JUDGMENT 1. (Oral) - Ramkaran son of Mishrilal, has preferred the present appeal, to assail his conviction for the offences under Section 376 (G) IPC, Section 3(2)(V) and Section 3(1)(xii) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities), Act, 1989. 2. The appellant vide impugned judgment dated 6.8.2004 was convicted for above offences and vide a separate order of even date was sentenced as under: For Offence under section 376(G) IPC, the accused appellant was sentenced to ten years R.I. and fine of Rs. 2000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo two months' R.I. For offence under section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST (P.A.) Act, the accused appellant was sentenced for life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo two months' additional R.I. For offence under section 3(1)(xii) of S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act, the accused appellant was sentenced to six months R.I. and a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo one month's additional R.I. 3. Investigation against the co-accused of the appellant, namely Ramavtar @ Habu was kept pending and we are informed that later on he was acquitted. 4. Mr. Mehla, appearing for the accused appellant, at the outset has raised the following question of law for consideration of this Court: "Whether the conviction of appellant under Section 3(2)(V) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities), Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') can be sustained when the prosecution has led no evidence to the effect that the prosecutrix (name withheld to protect her identity) was raped on the ground that she was a member of Scheduled Caste Community?" 5. Before we endeavour to answer the question raised before us, we shall notice brief facts of the case. 6. The prosecutrix on 11.7.2003 at 6:30 PM, had submitted a written report Exhibit P/1, to In-charge Police Station, Mahuwa. In the report, it was averred that on 9.7.2003, at about 9:00 PM, she along with her husband Ramprasad and son Dharamveer were standing on the road waiting for the conveyance. She had received an information regarding ailment of her father and she intended to visit her paternal village to ask welfare of her father. At that time, the present appellant along with one Habu arrived at the spot on a tractor. The tractor was driven by Habu. She had received an information regarding ailment of her father and she intended to visit her paternal village to ask welfare of her father. At that time, the present appellant along with one Habu arrived at the spot on a tractor. The tractor was driven by Habu. The case of the prosecutrix set out in the written report is that her husband had asked for a lift and offered to pay charges. Accused asked them to board the tractor. When the prosecutrix sat on the tractor, the accused ran away with the tractor leaving behind her husband and son. Ramkaran gagged her mouth so that she could not raise noise. Her husband and son were loudly calling them and saying that they also had to accompany her. However, accused had not stopped the tractor. When she attempted to escape, Ramkaran caught hold of her from back. He had torn her blouse and string of peticot. He threw her on the ground and ravished her. 7. After conclusion of the investigation, since the prosecutrix belonged to Scheduled Caste Community, charge-sheet was directly submitted in the court of Special Judge, SC/ST Cases, Dausa. The appellant was charged on three counts. 8. The first charge stated that on 8.7.2003 between 8/9 PM, when prosecutrix along with her husband and son were standing on the road, going from village Bisala to Katnadi, at that time, the present appellant along with co-accused came on a tractor. They offered to take away the prosecutrix and her husband to Katnadi. After agreeing to take lift, when the prosecutrix sat on the tractor, the accused ran away with the tractor and committed the offence of gang rape against wishes of the prosecutrix and thus, the appellant committed the offence punishable under Section 376(G) IPC. 9. The second charge stated that since for the offence of gang rape, the sentence of more than ten years is prescribed, and the appellant has committed an offence of gang rape with a member of Scheduled Caste, the appellant was charged for the commission of offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. 10. The last charge stated that since the appellant has sexually exploited a woman belonging to Scheduled Caste, he committed the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(xii) of the Act. 11. The accused appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 12. The prosecutrix appeared as PW-1. 10. The last charge stated that since the appellant has sexually exploited a woman belonging to Scheduled Caste, he committed the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(xii) of the Act. 11. The accused appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 12. The prosecutrix appeared as PW-1. She broadly reiterated as to what was stated by her in the written report Exhibit P/1. She was subjected to searching cross-examination and the defence could not impeach the credibility of the witness, though her statement that she suffered injuries in the occurrence is not corroborated by medical evidence. 13. We need not minutely notice deposition of the prosecutrix and details given by her as the learned counsel for the appellant has half heartedly assailed the conviction of the appellant so far the offence of rape is concerned. 14. Mr. Mehla, the learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently urged that the application of offence under Section 3(2)(v) of 'the Act' is not attracted. The thrust argument of Mr. Mehla is while committing offence of rape, accused may intend to satisfy his lust, but there is no evidence or assertion by the witness that accused intended to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or the offence of rape was committed only on the ground that the prosecutrix belonged to Scheduled Caste community. 15. The argument raised by Mr. Mehla is not new to this Court. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manohar Singh v. State of Rajasthan reported in 2000(2) RCC 894 , in similar circumstances, held as under:- "10.The doctor opined that from the external injuries, the possibility of rape being committed, cannot be denied. The doctor also seized the 'ghaghra' of the prosecutrix on which spots of semen were detected. He further stated that the accused Manohar Singh was also examined on 19.12.1996. He was found fit for indulging in sexual intercourse. The prosecution has produced the FSL report dated 2.9.1997, which shows that human semen was found on the 'ghaghra'. Thus, on careful consideration, we find the testimony of P.W.8 Mst. Ramila as trustworthy. The learned Judge has rightly held the accused appellant guilty of rape. 11. The next question, which arises for consideration is whether the conviction of the appellant under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act is justified and legal? 12. Thus, on careful consideration, we find the testimony of P.W.8 Mst. Ramila as trustworthy. The learned Judge has rightly held the accused appellant guilty of rape. 11. The next question, which arises for consideration is whether the conviction of the appellant under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act is justified and legal? 12. We have, recently in a case of Pappu Khan v. State of Rajasthan, "D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 722/98 decided on 2.9.1999 ", examined the scope and ambit of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. It is held therein that for the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, beside the ingredients of respective offence of Indian Penal Code, the prosecution is further required to establish that the accused being a person of non S.C./S.T. has committed the crime on a person of S.C./S.T. for the reason that such person belonged to such community or tribe." 16. The view taken by the Division Bench of this Court was subsequently followed by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sohan Singh & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan reported in 2002(2) Cr.L.R. [Raj.] 1541 . Their Lordships, while examining the law laid in Manohar Singh's case (supra) further to fortify had relied upon the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 722 . Since their Lordships relying upon the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in a very lucid manner had answered the above question. With all reverence to Their Lordships, the relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under: "10.We have considered the rival submissions, and have also gone through the record carefully. We may first take up the sustainability of the conviction under section 3(2)(v) of the Act. We may gainfully recapitulate the language of Section 3(2)(v) which reads as under:- "(v)committed any offence under the Indian Penal Code punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine." 11. Our attention has been invited by the learned counsel for the appellants, to a recent judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 722 , which was a case relating to murder, wherein the accused was convicted for the offence under section 304-II IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, and under the former he was sentenced to 5 years rigorous imprisonment while under the later he was sentenced to life imprisonment. These convictions were confirmed by the High Court. In appeal the Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed that there was no dispute about the deceased dying homicidal death, and considering the nature of injuries, confirmed the conviction under section 304-II IPC. Facts in that case were that between 7.00 and 8.00 p.m. on the fateful day Saoji Gamaji Jadhav, a member of Scheduled Caste, who had returned to his house at dusk, and after some time had left the house informing his wife that he would be going out for some time, and would return soon, thereafter. After about half an hour of the deceased left his home, the appellant came to the house of the deceased and enquired from his wife about the deceased. At that time the appellant was carrying a 'jambiya'. On coming to know from her that her husband had gone out of the house, the appellant started running through the lane. The wife getting suspicious followed, and near the hospital of Dr. Kalwaghe, she saw the appellant stabbing the deceased who fell down and died. It is on these facts Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under:- "To attract the provisions of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the sine qua non is that the victim should be a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and that the offence under the Indian Penal Code is committed against him on the basis that such a person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In the absence of such ingredients, no offence under section 3(2)(v) of the Act arises. In that view of the matter, we think, both the trial Court and the High Court missed the essence of this aspect." 12. With the above findings the conviction under section 3(2)(v) was set aside. In the absence of such ingredients, no offence under section 3(2)(v) of the Act arises. In that view of the matter, we think, both the trial Court and the High Court missed the essence of this aspect." 12. With the above findings the conviction under section 3(2)(v) was set aside. In our view, the judgment in Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman's case fully supports the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, and since in the present case also, there is not an iota of material on record, even to indicate that, either of the offence was committed "on the basis" that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste. Accordingly, the conviction for the offence, under section 3(2)(v) of the Act, is very much required to be set aside." 17. Recently, another Division Bench of this Court in Suban Khan v. State of Rajasthan reported in 2014 (1) WLN 454 , on similar facts had formulated the same view. 18. In view of the consistent interpretation of law by various Division Benches of this Court, we called upon Ms. Sonia Shandilya, the learned Public Prosecutor to point out any piece of evidence or material from which we can infer that prosecutrix was subjected to rape on the ground that she was a member of a Scheduled Caste community. The learned Public Prosecutor, however, could not answer our query, as no relevant material is available in the record. 19. Lust is a vice, from which human beings do suffer. As per medico-legal report Exhibit P/6, the prosecutrix is mother of five children. To attract Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, it was incumbent for the prosecution to bring on record some material that the prosecutrix was subjected to rape only on the ground that she is a member of Scheduled Caste or appellant wanted to assert superiority of his caste by humiliating a member of Scheduled Caste. Since there is nothing on record and the very wording of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act is that 'offence is committed against a person on the ground that such person is a member of Schedule Caste', which prescribe an essential ingredient and same is not satisfied. We shall follow the dictum of law laid in Manohar Singh's case (supra) and Sohan Singh's case (supra). 20. We shall follow the dictum of law laid in Manohar Singh's case (supra) and Sohan Singh's case (supra). 20. Hence, we answer the question in favour of the counsel for the appellant by holding that offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act in the facts and circumstances of the case is not made out and therefore, conviction of the appellant on this count cannot be sustained. 21. As a result of above discussion, we uphold the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant for the offence under Section 376 (G) IPC and set aside the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant under the provisions of the Act and acquit him of the charges under section 3(2)(v) and 3(1)(xii) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities), Act, 1989. 22. With the above modification, the present appeal stands disposed of.Appeal disposed of. *******