JUDGMENT 1. - By this criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., a i prayer is made for quashing of criminal proceedings in case No. 353/2012 for offence under Section 3/4 Chit Fund and Money Circulation Scheme Prohibition Act, 1978 (for short "Act of 1978"). Further prayer is for compounding the offence. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that settlement has been arrived between the parties, thus proceedings may be quashed. It is, however, admitted that offence is not compoundable under Section 320 of Cr.RC. and in view of above, the Court passed an order on 24th April, 2014 for hearing of case for framing of the charges. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of CBI, ACB, Mumbai v. Narendra Lal Jain & Ors. reported in 2014(1) WLC (SC) Criminal 572 . Therein, the case for offence under Section 5(1)(d), (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 along with offence under Section 420 & 120B of IPC was settled between the parties. In view of aforesaid, dropping of criminal proceedings by this High Court was held to be proper. The Apex Court did not interfere in the order passed by the High Court in view of the settlement, which was on discharge of liabilities of the Bank. 4. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel and perused the record. 5. It is a case where allegations against the petitioner was not only for the offence under Sections 420 & 120B along with 406 of IPC but 3/4 of the Act of 1978. I find that after registration of the case under Section 420, 120B & 406 of IPC, this Court passed an order on 04th April, 2014 for dropping of proceedings in view of the settlement. It was at the stage when investigation was pending and after the investigation, offence under Section 3/4 of the Act of 1978 was also found. An application to compound the offence was not accepted by the trial Court. 6. The question for my consideration is as to whether proceedings for an offence under Section 3/4 of the Act of 1978 can be dropped based on settlement between the parties. The judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of CBI, ACB, Mumbai (supra) has been referred. 7. 6. The question for my consideration is as to whether proceedings for an offence under Section 3/4 of the Act of 1978 can be dropped based on settlement between the parties. The judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of CBI, ACB, Mumbai (supra) has been referred. 7. The judgment supra was given after referring various judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court on the issue. The judgment in the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in 2012(2) WLC (SC) Cri. 753 : 2012 (10)SCC 303 has also been considered therein. Relevant paras of the said judgment are quoted hereunder for ready reference : "58. Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although affiances are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between offender and victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R. if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not so exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed. 59. B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji do illustrate the principle that High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji alias Pappu, this Court has compounded the non compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist the distinction between compounding of an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by the High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different although ultimate consequence may be same viz., acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment. 60. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia 14, Dharampal, Arun Shankar Shukla, Ishwar Singh, Rumi Dhar (Smt.) and Ashok Sadarangani. The principle propounded in Simrikhia that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override express bar provided in law is by now well settled. In Dharampal, the Court observed the same thing that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Similar statement of law is mode in Arun Shankar Shukla. In Dharampal, the Court observed the same thing that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Similar statement of law is mode in Arun Shankar Shukla. In Ishwar Singh, the accused was alleged to have committed on offence punishable under Section 307, IPC and with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC was not compoundable offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that no offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. In Rumi Dhar (Smt.) although the accused had paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for commission of offences under Section 120-B/420/467/468/471 of the IPC along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding that the Court would not quash a case involving a crime against the society when a prima facie case has been made out against the accused for framing the charge. Ashok Sadarangani was again a case where the accused persons were charged of having committed offences under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and 471, IPC and the allegations were that the accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as collaterals and utilised such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to the reference made in once of the present matters and also the decisions in B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant and Manoj Sharma and it was held that B.S. Joshi, and Nikhil Merchant dealt with different factual situation as the dispute involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case under consideration in Ashok Sadarangani was more on the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in Ashok Sadarangani supports the view that the criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing. 61. The decision in Ashok Sadarangani supports the view that the criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing. 61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus; the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand of different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings." 8. The perusal of the judgment of Larger Bench in the case of Gian Singh (supra) reveals that criminal proceedings can be dropped only in two type of cases. It is in relation to the matrimonial dispute or a case of personal dispute between the parties like for the offence under Sections 420, 467, 468 & 471 of IPC. For other offences, the proceedings cannot be quashed even if compromise has been entered between the parties. It is taking into consideration the provisions of Section 320 of Cr.P.C. The said provisions is also quoted hereunder for ready reference: "320. Compounding of offences : (1) The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) specified in the first two columns of the Table next following may be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that Table. Offence Section of the Indian Penal Code Applicable Person by whom offence may be compounded. Uttering wards, etc., with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings of any person. 298 The person whose religious feelings are intended to be wounded. Voluntarily causing hurt. 323 The person to whom the hurt in caused. Voluntarily causing hurt on provocation. 334 The person to whom the hurt is caused. Uttering wards, etc., with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings of any person. 298 The person whose religious feelings are intended to be wounded. Voluntarily causing hurt. 323 The person to whom the hurt in caused. Voluntarily causing hurt on provocation. 334 The person to whom the hurt is caused. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt on grave and sudden provocation. 335 The person to whom the hurt is caused. Wrongfully restraining or confining any person 341, 342 The person restrained or confined. Wrongfully confining a person for three days or more. 343 The person confined. Wrongfully confining, a person for ten days or more. 344 The person confined. Wrongfully confining a person in secret. 346 The person confined. Assault or use of Criminal force. 352, 355, 358 The person assaulted or the whom criminal force is used. Theft. 379 The owner of the property stolen. Dishonest misappropriation of property. 403 The owner of the property misappropriated. Criminal breach of trust by a carrier, wharfinger, etc. 407 The owner of the property in respect of which the breach of trust has been committed. Dishonestly receiving stolen property knowing it to be stolen. 411 The owner of the property stolen. Assisting in the concealment or disposal of stolen property, knowing it to be stolen. 414 The owner of the property stolen. Cheating 417 The person cheated. Cheating by personation 419 The person cheated. Fraudulent removal or concealment of property, etc. to prevent distribution among creditors. 421 The creditors who are affected thereby. Fraudulently preventing room being made available or his creditors a debit or demand due to the offender. 422 The creditors who are affected thereby. Fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing false statement of consideration. 423 The person affected thereby. Fraudulent removal or concealment of property. 424 The person affected thereby. Mischief, when the only loss or damage caused in loss or damage to a private person. 426, 427 The person to whom the loss or damage is caused. Mischief by killing or maiming cattle, etc. 428 The owner of the animal. Mischief by killing or maiming cattle, etc. 429 The owner of the cattle or animal. Mischief by injury to work of irrigation by wrongfully diverting water when the only loss or damage caused is loss or damage to a private person. 430 The person to whom the loss or damage is caused. 428 The owner of the animal. Mischief by killing or maiming cattle, etc. 429 The owner of the cattle or animal. Mischief by injury to work of irrigation by wrongfully diverting water when the only loss or damage caused is loss or damage to a private person. 430 The person to whom the loss or damage is caused. Criminal trespass 447 The Person in possession of the property trespassed upon. House-Trespass. 448 The Person in possession of the property trespassed upon. House-trespass to commit an offence (other than theft) punishable with imprisonment. 451 The person in possession of the house trespassed upon. Using a false trade or property mark. 482 The person to whom loss or injury is caused by such use. Counterfeiting a trade or property mark used by another. 483 The person whom loss or injury is caused by such use. Knowingly selling or exposing or possessing for sale or for manufacturing purpose, goods marked with a counterfeited property mark. 486 The person whom loss or injury is caused by such use. Marrying again during the lifetime of a husband or wife. 494 The husband or wife of the person so marrying. Criminal breach of contract of service. 491 The person with whom the offender has contracted. Adultery. 497 The husband of the woman Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a married woman. 498 The husband of the woman and the woman. Defamation, except such case as are specified against section 500 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) in column 1 of the Table under sub-section (2). 500 The person defamed. Printing or engraving matter, knowing it to be defamatory. 501 The person defamed. Sale of printed or engraved substance containing defamatory matter, knowing it to contain such matter. 502 The person defamed. Insult intended to provoke a breach of the peace 504 The person insulted. Criminal intimidation 506 The person intimidated. Inducing person to believe himself an object of divine displeasure. 508 The person defamed. (2) The offences punishable under the section of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) specified in the first two columns of the table next following may, with the permission of the court before which any prosecution for such offence is pending, be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table. 508 The person defamed. (2) The offences punishable under the section of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) specified in the first two columns of the table next following may, with the permission of the court before which any prosecution for such offence is pending, be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table. Offence Section of the Indian Penal Code applicable Person by whom offence may be compounded Causing miscarriage. 312 The woman to whom miscarriage is caused. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt. 325 3 [The person to whom hurt is caused] Voluntarily causing grievous hurt. 325 The person to whom hurt is caused. Causing hurt by doing an act so rashly and negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others. 337 The person to whom hurt is caused. Causing grievous hurt by doing an act so rashly, and negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others 338 The person to whom hurt is caused. Assault or criminal force in attempting wrongfully to confine a person. 357 The person assaulted or to whom the force was used. Theft by clerk or servant of property in possession of master. 381 The owner of the property stolen. Criminal breach of trust. 406 The owner of property in respect of which breach of trust has been committed. Criminal breach of trust by a clerk or servant. 408 The owner of the property in respect of which the breach of trust has been committed. Cheating a person whose interest the offender was bound, either by law or by legal contract, to protect. 418 The person cheated. Cheating and dishonestly inducting delivery of property or the making, alteration or destruction of a valuable security. 420 The person cheated. Marrying again during the life time of a husband or wife 494 The husband or wife of the person so marrying. Defamation against the President or the Vice-President or the Governor of a State or the Administrator of a Union territory or a Minister in respect of his public functions when instituted upon a complaint made by the public prosecutor. 500 The person defamed. Uttering wards or sounds or making gestures or exhibiting any object intending to insult the modesty of a woman or intruding upon the privacy of a woman. 500 The person defamed. Uttering wards or sounds or making gestures or exhibiting any object intending to insult the modesty of a woman or intruding upon the privacy of a woman. 509 The woman whom it was intended to insult or whose privacy was intruded upon. [(3) When any offence s compoundable under this section, the abetment of such offence or an attempt to commit such offence (When such attempt is itself an offence) or where the accused is liable under section 34 or 149 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be compounded in like manner.] (4) (a) When the person who could otherwise be competent to compound an offence under this section is under the age of eighteen years or is an idiot or a lunatic, any person competent to contract on his behalf, may, with the permission of the Court to compound such offence, (b) When the person who would otherwise be competent to compound on offence under this section is dead, the legal representative, as defined in the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) of such person may, with the consent of the Court compound such offence. (5) When the accused has been committed for trial or when he has been convicted and an appeal is pending no composition for the offence shall be allowed without the leave of the court to which he is committed, or as the case may be, before which the appeal is to be heard. (6) A High Court or Court of Session acting in the exercise of its powers of revision under section 401 may allow any person to compound any offence which such person is competent to compound under this section. (7) No offence shall be compounded if the accused is, by reason of previous conviction, liable 'either to enhanced punishment or to a punishment of a different kind for such offence. (8) The Composition of an offence under this section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded. (9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section. 9. The Hon'ble Apex Court has clarified as to in what cases, the FIR/proceedings can be quashed based on compromise between the parties. It is held that power of compounding of offence given to the Court under Section 320 of Cr.RC. (9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section. 9. The Hon'ble Apex Court has clarified as to in what cases, the FIR/proceedings can be quashed based on compromise between the parties. It is held that power of compounding of offence given to the Court under Section 320 of Cr.RC. is materially different from quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The High Court quash the criminal proceedings having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled, though the offences are not compoundable. The High Court does so in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored to secure ends of justice. The court was, however, cautious to hold that it would not be permissible in respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity or offence of moral turpitude and under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act, etc. The offences, which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such transactions apart from the offences arisen out of matrimony, etc., can be quashed based on settlement between the parties because there would be hardly any possibility of conviction after settlement between the parties. In para No. 60 of the judgment in the case of Gian Singh (supra), it was, however, found that the principle has been propounded in the case of Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukharjee reported in (1990) 2 SCC 437 that inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override express bar provided in law is by now well settled. In the case of Dharampal v. Ramshri reported in (1993) 1 SCC 435 , it was held that inherent power of the Court under Section 482 of Cr.RC. cannot be utilised for exercising powers, which are expressly barred by the code. 10. Similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. reported in (1999) 6 SCC 146 and in the case of Ishwar Singh v. State of M.P. reported in (2008) 15 SCC 667 . 11. cannot be utilised for exercising powers, which are expressly barred by the code. 10. Similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. reported in (1999) 6 SCC 146 and in the case of Ishwar Singh v. State of M.P. reported in (2008) 15 SCC 667 . 11. in the case of Ishwar Singh (supra), offence was punishable under Section 307 of IPC, thus not compoundable under Section 320 of Cr.P.C. Looking to the specific bar, the Court refused to quash the proceedings. In para No. 61 of the judgment in the case of Gian Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court, however, made distinction between inherent jurisdiction of the Court with that the power of the Courts under Section 320 of Cr.P.C. The inherent power of the Court is wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such powers, which are to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of law. In those cases, inherent power can be exercised but before exercise of such powers, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. In view of the judgments aforesaid, settlement can be taken note for quashing of FIR/proceedings even if offence is not compoundable under Section 320 of Cr.PC. 12. If the facts of this case are looked into, the allegation against the petitioner is for offence under Section 3/4 of the Act of 1978. It is not against an individual but against the society, thus settlement cannot be taken into consideration to quash the proceedings. 13. Accordingly, the prayer made by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted, rather petition for quashing of proceedings for offence under Section 3/4 of the Act of 1978 based on settlement is dismissed. This disposes of the stay application as well.Petition dismissed. *******