd., Ghaziabad filed a winding up petition on 15.12.1980 before this Court against M/s. Jaipur Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. (for short-the company under liquidation') on the ground of its inability to pay the debts. The company was ordered to be wound up by order of this Court dated 2.12.1983. The applicant herein was appointed as the Liquidator of the said company. He thereupon sent a notice dated 9.12.1983 to all the ex-Directors of the company directing them to file statement of affairs as required under Section 454 of the Act. Two of the Directors namely; C.L. Jaipuria and Banshidhar Somani responded to the notice by asserting that they have resigned from the office of the Directors of the company. They were, therefore, not liable to file the statement of affairs. On enquiry from the office of Registrar of the Companies, applicant found that form No. 32 as required under Section 303(2) of the Act has not been filed before him. Besides, C.L. Jaipuria was shown as one of the Directors of the company in the annual return upto 30.6.1983, which was filed under Section 159 of the Act before the Registrar of the Companies on 1.9.1993. As per the applicant, both were therefore liable to be taken as Directors of the company and consequently liable to file statement of affairs. The statement of affairs in the prescribed form No. 57 was required to be filed under Section 454 of the Companies Act in duplicate by ex-Directors and officers of the company. As per the applicant, both were therefore liable to be taken as Directors of the company and consequently liable to file statement of affairs. The statement of affairs in the prescribed form No. 57 was required to be filed under Section 454 of the Companies Act in duplicate by ex-Directors and officers of the company. None of the Directors filed the statement of affairs. Sub-section (3) of Section 454 mandated them to file such statement of affairs on or before 23rd December, 1983, within 21 days of the date of winding up order i.e. 2.12.1983, or if the Court for special reasons allow them to do so, within a period not exceeding three months therefrom. Since they failed to do so, they were guilty of non-compliance of provisions of sub-section (1), (2) & (3) of Section 454 of the Act. 3. The complaint was proceeded as a summons trial. Ganesh Narayan Poddar and C.L. Jaipuria appeared before the Court on 8.9.1989 and filed their affidavits by way of statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. when the matter was listed before the Court on 1.12.1989, they prayed for exemption from the presence. It was given out that this being summons case, Advocate representing them may give statement their on behalf as per the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The statements were made on behalf of other accused by their counsels. The statement under Section 313 on behalf of accused-respondents P.D. Somani and Ajay Kumar G. Poddar were recorded as stated by their counsel. It was given out to the Court on 23.3.1990 that they did not want to adduce any evidence. Even then, when the matter was listed before the Court on 18.5.1990, time was granted to the accused respondents to produce their defence witnesses. Statements of Shri Bhopal Chand Bhandari, Chartered Accountant and Shri Sanjiv Modi, Chartered Accountant, were recorded on their behalf on 13.7.1990. 4. Finally, arguments in the aforementioned complaint case were concluded on 4.1.1991 and the judgement was pronounced on 5.7.1991 by which only Ganesh Narayan Poddar was held guilty and convicted under sub-section (5) of Section 454 of the Companies Act whereas all other Directors were acquitted. 4. Finally, arguments in the aforementioned complaint case were concluded on 4.1.1991 and the judgement was pronounced on 5.7.1991 by which only Ganesh Narayan Poddar was held guilty and convicted under sub-section (5) of Section 454 of the Companies Act whereas all other Directors were acquitted. The matter was then fixed for hearing and passing appropriate order of sentence on 6.9.1991, on which date, it was held that since in the present case the Official Liquidator was not appointed, therefore, the date on which the winding up order was made, would be taken as relevant date' for the purpose of sub-section (3) of Section 454 and the period of 21 days would be counted therefrom. Since the order of winding up was passed on 2.12.1983, the statement of affairs was required to be filed afresh upto 24.12.1983. The accused Ganesh Narayan Poddar was held guilty and liable to pay sentence at the rate of Rs. 25/- per day from 24.12.1983 upto the date default continues. It was further directed that in default of payment of fine, the accused shall suffer 15 days simple imprisonment. The fine was quantified as Rs. 70,250 and it was directed that further amount @ Rs. 25/- per day after the judgement was pronounced, shall be liable to be paid. The order was held in abeyance on the request of counsel for the accused-non-applicant for one month to enable him to avail the remedy of appeal. 5. Ganesh Narayan Poddar preferred an appeal against the judgement dated 6.9.1991 before the division bench, being D.B. Special Appeal No. 34/1991 on 26.9.1991. Since he expired on 27.9.2005 during its pendency, the special appeal was dismissed in the presence of both the parties vide judgement dated 6.3.2006, as abated. Judgement of this Court having become final, the Official Liquidator then served notice on his sons-Ajay Kumar Poddar and Pawan Kumar Poddar dated 19.5.2010 stating they being his legal representatives, were liable to pay fine of Rs. 2,40,500 upto the date of filing of the said application. Ajay Kumar Poddar in his reply stated that the notice was misconceived and that he was not liable to pay any amount of fine. However, he did not deny the fact about the aforesaid penalty order passed by this Court imposing fine on his father Ganesh Narayan Poddar. 2,40,500 upto the date of filing of the said application. Ajay Kumar Poddar in his reply stated that the notice was misconceived and that he was not liable to pay any amount of fine. However, he did not deny the fact about the aforesaid penalty order passed by this Court imposing fine on his father Ganesh Narayan Poddar. When compliance of the aforesaid order was not made, the Official Liquidator, filed the present application on 27.9.2010. 6. A joint reply was filed on 24.11.2011on behalf of non-applicant No. 1/1 Pawan Kumar Poddar and non-applicant No. 1/5 Ajay Kumar Poddar, sons of late Ganesh Narayan Poddar, stating that they have been erroneously treated his legal heirs. Section 454(5A) of the companies Act confers power of a Magistrate upon this Court provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the trial of summons case, but this power cannot be exercised against sons of late Ganesh Narayan Poddar. The Official Liquidator had the knowledge of the fact that Ganesh Narayan Poddar has died on 6.3.2008, as is evident from the order passed by division bench of this Court on that date. Despite such knowledge, if he has filed present application with enormous delay, it is liable to be dismissed. 7. I have heard Shri G.K. Garg, learned Senior Advocate for the applicant-Official Liquidator and Shri R.C. Joshi, learned counsel for non-applicants Pawan Kumar Poddar and Ajay Kumar Poddar. 8. Shri G.K. Garg, learned senior counsel argued that non-applicants being sons of the deceased Ganesh Narayan Poddar, are his legal heirs. They are, therefore, liable to pay fine imposed on their father as a sentence in the proceedings under Section 454(5). The said fine was quantified by order dated 6.9.1991. They having not applied for their substitution as appellants in the appeal filed there against, the same has been dismissed by division bench as abated. Dismissal of the appeal has thus given finality to the order dated 6.9.1991. The official Liquidator was justified in serving a notice on Ajay Kumar Poddar and Pawan Kumar Poddar, calling upon them to deposit the amount of Rs.2,40,500. Even if their father is declared as insolvent, this would not provide them immunity from recovery of fine, because they have inherited his properties. Learned Sr. The official Liquidator was justified in serving a notice on Ajay Kumar Poddar and Pawan Kumar Poddar, calling upon them to deposit the amount of Rs.2,40,500. Even if their father is declared as insolvent, this would not provide them immunity from recovery of fine, because they have inherited his properties. Learned Sr. Counsel argued that the argument of the respondents that since Ganesh Narayan Poddar was declared insolvent and, therefore, they did not inherit any property from him, cannot be accepted being incorrect. Their this defence is contrary to the stand taken by them in the cognate legal proceedings before this Court where they have claimed to be counter bidders of the company in liquidation. Reliance in this connection is placed on the judgement dated 8.1.2010, 25.10.2010 and 18.8.2011 passed by this Court. 9. Shri G.K. Garg, learned senior counsel further argued that insolvency order dated 17.8.1989 passed by the Bombay High Court, which has been relied by the non-applicants, does not prove that late Ganesh Narayan Poddar did not pass on any property of the company in liquidation or otherwise, to his legal heirs. The winding up petition was filed on 15.12.1980 and the company in liquidation was observed to be wound up on 2.12.1983, which dates are much prior to the date of passing of the insolvency order. It is thus evident that late Ganesh Narayan Poddar had enough time to transfer his properties to his sons. Otherwise also, there are certain other matters pending before this Court with regard to transfer of property belonging to company in liquidation in which stay order is operating. It is argued that as per the settled proposition of law, the legal heirs are liable to pay fine levied on their father. Reliance in support of this submission is placed on judgement of the Supreme Court in Additional Income-tax Officer vs. E. Alfred- AIR 1962 SC 663 and Bondada Gajapathi Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh- AIR 1964 SC 1645 . 10. Shri G.K. Garg, learned senior counsel further argued that perusal of order dated 17.8.1989 even otherwise reveals that Ganesh Narayan Poddar has been declared insolvent in his capacity as Director of M/s. Shree Shakti Mills. Section 431, 528 and 529 of the Companies Act Clarifies how an individual's personal property is severable from his capacity as contributory in the company. Shri G.K. Garg, learned senior counsel further argued that perusal of order dated 17.8.1989 even otherwise reveals that Ganesh Narayan Poddar has been declared insolvent in his capacity as Director of M/s. Shree Shakti Mills. Section 431, 528 and 529 of the Companies Act Clarifies how an individual's personal property is severable from his capacity as contributory in the company. Once declared in different capacities as individuals or as a Director, even a company can be adjudicated as insolvent as per Sec. 529. Insolvency proceedings were initiated at the instance of the creditor -company and the insolvency was directed against Shree Shakti Mills Ltd. which bears a limited liability to the extent of the estate of the estate of the company represented by Ganesh Narayan Poddar in his capacity as director of the company. 11. Per contra, Shri R.C. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the non-applicant Nos. 1 and 5 argued that as far as non-applicant Ajay Kumar Poddar is concerned, this Court in the main judgment dated 5.7.1991 itself, whereby Ganesh Narayan Poddar was convicted, acquitted him (Ajay Kumar Poddar) holding that there is no material to prove that he was incharge of day to day management/affairs of the company. Even in the order of sentence dated 6.9.1991, Ganesh Narayan Poddar alone was sentenced to fine, who challen-ged the order dated 6.9.1991 before the division bench. The division bench stayed operation of the aforesaid order. In the meanwhile, Ganesh Narayan Poddar died on 27.9.2005. When the matter came up before the division bench for hearing, the Official Liquidator, who was the appellant, could have prayed for substitution of Ganesh Narayan Poddar by his legal heirs. The appeal was dismissed as having been abated because he failed to do so. Despite such fact, the application was not filed within a period of limitation of 90 days. Present application should therefore be dismissed as suffering from delay and laches. Late Ganesh Narayan Poddar was adjudged insolvent by Bombay High Court by order dated 17.8.1989. Whatever properties he owned were with official assignee of the Bombay High Court. None of properties has devolved upon either Pawan Kumar Poddar or Ajay Kumar Poddar. Therefore, recovery of the amount of fine cannot be made from either of them. 12. Late Ganesh Narayan Poddar was adjudged insolvent by Bombay High Court by order dated 17.8.1989. Whatever properties he owned were with official assignee of the Bombay High Court. None of properties has devolved upon either Pawan Kumar Poddar or Ajay Kumar Poddar. Therefore, recovery of the amount of fine cannot be made from either of them. 12. Shri R.C. Joshi, learned counsel further argued that the order dated 6.9.1991 by which sentence of fine was awarded to Ganesh Narayan Poddar, cannot be treated as decree of civil court. It, therefore, cannot be enforced under Section 634 of the Companies Act. The said order dated 6.9.1991 was not passed under Section 350 of the Cr.P.C. awarding any compensation and, therefore, also no direction can be given that the amount of fine be paid to the complainant-Official Liquidator. It is the domain of the State to recover the amount of fine imposed byway of sentence and the Official Liquidator has no authority to do so. Learned counsel relied on Section 421 of the Cr.P.C. and argued that recovery of fine can be made by adopting the procedure given therein. Had Ganesh Narayan Poddar been alive, he himself would not be in a position to make payment of fine because he was adjudged as insolvent. All his movable/immovable properties are in possession of official assignee of the Court. Consequently, in that situation, he would be liable to suffer simple imprisonment of 15 days, which is not possible now because of his death. Learned counsel argued that provisions of Section 421 of Cr.P.C. do not envisage recovery of amount of fine from the legal heirs. 13. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 14. In order to clearly appreciate the controversy, it is deemed appropriate to first take stock of the position of law; whether the amount of fine imposed by way of sentence in facts of the case, can be recovered from legal heirs of late Ganesh Narayan Poddar after his death. Two decisions have been relied by Shri G.K. Garg, learned Senior Counsel in this behalf. 15. Two decisions have been relied by Shri G.K. Garg, learned Senior Counsel in this behalf. 15. The three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Bondada Gajapati Rao, supra was dealing with a case where the appeal was filed by the accused himself against the order of sentence of imprisonment of life with Special Leave of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. He unfortunately died during pendency of the appeal. His legal representatives sought leave of the Court to continue the appeal. All the three Hon'ble Judges by separate, though concurring, judgments held that where the appeal is against the fine, it may be permitted to be continued by the legal heirs of the deceased-accused appellant. It was held that principle on which the hearing of a proceeding may be continued after the death of an accused would appear to be the effect of the sentence on his property in the hands of his legal representatives. If the sentence affects that property, the legal representatives can be said to be interested in the proceeding and may be allowed to continue it. However, the prayer of the legal representatives of the deceased-appellant in that case to continue the appeal, even though the sentence was only of life imprisonment, was rejected holding that there is no warrant for extending the principle applied to the case of sentence of fine also to a case where only sentence of imprisonment has been awarded, after the death of appellant. It was held that legislature has by limiting in Section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 the survival of appeals against the sentence of fine, chosen to recognise only one kind of interest and no other and that the Supreme Court in exercise of his inherent powers or discretionary powers, would not be acting according to the correct legal principles in recognizing a kind of interest which the legislature has not chosen to recognise. 16. Another relied judgment of the Supreme Court in E. Alfred, supra arose out of the misfeasance proceedings under Section 543 of the Act initiated against Director of a company in liquidation. The question involved was whether the said proceedings would be continued after death of Director and the amount declared to be due in such misfeasance proceedings can be realised from the estate of the deceased in the hands of his legal heirs. The question involved was whether the said proceedings would be continued after death of Director and the amount declared to be due in such misfeasance proceedings can be realised from the estate of the deceased in the hands of his legal heirs. It was held that the liability arising out of misfeasance proceedings is founded on the principle that the person, who has caused loss to the company amounting to breach of trust, should make good the loss. It was held that Section 543 of the Act does not really create any new liability. It only provides for a summary remedy for determining the amount payable by such person on proof of necessary ingredients. The Court further held that this is not a provision intended to punish a man, who is found guilty of misfeasance, but for compensating the company in respect of the loss occasioned by misfeasance. Whenever there is a relationship based on contract, quasi contract, some subsidiary relation or a failure to perform duty there is no abatement of law of the wrong doer. When once the liability is declared, it is open to the Official Liquidator to release the amount shown by resorting to Section 634 of the Companies Act and Sec. 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was further held that at the conclusion of the proceedings under Section 543, declaration of the liability is made. Such declaration partakes the character of decree in a suit. When once such declaration is made, it can be enforced under Section 634 of the Act. Where the order made by one Court had to be executed by another, the procedure prescribed by Section 535 has to be followed. In the course of such executive proceedings, provisions of Section 50 of the CPC have to be applied. When the person who is made liable to pay fine dies before the order has been fully satisfied, the liability of the legal representatives should be determined accordingly. This judgement, however, does not does not deal with the effect of the recovery of fine imposed by way of sentence from the legal representatives of the deceased-accused held guilty of an offence. 17. The Supreme Court in State of A.P. vs. S. Narasimha Kumar & Anr. This judgement, however, does not does not deal with the effect of the recovery of fine imposed by way of sentence from the legal representatives of the deceased-accused held guilty of an offence. 17. The Supreme Court in State of A.P. vs. S. Narasimha Kumar & Anr. (2006) 5 SCC 683 = RLW 2006(4) SC 3283 dealt with a matter in which number of accused were convicted and sentenced to various descriptions by the trial Court. The High Court in revision petition set aside the conviction and sentence in respect concerned. Aggrieved thereby, the State of Andhra Pradesh was up in appeal before the Supreme Court. One of the accused-respondents died during pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court. Application was filed by his legal heirs that the appeal on his death abates so far as he is concerned. The analogy of Section 394 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was pressed into service. The argument of State Counsel was that Section 394 Cr.P.C. does not govern the appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court relying on the judgment in Bondada Gajapathy Rao, supra, held that though that judgement was rendered in the context of old Cr.P.C. but the ratio thereof is equally applicable under the new Cr.P.C. Their Lordships in S.Narasimha Kumar, supra culled out the ratio of the judgment in Bondada Gajapathy Rao, as follows: "(1) Section 431 of the Old Code does not apply proprio vigore to a case of appeal filed with the special leave of the Supreme Court granted under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution') when the appellant-accused dies pending the appeal. (2) But where the appeal is against sentence of fine, the appeal may be permitted to be continued by the legal representatives of the deceased appellant accused. There is no provision making such appeals abate. If they can be continued when arising under the Old Code, there is no reason why they should not be continued when arising under the Constitution. If revision petitions may be allowed to be continued after the death of the accused so should appeals, for between them no distinction in principle is possible for the purpose of continuance. If they can be continued when arising under the Old Code, there is no reason why they should not be continued when arising under the Constitution. If revision petitions may be allowed to be continued after the death of the accused so should appeals, for between them no distinction in principle is possible for the purpose of continuance. (3) The principle on which the hearing of a proceeding may be continued after the death of an accused would appear to be the effect of the sentence on his property in the hands of his legal representatives. If the sentence affects that property, the legal representatives can be said to be interested in the proceeding and allowed to continue it. (4) But where the sentence is not one of fine but of imprisonment, which on the death of the accused becomes infructuous, the sentence does not affect the property of the deceased-accused in the hands of his legal representatives, and therefore, the appeal, in such a case, would abate, upon the death of the accused. (5) In fact that the accused was a government servant and was under suspension during the trial and the fact that if the conviction and sentence were set aside, his estate would be entitled to receive full pay for the period of suspension, cannot be said to affect his estate, because, the setting aside of the sentence would not automatically entitle the legal representatives to the salary. It would be extending the principle applied to the case of a sentence of fine, if on the basis of it appeal against imprisonment is allowed to be continued by the legal representatives after the death of the appellant and for such an extension there is no warrant." 18. In Harnam Singh vs. State of H.P. (1975) 3 SCC 343 , dealing with the provisions of Section 431 of the Old Code, analogous to Section 394 of the New Code and also other provisions of Chapter XXXI of the Old Code, it was held by the Supreme Court that the appeal by Special Leave granted under Article 136 of the Constitution would neither be governed under Section 411, nor under Section 417 of the Code, nor any provision of Chapter XXXI of the Code. Section 431 of the Code also would have no application, but in the interest of uniformity, there is no valid reason to apply to appeals under Article 136, a set of rules different from those which govern appeals under the Code in the matter of abatement. Every other appeal under Chapter XXXI, except an appeal from a sentence of fine, finally abates on the death of appellant. By `every other appeal' the phraseology used in Section 431, supra meant an appeal other than one against an order of acquittal, that is to say, an appeal against an order of conviction. Every appeal against conviction therefore abates on the death of the accused except an appeal from a sentence of fine. Their Lordships held that "an appeal from a sentence of fine is excepted from the all-pervasive rule of abatement of Criminal appeals for the reason that the fine constitutes a liability on the estate of the deceased and the legal representatives on whom the estate devolves are entitled to word off that liability." It would be pertinent to reproduce para 9 of the judgement containing relevant discussion, which reads as under: 9. Every other appeal under Chapter XXXI, except an appeal from a sentence of fine, finally abates on the death of the appellant. By "every other appeal" is meant an appeal other than one against an order of acquittal, that is to say, an appeal against an order of conviction. Every appeal against conviction therefore abates on the death of the accused except an appeal from a sentence of fine. An appeal from a sentence of fine is excepted from the all pervasive rule of abatement of criminal appeals for the reason that the fine constitutes a liability on the estate of the deceased and the legal representatives on whom the estate devolves are entitled to ward off that liability. An appeal from a sentence of fine is excepted from the all pervasive rule of abatement of criminal appeals for the reason that the fine constitutes a liability on the estate of the deceased and the legal representatives on whom the estate devolves are entitled to ward off that liability. By Section 70 of the Penal Code the fine can be levied at any time within six years after the passing of the sentence and if the offender has been sentenced for a longer period than six years, then at any time previous to the expiration of that period; and the death of the offender does not discharge from the liability any property which would, after his death, be legally liable for his debts." The fact that the offender has served the sentence in default of payment of fine is not a complete answer to the right of the Government to realize the fine because under the proviso to Section 386(1)(b) of the Code the court can, for special reasons to be recorded in writing issue a warrant for realizing the fine even if the offender has undergone the whole of the imprisonment in default of payment of fine. The sentence of fine remains outstanding though the right to recover the fine is circumscribed by a sort of a period of limitation prescribed by Section70, Penal Code." 19. In view of the authoritative pronouncement on the law noticed above, it must be held that it was open to the legal representatives of the Ganesh Narayan Poddar, who are respondents herein, to continue to prosecute the appeal against the judgment of conviction dated 5.7.1991 and the order of sentence dated 6.9.1991, which was dismissed as having abated on account of his death. Surprisingly, a contrary argument has been raised on behalf of his sons Ajay Kumar Poddar and Pawan Kumar Poddar that the Official Liquidator should have applied for continuation of that appeal and should have opposed dismissal of appeal as abated. Inescapable conclusion therefore is that the sentence of fine imposed by the order of this Court convicting the accused, having attained finality, has to be given effect to and the fine has to be recovered, regardless of whether the accused survives or not. Such fine has to be realised from his property in the hands of his legal representatives. Inescapable conclusion therefore is that the sentence of fine imposed by the order of this Court convicting the accused, having attained finality, has to be given effect to and the fine has to be recovered, regardless of whether the accused survives or not. Such fine has to be realised from his property in the hands of his legal representatives. It is for that reason that the legal representatives have been held to be interested in continuing the proceedings of appeal against conviction and sentence. Even as per Section 70 of Indian Penal Code, the fine or any part thereof, which remains unpaid, may be levied at any time within six years of the passing of sentence and if that period is longer than six years, then at any time previous to the expiration thereof and that the death of offender does not discharge from the liability any property, which would after his death, be legally liable for his debts. Since admittedly in the present case, the operation of the order of sentence remained stayed upto the date i.e. 6.3.2006, on which dates the appeal filed thereagainst was dismissed as abated, the present application having been filed well within the period of six years counting therefrom, the liability of the legal representatives of the deceased-accused would not cease only because the matter has remained pending before this Court. 20. We may for the present purpose also apply the analogy of the provisions contained in Chapter XIII of the Companies Act, 1956 having various penal provisions pertaining to the offences under the Act. Sec. 621 of the Act incorporated therein provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence against this Act, which is alleged to have been committed by any company or any officer thereof, except on the complainant in writing of the Registrar, or of a shareholder of the Company, or of a person authorised by the Central Govt. in that behalf. Sec. 622 provides that no court inferior to that of a Presidential Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class shall try any offence against this Act. Sec. 623 provides that if any offence against this Act which is punishable with fine only is committed by any person within a Presidency town, such person may be tried summarily and punished by any Presidency Magistrate of that Presidency town. Sec. 623 provides that if any offence against this Act which is punishable with fine only is committed by any person within a Presidency town, such person may be tried summarily and punished by any Presidency Magistrate of that Presidency town. Sec. 624 of the Act provides that notwith-standing anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, every offence against this Act shall be deemed to be non-cognizable within the meaning of the said Code. Sec. 630 of the Act provides that (1) If any officer or employee of a company -(a) wrongfully obtains possession of any property of a company; or (b) having any such property in his possession, wrongfully withholds it or knowingly applies it to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the Articles and authorised by this Act, shall, on the complaint of the company or any creditor or contributory thereof, be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 10,000. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 630 provides that the Court trying the offence may also order such officer or employee to deliver up or refund, within a time to be fixed by the Court, any such property wrongfully obtained or wrongfully withheld or knowingly misapplied, or in default, to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years. 21. The Supreme Court in Lalita Jalan & Anr. vs. Bombay Gas Company (2003) 6 SCC 107 , supra was dealing with a case arising out of the proceedings under Section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956. Their lordships held that rule of strict construction of penal law even in Section 630 is not applicable. Object of that provision is that property of the company is preserved and is not used for purposes other than those expressed or directed in the Articles of Association of the company or as authorised by the provisions of the Act. The Companies Act is entirely different from those Statutes, which basically deals with offences and punishments like Indian Penal Code, Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention Act), etc. The purpose of criminal justice is to award punishment. It is a method of protecting society by reducing the occurrence of criminal behaviour. It also acts as a deterrent. Where the punishment is disabling or preventive, its aim is to prevent a repetition of the offence by rendering the offender incapable of its commission. The purpose of criminal justice is to award punishment. It is a method of protecting society by reducing the occurrence of criminal behaviour. It also acts as a deterrent. Where the punishment is disabling or preventive, its aim is to prevent a repetition of the offence by rendering the offender incapable of its commission. Their Lordships held that having regard to the purpose for which Section 630 has been enacted viz. to retrieve the property of the company and the salient features of the statute (Companies Act), it is not possible to hold it as a penal provision as the normal attributes of crime and punishment are not present here. Hence, the principle of interpretation relating to criminal statutes that the same should be strictly construed will not be applicable. The principle that a statute enacting an offence or imposing a penalty is strictly construed is not of universal in every case. Section 630 for the purpose of recovery of the property and if, in spite of demand or subsequent order of the court, the possession of the property is not returned to the company, the question of imposing penalty would arise. There are similar provisions available even in the Code of Civil Procedure. In execution of a decree for recovery of money or enforcement of an injunction, the judgment-debtor can be committed to a prison. Such a provision by itself would not convert the civil proceeding into a criminal one. The award of sentence by order of court cannot amount to violation of fundamental rights granted under the Constitution. 22. Let me now advert to the alternative submission made by learned counsel for the respondents, which is that Ganesh Narayan Poddar was adjudged insolvent by the order of Bombay High Court dated 17.8.1989 and that all his movable and immovable properties were in possession of official assignee of the Bombay High Court and that the respondents have not inherited any property whatsoever from him. All these arguments shall have to be examined in the light of the counter submissions made on behalf of Official Liquidator. It is canvassed on behalf of Official Liquidator that insolvency order dated 17.8.1989 relied on by the non-applicants does not prove that late Shri Ganesh Narayan Poddar did not pass on any property; whether his personal or of the company in liquidation or otherwise, to his legal heirs. It is canvassed on behalf of Official Liquidator that insolvency order dated 17.8.1989 relied on by the non-applicants does not prove that late Shri Ganesh Narayan Poddar did not pass on any property; whether his personal or of the company in liquidation or otherwise, to his legal heirs. It is also submitted that the winding up petition was filed on 15.12.1980 and the winding up order was passed on 2.12.1983, both of which dates fall much before 17.8.1989, the date on which the insolvency order was passed. Further argument is that perusal of the insolvency order indicates that Ganesh Narayan Poddar was declared as insolvent in his capacity as Director of M/s. Shree Shakti Mills Ltd. Section 431, 528 and 529 of the Companies Act clarifies how a person's personal property is severable from his capacity as contributory in a company once declared insolvent. Despite, therefore, Ganesh Narayan Poddar having been declared insolvent in 1989, there is every reason to believe that he had enough time to transfer the property to his legal heirs during the period intervening 2.12.1983, when the company in the present case was ordered to be wound up and 17.8.1989, when the insolvency order was passed, has to be accepted, especially in view of magnitude of the company, of which he was Director and the amount sought to be recovered. 23. Moreover, Section 634 of the Companies Act, 1956 squarely applies to the present situation, which provides that any order made by a court under the Companies Act may be enforced in the same manner as a decree made by the court in a suit pending therein. Section 482 of the Companies Act, 1956, inter alia, provides that any order made by a Court for, or in the course of, winding up a company shall be enforceable at any place in India, other than that over which such Court has jurisdiction, by the Court which would have had jurisdiction in respect of the company if its registered office had been situate at such other place, and in the same manner in all respects as if the order had been made by that Court. Besides, Rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 also provides that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to give such directions or pass such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. The order of sentence of fine would not be therefore treated as inexecutable only because Ganesh Narayan Poddar has died. The order passed by this Court can therefore be lawfully executed and enforced even against legal heirs of the deceased-accused, not only in the State of Rajasthan but in any part of India. 24. Even otherwise, the non-applicants in proceedings before the court and elsewhere in other litigations have all along been asserting that they are contributories of the company in liquidation and various other companies of the deceased Ganesh Narayan Poddar. The Official Liquidator in this connection has placed reliance on the order dated 8.1.2010 passed in S.B. Company Application No. 44/2009 in the matter of company in liquidation in the present case itself, the order dated 25.10.2010 passed in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Company) No. 2/2010 and the order dated 18.8.2011 passed in Company Application No. 38/2011. Official Liquidator vs. Poddar Finance (P) Ltd. First of these orders i.e. dated 8.1.2010 dismissed the application filed by Poddar Finance Private Ltd., seeking permanent stay of the liquidation proceedings of the company (in liquidation) Jaipur Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd., through Ajay Kumar Poddar, ex-Director of the company (in liquidation), expressing his willingness to revive the company and to pay off all the creditors of the company and bring it out of liquidation. He asserted that he being substantial contributory and interested in the assets of the company has filed the application under Section 466 of the Act. Though he failed to substantiate, but he maintained that he had 65% equity shares of the value of Rs. 10 each, fully paid up. He even filed Special Leave Petition No. 14126/06 before the Supreme Court against the judgment dated 21.9.2005 passed by the division bench dismissing the appeal arising out of the Application No. 15/1989. Though he failed to substantiate, but he maintained that he had 65% equity shares of the value of Rs. 10 each, fully paid up. He even filed Special Leave Petition No. 14126/06 before the Supreme Court against the judgment dated 21.9.2005 passed by the division bench dismissing the appeal arising out of the Application No. 15/1989. The company Court rejected the application filed by Ajay Kumar Poddar, ex-Director on the premise that such application was filed 25 years after the date the company was ordered to be wound up and that he failed to submit any scheme of revival. 25. The order dated 25.10.2010 relied by the Official Liquidator has been passed by the division bench of this Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Company) No. 2/2010 dismissing the appeal wherein challenge was made to the aforesaid order dated 8.1.2010. The division bench in the aforesaid order has held that the application has been filed by Ajay Kumar Poddar as a proxy litigation that the conveyance deeds have been executed by the applicant in favour of certain parties in respect of the lease hold land, which discloses his mala fide intention to save the subsequent transferees. The applicant aforesaid filed Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 3580/2011 against the order dated 25.10.2010. The Apex Court vide order dated 11.3.2011 remitted the matter on the issue as to whether applicant-Poddar Finance Company (applicant) was a contributory of Jaipur Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. or not. When the matter came before the division bench, the division bench by its order dated 26.5.2011 considered it appropriate that exercise be first undertaken by the Official Liquidator and the report with respect to Poddar Finance Company Ltd. be filed before the Company Judge. The Official Liquidator in his report found the alleged transfer of shares by applicant company fraudulent and in violation of Section 531, 531A and 536 of the Companies Act. The Company Judge finally held that in absence of transfer of fully paid up shares being validated by Court of competent jurisdiction having taken place during interregnum period pendente winding up proceedings u/Sec. 536(2) of the Companies Act, the applicant-company cannot be held to be contributory merely because it holds fully paid up shares. The Company Judge directed the matter to be again placed before the division bench. 26. The Company Judge directed the matter to be again placed before the division bench. 26. In view of above discussion, the application filed by the Official Liquidator deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed holding the non-applicants Pawan Kumar Poddar and Ajay Kumar Poddar liable to pay the amount of fine as quantified by this Court in the order dated 6.9.1991 and further by computing a sum of Rs. 25 per day, for each subsequent day thereafter, upto the date of actual recovery. The Deputy Registrar (Judl.) of this Court is directed to issue warrant of recovery to the Collector under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 421 of IPC of the place within whose jurisdiction the property of the non-applicant is situate or they ordinarily reside, as per the details furnished by the applicant, who shall realise the amount of fine in accordance with law relating to recovery of arrears of land revenue.