JUDGMENT : Nisha Gupta, J. This is defendant's first appeal against the judgment and decree dated 7.7.84 passed by Additional District Judge, Kishangarhbas Distt. Alwar in Civil Suit No. 44/1980 (79/79) whereby the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sale has been decreed. 2. The brief facts of the case giving rise to this appeal are that plaintiff respondent filed a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale of agricultural land measuring 10 bighas and 3 biswas. Initially, the suit was filed against defendant respondent No.3 Gordhan Lal only. The case of the plaintiff respondent was that Gordhan Lal executed an agreement to sale Ex.1 in respect of the agricultural field on 17.5.79 for a sum of Rs.34,500/- in favour of plaintiffs and a sum of Rs.20,000/- was paid in cash and receipt Ex. 2 was issued on the same day. It was also pleaded that the balance amount was agreed to be paid on 15.12.79 at the time of registration of sale deed, sum of 14,500/- was paid on 17.11.79 and it was agreed that the registration of the sale deed shall be made on 18.11.79 but thereafter, respondent Gordhan Lal refused to execute the sale deed though the plaintiff respondents were prepared to perform their part of the agreement and are still ready to do so. A damages of Rs.,00/- has also been claimed and suit has been filed for specific performance of the contract. Gordhan Lal in his written statement admitted the entire claim of the plaintiff. During the pendency of the suit, the present appellant filed an application under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC for becoming a party to the suit, as the property has been purchased by them. The respondents No. 4 and 5 filed a joint written statement and contested the suit on the grounds that they had no knowledge of any agreement to sale dated 17.5.79 they are the bonafide purchaser without notice of earlier sale, the suit is collusive between the plaintiff and the defendant Gordhan Lal and their right should be protected. 3. On the pleadings of the parties, initially four issues have been framed. Thereafter, issue No.4/A has been added. After hearing, the suit has been decreed, hence this appeal. 4. 3. On the pleadings of the parties, initially four issues have been framed. Thereafter, issue No.4/A has been added. After hearing, the suit has been decreed, hence this appeal. 4. The contention of the appellants is that suit is mainly decreed on the principle of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act which deals with the theory of lis pendence but here in the present case, the suit was collusive between the plaintiff and the defendant Gordhan Lal and hence Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application on the sale which has been made in faovur of appellants. They are the bona fide purchasers, they have purchased the property with consideration without notice of the earlier agreement, the collusion is proved as the defendant Gordhan Lal has admitted the claim of the plaintiff and also stands witness in his favour. Reference has also been made to the provisions of Section 19-B of the Specific Relief Act and contention of the appellants is that his right should be protected. He is in possession of the property. The possession never handed over to the plaintiffs and his further contention is that he has a valid registered sale deed in his favour and no relief for cancellation of the same has been sought and suit could not be decreed in view of the provisions of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act and the court below has erred in holding that suit was not collusive, hence the appeal be allowed and suit should be dismissed. Per contra, the contention on behalf of the respondents is that the decree has already been executed on 23.9.2011, hence the whole issue is now only academic. The plea of bonafide purchaser is not available to the person who has purchased the property pendente lite. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is exception to the law laid down in 19-B of the Specific Relief Act. Otherwise provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would be redundant. There could not be any collision between the plaintiff and the defendant Gordhan Lal as the property has been sold to the present appellants on 28.11.79, whereas the suit has been filed prior to it on 27.11.79. Otherwise provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would be redundant. There could not be any collision between the plaintiff and the defendant Gordhan Lal as the property has been sold to the present appellants on 28.11.79, whereas the suit has been filed prior to it on 27.11.79. The appellants have never pleaded that there is any collusion between the parties and in absence of pleadings, this issue could not have been looked into by the court below. There is no need to pray for cancellation of the sale deed executed in favour of appellants. The court below has not decreed the suit on the admission of Gordhan Lal but after considering of the merits of the case, the suit has been decreed and there is no force in the appeal. The appeal is liable to be dismissed. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the original record as well as judgments and decree under appeal. 6. The facts are not in dispute that plaintiff respondents have purchased the property by way of agreement to sale dated 17.5.79 and paid part of the sale consideration and PW/4 Gordhan Lal who is the defendant in the suit has also admitted the agreement and the court below after considering the merits of the case, contentions of the plaintiff and the defendant Gordhan Lal, decided Issue No. 1 and 2 in favour of plaintiff respondents. While deciding Issue No. 3, the learned trial Court was also of the opinion that present appellants are the bona fide purchasers and they have purchased the property with due consideration without knowledge of the earlier agreement. The contention of the appellants is that his right should be protected under the provisions of Section 19-B of the Specific Relief Act which clearly speaks that specific performance of a contract may be enforced except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract and reliance has been placed on R.K. Mohammed Ubaidullah & ors. v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab (D) by LRs & ors., (2000) 6 SCC 402 wherein it has been held that where a subsequent purchaser proved his bona fides his right should be protected but burden to prove of good faith is on the purchaser and he has to show that he has made an enquiry as to the interest, nature of possession and title under which the person is in possession. Further reliance has been placed on Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj & Anr., (20 ) 8 SCC 1 where it has been held that in appropriate cases and having regard to the facts of the case, there could be cases where the suit property should be exempted from the operation of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and contention of the present appellants is that when he is the bona fide purchaser, the liability of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act could not be fastened upon him as he was not having any knowledge of the earlier sale and plaintiff and defendant are in collusion with each other. Per contra, the respondents have rightly submitted that plea of bona fide purchaser is not available to the subsequent purchaser and reliance has been placed on Arjan Singh v. Punit Ahluwalia & ors., (2008) 8 SCC 348 where it has been held that subsequent deed of sale would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendence and the said deed of sale would not come in the court's way in passing the decree in favour of the appellants. Further reliance has been placed on Ram Peary (dead) through LRs v. Bano (Smt.) & ors., (2000) 6 SCC 685 where it has been held that the purchaser would be deemed to have notice of earlier agreement and theory of deemed notice has been explained. Further reliance has been placed on Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal (dead) through LRs & ors., (2008) 5 SCC 796 wherein after relying on the judgment in Ram Peary v. Gauri, AIR 1978 All. 318 , the Apex Court has held as under: "Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act clearly says subsequent sale can be enforced for good and sufficient reason but in the present case, there is no difficulty because the suit was filed on 3.5.1975 for specific performance of the agreement and the second sale took place on 5.5.1975. 318 , the Apex Court has held as under: "Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act clearly says subsequent sale can be enforced for good and sufficient reason but in the present case, there is no difficulty because the suit was filed on 3.5.1975 for specific performance of the agreement and the second sale took place on 5.5.1975. Therefore, it is the admitted position that the second sale was definitely after the filing of the suit in question. Had that not been the position then we would have evaluated the effect of Section Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. But in the present case it is more than apparent that the suit was filed before the second sale of the property. Therefore, the principle of lis pendens will govern the present case and the second sale cannot have the overriding effect on the first sale." 7. The Apex Court after considering the effect of Section 19 (b) of the Specific Relief Act as well as Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, held that subsequent purchaser has to aware about the implications of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act before he purchase the suit property and in Para No.15, it has been held as under: "So far as the present case is concerned, it is apparent that the appellant who is a subsequent purchaser of the same property, he has purchased in good faith but the principles of lis pendens will certainly be applicable to the present case notwithstanding the fact that under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act his rights could be protected." 8. In the present case also, the court below has rightly held that the appellants are the bona fide purchasers but as held in Ram Peary (supra), the principle of lis pendence has rightly been applied by the court below as property has been purchased during the pendnecy of the earlier suit and Section 19-B is not having an overriding effect on the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. 9. The further contention of the appellants is that Section 52 is not applicable as the suit has been filed with collusion by the parties and the main stress is that a written statement of admission has been submitted by the defendant and he appeared in the witness-box on behalf of the plaintiff. 9. The further contention of the appellants is that Section 52 is not applicable as the suit has been filed with collusion by the parties and the main stress is that a written statement of admission has been submitted by the defendant and he appeared in the witness-box on behalf of the plaintiff. These two facts are factually correct, but the court below has not allowed the suit only on the ground of admission. After considering the evidence and merits of the case, the suit has been decreed. Apart from it, much has been said as regards the collusion between the parties but no such contention has been pleaded in the written statement of the present appellants and in the absence of pleadings, the foundation of the contention has not been led and in absence of pleadings, this contention is not available to the appellants. Furthermore, if any agreement has been entered between the parties and with clean hands, bonafidely the defendant admits in his written statement about the execution of the agreement, it cannot be termed as collusion and same facts have been stated in the examination of PW/4 Gordhan Lal. Furthermore, the appellants have not stated a single word in his examination before the court below as to the collusion between the parties hence plea of collusion is foundation-less and could not be sustained. 10. The further contention of the appellants is that in spite of provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the transfer is valid and no relief has been sought to cancel the deed and reliance has been placed on Nagubai Ammal & ors. v. B. Shama Rao & ors., AIR 1956 SC 593 . There is no dispute about the proposition that transfer is good except to the extent that it might conflict with the rights decreed under the decree or order and transfer pendente lite is valid and operative as between the parties but it was not necessary for the plaintiff respondent to pray for the cancellation of sale deed in view of the law laid down in Durga Prasad & Anr. v. Deep Chand & ors., AIR 1954 SC 75 wherein it has been held as under: "According to the Supreme Court, the proper form of decree is to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the prior transferee and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the prior transferee. He does not join in any special covenants made between the prior transferee and his vendor; all he does is to pass on his title to the prior transferee." 11. In view of the law laid down (supra), the contention of the appellants is not acceptable. In view of the above discussion, the court below has rightly decided the issue No. 1 2 and 3 in favour of respondent plaintiffs and against the present appellants and rightly held that subsequent purchase by the present appellants is hit by the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The court below has appreciated the evidence in right perspective and no fault can be found in the reasoning and conclusion arrived at by the court below. Consequently, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal Dismissed.