JUDGMENT Pankaj Mithal, J. 1. Heard Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Sri M.A. Qadeer Senior Counsel assisted by Sri A.R. Khan who appears for respondent No. 2. This petition is directed against the order of the Revisional Court dated 25.8.2007 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 6, Saharanpur and the order dated 12.2.2004 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Saharanpur. 2. The dispute is regarding the release of House No. 2/388/14 1st Floor situate on Gurudwara Road, Saharanpur under section 16(1)(b) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 72. 3. There is no dispute that the aforesaid premises was declared to be vacant under section 12 of the Act after the tenant Raj Kumar vacated the same. Thereafter two sets of release applications under section 16 were filed. One by the petitioners claiming to be the owners and landlords and the other by respondent No. 2 Nawab Sher claiming to be the co-owner to the extent of 22/76 on the basis of the judgment and decree of the Civil suit dated 22.10.2000. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer by order dated 12.2.2004 allowed the release application of the petitioners to be effective on the decision of the Second Appeal No. 66 of 2000, pending in the High Court between Nawab Sher and Smt. Sumita Ghai and others. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, both the parries preferred revisions which were decided by a common judgment and order dated 25.8.2007. The revisional Court after setting aside the order of release passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer remanded the matter with the direction to consider the need of both the parties for release of the premises. 4. In challenging the above order, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Revisional Court has manifestly erred in remanding the matter for consideration of the release application of Nawab Sher. The release application of Nawab Sher cannot be considered as he is not the owner and landlord of the premises in dispute. Secondly, he has argued that once the need of the petitioners has been found to be genuine and bona fide and the release was ordered in their favour, its implementation could not have been deferred till the decision of the second appeal. At best it could have been subjected to the decision of the second appeal. 5. Secondly, he has argued that once the need of the petitioners has been found to be genuine and bona fide and the release was ordered in their favour, its implementation could not have been deferred till the decision of the second appeal. At best it could have been subjected to the decision of the second appeal. 5. It may be pertinent to mention here that the property in dispute was, originally, the property of one Haji Abul Hasan. It was gifted by him by means of oral hiba in favour of Hajjan Mgani. Nawab Sher who claims to be the son of Haji Abdul Hasan and Hajjan Mgani have only 22/76 share in it. He is not claiming to be the exclusive owner and landlord of the same. On the other hand, the petitioners claim to have purchased the entire property from Hajjan Mgani by two sale-deed dated 15.3.1974 and 23.3.1974. The dispute of ownership/title between the parties was decided by the Civil Court vide judgment and order dated 22.10.2000 and the share of Nawab Sher was held to be 22/76 in the aforesaid property. The said decree has been set aside by the First Appellate Court vide judgment and order dated 21.9.1999 and the petitioners were held to be the exclusive owners of the entire property. The said order is under challenge in the second appeal No. 66 of 2000 but there is no stay of the decree. The decree as such continues to exist. 6. It has been argued that in the second appeal initially the order of status quo was passed. However, the appeal was dismissed in default and on its restoration no specific order has been passed either restoring the order of status quo or any other order of interim nature. The order of status quo in no way keeps in abeyance the judgment and order of the Appellate Court. It continues to remain in operation. Therefore, the order of status does not come in way of the declaration which has been made by the Appellate Court in favour of the petitioners. 7. In view of the above, as on date, petitioners stand declared to be exclusive owner of the property. 8. Section 16 of the Act provides for the release of house or any part of the building in favour of the landlord by the District Magistrate. 7. In view of the above, as on date, petitioners stand declared to be exclusive owner of the property. 8. Section 16 of the Act provides for the release of house or any part of the building in favour of the landlord by the District Magistrate. Therefore, an application for release under section 16 of the Act lies only on behalf of the landlord. 9. The petitioners being the owners of the building are entitled to realise rent thereof whereas Nawab Sher as on date has no right of ownership or to realise the rent. 10. In view of the above, Nawab Sher cannot be recognised as the landlord or co-landlord having any right to move an application for release under section 16 of the Act. 11. Sri Qadeer has argued that Nawab Sher is also the land lord inasmuch admittedly his father Hazi Abdul Hasan was recognized as landlord. Therefore, on his death Nawab Sher is entitled to realise rent conferring the stratus of landlord upon him. 12. There is no material or any finding that on the death of Hazi Abul Husan, Nawab Sher ever realized rent of the premises, particularly after the execution of sale-deeds dated 15.3.1974 and 23.3.1974 by which the ownership stood transferred in favour of the petitioners. Once the petitioners acquired ownership and they been declared to be the exclusive owner, they alone are entitle to realize rent of the premises. Thus, the Appellate Court committed an error in directing for considering the release application filed by Nawab Sher also. 13. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the Revisional Court has manifestly erred in remanding the matter directing the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to consider the release application of both the parties. Accordingly, the Revisional Court's order dated 25.8.2007 is unsustainable in the eyes of law and is hereby quashed. The order of Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 12.2.2004 is affirmed with the modification that the release which has been allowed under section 16 of the Act in favour of petitioners shall be subject to the final decision of the second appeal No. 66 of 2000. The petition is allowed.