Steel Authority of India Limited, Research & Development Centre for Iron and Steel, through its General Manager v. Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Govt. of India, New Delhi
2014-01-30
R.BANUMATHI, SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
CAV ORDER Since the challenge to the reference made to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, No. 1, Dhanbad made on 18.04.2012 has failed before the Writ Court, the Steel Authority of India has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. The Steel Authority of India is a Government company and is manufacturing steel. It is also engaged in the research and development activities in the field of iron and steel. The writ petition was filed challenging the Reference Order dated 18.04.2012 to the extent that the appellant was made a party in the dispute. The Reference Order dated 18.04.2012 was also challenged as not maintainable on the ground that the dispute was between the terminated employees and their employer and not between the terminated employees and the appellant. The case pleaded by the appellant before the Writ Court was that a contractor was selected through tender process for outsourcing the job of upkeep and maintenance of the Guest House and T.D.C. Programme Complex and premises of SAIL Guest House at Shyamli Township, Ranchi. The respondent no. 3 namely, M/s Maa Construction was selected as the contractor vide letter dated 31.12.2008 on certain terms and conditions. Initially the work period was from 01.01.2009 to 31.12.2009 which was subsequently extended upto 31.03.2010. After the contract period of M/s Maa Contraction came to an end, a fresh process was initiated and one M/s Indian Security and Management Services was awarded the work on 31.03.2010 however, the said contractor did not retain earlier workmen. One M/s Uma Construction Works was awarded the contract for providing support services at the appellant's unit vide letter dated 31.04.2010. The said contractor engaged 3 workmen who had earlier worked with the previous contractor. Two other workmen were engaged by one M/s T.K. Mandal & Co. which was awarded the work for execution of the job of cutting, cleaning of grass/bushes, trimming of branches of trees and other related job. The contractors were paying EPF, EPS, EDLI, administrative charges and inspection charges in respect of the work awarded to them. The respondent no. 3 had employed 14 labourers which included 5 workmen who have raised industrial dispute. The respondent no.
The contractors were paying EPF, EPS, EDLI, administrative charges and inspection charges in respect of the work awarded to them. The respondent no. 3 had employed 14 labourers which included 5 workmen who have raised industrial dispute. The respondent no. 4, i.e. the workers' union raised an industrial dispute on behalf of the concerned workmen and the same was referred by the State Government for adjudication by the Labour Court vide Reference No. 18 of 2010 however, it was dismissed on 06.09.2011 as not maintainable. The respondent no. 4 again raised an industrial dispute before the Regional Labour Commissioner, Ranchi vide letter dated 14.07.2011 and finally the dispute has been referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute vide Reference dated 18.04.2012 which was challenged by the appellant before the Writ Court. The appellant contended that the concerned workmen were engaged by the contractor and the contractor had full discretion to engage any worker. The wages to the workers were directly paid by the contractors and the appellant was making payment to the contractors under the terms and conditions of the Contract as against bill submitted by them. In these facts, the relationship of employer and employee between appellant and the concerned workmen was denied. 3. Taking exception of the words “through the contractor”, the learned counsel for the appellant-Steel Authority of India Limited has contended that since the workmen were never employees of the Steel Authority of India Limited, there is no question of termination of their services by the Management of SAIL, RDCIS through, the contractor. Relying on decision in “M/s Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Jharkhand and Others”, reported in (2013)11 Scale 467, the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the Reference as made by order dated 18.04.2012 suffers from infirmity and therefore, liable to be quashed. 4. By order dated 18.04.2012, the Ministry of Labour, Government of India referred the dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court in the following terms : “Whether the termination of service of S/Shri Afroz Ahmed, Mahabir Gope, James Bhengra Sahdeo Mahil and M. Prakash Jojo all contract labour w.e.f. 31/3/2010 by the management of SAIL RDCIS through the contractor is legal and justified ? What relief the workmen are entitled to ?” 5. The facts narrated in “M/s Tata Iron & Steel Co.
What relief the workmen are entitled to ?” 5. The facts narrated in “M/s Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd” (supra)”, are entirely different from the facts in the present case. In “M/s Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (supra), the Reference Order pre-supposed that the workmen were employees of Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited and therefore, taking note of such infirmity the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Reference was not appropriately worded whereas, in the present case we do not find any such infirmity in the Reference Order dated 18.04.2012. In the present case there is a dispute between the workmen and the management of SAIL in as much as, the management of SAIL has denied that the workmen were its employee. This itself is a dispute which has to be adjudicated by the Labour Court. A dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen has been defined as “industrial dispute” under Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in series of judgments that a reference order should not be questioned on mere technical grounds. In “S.K. Verma Vs. Mahesh Chandra and Another”, reported in (1983) 4 SCC 214 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when the Central Government in all solemnity refers industrial dispute for adjudication, a public sector corporation which is an instrumentality of the State should not attempt to evade it by raising preliminary objections on technical grounds. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus:- “2. There appear to be three preliminary objections which have become quite the fashion to be raised by all employers, particularly public sector corporations, whenever an industrial dispute is referred to a tribunal for adjudication. One objection is that there is no industry, a second that there is no industrial dispute and the third that the workman is no workman. It is a pity that when the Central Government, in all solemnity, refers an industrial dispute for adjudication, a public sector corporation which is an instrumentality of the State instead of welcoming a decision by the Tribunal on merits so as to absolve itself of any charge of being a bad employer or of victimisation etc.
It is a pity that when the Central Government, in all solemnity, refers an industrial dispute for adjudication, a public sector corporation which is an instrumentality of the State instead of welcoming a decision by the Tribunal on merits so as to absolve itself of any charge of being a bad employer or of victimisation etc. should attempt to evade decision on merits by raising such objections and never thereby satisfied, carry the matter often times to the High Court and to the Supreme Court, wasting public time and money...................” 7. In “Sultan Singh Vs. State of Haryana”, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 66 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the order of reference is only an administrative order based on subjective satisfaction on the basis of material on record and no lis is involved. The appropriate Government would be justified in making a reference under Section 10 of the Act if it is satisfied on the facts and circumstances brought to its notice that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. 8. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that if the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that services of the contract labourers were not terminated by the writ petitioner, no award would be passed against the writ petitioner. A liberty was reserved with the appellant to raise all the plea before the Labour Court. 9. We find that the plea taken by the appellant that, the concerned workmen were not its employees is a matter which can be adjudicated before the Labour Court and on that ground alone, the reference order dated 18.04.2012 cannot be held to be not maintainable. The learned Single Judge has permitted the appellant to raise all pleas which were raised before the Writ Court. We do not find any infirmity in the impugned order dated 02.01.2013 and accordingly, the Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed.